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Abstract 
Despite the seemingly never failing popularity of the subject in non-scholarly works of 
popular history, the academic study of specialist formations and irregular warfare has 
remained as broadly elusive and as specialist as the practitioners of special operations 
themselves. This thesis serves as a holistic study of the development, application and 
value of Anglo-American commando and special forces formations, 1943-1945. 
Placing the development and use of these units within the broader context of the 
Anglo-American `special relationship' reveals a close, almost symbiotic, bond between 
Britain and the United States. This relationship, characterised at all levels by a spirit of 
interdependency and cooperation, was instrumental in how many of these units were 
conceived and consequently evolved. Although of a mutually supportive nature, it is 
fair to suggest that the US profited more from a close alliance in these fields than did 
the British. By the time the US entered the war Britain had already developed a range 
of unconventional forces and had begun to amass significant experience in their 
application. The willingness of the British to share this experience and guide their 
ally's first forays into this field was of the utmost importance to American 
developments. British support would continue throughout the war to broadly outlast 
the more general decline of Britain's strategic contribution; it would take time before 
the US, having gradually forged many of their own unique approaches towards these 
units, were able to approach the British volume of irregular operations. 
Despite such clear allied commonality, an analysis of the Anglo-American attitudes 
towards the inception, organisation, expansion, use and disbandment of the varied 
commandos and special forces ultimately reveals notable points of divergence between 
the policies and perceptions of the two allies. This work serves to examine and 
evaluate how and why Britain and the US, respectively, went about conceiving both 
commandos and special forces and serves to chart the evolution of their use. Analysing 
the roles and employment of these formations, charting the evolution of their command 
and control, and investigating the notion of `correct' use, this study also serves to 
examine the impact of these formations on the course of the Second World War and, 
through an assessment of their merits and failings, presents a favourable overall 
conclusion as towards the value and cost-effective nature of these units. 
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Glossary of terms 
AAI Allied Armies Italy 
ACO Adviser on Combined Operations 
AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters [Allied headquarters for the Mediterranean 
theatre] 
AIB Allied Intelligence Bureau 
APD Fast-destroyer transport ship 
ATB Amphibious Training Base 
BAF Balkan Air Force 
BPB Boom Patrol Boat 
BSC British Security Co-ordination [early British intelligence organisation 
in the US] 
CBI China, Burma, India [Theatre] 
CCO Chief of Combined Operations 
CCOR Chief of Combined Operations Representative 
CGS Chief of General Staff 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
C-in-C Commander-in-Chief 
CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations [US] 
CO Commanding Officer 
CODC Combined Operations Development Centre 
COHQ Combined Operations Headquarters 
COI (Office of ... ) Co-ordinator of Information [US] 
COLO Combined Operations Liaison Officer 
COPP Combined Operations Pilotage Parties 
COS Chiefs of Staff [British] 
COSD Combined Operations Supply Depot 
COSU Combined Operations Scout Unit 
CTC Combined Training Centre 
DCGS Deputy Chief of the General Staff 
DCO Director of Combined Operations 
DDGS Deputy Director of General Staff 
DDO Deputy Director of Operations 
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DNI Director of Naval Intelligence 
DOD Director of Operations Division [Admiralty] 
DDOD Deputy Director of Operations Division [Admiralty] 
DOL Department of Opposed Landings 
DSO Directorate of Special Operations 
EMFFI Etat-majeur des Forces Francaises de I Interieur [Fighting French 
General Staff in London] 
ETO European Theatre of Operations 
FETO Far Eastern Theatre of Operations 
FFI Forces Frangaises de 1 Interieur 
FLEX Fleet Landing Exercises 
FOS Flag Officer, Submarines 
FSSF First Special Service Force 
G-2 Divisional Intelligence Staff [US] 
G-3 Divisional Operations Staff [US] 
GHQ General Headquarters 
GOC General Officer, Commanding 
G(R) Middle East cover for SOE 
G(RF) General Staff Branch (Raiding Forces) 
GS(R) General Staff (Research) 
IC In Command 
IBT India-Burma Theatre 
ILRS Indian Long Range Squadron 
IO Intelligence Officer 
IS 9 Intelligence School 9 [MI 9 Branch concerned with escape and 
evasion] 
ISD Inter-Allied Service Department [precursor to the SRD] 
ISLD Inter-Service Liaison Department [M16 cover name] 
ISSU-6 Inter-Service Signals Unit -6 [SOE cover name] 
ISTDC Inter-Service Training and Development Centre [British pre-war 
department that experimented with amphibious operations] 
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff [US] 
JIC Joint Intelligence Committee 
JSM Joint Staff Mission 
LAF Libyan Arab Force 
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LCOCU Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Unit 
LCN Landing Craft, Navigation 
LCP Landing Craft, Personnel 
LFA Land Forces, Adriatic 
LRDG Long Range Desert Group 
LRP Long Range Patrols [forerunner of LRDG] 
LRPG Long Range Penetration Groups [Chindits] 
LRRP Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols 
LST Landing Ship, Tank 
MEDTO Mediterranean Theatre of Operations 
MEF Middle East Forces 
MEHQ Middle East Headquarters 
MI(R) Military Intelligence (Research) 
MNBDO Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation 
MTO Mediterranean Theatre of Operations 
MU Maritime Unit [OSS] 
NATO North African Theatre of Operations 
NCAC Northern Combat Area Command [US/Chinese Command in Burma] 
NCDU Naval Combat Demolitions Unit [US] 
NCO Non-commissioned Officer 
NORSO Norwegian Special Operations [Group] 
OC Officer Commanding 
OETA Occupied Enemy Territory Administration 
OG Operational Groups [OSS] 
OR(s) Other Rank(s) 
OSS Office of Strategic Services 
PAIC Persia and Iraq Command 
PPA Popski's Private Army 
PWE Political Warfare Executive 
RAF Royal Air Force 
R&A Research and Analysis [OSS Branch] 
R&D Research and Development [OSS Branch] 
RCNVR Royal Canadian Navy Volunteer Reserve 
RCT Regimental Combat Team 
RE Royal Engineers 
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RF Raiding Forces 
RM Royal Marines 
RMBPD Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment 
RN Royal Navy 
RNVR Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve 
RSR Raiding Support Regiment 
SA Special Activities [COI Branch] 
SAARF Special Allied Airborne Reconnaissance Force 
SACO Sino-American Cooperative Association 
S&R Scouts and Raiders [US] 
SAS Special Air Service 
SACMED Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean 
SACSEA Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia 
SBS Special Boat Section [also Squadron and later Service] 
SBU Special Boat Unit 
SDF Sudan Defence Force 
SEAC South East Asia Command 
SEU Special Engineering Unit 
SF Special Forces 
SFHQ Special Forces Headquarters 
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces 
SI Secret Intelligence [OSS Branch] 
SIG Special Interrogation Group 
SIS Secret Intelligence Service 
SO Special Operations [OSS Branch] 
SOE Special Operations Executive 
SOF Special Operations Forces 
SOG Small Operations Group 
SOM Special Operations Mediterranean [Branch) 
SPOC Special Projects and Operations Centre 
SRD Services Reconnaissance Department [AIB branch responsible for 
sabotage] 
SRS Special Raiding Squadron [Also Sea Reconnaissance Section, 
forerunner of SRU] 
SRU Sea Reconnaissance Unit 
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SS Special Service [Not to be confused with German Schutzstaffel in this 
instance] 
SSO Strategic Services Officer [OSS] 
SSRF Small Scale Raiding Force 
SWPA Southwest Pacific [Theatre] 
TOE Table of Organisation and Equipment [US equivalent of British War 
Establishment] 
UDT Underwater Demolition Team 
USAAF United States Army Air Force 
USANIF United States Army - Northern Ireland Forces 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
USN United States Navy 
Introduction 
Throughout the course of the Second World War both Britain and the United States 
individually and jointly created a number of military formations whose purpose was the 
conduct of irregular, specialist operations that fell beyond the capacity of their 
conventional armed forces. These formations were a direct precursor to the `Special 
Forces', `Special Operations Forces' and elite light-infantry units which form such a 
prominent part of modem military force structures. This thesis is concerned with 
examining how and why Britain and the United States developed and used these 
formations in the Second World War. It serves to chart how these formations evolved 
during the war; to examine the relationship between `commando' (or `ranger' in the 
American vernacular) formations and `special forces'; ' to place the development and use 
of these units within the context of the broader Anglo-American alliance; to analyse the 
impact which these formations had on the Second World War; and to make an assessment 
of their value in cost-effectiveness terms. 
Although irregular warfare and special operations during the Second World War are the 
subjects of an ever-increasing body of literature, for the most part, however, coherent 
academic analysis of the rise, evolution, deployment, and value of these formations has 
remained elusive. Whilst certain units (such as the SAS or US Army Rangers), and certain 
operations (such as the Dieppe raid), have attracted a wealth of works of dramatically 
varying scholarship and quality, other units and operations have received little or no 
attention. The neglect of certain significant American special forces (such as the OSS 
Operational Groups or Alamo Scouts) is particularly apparent. 2 The prolific numbers of 
sources which narrowly chart the history of either a specific unit or a specific operation are 
quite disproportionate to the scant number of works that attempt to engage with the 
broader phenomena of specialist formations during the Second World War. 
The literature of specialist formations is all too often focused on tactics, tradecraft and the 
dissection of operational minutiae; it rarely examines broader issues such as the mechanics 
1 Henceforth the term `ranger' (without capitalisation) will be used to refer to all American units of 
the elite light-infantry variety whilst the term `commando' will be used when referring to British 
forces of the same ilk. The umbrella term `specialist formations' will be used to collectively 
encompass both special forces and commando units. 2 As Russell F. Weigley tellingly commented: `American military historians have mirrored the 
tendency of the United States Army itself to prefer preparation for and study of conventional war - 
to say nothing of waging it - far above examination of irregular war'. Russell F. Weigley in foreword to Heaton, Colin D., German Anti-Partisan Warfare in Europe, (Schiffer: Atglen, PA, 
2001) p. 9 
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of the creation and use of these units, their evolution of purpose and application, or the 
notion of their utility and value. For, as Colin Gray claimed, in an excellent and all too 
uncommon study of the strategic dimension of special operations: `For every thousand 
pages in the literature [of Special Operations] which recount the deeds of derring-do, there 
is scarcely one page that troubles to ask whether these deeds made much of a difference to 
the course and outcome of a conflict'. 3 Furthermore, though there are a modest number of 
scholarly studies that serve to illuminate the history of the specialist formations of either 
Britain or the United States during the Second World War, 4 very few exist which analyse 
collectively the developments of the two allies. Yet such a joint analysis is, particularly for 
an understanding of the American adoption and use of specialist formations, quite 
essential. During the Second World War the Anglo-American `special relationship' would 
result in close, and at times almost symbiotic, links between the specialist formations of 
the two nations. On a number of occasions this relationship and the direct interplay and co- 
operation between various British and American specialist units had a very great bearing 
on the manner of their inception, evolution and application. By taking a holistic approach, 
that engages with the inception, evolution, use, and value of both British and American 
special forces and commando formations, this thesis serves to address some of the broader 
deficiencies surrounding this subject's existent literature. 
Today the distinction between `Special Forces' (or, in the American vernacular, `Special 
Operations Forces') and elite light-infantry units are clearly defined and well understood. 
Broadly considered, the two varieties of formation are distinguished by such factors as 
having different sized establishments; comprising a different `type' of individual; 
undertaking different missions; utilising different methods; operating at different depths of 
deployment; and having different command and control arrangements etc.. Although both 
genre of formation emerged during the Second World War, such accurate distinctions 
between the two were seldom immediately apparent. Linked by broadly irregular 
mandates, the two genres of specialist unit represented two sides of the same coin, and it 
would take time and a degree of operational evolution before clear points of divergence 
between the two genres began to solidify. Because the creation, employment and evolution 
of special forces could be closely intertwined with that of commando formations and vice 
3 Gray, Colin S., Explorations in Strategy, (Greenwood: London, 1996) p. xvii in Introduction. ° For the British perspective, see: Thompson, Julian, The Imperial War Museum Book of War 
Behind Enemy Lines, (Sidgwick and Jackson: London, 1998); Warner, Philip, Secret Forces of 
World War II, (Pen and Sword: Barnsley, 2004); or Morris, Eric, Churchill's Private Armies, 
(Hutchinson: London, 1986). For the US perspective, see: Paddock, Alfred H. Jr., US Army Special 
Operations, (University Press of Kansas, 2002); or Hogan, David W., Jr., US Army Special 
Operations in World War II, (Department of the Army: Washington D. C., 1992) 
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versa, it is imperative that both genre of formation are given equal consideration within 
this thesis. 
There can be a great deal of ambiguity surrounding such esoteric terms as `irregular 
warfare', `unconventional warfare', or `special operations'. As Mockaitis highlighted, `the 
language of irregular warfare has become as elusive as the guerrillas themselves'. 5 Colin 
Gray has similarly noted the `peril' of defining `special operations' arguing that `the 
exclusiveness that must characterise any good definition is contrary to the very spirit of 
special operations' 6 Twenty-first century official definitions of special operations are 
suitably broad, and place emphasis on the diversity and flexibility of these units. The 2003 
US Joint Chiefs of Staff definition, for example, holds that special operations are: 
Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to 
achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing 
military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. 
.... Special operations differ 
from conventional operations in degree of physical 
and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence 
from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and 
indigenous assets. 
Whilst such definitions certainly serve to highlight the multi-faceted nature and roles of 
modem-day specialist formations, such breadth does little for the study of the specialist 
formations of the Second World War except muddy an already confused pool of water. 
Rather than exacerbate confusion in the search of a more `timeless' definition, it is suffice 
to provide a guide to some of the prior approaches that have been taken towards this 
subject, and through this, broadly justify the focus of this thesis. 
Within historical appraisals of specialist formations it is a relatively common trend of 
analysis to selectively examine units of a particular modus operandi. A number of works, 
for example, are confined to the study of those units that conducted operations `behind 
enemy lines'. Yet operations in depth, when broadly considered, although often a 
characteristic of special operations, were not a universal constant, and are thus inadequate 
as the sole point of definition for all specialist formations and activities. Also prevalent is a 
potentially more undesirable tendency to focus exclusively upon the `raid' as a `would-be 
hegemonic broad class of special operations activities'. 8 Yet it remains important to 
identify that the legacy of special operations goes beyond those well-publicised and 
5 Mockaitis, Thomas R., British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960, (Macmillan: London, 1990) p. 1 
6 Gray (1996), pp. 144 
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-05, December 
2003 
8 Gray (1996), p. 152 
12 
infamous actions of derring do which tend to overshadow the more mundane day-to-day or 
inconspicuous activities of these units. To escape the `raid' and `behind enemy lines' 
myopia it thus becomes essential to also examine the much broader remit of special 
operations including, but not limited to, intelligence activities; work alongside indigenous 
populations; and tasks undertaken by maritime-orientated special forces. 
Whilst this thesis strives to be intentionally broad and inclusive of a range of irregular 
formations and activities, it is, however, necessary to maintain a strict definition of what 
constituted Anglo-American commandos or special forces. The Second World War 
provides numerous examples of groups and organisations undertaking irregular, 
subversive, clandestine intelligence, or light-infantry tasks etc., and in a work of this size it 
would be quite impracticable to study all of these elements with the requisite degree of 
thoroughness. Although modem interpretations of special operations include a range of 
activities broadly grouped as `non-military special operations' or `operations other than 
war', such as propaganda, subversion, economic warfare, psychological warfare, and 
political warfare, it is simply not practicable to include these activities, or the organisations 
organised for their conduct, within this thesis. Such activities were never the principal 
occupation of either commando or special forces during the Second World War. 
It becomes important to separate special forces and commando-style units from the various 
espionage, subversive and `cloak and dagger' organisations and activities undertaken 
during the war. Perhaps the best point of distinction is that specialist formations were 
specially organised, clearly identifiable, units comprising regular uniformed servicemen 
(albeit by no means always pre-war `regulars') who were trained to undertake irregular 
military tasks. As General Sir John Hackett asserted, special forces `are not clandestine 
saboteurs. They are soldiers operating in uniform, engaged in legitimate military tasks'. 
9 It 
is thus not warranted to analyse in detail the broader activities undertaken by the likes of 
the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), or 
the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS). This point notwithstanding, it will still be 
necessary to examine the activities of these organisations which fall within the aegis of this 
thesis. Under OSS, for example, a very significant proportion of US special forces would 
develop and it is crucial to include OSS's specially organised paramilitary groups within 
this study. 
9 Hackett, J. W., `The Employment of Special Forces', Journal of the Royal United Service 
Institution, (February 1952), No. 585, Vol. XCVII pp. 26-41, pp. 26-27 
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Otto Heilbrunn divided those unconventional military operations occurring `in the enemy's 
rear' into two subcategories: `partisan operations' and `special forces operations'. 10 This is 
a relatively common division. Jonathan House, employing a similar distinction, provides a 
solid definition: 
Unconventional, ranger, or commando operations involve a specially trained force 
that is self-contained - it penetrates enemy rear areas to gather intelligence or to 
conduct sabotage, ambushes, and other combat operations. By contrast, guerrillas 
or partisan warfare depends on the indigenous populations of an enemy-controlled 
area, although special teams of soldier-instructors may be sent to organise, train, 
and lead the local population. " 
It is not practicable within the boundaries of this work to examine the broader issues of 
partisan warfare. When considering this subject it is, however, impossible to avoid some 
degree of overlap with partisan, guerrilla, or resistance operations. Many specialist 
formations worked closely with indigenous movements and, for certain units, such 
activities were their raison d'etre, making an examination of the operations and impact of 
those `special teams of soldier-instructors' absolutely essential in a holistic appreciation of 
specialist formations. 
Another oft used mechanism through which this subject has been examined is by a 
consideration of military `elites'. Elite bodies of soldiers are as old as war itself, men more 
talented, better trained or equipped than their counterparts who would be assigned the most 
important missions of their day. '2 Eliot Cohen identified three main criteria that define an 
elite unit: the perpetual assignment of hazardous and unusual missions; the conduct of such 
missions that `require only a few men who must meet high standards of training and 
physical toughness, particularly the latter'; and a `reputation -justified or not - for bravura 
and success'. 13 If one applies these points to special forces and their commando brethren, 
then most units can be considered to be elites, but not all elites are specialist formations. 
Special forces are more than units that purely wage war at a high standard; they wage a 
unique form of warfare which separates them from conventionally-orientated bodies. As 
John Gordon clarified: special forces `were "elite" in the qualitative sense of their choice 
of personnel and excellent preparation, but they were "special" in the functional military 
sense of what they did'. 14 
10 Heilbrunn, Otto, Warfare in the Enemy's Rear, (George Allen and Unwin: London, 1963) p. 42 
" House, Jonathan M., Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, (University Press of 
Kansas, 2001) p. 180 
12 See Beaumont, Roger, Military Elites, (Robert Hale: London, 1974) 
13 Cohen, Eliot A., Commandos and Politicians, (Harvard University, 1978) pp. 17-18 14 Gordon, John W., The Other Desert War, (Greenwood Press: London, 1987) p. xix in preface 
14 
In light of both the relatively common `behind enemy lines' and `elites' focus of this 
subject, occasionally both the Chindits and airborne formations are placed within the same 
bracket as other special forces and commando units. This association is not warranted. 
Their designation of `Special Force' and their role behind the enemy line notwithstanding, 
the long range penetration role of the Chindits is not broadly comparable to the activities of 
other special forces operating in depth - the Chindits sought to hold ground and fight 
rather than to raid and harass. 15 As General Julian Thompson asserted, the Chindits can be 
perceived as a `conventional force' fighting `conventional battles,. 76 Another notable point 
of separation, as emphasised by Scott R. McMichael, is that, unlike many specialist 
formations, only some five percent of the Chindits were volunteers; on the whole they 
were `perfectly ordinary soldiers from perfectly ordinary battalions assigned to Wingate to 
be prepared for extraordinary tasks'. 17 Alongside both these factors is the issue of 
proportionality of scale, which undoubtedly serves as the clearest justification for the 
exclusion of the Chindits from this argument. The scale of the Chindit expeditions (some 
3,000 men involved in the First expedition, and some 20,000 men involved in the Second ) 
would dwarf any other specialist operation in depth. 18 
Although a consideration of the Chindits is unwarranted it is, however, important to 
consider their direct American `equivalent': the 5307`h Composite Unit (Provisional), 
known as either `Galahad' in official communiques, or (more commonly) as Merrill's 
Marauders. Despite the Marauders having initially been created with the intention of 
serving as an `American Chindit', and despite the fact that they were partly trained under 
Wingate to undertake such tasks, their ultimate employment in a medium-range 
spearheading role would, however, have many greater similarities to the roles undertaken 
by other commando and ranger formations than to the work of the Chindits. It is also 
significant both that the Marauders were an all-volunteer force and that they consisted of 
noticeably smaller numbers than the Chindits. 19 
It is for much of the same reasons about the divergence of role and inflation of numbers 
that it is also impracticable to examine airborne formations within this study. In the early 
stages of the war airborne formations had a certain commonality with the nascent 
commando and special forces units (in the British instance the first parachute unit actually 
15 Heilbrunn (1963), pp. 166-167 
16 Thompson (1998), p. 256 
17 McMichael, Major Scott R., A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry, (US Army Command and 
General Staff College: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1987) p. 13 
18 Bidwell, Shelford, The Chindit War, (Book Club Associates: London, 1979) p. 25 
19 Ogburn, Charlton, The Marauders, (Harper: New York, 1959) p. 33 
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stemmed directly from an Army Commando), and on a handful of occasions these early 
airborne units actually undertook missions clearly falling within the definition of special 
operations 2° These points notwithstanding, irregular activities were never intended to be 
the principal occupation of airborne formations. Their utilisation of the parachute or glider 
was for transportation purposes alone, and once these formations reached the ground they 
were always intended to serve as normal infantry in conventional battles. 21 This 
fundamental discrepancy in role, combined with the significant fact that the size of 
airborne formations (which reached army scale by August 1944) would dramatically 
exceed the establishment of even the largest specialist formation, ensures that their 
inclusion within this study is similarly not warranted. 
The importance of scale or size of establishment in the categorisation of a specialist 
formation is an important consideration. Special forces and commandos, the latter of which 
is generally larger, are in many ways defined by their size. Although the scale of their 
establishments and operational commitments during the course of the war often had 
notable variation - ranging from mere handfuls of men to concentrations upwards of two 
thousand men - kept in perspective, however, specialist formations rarely exceeded such 
numbers and, as individual formations, their proliferation and use was in no way 
comparable to the aforementioned examples of the Chindits or airborne formations. Issues 
of scale have, however, clouded some treatments of this subject. Robin Neillands, for 
example, claimed: `Special Forces units were not always small. Few of them come out of 
the Second World War with a higher reputation than the mighty United States Marine 
Corpsi22 Neilland's inclusion of the entire USMC as a special force betrays the sheer 
broadness, and concomitant inadequacy, of his definition. Certainly the amphibiously- 
trained men of the USMC fulfilled a role above the most basic conventional doctrine, but 
not in such a manner that they could be considered either a commando or a special force. 
With these broad limitations in mind, one of the best, and more succinct, definitions of 
specialist formations that can be applied to this study is that offered by John Gordon in his 
excellent study of British special forces in the Desert War. He states that these units were 
... not civilian saboteurs but uniformed soldiers specifically organised 
to carry out 
the high-risk functions of raiding, harassing, and intelligence gathering on the 
flanks or behind enemy lines. Their creation was predicated upon the assumption 
20 As seen with operation `Colossus', the attack against an aqueduct in Southern Italy in February 
1941; operation `Biting' the raid on radar infrastructure at Bruneval in February 1942; or various 
USMC Parachute Battalion deployments directly alongside the Raider Battalions in the Pacific. 
21 Frost, John, A Drop Too Many, (Sphere Books: London, 1980) p. 118 
22 Neillands, Robin, In the Combat Zone, (New York University Press, 1998) p. 31 
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that the missions they undertook either fell outside the `normal operations of war' 
or else were impossible for standard units to perform efficiently within time and 
space constraints. 23 
It is upon this suitably broad definition, closely relevant to the range of operations as 
undertaken by commando and special forces during the Second World War, that this thesis 
shall continue. 
This argument is proceeding on the contention that the Second World War represented the 
beginnings of modem special forces and commando units. It would, however, be erroneous 
to ignore the fact that both Britain and the US had rich historical backgrounds of 
undertaking irregular and unconventional activities before 1939. British history from the 
sixteenth century onwards is full of examples of such operations; one only needs to look at 
the campaigns of Drake, Wolfe, or Cochrane, or to examine the methods utilised in the 
Peninsular War or during the `Great Game' on the Indian Frontiers'24 to see such a 
legacy. 25 Nor is it without significance that the British had a long history of being on the 
receiving end of irregular warfare, and their perception of the potential efficiency of such 
activities was certainly effected by their experiences in South Africa, Palestine, the 
Northwest Frontier, and Ireland. 26 
At the outset of the Second World War perhaps the most prominent British memories of 
irregular warfare came from the exploits of T. E. Lawrence during the Arab Revolt. In a 
conflict infamous for static battles of attrition, the paucity of irregular operations ensured 
that the exploits of Lawrence stood out like a beacon. Whilst the effectiveness of 
Lawrence's `sideshow of a sideshow' is debateable, his activities did, nevertheless, prove 
to some of the military establishment the potential benefits of these operations: that a 
small, low-cost commitment of men and material organised to conduct a campaign of 
mobile attacks could produce a disproportionate impact; and that `small teams of advisers 
and leaders, provided with money and basic weapons, can weld untrained, undisciplined, 
indigenous volunteers into an effective military force'. 2' Lawrence `provided both glamour 
and intellectual sinew to the theory of guerrilla warfare'. 8 His exploits and, more 
23 Gordon, p. xvii in preface 
24 Adrian Weale contended that the `Great Game' was where `the real roots of modem Anglo- 
American-influenced special forces lie'. Weale, Adrian, Secret Warfare, (Hodder and Stoughton: 
London, 1997) pp. 8-9 
25 Arquilla, John (ed. ), From Troy to Entebbe, (University Press of America: Lanham, Maryland, 
1996) pp. 11-12 
26 Mackenzie, William, The Secret History of S. O. E., (St. Ermin's Press. London, 2002) p. 3 27 Weale, p. 30 
28 Bidwell, Shelford, `Irregular Warfare: Partisans, Raiders and Guerrillas', Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute, Vol. 122, No. 3 (September 1977) p. 80 
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importantly, the literature and publicity that followed them, ensured that the potential for 
irregular activities had been realised by some, although by no means all, British military 
theorists and practitioners before 1939.29 
Britain would enter the Second World War with a military that was certainly conducive 
towards the development and exploitation of irregular means: the British having both a 
small and decentralised military well experienced in the rigours of colonial warfare and a 
strategic culture which placed a premium on surprise, manoeuvre and peripheral attack, " 
The British strategic perspective, epitomised by the likes of J. S. Corbett and Captain B. H. 
Liddell Hart, held that: 
... when Britain had employed troops outside Britain they had been most effective 
when they had been used in amphibious roles to raid the enemy's coastline and 
compel him to withdraw forces which might otherwise have been used to fight 
Britain's continental allies, to cripple the enemy's fleet by destroying his naval 
bases, or to capture his overseas colonies. 31 
Nor had Britain forgotten the lessons of its irregular past. When considering the future of 
infantry in 1933 Liddell Hart advised that the `.... infantry soldier needs to revive the 
tradition of the Peninsular skirmisher, but also to carry it to a higher pitch. He should profit 
by the lessons of irregular warfare so that he may develop the rusefulness and the ground- 
craft of the guerrilla fighter'. Hart saw that an infantryman who was 'triajuncta in uno - 
stalker, athlete, and marksman' could `seize or create many opportunities for vital 
intervention on the modem battlefield'. Such a motivation encapsulated many of the 
virtues later emulated amongst those personnel of specialist formations. 32 The prominent 
vein of irregular actions throughout British military history ensured that, by the outbreak of 
the Second World War, the British `way in warfare' was inherently amenable towards the 
creation and employment of specialist formations. 
Before the Second World War the United States also had a long history of irregular 
warfare. Colin Gray has gone as far as suggesting that in its colonial phase the US `all but 
invented irregular warfare in modem times'. 33 During the American Revolution the 
Continental militia's guerrilla-style fighting, particularly the `strategy of partisan war' 
29 For an overview of the array of works on, and about, Lawrence, see: Holden Reid, Brian, `T. E. 
Lawrence and his Biographers', in Bond, Brian (ed. ), The First World War and British Military 
History, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1991) 
30 Mockaitis, p. 146; Bidwell, Shelford and Graham, Dominick, Firepower - British Army Weapons 
and Theories of War 1904-1945, (George Allen and Unwin: London, 1982) p. 224 
3' French, David, The British Way in Warfare, (Unwin Hyman: London, 1990) p. xv in introduction 32 See Liddell Hart, B. H. The Future of infantry, (Faber & Faber: London, 1933) pp. 62-63 33 Gray (1996), p. 155 
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employed by Nathanael Greene, and the formation of `Rangers' by the likes of Dan 
Morgan and Thomas Knowlton highlight well this pattern. 34 This legacy continued in the 
American Civil War during which time it was estimated that `more than 400 ... military 
organisations called themselves "ranger" units. i3' Spontaneous local events and the April 
1862 Confederate Partisan Ranger Act would ensure that the South, in particular, would 
utilise various irregular formations, perhaps the most infamous being those under John S. 
Mosby or William C. QuantrilI 36 In spite of such historical experiences, it is not possible 
to surmise that the American `way of war' was as amenable as that of the British towards 
irregular warfare. 
Even as unconventional elements were proliferating in the formative stages of American 
history, the masses were striving to conventionalise their force structures. As Thomas 
Adams emphasised, when George Washington took command of the Continental Army it 
was his first order of business to `create an army that could fight in the properly accepted 
"European" manner of its British opponents'. Furthermore, despite the colourful 
reputations amassed by the likes of Mosby and Quantrill during the Civil War, the US 
Army would emerge from that conflict firmly behind the tradition as laid out by Ulysses S. 
Grant. The US Army viewing the use of irregulars during the war `as nothing more than 
bandits with Southern sympathies'. 37 Moreover, although the US were regularly faced with 
irregular threats, such as the Indians or, later the Filipino ladrones, the US Army would, 
with a few exceptions (such as General George Crook who displayed an uncommon skill 
in guerrilla warfare against the Apaches in the 1880's), experience notable difficulties in 
deviating from its European-style methods and, consequently, was broadly `ill-prepared to 
fight an unconventional foe'. 38 
The result of Washington's drive to emulate European methods of fighting, alongside the 
victory of the Union in the Civil War against the often barbarous guerrilla bands of the 
South, ensured that the US military was, by the First World War, eschewing 
unconventional war. This, combined with the fact that during the First World War the US 
suffered no Somme or Passchendaele, meant that by 1939 the US were, militarily 
speaking, not seeking unorthodox solutions to large-unit warfare in the same manner that 
the British were prone to. By the eve of the Second World War, therefore, the American 
34 Weigley, Russell F., The American Way of War, (Collier Macmillan: London, 1973) pp. 18-39 35 Zedric, Lance Q. and Dilley, Michael F., Elite Warriors, (Pathfinder: Ventura, California, 1996) 
84 
6 Millett, Allan R. and Maslowski, Peter, For the Common Defence, (Free Press: New York, 1994) 
pp. 180-181 
Adams, Thomas K., US Special Operations Forces, (Frank Cass: London, 1998) p. 27 38 Millett and Maslowski, p. 254; Weigley (1973) p. 163 
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`way of warfare' was firmly committed to the notion of applying `mass and concentration 
in the manner of U. S. Grant'. 39 The American orientation towards the mass of the citizen 
army remained pronounced and the US Army's `long-standing suspicion of elite forces' 
was arguably greater than ever. 4° 
Despite such pronounced divisions in their respective attitudes towards irregular warfare in 
the interwar period, neither Britain nor the US had, with a couple of exceptions, made any 
significant doctrinal or organisational strides in the fields of irregular warfare before the 
start of the Second World War. Within Britain, perhaps the most notable exception to this 
was the establishment, in 1938, of a new branch of the General Staff concerned with 
researching irregular methods and guerrilla warfare. This small branch, initially known as 
GS(R) and then as MI(R), was headed by Colonel J. C. F. Holland, an officer with some 
experience in such activities having served in both Arabia and later, having been wounded, 
during the 'troubles' in Ireland. 4' At the hands of Holland and the likes of Major Colin 
Gubbins (later head of SOE) this branch would produce such documents as The Art of 
Guerilla Warfare [sic] and the Partisan Leader's Handbook based on recent experiences 
of irregular warfare. Such documents would succinctly set out the principles for 
individuals and small groups `working by stealth on acts of sabotage'; for larger groups 
`working as a band under a nominated leader, and employing military tactics, weapons 
etc. '; and for the operations of large guerrilla forces whose `strength necessitates a certain 
degree of military organisation in order to secure their cohesion and to make and carry out 
effectively a plan of campaign'. 42 
MI(R) would eventually merge with Section D, a small SIS section which had been raised 
in March 1938 for the conduct of sabotage, and a department of the Foreign Office known 
as Electra House which dealt with propaganda, to form the nucleus of SOE in the summer 
of 1940.43 The existence of such departments immediately prior to the outbreak of the 
Second World War illustrates both that the British were beginning to attach certain 
priorities to irregular warfare and that they were attempting to translate some of their 
previous experiences into practical lessons. 
39 Weigley (1973), p. 313 
40 Weigley, Russell F., History of the United States Army, (B. T. Batsford: London, 1967) p. 543 
41 Foot, Michael and Langley, J. M., MI 9- The British Secret Service that fostered Escape and 
Evasion, (The Bodley Head: London, 1979) p. 31 
42 For copies see: IWM Gubbins 04/29/8 6/1 and 6/2 
43 For a good summary of the work of these departments, see: Mackenzie, Secret History of S. O. E. 
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Although before 1939 the US had made no effort to research irregular methods in the same 
manner as did Section D or MI(R), a number of pre-war developments made by the USMC 
are, however, certainly of note. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War the USMC 
had gained a proportion of recent experience of irregular warfare in South America and 
China, and had made efforts to translate these into a tentative doctrine with the publication 
of their Small Wars Manual. 44 Also worthy of mention are the experiments and doctrinal 
developments which the USMC had made in the field of amphibious operations during this 
period, which had resulted in strides having been made in such areas as `... utilising 
aircraft and submarine reconnaissance for improved intelligence ... and experimenting 
with the specialist groups needed to control naval gun fire and close air strikes 
accurately'. 45 It would be wrong, however, to view such advances (many of which were 
also mirrored by the Royal Marines) as anything more than tentative doctrinal 
investigations. 
While historically noteworthy, such interwar studies and advances from both Britain and 
the US would have little direct application to the development and employment of 
specialist formations during the Second World War. These efforts were not sufficient to 
suggest that before the war either Britain or the US placed any great faith in the potential 
of special operations. The fact remains that in 1939 neither power had formed any such 
specialist unit nor had any coherent plans to do so. This is significant. The importance both 
of any interwar studies, as well as the significance of any prior historical experience or 
national predisposition in these fields, thus becomes greatly lessened. It was the unique 
conditions and circumstances of the Second World War that would promote both Britain 
and the US to ultimately adopt specialist formations. At the start of the war neither nation 
had any practical doctrine nor any vast reserves of first-hand experience about the conduct 
of irregular warfare upon which to base their first specialist formations. In the adoption of 
these units both Britain and the US would initially be in the same position of having either 
to invent, or assimilate, such capabilities. 
This thesis serves to examine how from such a `cold start' in 1939 and 1941 respectively, 
Britain and the US would go on to successfully and extensively conceive, develop and 
utilise a wide variety of commando and special forces units to cater for a multitude of tasks 
across practically every theatre of operation during the Second World War. The existent 
historical record regarding this subject tends to make assumptions that the pre-war patterns 
44 USMC, Small Wars Manual, (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1940) 
45 Isely, Jeter, A. and Crowl, Philip A., The U. S. Marines andAmphibious War, (Princeton 
University Press, 1951) pp. 4-5 
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and attitudes which Britain and America held towards these formations continued into the 
Second World War. It suggests that the British, historically familiar as they were with 
raiding operations and decentralised autonomous groupings, resorted swiftly and adapted 
well to the development and use of specialist formations during the war. The British found 
in these operations, in the opinion of Clifford, a `buccaneering, marauding, piratical sort of 
game which Englishmen took to like a duck to water. They discovered a talent and a liking 
for it, a heritage ... [from] four centuries of pioneers, explorers, travellers, colonists, 
eccentrics, individuals. '46 
As far the US is concerned, however, it is conversely assumed that the American pre-war 
reticence towards irregular warfare continued during the war itself. The assumption thus 
follows that specialist formations were neither favoured nor widely adopted by the US 
during the Second World War. Such deductions have caused David Thomas (who 
confusingly adopted the term `commando operations' to embrace both commando and 
special forces units) to claim that during the Second World War only the armies of Britain, 
Germany and the Soviet Union would develop `a coherent, if practical and 
improvisational, concept of commando operations informing the operational deployment 
of commando forces'. He would further assert that the `American Army ... never grasped 
the concept of commando operations, or attached any value to commando forces in the 
second world war' . 
47 Similar reckoning caused Adrian Weale to erroneously contend that 
the US did not create a `military special operations unit during the war'. [Original 
emphasis]48 
Existent appraisals of the American conduct of the Second World War seem to suggest that 
the American `way of war' had difficulty embracing or utilising specialist formations 49 
The strategic perception of the US was notably reticent towards `Britain's tangential, "soft- 
underbelly", "closing the ring" approach to waging war', an approach in which the 
potential for specialist operations was quite prominent. 50 Instead, they would favour a 
strategy that ignored the periphery and extraneous activities in place of a concentrated 
annihilative strike, reliant upon an `overwhelming quantity of ... 
firepower and logistical 
capacity', against the enemy heartland - an approach in which the potential value of 
46 Clifford, Alexander, Three against Rommel, (George G. Harrap: London, 1943) p. 167 
4' Thomas, David, `The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-82', 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, (October, 1983), pp. 689-717, pp. 690-691 
48 Weale, p. 147 
49 Gray, Colin S., `Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operations 
Succeed? ', Parameters, (Spring 1999), pp. 2-24, p. 4 
50 Weiss, Steve, Allies in Conflict, (Macmillan: London, 1996) p. 2 
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specialist formations would appear to be much less pronounced. " Such a traditional 
appreciation, however, neglects some central factors related towards the creation and use 
of specialist formations during the Second World War. It is important to recognise that 
though broadly committed to a more undeviating `way of war', the US would swiftly 
develop an understanding of the potential value of employing specialist formations for the 
furtherance of their application of mass conventional force. Understanding that beaches 
had to be reconnoitred; fortifications stormed; flanks protected; advances screened etc., 
they recognised the value of specialist formations in catering for such needs and in serving 
as an ancillary to their `way of war'. Furthermore, whilst it is true that the US, on the 
whole, was reluctant to become embroiled in peripheral activities, they did, however, show 
a marked willingness (for both political and military reasons) to employ and exploit 
specialist formations - just as the British did - in peripheral theatres such as Yugoslavia, 
Greece, Scandinavia and the Far East. Specialist formations operated above traditional 
strategic impediments and the employment of these units could circumvent national 
strategic perceptions and policies. 
The broader realities of US strategy in the Second World War have coloured and distorted 
analysis of the American adoption and utilisation of specialist formations. The military 
culture and strategic priorities of the US was not an impediment towards their development 
and application of specialist formations during the Second World War. Ultimately, 
American specialist units would proliferate, in numerical terms, almost as extensively, and 
in practical terms, as effectively as they did amongst the culturally more predisposed 
British. What the divergence of military cultures and strategic approaches between Britain 
and the US did do, however, was affect how each power would perceive virtually all 
aspects of the inception, use and evolution of these units. The result was that between 
Britain and the US there would be a range of different attitudes, policies and motivations 
behind the inception, expansion, organisation, proliferation, command and control, and 
disbandment of these units; not to mention a range of divergent ideas and priorities 
concerning the respective roles, methods and employment of both commandos and special 
forces. 
This thesis will develop an argument engaging with the similarities and differences 
between the British and American approaches to special forces and commandos during the 
Second World War. It will study the inception, use and evolution of these units and, in so 
doing, serves to examine how and why these units were created. It will examine the 
51 Weigley (1967), p. 479 
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distinctions between the commando and special forces genre of unit and how these 
developed, as well as analysing how the employment of these units evolved during the 
course of the war (Chapters 1 and 2). It will examine how the Anglo-American alliance 
functioned in the application and evolution of these units, and highlight and assess the 
significance of the extensive co-operation and interdependency between Britain and the US 
in these fields (Chapter 3). It will address command perceptions, and the manner in which 
these formations were controlled during the course of the war (Chapter 4), and go on to 
address the notion of their `correct' employment and application, and account for any 
limitations and failings therein (Chapter 5). Having done this, the thesis will draw 
conclusions about the value and effectiveness of these units and examine their impact upon 
the course of the Second World War (Chapters 6 and 7). 
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Chapter 1 
The inception and employment of commando and ranger formations 
As a prerequisite to a detailed examination of the rise, operation, evolution and value 
of Anglo-American specialist formations during the Second World War it is necessary 
to provide a brief historical narrative of the inception and employment of these varied 
units. In light of the eventual distinctions between commando-style elite light infantry 
formations and special forces it is warranted to separate the analysis of the two genres 
of unit. Undertaking such an approach will illustrate the divergent processes of 
creation, composition and modus operandi between these formations and will also 
highlight the notable interplay and dependency existing within the evolution of the two 
genres. This chapter thus serves to highlight the processes of the inception of 
commando- and ranger-style formations and examine how the roles and missions of 
these units evolved through deployment. The subsequent chapter will do the same for 
the special forces variety of unit. 
The most prevalent catalyst for the creation of specialist formations within the first 
years of the Second World War was exigency. Specialist formations arose from 
weakness and limitations (both real and imagined) and a lack of opportunity to use 
conventional means. In their inception Plato's tenet that `necessity ... 
is the mother of 
all invention' certainly holds true. As Barry Posen contended in reference to interwar 
doctrinal developments: `organisations innovate when they fail'. ' There can be no 
doubt whatsoever that defeat in France and the Low Counties and continental 
exclusion following Dunkirk in the summer of 1940 caused Britain to opt `for the 
"British way in warfare" from necessity, not choice' and paved the way for the 
creation of an extensive range of unconventional forces. 2 A climate of fear, surprise, 
impotence and conventional defeat would cause Britain to develop the Commandos, 
SOE, as well as a range of smaller irregular `private armies' all within a the space of 
weeks in June 1940. The reverses of Dunkirk, Greece, and Narvik (and later, Crete, 
Tobruk and Singapore) would reinforce all too vividly the spectre of the Somme or 
Passchendaele. Specialist formations, small bands of specially selected men willing to 
take great risks for low outlay, were thus naturally attractive. They offered a means of 
regaining the strategic initiative and, by successful action, could personalise conflict, 
create heroes, and represent a glimmer of hope in an otherwise bleak looking period. 
' Posen, Barry R., The Sources of Military Doctrine, (Cornell University Press: London, 1984) p. 47 
2 French, p. 201 
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The Independent Companies were the first real British specialist formation to have 
been created during the war. 3 They were formed in April 1940 following the 
suggestion of Colonel Colin Gubbins of MI(R) who had a complex notion of forming 
units of specially-selected volunteers which could serve as `guerrillas' in occupied 
territories supplementing their strength by raising additional `bands' from amongst 
indigenous populations. Within five weeks ten Companies were formed from various 
sources (predominantly the Territorial Army), each comprising volunteers with an 
ability to `fend for themselves' and preferably possessing `stalking' and `ambushing' 
skills. 4 In May, five hastily raised, trained and equipped Companies arrived in Norway 
in an effort to delay the German advance towards Narvik. 5 With scant opportunity to 
practice anything irregular, however, they `were squandered in main force operations, 
where they lacked the numbers, fire-power and logistical support necessary for 
sustained combat operations'. 6 With hindsight, the expectation that uniformed 
personnel with negligible specialist instruction, equipment, or knowledge of the 
Norwegian language could operate in groups of nearly 300 men behind enemy lines 
has all the hallmarks of an ad hoc and amateurish effort. The mismatch between theory 
and practise, between concept and reality, which would see commando-style 
formations face evolution from their originally intended role and move closer towards 
conventional occupations and the main battle, was a pattern that would, for both 
Britain and the US, often be repeated. Despite such obvious limitations with their 
projected role, the creation of the Independent Companies is illustrative of just how 
rapidly elements of the British military establishment were willing to put MI(R)'s pre- 
war research on irregular means into effect. 
The inception of the Independent Companies, both chronologically and evolutionary, 
was followed by that of the Army Commandos. Credit for whose formation falls at the 
3 One formation with a somewhat irregular mandate pre-dating the formation of the Independent 
Companies was the Fifth Battalion Scots Guards. Formed in January 1940 the Battalion was 
intended to act as an elite ski-troop to aid Finland in the `Winter War'. An ill-conceived and 
desperately ad hoc expedient designed to fight in the wrong war, it was fortunate for the British that 
it was swiftly disbanded in March having never been operationally deployed. Erskine, David, The 
Scots Guards 1919-1955, (William Clowes: London, 1956); and Calvert, Michael, Fighting Mad, 
(Airlife: Shrewsbury, 1996) 
° Major-General Richardson, Director of Military Training to Divisional Commanders, 24 April 
1940, WO 106/1889; and varied documents in: WO 260/32 
S Brigadier Colin Gubbins, `Observations on the organisation, equipment, training and discipline of 
the British Army, based on the recent fighting in Norway', 13 June 1940, IWM Gubbins 04/29/8; 
2/3 
6 Morris (1986), p. 34; Reports on Independent Companies in Norway, CAB 106/1155 
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door of Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Clarke, a knowledgeable officer who had had first 
hand experience of counterinsurgency serving as a staff officer in Palestine following 
the Arab rebellion. Just two days after Dunkirk, on 5 June 1940, having discussed the 
need to maintain offensive action with Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, Vice-CIGS, to 
whom he was military assistant, Clarke had written and submitted proposals for 
`Commando' forces. 7 He sought, in his own words, to give the Boer Kommando a 
rebirth, `to aim mosquito stings with telling effect on the ponderous bulk of a German 
Army stretched invitingly along a coastline which might soon reach from Narvik to 
Biarritz'. 8 
Concurrent to the submission of Clarke's proposals Churchill was thinking on similar 
lines. On 6 June 1940 the Prime Minister wrote to Major-General Hastings Ismay, his 
Chief of Staff, suggesting that Australian formations due to arrive in Britain should be 
organised into lightly armed `Striking Companies' of 250 men of the `hunter class' 
which would be capable both of reacting quickly against enemy landings and of 
developing a `reign of terror' against enemy-occupied coastlines with `butcher and 
bolt' raids. 9 Clarke's proposals were thus submitted in a favourable climate and on 8 
June the Commando concept was given official approval and ten Commandos, each 
comprising 500 volunteers, were authorised. Clarke was appointed to head a new War 
Office section, M09, which would be responsible for raising these units and preparing 
cross-channel raids. On 14 June M09 came under the larger aegis of Lieutenant- 
General Bourne who was appointed as `Commander of Raiding Operations'. This 
arrangement was superseded on 17 July by the appointment of Admiral Roger Keyes's 
as Director of Combined Operations (DCO) who, as part of a larger mandate, took 
charge of the Commandos and raiding operations. 
Churchill is representative of a foremost champion of specialist formations. David 
Stafford has emphasised the significance of `Churchill's romanticism, which enlarged 
and fed upon his own memories of quasi-guerrilla fighting on the north-west frontier 
and in South Africa, and upon the legacy of T. E. Lawrence and the revolt in the 
desert'. 1° His personal desire to avoid stalemated campaigns of attrition epitomised by 
the First World War combined with `a profound conviction that, as an underdog, 
7 Colonel Clarke, `The Start of "Commandos"', 30 October 1942, DEFE 2/4 
S Clarke, Dudley, Seven Assignments, (Jonathan Cape: London, 1948) p. 207 
9 Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War - Volume II. Their Finest Hour, (Cassell: London, 
1950) pp. 217-218 
10 Stafford, David, British and European Resistance, (University of Toronto Press, 1980) p. 206 
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Britain in 1940 had to mobilise every form of warfare that it could, however 
unconventional', to ensure that Churchill was particularly enthusiastic towards 
specialist units, and would give significant support to the creation of both the 
Commandos and SOE. 1 1 
Even as the Commandos were being established, Churchill continued to expound his 
desire for further specialist formations. Unashamedly influenced by a perception of 
how the German armed forces operated, 12 on 18 June 1940 he asked General Ismay 
about his ideas for `Storm Troops': 
We have always set our faces against the idea, but the Germans certainly 
gained in the last war by adopting it, and this time it has been a leading cause 
of their victory. There ought to be at least twenty thousand Storm Troops or 
"Leopards" drawn from existing units, ready to spring at the throat of any 
small landings or descents. 13 
Such perceptions were expressed again in correspondence with the Anthony Eden, 
Secretary of State for War, on 25 August when the Prime Minister wrote: 
.... 
how strongly I feel that the Germans have been right, both in the last war 
and in this, in the use they have made of storm troops..... The defeat of France 
was accomplished by an incredibly small number of highly-equipped elite, 
while the dull mass of the German Army came on behind, made good the 
conquest and occupied it. 14 
As no existent formation could be diverted from the pressing needs of home defence, it 
was thought axiomatic that the Commandos should be formed as entirely new 
entities. 15 The resulting call for first-class officers and men aggrieved many regular 
unit commanders who were preoccupied with the problems of mobilising and 
equipping their own units. Spurred on by the belief that `raids must necessarily be the 
British Army's main offensive contribution for the present', however, the formation of 
the Commandos was granted a high priority and much opposition was accordingly 
11 Stafford, David, Churchill and Secret Service, (Abacus: London, 2000) p. 400 
12 Although Germany used small numbers of the Brandenburg Regiment and specially-trained 
Fallschirmjäger units in their early Blitzkrieg victories, common perception in Britain in 1940 had 
dramatically exaggerated the prevalence and value of such forces. For a good debunking of such 
perceptions see: de Jong, Louis, The German Fifth Column in the Second World War, (Routledge 
and Kegan Paul: London, 1956) 
13 Churchill Vol. II, p. 147 It should be noted that those German `storm troopers' of the 1918 
offensives were conventional forces conducting a new form of regular combined arms warfare and 
cannot be cited as examples of specialist forces. 
14 Ibid., p. 413 
15 Colonel Clarke, The Start of "Commandos"', 30 October 1942, DEFE 2/4 
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brushed aside. 16 By June 1940 the Independent Companies had become somewhat 
redundant and despite their lack of specialist training were immediately latched onto as 
a source of personnel for the Commando initiative. In November 1940 when a 
sufficient number of Commandos had been raised it was decided to group them, 
together with the remaining Independent Companies, into Special Service (SS) 
Battalions. 17 This was, however, a short-lived arrangement and in February 1941 the 
SS Battalions were restructured as Commandos and the Independent Companies 
therein formally merged into their establishment. 
The Royal Marines may appear to have been an obvious source of recruits for the 
Commandos. During the interwar period the Marines were certainly the most advanced 
service as far as amphibious operations were concerned and they, as stipulated by the 
Madden Committee of 1924, had an explicit wartime role to supply the Army `with 
units for special duties for which Naval experience is necessary'. 18 Despite this 
mandate, and the fact that in the summer of 1940 the provisional Royal Marine 
Brigade was `technically available', the decree that the Commandos should be formed 
as entirely new units was concrete, placing the men of the Royal Marines `severely off- 
limits'. 19 It was a decision that caused a degree of offence to many Marines who saw 
the Commando role of amphibious raiding as being a central part of their own raison 
d'etre. Royal Marines would not join the Commando organisation until 1942. 
The roles intended for the first Commandos in the summer of 1940 were as indistinct 
as those of the original Independent Companies. The Commandos were expected to 
undertake the dual, but seemingly opposed, roles of `Striking Companies' of 
Churchill's `butcher and bolt' policy, and of serving as `leopards' in a defensive 
mobile reserve capacity to `pounce' on any German landing against Britain. 20 Until 
invasion fears were allayed the `leopard' role continued, but increasingly became 
tertiary to what was considered their main role: small-scale amphibious raids of limited 
duration, variously termed `tip and run', `butcher and bolt', and `smash and grab' 
'6 Lieutenant-General R. H. Haining, DCIGS to Lieutenant-General Sir A. F. Brooke, C-in-C 
Southern Command, 6 July 1940, WO 199/1849 
17 Henceforth, and unless explicitly stated otherwise, the initials 'SS' will refer to Special Service 
rather than the German Schutzstaffel. 
'$ It had also been proposed at this time that the Marines should form a 1,800 man `striking force'. 
Thompson, Julian, The Royal Marines, (Pan Books: London, 2000) pp. 227-228; Ladd, James, By 
Land, By Sea, (Harper Collins, London, 1998) p. 59 19 Fergusson, Bernard, The Watery Maze, (Collins: London, 1961) p. 261; Morris (1986), p. 81 20 Minutes of DCO meeting on 'Means of assisting Home Forces with SS Troops', 30 January 1941, 
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operations. 21 It was made explicit that a Commando was `not expected to resist an 
attack or to overcome a defence by formed bodies of troops .... success must depend 
on speed, individual ingenuity and dispersion'. 22 
Despite the necessity that had spurred their creation, the perceived need to strike back 
at the enemy in a series of pin-prick raids, the early Commandos performed few of 
these operations, and lack of experience, equipment, and inadequate training ensured 
that those operations that did take place in 1940 were invariably unsuccessful. The first 
cross-Channel raid to be undertaken, operation `Collar' of 23/24 June 1940, was 
conducted by No. l I Independent Company, a composite force made up of volunteers 
from Nos. 6,7,8 and 9 Independent Companies. 23 The first true `Commando' raid, 
however, was the mid-July 1940 operation `Ambassador' against Guernsey undertaken 
by personnel from No. 3 Commando and No. 11 Independent Company. Neither 
operation was of great success. The `Ambassador' raid was, in the words of 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Durnford-Slater of No. 3 Commando, `a ridiculous, almost a 
comic, failure. We had captured no prisoners. We had done no serious damage. We 
had caused no casualties to the enemy..... A youth in his teens could have done the 
same'. 24 Such amateurish operations unsettled even Churchill who vowed that there 
should be no more `silly fiascos .... The 
idea of working all these coasts up against us 
by pin-prick raids ... 
is one to be strictly avoided. '25 
These initially disappointing operations severely curtailed the ad hoc opportunistic 
small-scale raids that some had envisioned as being the prime occupation, and one of 
the key benefits, of the Commandos. The prospect of coordinated coastal raiding 
operations from mainland Britain remained elusive. The weighty demands of inter- 
service and inter-agency co-operation ensured that Combined Operations Headquarters 
(COHQ) would increasingly favour larger pre-planned `set-piece' raids that 
encompassed, and exceeded, the deployment of entire Commandos. The larger raids 
conducted from Britain in the period 1941-42 such as the successful raids against the 
Lofotens ('Claymore') in March 1941, Vaagso ('Archery') in January 1942, or St. 
21 Colonel Clarke, `The Start of "Commandos"', 30 October 1942, DEFE 2/4 22 Major-General R. H. Dewing, Director of Staff Duties, `Formation of Commandos', 23 June 1940, 
WO 199/1849 
23 See reports on `Collar', WO 106/1740 24 Durnford-Slater, John, Commando, (Greenhill: London, 2002) p. 32; Report on 'Ambassador', 
WO 106/2958 
25 Churchill Vol. II, p. 572 
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Nazaire ('Chariot') in March 1942 do, nevertheless, illustrate that the Commandos 
generally conformed to their original role as `pinprick' raiders even if they were not 
deployed in the frequency or scale originally intended 26 
Although regular small-scale raids by Commando elements from Britain were 
infrequent, it was hoped in late-1940 that the Mediterranean and the Middle East 
would provide a much more suitable climate for amphibious raiding. At this time three 
Middle East Commandos (Nos. 50,51 and 52) had been raised from this theatre, and in 
February 1941 Nos. 7,8 and 11 Commandos were sent to join them as the `Layforce' 
Commando group. Upon deployment, however, the strategic situation was found 
generally unsuitable for the planned Commando operations. For five months in early- 
1941 No. 50 Commando was held in a defensive capacity in Crete and Egypt, whilst 
Nos. 51 and 52 Commandos were deployed in protracted operations in East Africa 
which, although successful, were along the lines of those that any infantry battalion 
could undertake. 27 
For the Layforce Commandos (with which the Middle East Commandos were merged 
from March 1941) general inexperience, inadequate numbers of naval transports, and a 
lack of air superiority, transpired to abort most of the planned operations. Of those 
undertaken, such as the actions of No. 50(ME) Commando at Casterlorizzo in February 
1941; the No. 7 Commando attempt on Bardia in April 1941; or the Litani river 
operation of No. 11 Commando in June 1941,28 `none ... was a great success'. 
29 
Perhaps most illustrative of the confused deployments in this theatre is the use of 
Nos. 7 and 50/52(ME) Commandos as part of the rear guard covering the evacuation of 
Crete. This task was born of necessity and although well performed, marked a 
conventional and inappropriate (although not necessarily unwarranted) use of specialist 
formations that were ill-equipped and too lightly armed for the task. 30 Although 
Commando deployments in the Mediterranean and Middle East were certainly more 
26 See various documents in: IWM Haydon 93/28/4; JCH 2/6 
27 Dunstan, Simon, Commandos, (Ian Allan: Surrey, 2003) p. 23 28 Although the Litani River Battle was characterised by a number of misfortunes due to a general 
inexperience Laycock stated that it: `.... may be taken as a very fair example of a Combined 
Operation involving the opportune use of Special Service troops in a suitable role'. The general 
conception of the operation would, in later campaigns, become a familiar role to Commandos. 
Pr6cis of lecture given by Laycock on the `Litani River Battle', March 1942, CAB 106/389 29 General Auchinleck, C-in-C MEF, `Future of 15f SS Regiment', 24 and 26 July 1942, WO 
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varied than those from mainland Britain, they were, nevertheless, fraught with many of 
the same difficulties and frustrations. 
By 1942 the expediency of hitting back at the enemy in a series of pinprick raids was 
gradually being replaced with a desire to gain experience in, and to prosecute, large- 
scale amphibious actions to facilitate the commencement of conventional operations. 
In such a climate the amphibious experience and capabilities of the Commandos were 
at a premium, and their potential value in spearheading or supporting major 
amphibious assaults was becoming clear. Such was the perceived value of utilising 
Commandos in such a capacity that in March 1942 the CIGS recommended that 
eighteen Commandos should be raised by April 1944 with the expectation that there 
should be four Commandos per assault division in any future large-scale amphibious 
landings. 31 
Charles Messenger has claimed that No. 5 Commando's participation in the May 1942 
Madagascar landings `marked the first occasion when the Commandos were used in 
what was to become their fundamental role, the spearheading of major amphibious 
assaults on opposed shores'. 32 It is, however, the use of Nos. 3 and 4 Commandos in 
securing the flanks during the Dieppe raid that most adequately highlights this 
transition. 33 No. 4 Commando's successful `textbook' attack on the German battery at 
Varengeville-sur-mer in particular, highlighted the versatility of Commandos in such a 
role. 34 The COHQ report of the raid surmised that it was the success of the 
Commandos on the flanks of the raid that `allowed the operation of our ships off 
Dieppe for all the nine hours'. 35 The lesson that Commandos could act as `perfect flank 
guards' for conventional operations was disseminated to, and understood by, British 
and American planners alike. 
Despite the many limitations with the early Commandos and the initial raiding 
programme, their inception would have a profound significance in paving the way for 
31 General Paget, C-in-C Home Forces to CCO, 7 June 1943, WO 106/4158 
32 Messenger, Charles, The Commandos 1940-46, (William Kimber: London, 1985) p. 409 
33 During the raid the Royal Marine `A' Commando (later named No. 40 Commando) also made 
their debut acting as a floating reserve to the central landing. Tentatively committed in such a 
capacity, the Commando sustained heavy casualties. 
34 Lessons from No. 4 Commando's attack were subsequently turned into a War Office training 
manual: 'Destruction of a German Battery', Notes From Theatres of War No. 11, February 1943, 
WO 208/3108 
35 War Cabinet to JCS, 21 August 1942, RG 218, Geographical File 1942-45, Box 58; Folder CCS 
350.05 Dieppe 
32 
the creation of several other specialist formations on both sides of the Atlantic. Even if 
the US did not share the same reticence as the British towards attrition and the big 
battle, after Pearl Harbor they found themselves in much the same position as Britain 
in 1940: shocked, outnumbered, and conventionally defeated, they were unable to 
come to grips with the enemy on a large scale. Prior to Pearl Harbor, the US was 
already well aware of Commando developments. As well as providing information on 
their establishment, organisation and methods, Britain also had permitted both William 
J. Donovan's Coordinator of Information (COI), the forerunner of OSS, and USMC 
representatives to observe and receive training from the Commandos. 36 The lessons 
learned during these tours certainly helped influence the inception of the first US 
specialist formation: the USMC Raiders. James Ladd has claimed that it was `largely 
on the basis' of reports made by two Marine Captains who had received Commando 
training, Samuel B. Griffith II and W. M. Greene Jr., that the Raiders were created. 37 
More significant, however, was the lobbying from Captain James Roosevelt, son of the 
President, who had toured the Commandos whilst working for COI. In January 1942 
Captain Roosevelt had submitted a proposal to Major-General Thomas Holcomb, 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, outlining ideas for a unit "`for purposes similar to 
the British Commandos and the Chinese Guerrillas". '38 Although Holcomb had 
reservations based on a belief that any existent Marine unit could perform the proposed 
tasks, the scheme received obvious fillip when submitted to the President. 39 
Whilst not comparable to Churchill, President Franklin D. Roosevelt certainly held 
some natural inclination towards irregular warfare. During the First World War as 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy he was responsible for overseeing the Office of Naval 
Intelligence, and consequently, as Stafford has claimed, `Roosevelt liked secrets' . 
40 IliS 
willingness to appoint Donovan as COI (and later as head of OSS) and his enthusiasm 
about the Raiders is certainly representative of this. That his son's proposal also 
referenced the example of the Chinese guerrillas struck a further chord with the 
President in light of his meetings with Lieutenant-Colonel Evans F. Carlson. Carlson 
was Roosevelt's pre-war military observer in China who, having observed the Chinese 
36 Lieutenant-Colonel T. Ely, Office of DCO to Major Daniell, War Office, 31 July 1941, WO 
193/405 
37 Ladd, James, Commandos and Rangers, (MacDonald and Jane's: London, 1978) p. 95 
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guerrillas, had become `convinced that guerrilla warfare was the wave of the future' 
and had discussed such matters with the President. 1 
Equally, if not more, important than the British example and Chinese lessons, however, 
were the pre-war USMC forays into `rubber boat' companies. As early as 1940 
General Holland M. Smith, commanding the Is` Marine Division, had experimented 
with such companies to conduct raids and diversions from APDs (fast destroyer 
transports) in Fleet Landing Exercises. By 1941 this concept had evolved and General 
Smith, now commanding the Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet selected the 1st 
Battalion, 5`i' Marines to become an independent `APD battalion' under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Merritt Edson. Following Pearl Harbor and Captain Roosevelt's suggestions, 
this Battalion was re-named the IF" Separate Battalion and a sister battalion was created 
using a proportion of its personnel as a nucleus. On 16 and 19 February 1942 
respectively, the 1` and 2°d Separate Battalions were redesignated Raider Battalions 42 
Edson would command the IS` and Carlson the 2°d Battalion. James Roosevelt and 
Samuel Griffith II, who both had observed first-hand Commando training, became 
their executive officers. 
The creation of the US Army's first specialist unit, the ls` Ranger Battalion, owes 
much more to the British model than did the Raiders. Their inception was a direct 
consequence of General Marshall's April 1942 visit to Britain. Following a tour of 
Whitehall Marshall began to view COIJQ and Commando raids as an important 
mechanism for making a `preliminary active front' of the continental European 
coastlines. Marshall believed that an attachment of American service personnel to 
COHQ would provide a solid means of gaining much needed combat and amphibious 
experience. 43 It was thus proposed that a small number of American soldiers undertake 
Commando training (akin to an arrangement with the USMC six months earlier), a 
proportion of whom could then be used to form the nucleus of an `American 
Commando' whilst the remainder be returned to the US to serve as `Commando 
instructors' who would train Army Ground Forces personnel in combined operations 
techniques. On the back of such suggestions, eight officers from the US Army, Navy 
41 Hoffman, Jon T., From Makin to Bougainville: Marine Raiders in the Pacific War, (USMC 
Historical Centre: Washington, D. C., 1995) 
42 Ibid. 
43 Darby, William 0. and Baumer, William H., Darby's Rangers, We Led the Way, (Ballantine: 
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and Marines under Colonel Lucian K. Truscott Jr., were attached to COHQ. 44 On 26 
May 1942, having witnessed British developments, Truscott reported to the JCS that 
there should be an immediate formation of an `American Commando' which, in light 
of earlier suggestions, was immediately agreed to. 45 
The I` Ranger Battalion was thus activated on 19 June 1942, its ranks comprised 488 
volunteers from personnel in USANIF. In line with the British approach, when forming 
the Rangers it was thought desirable to create an entirely new unit rather than risk 
destroying the operational integrity of an existing formation. Although the Rangers 
were to closely mirror the Commando model and come under the SS Brigade for 
`training and tactical control', conscious efforts were made to retain the US military 
identity of the force as much as practical. It was made explicit that the US 34`" Infantry 
Division would remain responsible for all administration and supply, and it was hoped 
that American equipment and tactical doctrines would be retained as much as 
practicable. 46 
Marshall's 1942 visit to Britain also laid the foundations for another specialist 
formation: the First Special Service Force (FSSF). When visiting COHQ Marshall had 
been introduced to a British scientist, Geoffrey Pyke, who had developed a plan for a 
special snow vehicle, codenamed `Plough', which he believed specially trained 
personnel could use to raid vulnerable German possessions in Norway or other snow- 
covered theatres. As the `Plough' would need to be developed in America, it was 
suggested to Marshall that the US Army might take responsibility for undertaking the 
scheme. Marshall was enthused and sent Lieutenant-Colonel Robert T. Frederick from 
the Operations Division of the General Staff to `make a strategic assessment of the 
viability of the Plough mission'. Although this appreciation identified some limitations 
in the plan, Marshall remained keen and in June 1942 would place Frederick in charge 
of creating the FSSF. 47 
44 Major-General Chaney, Adjutant General to GOC, USANIF, 1 June 1942, RG 407, Entry 427, 
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The FSSF was created as a joint American-Canadian formation. The Canadian 
contingent became involved partly from a desire to develop their own specialist 
capabilities, of which they provided no other example during the war, and partly 
because of the Canadian Army's suitability for training and operating in winter 
conditions. 8 Initial recruiting for the Force was, at least for the American contingent, 
fraught with problems. Whilst the Canadian `half comprised hand-picked and 
qualified volunteers, much of the initial American contingent comprised `a collection 
of marginal types culled from stockades and unit rejects .... 
[who] were low on the 
scale of intelligence in the US Army'. 49 Frederick had to fight numerous bureaucratic 
battles to help rectify the situation, which arose principally because of a common 
reticence to release high-quality personnel from their regular units for indistinct 
purposes. Prescribed and heavily favoured by the British, yet executed in a joint 
manner by the US and Canada, the inception of the FSSF was, in both conception and 
composition, uniquely representative of an international effort. 
Offspring of divergent military cultures and, potentially more significantly, born at 
different stages of the war, the motivation behind Britain's creation of the Commandos 
and America's adoption of the Rangers, and to a lesser extent the FSSF and Raiders, 
was notably different. The Commandos (the number of which consistently 
outnumbered ranger units) were raised at a time of strategic desperation and as such 
there was some gravitas behind their creation: they were viewed as an important 
striking arm that could help wrest back the strategic initiative. The various ranger-style 
formations, on the other hand, were conceived at a time when the strategic situation 
was, although still taxing, by no means as desperate as it had appeared in the summer 
of 1940. From the outset, the US Army Rangers were perceived as a transitory 
`training and demonstration unit': as a means of providing employment and experience 
for a proportion of personnel before the brunt of conventional US forces had 
opportunity to fight in a style more synonymous with the American `way of war'. so 
The Ranger participation in the British raiding programme was in line with Marshall's 
initial intention: they served to be `the first step in a program ... 
for giving actual battle 
48 Dziuban, Colonel Stanley W., Military Relations Between the United States and Canada 1939- 
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experience to the maximum number of personnel of the American Army. '51 It is of no 
coincidence that the Ranger's inception coincided with Army Ground Forces 
establishment of its first Amphibious Training Centre at Camp Edwards, 
Massachusetts. 52 
Given the British influence on the creation of the US Army Rangers it is perhaps not 
surprising that their function and employment would closely follow the evolution of 
their British counterparts. The first operational deployment involving Ranger 
personnel, and the only time the 1St Rangers would serve in a raid, occurred when fifty 
Rangers took part, via attachment to various elements (predominantly No. 3 
Commando), in the Dieppe Raid. Even before the completion of their formal training, 
therefore, the Rangers had begun to emulate the Commando's transition towards 
spearheading roles. Had they not done this they may swiftly have become redundant. 
Operation 'Torch' would soon enable a much larger proportion of the US Army to gain 
practicable combat experience without the need for training and demonstration units. 
For both the Commandos and Rangers Dieppe cut a role for future deployments and 
altered their inherent function; they began to be perceived, and used, as shock troops to 
tackle difficult tactical objectives for the furtherance of conventional operations, rather 
than serving as independent raiding specialists. The landing of Nos. 1 and 6 
Commandos `at the head of the hunt' during operation `Torch' was the first significant 
deployment of the Commandos in a landing where the objective was to stay ashore 
rather than withdraw. 53 Deployed in a spearheading capacity with the leading elements 
during the assault, the Commandos were not subsequently withdrawn and were instead 
retained for operations at the front. With few exceptions, such as operation `Bizerte', 
No. l Commando's 5 December 1942 attempt to turn the enemy's sea flank in support 
of 36th Infantry Brigade, the Commandos spent six months acting in a light-infantry 
capacity in the front lines. 54 
The first deployment of the 1 S` Ranger Battalion as a complete unit was also during the 
`Torch' landings when they were tasked with neutralising the coastal artillery at Fort 
51 HQ USANIF on `Commando Organisation', 7 June 1942, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 21066, Folder 
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de la Pointe guarding the harbour of Arzew. 55 Subsequent to the initial assault, 
however, the role of the Rangers became ill-defined and experienced `the phenomena 
of "mission creep". 956 After undertaking a number of more mundane activities, the 
Rangers were ultimately attached to the 1s` Infantry Division under whom, like the 
Commandos, they would fight `a dozen soldiers' battles'. Although the raid on Station 
de Sened and the seizure of the Djebel el Ank Pass emphasised their talents in night 
infiltration and assault, the commonest deployments of the i Rangers in North Africa 
were in a conventional infantry capacity. 57 
Despite operating against a different enemy in different operational environments, the 
employment of the USMC Raiders in the Pacific War would largely mirror the same 
process of evolution as the Commandos and Rangers were undergoing in Europe and 
North Africa. In light of the imprecise blend of Commando and Chinese guerrilla 
influences which had dominated their inception, the exact purpose for which the 
USMC Raiders had been created was somewhat unclear. The two initial battalions 
were each strongly influenced by their respective commanding officer's perspective as 
to what their function should be. Lieutenant-Colonel Evans Carlson's progressive ideas 
about guerrilla warfare and devolved leadership for the 2nd Battalion were at odds with 
Lieutenant-Colonel Merritt Edson's more conventional methods for the ls` Battalion, 
and went some way to ensure that although the `battalions bore the same name ... they 
could hardly have been more dissimilar. '58 The 16` and 2nd Raider Battalions were first 
deployed, independent of one another, in August 1942. On 7 August, with clear 
parallels to the commando role emerging in Europe, the 1St Battalion attacked Tulagi 
spearheading the first US amphibious landings of the war. 59 Ten days later, the 2nd 
Battalion raided Makin atoll via submarines with an aim of destroying the garrison, 
gaining intelligence, and drawing Japanese attentions away from Guadalcanal60 
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Although the raid to an extent would prove the validity of the raiding and scouting 
concepts that Carlson had been expounding for his unit, the operation itself was beset 
with problems brought about by poor intelligence and general inexperience (bearing 
clear parallels to the limitations of early British raids). Makin would remain the only 
operation of its type undertaken in the Pacific War. 61 
Following these operations, both Battalions, one after the other, were deployed to 
Guadalcanal. There, both the 1st Battalion's `copy-book hit-and-run' amphibious raid 
against Tasimboko village of 8 September 1942,62 and the 2nd Battalion's landing and 
protracted long range patrol near Aloa Bay throughout November, illustrated the 
Raider potential in specialist deployments. 3 Their far more common deployments, 
however, akin to the use of Rangers and Commandos in North Africa, were 
conventional infantry tasks. Although in numerous aggressive patrols, and in actions 
such as the defence of 'Edson's Ridge' in September 1942, the Raiders performed 
admirably, Lieutenant-General Thomas Holcomb would echo the sentiments of many 
Raider critics when he stated that `such tasks could just as well be performed by any 
marine rifle battalion'. 64 Tulagi, Makin and Guadalcanal had, nevertheless, highlighted 
the potential versatility and value of the Raiders which were subsequently expanded 
with the creation of the 3Td and 4th Battalions in Samoa and California, respectively. 
The European-orientated Commandos and Rangers were also expanding and facing 
reorganisation at this time. The deployment these units faced in North Africa had 
broadly overstretched their establishments. As light-infantry forces, they lacked the 
firepower, transport, medical, and logistical facilities to deal with protracted 
operations, and suffered accordingly. Despite the difficulties experienced, these North 
African deployments cemented the commando and ranger transition in role as it 
became clear both that `raiding for the sake of raiding was unlikely to be undertaken' 
and that `Commandos must be prepared to carry out a role as specialised and highly 
trained infantry, possibly for protracted operations. '65 In preparation for future 
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deployments steps were undertaken to reorganise the Commandos on more regular 
lines so as to render them `capable of taking part in operations subsequent to the 
assault'. 66 The Commandos were thus grouped into four SS Brigades to make them 
`administratively as well as operationally self-contained'; their establishment received 
an increase in support weaponry and transport `to enable commandos to remain in 
contact with the enemy during daylight and after surprise has been lost'; and a `holding 
commando' was established to help alleviate the significant problems with 
reinforcement following casualties. 67 
North Africa had similarly demonstrated the potential of the US Army Rangers in both 
the initial assault and in post-landing operations. The Rangers became viewed as 
highly-trained `all-around infantrymen' 68 Such was their perceived value that it was 
decided to expand the concept, and in early-1943 the 3rd and 4h Ranger Battalions 
were raised by taking a nucleus of 1st Ranger personnel and bulking them up with 
recruits taken from US personnel in North Africa. Their creation was, however, in no 
way illustrative of a fundamental shift in the US Army's attitude towards these units. 
Despite the ever-growing opportunity for conventional formations to gain combat 
experience, these new Battalions were still created with the expectation of being able 
to act as a training vehicle. As Marshall signalled Eisenhower upon their creation: `.... 
after need for these battalions is passed personnel therein might be returned to parent 
organisations so that personnel might attain highest rating commensurate with proven 
69 ability'. 
As with the Commandos, following North Africa Darby became convinced that the 
Rangers had to develop a greater capacity to operate in a conventional infantry role. 
With a background as an artillery officer Darby had a `fetish for firepower' and he 
gradually undertook measures to transform the Rangers `into a light combined arms 
team. ' Prior to Sicily mortars of the 83`d Chemical Warfare Battalion were attached to 
the Rangers in what was to become a permanent arrangement, and later, for the 
invasion of Italy, Darby introduced a `cannon company' to Ranger Force comprising 
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four 75mm guns mounted on halftracks. 70 Such tactical concessions were, however, the 
limit of Darby's powers to reorganise the Rangers and, despite lobbying, he was not 
authorised to instigate any more significant changes akin to those which Laycock and 
Mountbatten were making to the Commandos. The Ranger establishment was to 
remain firmly provisional. 
Tasked with securing defensive batteries overlooking the main landing beaches, the 
missions for Nos. 3,40(RM) and 41(RM) Commandos during the invasion of Sicily 
certainly had a `familiar ring' about them. 7' Having helped to secure the beachhead, on 
14 July No. 3 Commando participated in a costly amphibious `right hook' to secure the 
Ponte di Malati Bridge in conjunction with airborne forces. Aside from this action, and 
quite unlike events in North Africa (and many future landings), the Commandos were 
subsequently swiftly withdrawn from the line to prepare for forthcoming operations 
against Italy. 72 The Rangers were similarly employed during the Sicilian assault: the ls` 
and 4th Battalions spearheaded the landings at Gela to secure the coastal defences 
whilst the 3rd Rangers attacked beach defences at San Mollarella. 73 After these actions 
it was initially hoped that the Rangers would help further the offensive, but neither the 
ls` nor 4th Rangers could keep pace with Patton's `reconnaissance in force' and thus 
their time was spent undertaking marginal tasks before they too were withdrawn in 
readiness for the invasion of the Italian mainland. Amongst all of the commandos and 
rangers in Sicily, the employment of the 3r' Rangers was something of an exception: 
continuing to keep pace with Truscott's 3rd Infantry Division they were widely 
deployed in frontline duties and would be amongst the first units to reach Messina. 
Sicily had further reinforced to both Britain and the US the potential value of 
commandos and rangers in supporting and hastening amphibious assaults. With the 
invasion of France on the horizon these units were thus placed at a premium and it was 
deemed advisable to expand the number of such formations to cater for future 
landings. 74 For the British, the most obvious manner of facilitating this expansion was 
to authorise the direct conversion of Royal Marine battalions into seven additional 
70 King, pp. 2-3; 13 
" Ladd (1978), p. 129 
72 Brigadier Laycock to Major-General Haydon, 8 August 1943, File 23 in KCLMA Laycock 
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Royal Marine Commandos (to join the two already in existence). This was a move that 
initially brought much resentment from the all-volunteer Army Commandos who 
believed `that units of conscripted marines could not be expected to maintain the high 
Commando standards'. 75 Such animosity was, however, short-lived and was gradually 
suppressed by the sensible grouping of Royal Marine and Army Commandos together 
in the same SS Brigades, a move that would foster mutual respect and esprit de corps. 
Observing the `Husky' landings Brigadier-General Norman D. Cota, USA echoed the 
sentiments of the British and singled out the importance of `improved Ranger 
Activities' in the success of the assault and deemed Rangers `vitally necessary' for 
future landings. Cota went on to recommend that further Ranger battalions be raised `at 
least two per "assault division" .... without 
delay' for 'Overlord'. Unlike with the 76 
British, however, this request was met with a `cold reception' from Army Ground 
Forces which still viewed the Rangers as transient expedients that were contradictory 
to the favoured mobilisation of large numbers of homogenous conventional 
formations. Rangers were recognised as valuable for the assault but not for subsequent 
roles. 77 It was only following concerted pressure from ETOUSA, and particularly the 
likes of Cota who had worked with COHQ, that the formation of the 2 °d and 5`h Ranger 
Battalions at Camp Forrest, Tennessee in April and September 1943 respectively was 
grudgingly accepted. 8 
Following Sicily `the war had ... reached a stage where raiding was nearly finished 
with..... There might still be small-scale reconnaissance raids, but there would be no 
more Vaagso's or Dieppe's'. 79 Laycock predicted that: `Such raids as do take place are 
likely to be on a larger scale, of long duration and of immediate strategic 
importance'. 80 Instead of conducting `hit-and-run' raiding operations or even 
spearhead operations, where, withdrawal was possible, the Commandos would, with the 
commencement of offensive overland operations, be increasingly called upon to 
undertake more protracted employment. Their `hit-and-run' repertoire was gradually 
75 Dumford-Slater, p. 171 
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being replaced by `hit-and-hold' or `bite-and-hold' operations. For the invasion of Italy 
the 1", 3rd and 4`b Ranger battalions (which illuminatingly, in August 1943, had been 
formally redesignated Ranger Infantry Battalions) were deployed at Salerno alongside 
Nos. 2 and 41(RM) Commandos to protect the flanks of X Corps. After spearheading 
the initial landings, these units held the flanks for twenty-one days before being 
relieved. Salerno is illustrative of the consistent problems with this form of deployment 
for both the Commandos and the Rangers. Despite changes to their establishments, 
these light-infantry forces could never hope to emulate the organisation and firepower 
of conventional forces. 81 For as Darby wrote: `All my soldiers were rugged raiders, but 
we lacked enough artillery for a full-scale defence. We were equipped to hit and run 
but not to stick it out in a slogging match against forces armed with medium and heavy 
artillery outnumbering us at least eight to one'. 82 
The transition to `bite-and-hold' is perhaps best illustrated by operation `Devon', the 3 
October 1943 landing of Nos. 3 and 40(RM) Commandos and the Special Raiding 
Squadron (a lineal descendant of the I` SAS Regiment which at this time was 
deployed in a Commando capacity) at Termoli to outflank the German lines. There, the 
Commandos independently took the town and doggedly held it for three days against 
repeated counterattacks with the minimum of support until eventually being relieved 
by 78th Division's coastal drive. 83 `Devon', in the opinion of General Thompson, was a 
`classic example of employing commandos'. 84 In Italy, as in North Africa, the 
Commandos also undertook a number of more protracted, less specialised, 
deployments that saw them operate in a manner more akin to conventional infantry 
battalions. A fine illustration of such a deployment is the five-weeks that No. 40(RM) 
Commando spent on the line at the Garigliano River. 
Despite their limitations when deployed in protracted defensive operations without 
support, by 1944 Commando-style formations were, nevertheless, `fully prepared to 
undertake any normal infantry tasks'. 85 Completely comprehending their evolving role, 
many Commandos thus undertook measures to adapt and prepare for such tasks. In 
February 1944, for example, Colonel Tod, CO No. 9 Commando, actually requested 
81 Hogan, US Army, p. 23 
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that his men each spend time in the line before future deployments to give them `time 
to appreciate the nature of the tasks before them, learn the working and routine 
organisation of life in the line, and become accustomed to working with other units in 
the Field Army'. 86 Despite a gradual acceptance of more conventional activities it 
remained clear that the best advantage offered by commandos was to utilise them as 
elite spearhead and shock troops in amphibious operations; deployments over difficult 
country; night time operations; and operations requiring the elimination or capture of 
specific objectives such as forts, bridges, roads, and coastal defence positions. The 
expansion of both Commando and Ranger programmes in preparation for the invasion 
of France epitomises the value attributed to these formations in such roles. 
Joining the Commandos and Rangers in Italy at this time was the FSSF. The FSSF's 
unique intended role of conducting protracted operations and raids against Norway had 
been put aside within six months of their inception. The Force had faced intractable 
problems with both the readiness of the `Plough' and with political disputes with the 
Norwegian government-in-exile over the destruction of industry. 87 Absence of a clear 
role prompted the FSSF to supplement its already accomplished arctic warfare 
expertise with a training schedule which included both parachuting and amphibious 
techniques. In the opinion of McMichael, the training programme `in terms of 
intensity, difficulty, variety, and scope, far surpassed that experienced by any other 
regiment or division in the US Army during the war'. 88 With no opportunity to deploy 
against Norway, the Force was first used in August 1943 in a `traditional' commando 
spearhead capacity during the unopposed assault on Kiska in the Aleutians. Following 
this brief deployment, the Force was offered to various Theatre Commanders in the 
hope of attaining more permanent employment. 89 Two potential suitors for the Force 
emerged: deployment with Fifth Army in Italy, with an aim to utilise the Force's 
unique skills in the Apennines; or, as requested by General Wilson, C-in-C ME, and 
deployment along the Dalmatian coast to serve alongside partisans in a guerrilla 
capacity. 90 The divergence between these two potential deployments highlights both 
86 `History of the Commandos in the Mediterranean, September 1943 to May 1945', DEFE 2/700 
'Minutes from COS Committee Meetings, 17 and 25 November 1942, WO 193/74 and DEFE 2/4 
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the indistinctness of the Force's role and the expected versatility of the Force's 
capabilities. 
Ultimately it would be operational necessity, particularly General Mark Clark's 
shortage of personnel, which forced the decision and saw the FSSF deployed to Italy 
where it was hoped that the unit could `provide extremely valuable leavening for 
normal divisions' and make up for a general deficiency in knowledge about fighting in 
mountainous and winter conditions. 91 Upon their arrival in Italy the Force was swiftly 
put to use. In December 1943 it was tasked with taking, by night time 
infiltration/assault, the peaks of Monte la Difensa and Monte la Remetanea, key 
positions in Field-Marshal Kesselring's `Winter Wall'. The assignment was, in the 
opinion of McMichael, `fully suited to the FSSF taking advantage of their `special 
training in night fighting, mountain climbing, cold weather, and lightning assault'. 92 
Though a difficult proposition, such operations were, nevertheless, of the shock troop 
variety and once the peaks had been taken they had to be held, actions that precipitated 
a costly period of protracted mainline deployment. 93 
Anzio would be the next notable deployment for both the US Army Rangers and the 
FSSF. During the Anzio landings both the ls`, 3`a and 4"' Rangers and Nos. 9 and 
43(RM) Commandos were used in the initial assault. The Commandos, which were 
used `almost as an afterthought' as a blocking force for the landings, were, as at Sicily, 
swiftly withdrawn from the beachhead after only three days (two Commandos would 
later return to the beachhead to help hold its left flank once it became threatened). 94 
The Rangers, however, were not relieved after the initial landings, and were used both 
to expand the beachhead and, subsequently to help hold the line against enemy 
counterattacks. It was here that the mismatch between Ranger capabilities and 
application would have disastrous consequences. On 31 January 1944 the is` and 3`d 
Rangers attempted to infiltrate enemy lines to seize the town of Cisterna, held 
unbeknownst to them in light of inadequate intelligence, by a superior, strongly 
fortified and alert enemy force. At Cisterna `the odds of such misemployment caught 
91 AGWAR to Combined Chiefs of Staff, 7 September 1943, WO 204/1532; Lieutenant-Colonel 
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up with Darby's force' and the two battalions were encircled and decimated. 95 The 4t1i 
Rangers, although avoiding this battle, were absorbed in protracted deployments 
alongside the 504`" Parachute Infantry Regiment and the FSSF, and in March 1944, 
having sustained heavy casualties, were disbanded with a proportion of its personnel 
retained as reinforcements for the FSSF. 96 
Such was the stock of the FSSF following Monte la Difensa that at Anzio they were 
given responsibility for an eight-mile frontage, representing over one quarter of the 
entire beachhead and double that held by the P Infantry Division (albeit across a 
frontage unsuited to mobile operations and thus unlikely to be directly 
counterattacked). 97 During this period in the line the Force performed effectively, 
masking its numerical inferiority by consistently maintaining aggressive night-time 
fighting patrols along the Mussolini Canal. 98 In preparation for the Anzio breakout, 
Colonel Frederick had prepared his unit for `mobile operations in conjunction with 
tanks'. 99 It was a prudent move, and in the subsequent drive on Rome the FSSF formed 
part of the conventional task force leading the advance and, having captured key 
bridges en route, would be amongst the first units to arrive in the city. '°° 
Solid illustration of the ultimate evolution of commando roles is provided by 
employment of these units during the invasion of France and in the subsequent 
campaign across Northwest Europe. During the D-Day invasion both the 1St and 4`h SS 
Brigades deployed in a classic spearhead manner acting against specific points of 
resistance to hasten the formation of the beachhead. Unlike many other landings, the 
Commandos at Normandy did not land first: instead, the SS Brigades landed just 
behind the leading assault waves (No. 46(RM) Commando actually landing on D+1). 
The Commandos of the ls` SS Brigade were tasked with helping to secure Oiustreham 
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and linking-up with the 6`h Airborne Division to anchor the left flank of the invasion. 101 
The Commandos of 4th SS Brigade would join them on this flank after having, for the 
first hours of the invasion, operated independently against individual points of 
resistance. Perhaps the most difficult task fell to No. 47(RM) Commando, who were to 
capture Port-en-Bessin and link up with US formations moving east from `Omaha'. 
After the initial assault, despite some premature predictions that they would be 
withdrawn to the UK to reorganise and refit, both Brigades were deployed on the line 
in conventional tasks until the build up reached a stage where their withdrawal was 
feasible. 102 This occurred only after the SS Brigades had spent 83 days in contact with 
the enemy, more time than any other British formation. 103 
On D-Day the 2°d and 5`h Ranger Battalions were deployed in an archetypal spearhead 
and flankguard capacity. In the planning stage of the `Neptune' landings the guns at 
Pointe du Hoc were singled out as the only objective `which is both suitable for a 
Commando or Ranger task and also vital to the Operation. ' 04 The assault on these 
cliff-top defences by elements of the 2'' Rangers remains illustrative of a model 
application of ranger formations in support of an amphibious landing. ' 05 The remainder 
of the 2'' Rangers landed with the 5th Rangers amongst the early waves at `Omaha' 
beach in what Michael King considered their `most authentic' operation of the war. 106 
The D-day assault was the raison d'etre of the 2nd and 5"' Rangers and its successful 
completion created a void for further Ranger employment. Following the initial assault 
Colonel Rudder, CO of the 2"d Rangers, petitioned for his command to be returned to 
Britain, be reinforced, and be withheld for future specialist deployments. 107 His 
lobbying was, however, unsuccessful, and like the Commandos (and many parachute 
and gilder-borne troops that took part in the initial assault) the Rangers were retained at 
the front for more conventional tasks. 
During the drive on Germany the Commando virtuosity in spearheading tasks made the 
obvious transition to overland infiltration and assault. The effectiveness of the 
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Commandos in such tasks is well illustrated by their advances across the flooded 
terrain of the lowlands; the 4`h SS Brigade's November 1944 attack on Walcheren; the 
March 1945 crossing of the Rhine, operation `Widgeon', in which the 1s` Commando 
Brigade (as the SS Brigades were renamed in December 1944) attacked and held the 
town of Wesel; or operation `Enterprise', the seizure of bridges over the Elbe in April 
1945.108 After their D-Day tasks had been accomplished the Rangers had a brief period 
out of the line for reinforcement and were then deployed in a largely conventional 
manner in the reduction of Brest, and subsequently in the advance towards 
Germany-109 Like their Commando counterparts, however, the Ranger Battalions were 
still called upon, albeit more infrequently, to supplement these more conventional 
deployments with shock troop roles to tackle difficult objectives. The 2nd Ranger 
Battalion taking and holding Hill 400, `Castle Hill', near Bergstein in December 1944 
provides good example of such a role; ' 10 as does the 5`" Rangers' costly four kilometre 
infiltration to capture and hold the Irsch-Zerf road for nine days in February 1945.11' 
Two months after the invasion of Normandy, the FSSF participated in the 
'Anvil/Dragoon' landings against the South of France. During the initial assault the 
Force was used in a commando spearheading capacity to seize the German coastal 
batteries on Ile du Levant and Ile de Port Cros on the left flank of the invasion 
beaches. ' 12 They were not, however, used in the main landings and were not deployed 
on mainland France until breakout had occurred. The subsequent deployment of the 
Force during `Champagne campaign' was very conventional and more of `an extended 
route march than a battle'. 113 In December 1944, in a climate where the majority of 
other commando and ranger formations were being deployed conventionally, the FSSF 
was disbanded. Lack of a clear role, increasing headaches over the multi-national 
composition of the unit, and a general manpower shortage all contrived to give this 
step certain inevitability. 
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From late-1942 a common pattern for the employment of commandos and rangers in 
the European theatres had been established which saw their primary occupation 
evolving from independent raiding towards spearhead and shock troop roles alongside 
greater participation in the main battle. This pattern was not, however, entirely uniform 
and throughout the war a number of Commandos, both individually and in brigades, 
continued to undertake independent specialised deployments more analogous to their 
original concept. The theatre of operation in which these units operated would, 
unsurprisingly, have ramifications for their employment. Operating in Italy and the 
Adriatic 2°d SS Brigade (comprised Nos. 2,9,40(RM) and 43(RM) Commandos) 
undertook a diverse range of operations that, alongside more protracted conventional 
deployments, included numerous raids and independent actions. Their operations from 
the island of Vis against the Dalmatian coast and later tasks in Albania and Greece in 
close coordination with special forces and partisans, in particular, were representative 
of a distinctly different manner of deployment from those that the Brigade performed 
on the Italian mainland. In the opinion of one Commando officer, the Balkans offered a 
`setting for true Commando operations [which] couldn't have been bettered'; such 
periphery theatres permitted Commandos to be deployed, almost as originally 
intended, to raid coastlines and support indigenous partisan forces with the goal of 
tying down disproportionate numbers of enemy manpower and material. ' 14 
The Commandos of the 3`d SS Brigade (Nos. 1,5,42(RM), and 44(RM) Commandos) 
sent for deployment in the Far East from January 1944 similarly undertook, albeit 
sporadically, a more diverse set of operations than their comrades employed in 
Northwest Europe. The Arakan coastline and the numerous rivers in the Burma theatre 
offered the potential both for coastal raiding as well as spearheading projected 
amphibious assaults and river crossings. 115 Even with these more apposite conditions, 
however, there could be definite commonality between the use of these Commandos 
and those formations deployed in Europe. The January 1945 operations conducted in 
support of the 25`h Indian Division against the Mybon Peninsula, for example, have 
clear parallels. Of particular note, and illustrative of their shock troop role, was Nos. 1 
and 5 Commandos' critical seizure and holding of Hill 170 near Kangaw in January 
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the Mediterranean, September 1943 to May 1945', DEFE 2/700; also various documents in WO 
204/1527 
115 Joint Planning Staff report on `Employment of Commandos', January 1945, WO 203/2102; HQ 
3 `d SS Brigade War Diary, DEFE 2/53 
49 
1945, an action bearing considerable similarities to the 2"d Ranger's seizure of `Castle 
Hill' in the Hurtgen campaign one month earlier. 1 16 
In addition to these aforementioned `regular' establishment Commandos serving under 
the SS Brigade organisation, a number of other Commandos existed which, possessing 
unique establishments or operational responsibilities, would to an extent eschew the 
broader pattern of evolution as affecting these units. One such unit was No. 10(Inter- 
Allied) Commando. Raised in June 1942, it comprised foreign nationals: French, 
Belgian, Dutch, Norwegian, Polish, Yugoslav and `X troop' (later known as No. 3 
`Miscellaneous' Troop) comprised enemy aliens. Never intended to deploy as a 
complete unit, the personnel of the Commando would be attached, either as individuals 
or troops, to other formations, specialist and otherwise, for deployment. Personnel of 
the Commando were thus employed in a wide variety of tasks, taking part in both 
numerous raids such as Bruneval, St. Nazaire and Dieppe, as well as in conventional 
operations in Italy, France and Holland. "7 
No. 12 Commando had been raised from Irish and Welsh regiments with the intention 
of being a `normal' Commando but, experiencing difficulties coming up to 
establishment, it was retained outside of the SS Brigade organisation and placed 
directly under COIIQ for special duties. In its deployments No. 12 Commando was 
unusually malleable and throughout 1941-44 would continue to undertake various 
small-scale raids within the original Commando mandate at a time when the majority 
of other Commandos were in the process of making the transition to more conventional 
deployments. 18 In late-1943 No. 12 Commando and the French and `Miscellaneous' 
Troops of No. 10(IA) Commando were grouped together as `Layforce II' under Major 
P. Laycock (son of Robert Laycock, CCO) and assigned responsibility for undertaking 
the majority of the `Hardtack' reconnaissances and `Manacle' (or `Candlestick') raids 
proposed to be undertaken against the Channel coast prior to D-Day. Because of 
security concerns, the main purpose of such operations was deceptive: to indicate other 
landing sites, test general defensive readiness and draw attention away from 
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clandestine reconnaissance activities. In the event, howevei, the majority of such 
operations would be aborted as a result of unsuitable weather conditions. 119 Shortly 
before D-Day No. 12 Commando was disbanded as surplus to requirement; the 
commencement of continental operations made small-scale coastal raiding unnecessary 
and to have altered No. 12 Commando's understrength establishment to deal with the 
rigours of more conventional deployments would have been a difficult and 
unwarranted course of action. 
No. 14 Commando was raised in November 1942 with the intention of becoming an 
`Arctic Commando' for deployment against Norway. 120 With an establishment of only 
two troops, the Commando had an international makeup, with personnel coming from 
the Royal Navy, the Canadian Army and a select number of Norwegians all chosen for 
their `experience in mountain or snow conditions or for their knowledge of 
canoeing'. 12' The first troop of the Commando was a `Boating Troop' intended to 
operate, somewhat redundantly, in a manner analogous to existent maritime special 
forces. Its establishment was fraught with a number of intractable problems, as Captain 
Croft, commanding, was to claim: `never in my life have I met a set-up more 
conducive to failure.... [we] were not exactly a cohesive, well adjusted marine unit, 
which our dangerous mission really demanded, and none of the men had any battle 
experience at all'. 122 Problems of `differences in languages, outlook and rates of pay' 
ensured it was `impossible to foster a proper esprit de corps' and in February 1943 the 
troop was disbanded with its personnel being amalgamated into No. 12 Commando. 
No. 14 Commando's second troop was conceived to be a `ski troop' with a mandate not 
dissimilar to that of the significantly larger FSSF. Like the FSSF, however, this troop 
would never deploy as initially intended and in mid-1943 it was disbanded with the 
remainder of its personnel joining the Lovat Scouts training in Canada for winter 
operations. 123 
No. 30 (Assault) Commando (for a time known as the `Special Engineering Unit') bore 
few similarities to the other Army and Royal Marine Commandos, being notably 
"' See operational reports in DEFE 2/57; WO 106/4290; and RG 331, Entry 12, Box 14; Folder 
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different in size, composition and role. 124 Formed in August 1942 at the 
recommendations the DNI's personal assistant, Commander Ian Fleming, the unit was 
intended to mimic the operations that the German Abwehrkommando had employed in 
Yugoslavia and Greece. ' 25 Operating closely with the DNI the unit was to act as an 
`intelligence assault unit' to be `employed both before a landing and, in a tactical role 
in conjunction with the first assault, going for enemy Headquarters and attempting to 
obtain enemy cyphers [sic], equipment, instruments, papers, or other intelligence data 
as required. 9126 In addition to this `authorised looting' the unit would carry out 
demolition and counter-demolition operations ahead of the main advance as well as 
protecting `white list' VIPs. 127 No. 30 Commando was divided into three troops, one 
each from the Army, Royal Marines and the Royal Navy. Personnel of which first 
deployed during operation `Torch' and subsequently saw action in Sicily, Italy, the 
Aegean and on the Dalmatian coast. Prior to `Overlord' the Royal Marine element was 
reorganised as 30 Assault Unit [30AU] which, in close coordination with their DNI 
counterparts, continued to operate with advancing Allied formations until the end of 
the war. 128 
Despite the above exceptions, the majority of commando formations followed a 
pronounced trend which saw their role evolve away from the conduct of independent 
raiding and related enterprises and move closer towards more conventional `shock 
troop' occupations. This pattern, seen with both the Commandos and US Army 
Rangers, was also apparent with the other US light-infantry modelled specialist 
formations. 
As contrasted to the war in Europe, the war against Japan would ultimately promote 
somewhat different experiences for the application of ranger formations. The initial 
employment of the USMC Raiders following Guadalcanal was, however, broadly 
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David (ed. ), Attain by Surprise - The Story of 30 Assault Unit, (David Colver: Chichester, 1997) 125 Lieutenant-Commander Glanville, History of No. 30 Commando, 1947, ADM 223/214 
'Z6 GOC SS Group paper on administration of SBU, 28 October 1943, DEFE 2/1035 
127 Nutting, p. 15; Lieutenant-Commander Riley, Intelligence Division, SACSEA to BGS(I) 11 
Army Group, 26 August 1944, KCLMA Riley; Memorandum on Special Engineering Unit `Objects 
and Possibilities', 4 November 1943, DEFE 2/742 
128 In addition to the aforementioned units there were also the Royal Navy Commandos (later Naval 
Beach Control Parties) which acted as beachmasters during amphibious assaults, and the RAF 
Servicing Commandos which had the role of servicing newly captured airfields. Nomenclature 
aside, these units were quite distinct from other specialist formations. Messenger, p. 139 
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conformist to the same pattern as witnessed in Europe: the four Battalions were widely 
employed in both an amphibious spearhead capacity (as against the Russell islands in 
February 1943 or against Bougainville in November 1943) and in more protracted 
conventional infantry tasks (as on New Georgia). 129 Whilst the Raiders' 
unconventional attitude and training generally served them well, the Pacific War was 
gradually outpacing opportunities for their deployment. The series of `island hopping' 
campaigns emerging would certainly call for great amphibious virtuosity but the nature 
of the small islands and atolls; the huge distances between the chains; and the heavily 
fortified enemy who expected to fight to the last man, simply did not offer specialist 
forces the opportunity to independently raid and harass. Whilst in the European and 
Mediterranean theatres commando and ranger formations fitted well into an Anglo- 
centric amphibious doctrine that placed a premium on speed and surprise; in Pacific 
theatre, on the other hand, the firepower-focused doctrine of the USMC and US Navy 
was found to be largely incompatible with the application of Raider formations. 
The strategic realities of the Pacific War transpired to degrade the Raider role, whose 
lack of firepower, mobility and an inability to sustain losses could not be offset by 
training and esprit de corps alone. 130 Following deployment on Guadalcanal, Carlson 
had recommended that: `our military units must be mobile, flexible, persistently 
aggressive, clever and must possess as much fire power as is commensurate with 
mobility'. 13 1 By emphasising mobility, flexibility, and a continued light-infantry role, 
Carlson was effectively shunning the conventionalisation in establishment that both 
Darby's Rangers and the Commandos had undertaken, and had misread the nature of 
the war evolving in the Pacific. Technological and doctrinal developments such as the 
use of the `amphibian tractor and improved fire support ... removed the need 
for the 
light assault units envisioned by Holland Smith at the beginning of the war'. 132 
Requirements for assault troops and spearheaders in landings were being fulfilled by 
the better equipped conventional Marine units whom detractors of the Raiders had long 
stated were already an amphibious elite. Under such circumstances, the decline of the 
Raiders became inevitable as they were gradually conventionalised and ultimately 
129 RG 127, USMC Geographic Files, Russell Islands, Box 315; Folder A10-1; and Bougainville, 
Box 2; Folder A3-1; Hoffman (1995) 
130 Illustrative of this point is the manner in which the Raiders struggled at Bairoko on New Georgia 
because of the absence of supporting arms. 
131 Lieutenant-Colonel Carlson to GOC I Amphibious Corps, RG 127, USMC Geographic Files, 
Guadalcanal, Box 44; Folder A39-1 
132 Hoffman (1995) 
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disbanded in February 1944 with their personnel amalgamated into the newly reformed 
4th Marine Division. 
Despite the incompatibility of ranger ideas in the Central Pacific, in September 1944 
the 6th Ranger Battalion would be created to cater for specialist operations in the 
Southwest Pacific. Technically not related to the other Rangers except in name, the 6`h 
Rangers were created from a `batch conversion' of the 98`h Field Artillery Battalion. 
General Krueger, a foremost American `champion' of specialist formations, had 
conceived of the Battalion in an effort to furnish his Sixth Army with a force capable 
of undertaking independent offensive tasks analogous to those expected of early 
Commandos. Like the other Ranger Battalions, much of the 6`b Ranger's deployment 
was in a spearheading capacity. Three days before the invasion of Leyte in October 
1944 the Rangers landed to secure the outlying islands of Dinagat, Guiuan and 
Homophon that potentially threatened the main landings. 133 Similarly, before the 
Luzon landings the Rangers were tasked with the capture of the undefended Santiago 
Island, but were left non-combatant roles, such as acting as a headquarters guard, 
during the main landings. 134 
What made the 6`h Rangers unique from their counterparts, both British and American, 
was that they were never called upon to conduct protracted conventional infantry 
duties after the assault. This was not due to any overarching decision, however, but 
was a manifestation of various factors: the nature of operations in the Philippines 
favouring decentralised control and small groups; a comparative lack of other 
specialist formations in theatre removing competition for specialist tasks; and, perhaps 
most significantly, the military situation on the ground in the Philippines was never 
desperate enough to warrant the use of the Rangers in such a capacity. In the 
Philippines, the 60' Rangers seldom deployed as a complete unit and, often in 
company-sized or smaller formations, undertook roles `so broad as to defy definition'. 
Their most famous action, and subject of much literature and cinema, was the January 
1945 infiltration of Japanese lines to raid the Cabanatuan prison camp to rescue Allied 
prisoners of war. 135 
133 History of `King II' Operations of 6`h Ranger Battalion, October 1944, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 
21079; Folder INBN-6-0.3; King, pp. 55-56; Black (1992), p. 250 
134 Combat History of 6`h Ranger Battalion, January 1945, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 21079; Folder 
INBN-6-0 
135 Hogan, US Army, p. 88; Black (1992), p. 332; and various documents in RG 407, Entry 427, Box 
21079; Folder INBN-6-0.3 
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The last originally-conceived American commando-style formation raised during the 
war was the 5307`h Composite Unit (Provisional), a unit better known as Merrill's 
Marauders. Its inception stemmed from decisions made at the August 1943 Quebec 
`Quadrant' conference at which Orde Wingate had so impressed the Americans with 
his concept of Long Range Penetration that the US Army agreed to form an American 
Chindit `counterpart'. 136 Instead of taking Wingate's lead and converting conventional 
infantry units into jungle specialists, however, the US Army issued a call for 
volunteers with combat and jungle experience. The result was recruits from three 
different sources: 960 men from the Caribbean defence command; 970 men from 
Army Ground Forces; and 674 battle tested men from the South Pacific. 137 Although 
by late-1943 the precedent of volunteerism for specialist units had become well 
established, there remained no guarantee that the most suitable men would be put 
forward and the recruiting process for the Marauders, akin to that of the FSSF, met 
with a number of problems. Of his command one Marauder officer, Charlton Ogburn, 
would remark that `an assemblage of less tractable-looking soldiers I had never seen'. 
Ogburn believed that instead of issuing a call for volunteers it would have been more 
profitable to have used an existent and cohesive unit with jungle training, such as the 
33rd Infantry in Trinidad, for the task. 138 That this did not occur had much to do with 
the US Army's perception of the Marauders as being a fleeting expedient. 
From the outset the Marauders' role was focused on protracted infiltration and 
penetration of enemy lines, their initial training being based on the assumption that 
they would operate in a manner analogous to Wingate's Long Range Penetration 
Groups. The unit's function altered, however, once command of it ceded from Wingate 
to Stilwell in early-1944. The Marauders would become what Otto Heilbrunn dubbed, 
a `Medium Range Penetration Group' with a task `closer to that of the Rangers than to 
that of the Chindits'. 139 From February 1944 onwards Stilwell employed the 
Marauders, in conjunction with Chinese formations, as a spearheading and encircling 
force for his Burma Road offensive. 140 The Marauder's campaign, heavily intertwined 
with both the actions of OSS-led Kachin guerrillas and Chinese regulars, would 
'36 Rooney, David, Wingate and the Chindits, (Arms and Armour: London, 1994) p. 182 137 Historical Division, US War Department, Merrill's Marauders, (US Army: Washington, D. C., 
1990) p. 7; See various documents in RG 407, Entry 427, Box 213211; Folder INRG-5301-1.13 
138 Ogburn, p. 33 139 Heilbrunn (1963), pp. 92-93 140 US War Department, Merrill's Marauders, p. 15 
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involve an advance of over 750 miles and culminated in their most notable success, the 
seizure of the important landing ground of Myitkyina. 14 1 Throughout their operations 
the Marauders were subjected to massive levels of attrition from both disease and 
malnutrition as well as from casualties sustained performing countless blocking 
operations. Such was their wastage rate that whilst engaged at Myitkyina some two- 
thousand new volunteers were hastily organised and committed, with only a modicum 
of training, as wholesale reinforcement for the second and third Marauder battalions, 
whilst all the remaining Marauder veterans were integrated into the first battalion. 142 
These losses ultimately became unsustainable and in August 1944 the Marauders were 
disbanded. This move certainly correlated with the spirit in which the unit was raised: 
as a provisional and expendable expedient. '43 
Despite some points of divergence in the experience of these various commando and 
ranger formations, and in spite of the fact that the varied Anglo-American commando 
and ranger formations were often initially intended to fulfil slightly different roles, 
their actual deployments and the manner in which their role evolved followed a 
common pattern. This was a result both of the close relationship between Britain and 
the US in the inception of these units, in particular the significance of the Commando 
model on the American formations, as well as being a natural consequence of these 
formations evolving in a similar manner to the same battlefield requirements. The 
evolution of commando roles closely mirrored transitions in the overall strategic 
picture. Peripheral and independent raiding operations were at a premium when the 
Allies were understrength and on the strategic defensive. Up until mid/late-1942, 
therefore, many of the commando formations, both existent British examples and 
emergent US varieties, were employed (albeit often infrequently) in raiding activities; 
as evident in the cross-Channel and Norwegian activities of the Commandos; the 
Raider raid on Makin; or even the Ranger's participation in the Dieppe raid. After this 
point, however, the raison d'etre of the majority (although not all, as with the 6th 
Rangers or No. 12 Commando, for example) of Anglo-American commando and ranger 
formations began to shift in conjunction with changes in the strategic situation. 
Gradual mobilisation and a transition to the offensive ensured that the war could be 
fought, as in the favoured American tradition, with an emphasis on firepower and 
141 Ibid. pp. 92-113; Prefer, Nathan N., Vinegar Joe's War, (Presidio: Navato, CA, 2000) 
142 Prefer, p. 155 
143 See various documents in RG 407, Entry 427, Box 213211; Folder INRG-5301-1.13 
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overwhelming quantitative superiority. In such a climate, expedient irritant raids by 
relatively large light-infantry formations became distinctly tertiary to operations in 
direct support of the main effort. Increasingly wedded to the main battle, these 
commando forces were prone to be viewed as elite infantry, as shock and assault 
troops to be used at the front, or on the flanks, of conventional deployments. Dieppe, 
North Africa and Sicily had proven the potential value of using commandos to tackle 
difficult objectives and, most importantly, to spearhead amphibious assaults. The 
expansion and modification of both the Commando and Ranger programmes 
subsequent to `Husky' epitomises the perceived desirability of maintaining 
commandos for such tasks. The ever-looming spectre of an invasion of France gave 
obvious fillip, particularly in the US, to the development and retention of these 
formations after raiding no longer became a necessary or viable proposition. 
Nevertheless, the US created the majority of their ranger formations with a definite 
understanding that these units were only temporary and expendable expedients that 
would fill a gap until conventional arms were ready and able to engage the enemy with 
mass and firepower. Whilst America was certainly willing to embrace these 
formations, it did so for distinctly limited ends. Ranger formations were perceived as 
temporary expedients, as mechanisms for gaining experience; a means for aiding the 
prosecution of amphibious warfare; and as facilitators for the `American way of war'. 
Subsequent to these goals being attained, when conventional formations had gained 
experience and were able to conduct operations at the scale and duration required, 
there was a definite awkwardness in the ability and willingness of the US to adapt their 
ranger formations to alternate applications. This discomfort is illustrated both in the 
general absence of US ranger-style formations undertaking independent or raiding 
operations, and in the American attitude towards disbanding their formations. Once the 
USMC was in a position to mount its Central Pacific drive, the Raiders were surplus to 
requirement; once the US Army had its foothold in France, the FSSF was disbanded 
and the 2nd and 5`h Rangers fought desperately for specialised employment; and once 
the Marauders and 1s`, 3Td and 4`h Rangers had sustained heavy casualties it was 
deemed wiser to disband rather than reconstruct them. 
The proliferation of ranger-type formations in the period 1942-1944, whilst never quite 
keeping pace with the development of the British Commandos, is certainly illustrative 
of the US willingness to develop these units. Despite this, by late-1944 the 
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overwhelming majority of these formations had been disbanded or deployed to 
extinction. The number of men in ranger formations peaked in mid-1943 with 
approximately 6,630 personnel involved, but by the start of 1945 this figure had 
declined to 1,350 men. Their pattern of proliferation was quite distinct from that of the 
British whose Commandos gradually increased until they peaked late-1943/early-1944 
with an approximate 9,100 men involved. This number did not drop substantially until 
the end of the war. 144 The British retained their enthusiasm for the Commandos 
throughout the war and, compared to the US, were much more inclined to utilise them 
in both independent tasks, as seen in their operations from Vis and in Greece, and in 
the main battle, as seen with their lengthy deployments in both Italy and northwest 
Europe. 
As was emphasised at the outset, the evolution and development of commando and 
ranger formations was closely linked to the proliferation and use of special forces. 
Almost in tandem with the decline of larger light-infantry commando formations 
conducting independent direct action, reconnaissance and coup de main raids was the 
rise of smaller, more specialised and flexible special forces with a mandate for such 
activities. The two events were not unrelated. Usurping some of the more traditional 
commando roles, special forces would often prove themselves a more versatile and 
cost-effective alternative to the committal of commando elements. With their raiding 
role in decline, the commandos were, nevertheless, able to prove their worth in other 
tasks. However, the more they performed shock troop or conventional tasks, the more 
they had to adapt, doctrinally and via reorganisation of establishment; and the more 
they adapted, and the greater their successes in these tasks, the more likely it was that 
they would be utilised in such a capacity again. Examination of the inception and 
manner of employment of special forces is thus an important component in 
understanding the evolution of the Anglo-American commando and ranger formations. 
144 See Appendix II for further details. 
58 
Chapter 2 
The inception and employment of special forces 
Alongside witnessing the advent of commando formations, the summer of 1940 also 
saw the emergence of what would become the special forces genre of unit; broadly 
separated from their commando cousins by being of a smaller scale, operating with a 
greater degree of autonomy, and undertaking a more diverse range of specialised tasks. 
Whilst commando and ranger formations generally followed a clearly discernable 
pattern of inception and employment, the creation and use of special forces was, 
conversely, rather more complex and prone to much variation. The desperately ad hoc 
inception of many early special forces ensured that they often arose with only vague 
notions of intent; their roles and manner and employment commonly evolving on 
highly individualistic lines. 
For Britain it was the experience of the Desert War that was to prove instrumental in 
giving rise to and defining the genre of special forces. The nature of that campaign 
provided unique circumstances and variables for the creation of special forces units: it 
was a conflict of supply, of vast distances, open flanks and stretched lines of 
communication that provided many fertile and accessible targets for raids and 
reconnaissance. The first British special forces unit created during the war, and one 
that in many regards cut the mould for future formations, was the Long Range Desert 
Group (LRDG). The creation of which, in June 1940, was a direct result of the efforts 
of Major Ralph Bagnold. Bagnold, alongside many of the LRDG's first officers (such 
as Pat Clayton, Bill Kennedy Shaw or Guy Prendergast) was a pre-war desert explorer 
of the Libyan Desert. ' In both late-1939, and again in January 1940, whilst attached to 
the 7th Armoured Division Bagnold had made suggestions that a unit be formed that, 
benefiting from his `almost unique knowledge of the desert and desert travel', could 
undertake long-range desert patrols for intelligence purposes. Bagnold himself 
admitted these concepts were in a sense a revival of the Light Car Patrols used against 
the Senussi Arabs in 1915. On both occasions, however, these proposals were rejected 
as unwarranted. 2 It would take the Italian declaration of war and the realisation that the 
British forces in Egypt were drastically outnumbered to provide the requisite necessity 
' Kelly, Saul, The Hunt for Zerzura, (John Murray: London, 2002) p. 136 
2 Bagnold, Ralph A., Sand, Wind and War: Memoirs of a Desert Explorer, (University of Arizona 
Press, 1990) p. 123; LRDG War Diary and Narrative, 1940, WO 201/807 
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for General Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East to assent to the 
adoption of Bagnold's scheme. 
Even given the sudden requirement for force amplification and intelligence, the LRDG 
would have been unlikely to have been created were it not for Bagnold's `driving 
power and importunity' for his concept, or for Wavell's patronage and willingness to 
grant Bagnold a carte blanche for his scheme in the face of his own almost crippling 
shortages of personnel and equipment. Without such support from a man who in the 
interwar period both had been conversant with both T. E. Lawrence and J. F. C. Fuller 
about `motorised guerrillas' and who had personally granted Orde Wingate permission 
to create the much lauded special night squads in Palestine, it is doubtful that Bagnold 
would have been able to raise the LRDG as quickly and as thoroughly as he did. 4 
The manner of the LRDG's inception is illustrative of a common process in the 
creation of so many of Britain's first special forces. Initially heavily intertwined with 
the concept of the `private army', these units so often stemmed from an individual 
innovatory actor such as Bagnold; commonly a relatively junior officer, an `errant 
captain', who would both conceive of an idea for a unit and subsequently prove 
instrumental in its creation, establishment and operations in the field. In reference to 
military reform in the interwar period Barry Posen highlighted the significance of both 
the role of the civilian reformer and the `maverick' military officer as prime motivators 
for change. ' The role and prominence of the `errant captain' in the inception of special 
forces in the early stages of the Second World War arguably conforms to such a 
pattern. Determined and innovatory individuals could not, however, hope to overcome 
the obstacles of orthodoxy alone, and in the creation of their units backing was often 
needed from a sympathetic, or equally innovative, `champion': a well-placed senior 
officer, such as Wavell, willing, and able, to lift the red tape of orthodoxy and allow 
these formations to be formed in the first instance. For as Murray and Millett 
emphasised, in application to the interwar period, `new ways of fighting' cannot `take 
root within existing military institutions' without `the emergence of bureaucratic 
3 Shaw, W. B. Kennedy, Long Range Desert Group, (Collins: London, 1945) p. 27 
4 Raugh, Harold E., Wavell in the Middle East 1939-1941, (Brassey's: London, 1993) p. 22; Fuller, 
J. F. C., Lectures on F. S. R. III, (Sifton Praed: London, 1932) pp. 52-56 
5 Posen, p. 47 
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acceptance by senior military leaders'. 6 Every `errant captain' had his `champion', for 
without him nothing would have been achieved. 
The LRDG was created with the expectation of fulfilling two immediate goals not 
readily attainable by other means: to provide a reliable `human intelligence' means of 
monitoring Italian intentions in Southern Libya, and to act as a force multiplier by 
harassing far flung Italian outposts in inner-Libya to unnerve the enemy, disrupt his 
plans and make him alter his dispositions. ' The LRDG straddled these two principal 
responsibilities, requiring both offensive and intelligence-gathering capabilities, with 
great flexibility. Throughout the course of the Desert War the operations of the LRDG 
remained uniquely broad; they were, in the words of one officer, `of infinite variety '. 8 
The most widely undertaken occupation of the Group was their provision of long range 
reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and information reporting. Of particular note 
were the almost continuous `road watches' that the unit mounted along the main 
coastal road between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania from February 1942 onwards. Such 
was the value attributed to these operations that they would absorb much of the 
LRDG's time and often took precedence over their other activities in 1942.9 
With expertise furnished by their nucleus of pre-war desert travellers and enhanced via 
the attachment of other specialists, such as officers from Egyptian Desert Survey, the 
LRDG were able to supplement their provision of military intelligence with 
topographical survey, map making, and reports on `going'. Such roles were significant 
in charting the largely unknown terrain west of the Egyptian Frontier. LRDG patrols 
also performed useful service in undertaking pathfinding and scouting tasks for both 
Eighth Army and Free French units. ' O Their long range patrols, capable of covering 
over 3,500 miles in a round trip, also provided a reliable means of transporting agents 
of SOE, SIS, and M19; as well as the personnel of the LAF Commando and `L' 
Detachment SAS for much of their formative year in the desert. The unit's expertise 
further ensured that its personnel would find employment as instructional troops, 
teaching conventional and specialist units alike the arts of desert travel, navigation and 
6 Millett, Allan R. and Murray, Williamson, (eds. ) Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 409 
7 Bagnold, pp. 123-124 
8 Timpson, Alistair and Gibson-Watt, Andrew, In Rommel's Backyard, (Leo Cooper: Barnsley, 
2000) p. 17 
9 Brigadier T. S. Airey, DMI, notes on LRDG Road Watch, 14 December 1942, WO 201/771 
10 GHQ MEF to Bagnold, 10 July 1941, WO 201/754; LRDG War Diary, September 1940, WO 
201/907 
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signals, and producing training pamphlets on these subjects. " Such varied demands on 
the small unit could, at times, be considered quite exacting. 
Although well within their initial mandate, offensive action by the LRDG generally 
came secondary to intelligence tasks, being largely limited to opportunistic and extra- 
curricular actions rather than those pre-planned strikes as undertaken by other forces. 
There were occasional exceptions to this general rule, however, such as in November 
1940 when patrols performed a series of raids on Italian strongholds in cooperation 
with the Free French, most notably attacking the fort of Murzak in the Fezzan and 
serving as an advance guard for Colonel Leclerc's capture of Kufra Oasis. 12 
Furthermore, so long as it did not compromise their intelligence activities, most patrols 
were given carte blanche for `piracy' and harassment during their deployments. 13 
Fluctuations in the strategic situation could, however, shift the priority from 
intelligence operations towards offensive activities, and vice versa. In February 1941, 
for example, the shock of the arrival of the Afrika Korps ensured that aggressive 
actions took priority in attempts to impede Rommel's advance. 14 Whilst for much of 
1942 the intelligence gains of the `road watch' generally took precedence. 
Soon after its first successful operations, there were plans to expand the scope of the 
LRDG. In October 1940 Orde Wingate arrived in theatre and proposed operating in 
southern Libya with a `fully mechanised desert force' of divisional strength that would 
utilise highly mobile columns supported by organic reconnaissance and tactical 
aircraft. 15 These plans, many themes of which would later be seen in Wingate's 
Chindit concept, were wildly impracticable and failed to recognise the precarious 
manpower and resources situation in theatre; the physical and logistical limitations of 
operating in the desert; or the significance of keeping operations to a small scale, a 
central tenet of special forces success. Despite such clear limitations, Bagnold was 
taken by the scheme and proposed a `Modified Wingate' whereby the LRDG would be 
expanded into a self-supporting `Desert Striking Force' with its own artillery, light 
armour, infantry and close air support. Although more realistic and informed than 
Wingate's original concept, such a proposal was still fanciful and little came of it aside 
'I Shaw, p. 91 
12 Maule, Henry, Out of the Sand - The epic story of General Leclerc and the Fighting Free French, 
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from some minor experiments whereby the LRDG employed a handful of light tanks, 
low-calibre guns, and, more successfully, obtained two light aircraft for their own 
`private airforce'. 16 
In lieu of such ambitious schemes, Bagnold was promoted out of the LRDG to 
examine the potential of forming upwards of five more LRDG-equivalent units for 
operations in the African and Syrian deserts. " The only formation to be created from 
this initiative, however, was the Indian Long Range Squadron (ILRS) formed in mid- 
1941 from volunteers from Indian cavalry regiments with the expectation of 
undertaking LRDG-style operations for Persia and Iraq Command (PAIC). 
Underemployed, in October 1942 the ILRS was transferred to the Libyan desert, 
placed under LRDG control, and was used to undertake medium-range reconnaissance 
for Eighth Army, and later helped escort elements of General Leclerc's command 
across the Fezzan. '8 With the close of operations in the desert, the Squadron was 
returned to India and remained unemployed until May 1944 when it was used to `patrol 
the Persian-Afghan-Russian border zone .... to 
discourage Soviet attempts to infiltrate 
clandestine takeover forces into this oil-rich area. '19 
The LRDG had been proven to be a valuable and versatile formation with their 
operations providing clear indication of the potential of small-scale, highly mobile, 
long range special forces. Their successes gave obvious fillip to the establishment of 
the Special Air Service (SAS) in the summer of 1941. The initial impetus for the 
inception of the SAS more directly stemmed, however, from shortfalls with the 
Layforce Commandos. Lieutenant David Stirling of No. 8 Commando was frustrated by 
the infrequency and inadequacy of Commando operations and became convinced that 
their use was fundamentally flawed. Recuperating in hospital following a mishap in 
experimenting with parachutes, Stirling devised a proposal for the formation of a small 
unit that he believed would be capable of undertaking a broader and more flexible 
range of offensive actions than a Commando. In July 1941 Stirling presented this 
proposal in a typically unorthodox manner direct to the highest local authorities: 
General Claude Auchinleck, C-in-C MEF and his Chief of Staff, General Neil Ritchie. 
Coming at a time when GHQ MEF were looking to expand upon the successes of the 
16 Bagnold, `Modified Wingate Scheme', 30 October 1940, WO 201/807; Memorandum by 
Bagnold, 22 December 1940, WO 201/808 
'7 LRDG War Diary and Narrative, April-August 1941, WO 201/809 
'S Major W. McCoy, CO ILRS, Report on deployments, 5 June 1943, WO 201/797 19 Whittaker, Len, Some Talk of Private Armies, (Albanium: Ilertfordshire, 1984) p. 36 
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LRDG, Auchinleck was willing act as `champion' and accordingly granted Stirling a 
small establishment for `L' Detachment SAS Brigade (the name being part of a 
deceptive ruse conceived by Dudley Clarke) and a role in the forthcoming `Crusader' 
offensive. 
Helped greatly by popular literature, Stirling has attained almost mythological status. 
Illustrative of the aggrandisement of the man is Morgan's contention that Stirling 
`ranks alongside Hannibal and Wellington as one of the most extraordinary gifted and 
original military thinkers of all time' 2° Despite such contentions, the themes of 
Stirling's proposal cannot be considered to be entirely original: the LRDG had been 
operating in small groups in this theatre for over a year; whilst the February 1941 
`Colossus' raid on the Tragino aqueduct in Italy undertaken by the lineal forebears of 
the Parachute Regiment, had already proven the potential of utilising the parachute for 
sabotage in depth? ' Stirling himself also recognised that he owed much to his 
colleague, and fellow Commando officer, John Steel `Jock' Lewes, following whose 
death on an early SAS raid Stirling claimed: `Jock could far more genuinely claim to 
be the founder of the SAS than I'. 22 Lewes had already established himself as an 
exponent of the night-time raid in a number of forays near Tobruk immediately prior to 
SAS creation, and it was he who was tasked with undertaking the parachute trials that 
had preceded Stirling's proposal were first carried out. 23 Furthermore, once the unit 
was raised, it was Lewes who devised practically all formative training schemes and 
tactics. 24 The issue of originality is not, however, significant. Having the idea was only 
half of the battle; to `have the tenacity to drive it though an unwilling and therefore 
unresponsive higher headquarters was another'. 25 Like Bagnold and the other `errant 
captains', Stirling had this determination (not to mention the social connections) to get 
the idea accepted at higher headquarters and to bring the concept to the field. This is 
where the true significance of his contribution lies. 26 
Central to Stirling's ideas for the SAS was that the scale of Commando operations was 
totally unsuited to the strategic realities in the Middle Eastern theatre; he was emphatic 
20 Morgan, Mike, Daggers Drawn, (Sutton: Gloucestershire, 2000) p. 21 
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that a smaller unit could undertake raiding operations more efficiently than a 
Commando. Like many of the men in Layforce, Stirling had been frustrated by the 
constant cancellation of operations and he believed that the smaller a unit's 
deployments, the less likely it would be that the headaches of logistics, transportation 
and administration would impede employment. By dividing his men into a number of 
small patrols, each of approximately five men, Stirling believed it would be feasible to 
engage a much wider range of targets than had been possible with the Commandos, 
moreover, he foresaw that the use of such autonomous groups simultaneously against 
different targets would magnify the disruptive and destructive effects of each raid and 
further increase the moral attrition of the enemy. Furthermore, by confining individual 
attacks to a small-scale it was more likely that each would attain tactical surprise 
thereby increasing their margin of success, whilst at the same time reducing the 
potential cost of men and material lost should an operation fail. 27 The ultimate 
application and success of the SAS in the Desert War would, on the whole, validate 
this cost-effective logic. 
V Detachment's first deployment was a set piece attack on airfields near 
GazalalTmimi in conjunction with Auchinleck's `Crusader' offensive of November 
1941. Lack of experience in desert travel and an early fascination with the potential of 
the parachute ensured that this operation would be the first ever operational parachute 
jump undertaken in theatre. The operation was, however, a disaster. Atrocious weather 
and heavy flak ensured that thirty-four of the fifty-five men dropped were killed or 
captured whilst the objective remained unscathed. It was only when the survivors of 
the drops were picked up, as planned, by the LRDG for exfiltration, that both Stirling 
and David Lloyd Owen, a LRDG patrol commander, came to the conclusion that much 
could be gained from the LRDG transporting the SAS to, as well as from, their 
objectives. This partnership was soon formalised so that while the SAS took advantage 
of a safer and more efficient manner of transportation, navigation and administration, 
the LRDG would receive help facilitating their offensive mandate. 28 This `marriage' 
continued for approximately nine months until the SAS, having gained some 
experience and secured their own transportation, forged different tactical means and 
made moves towards independence. Despite this, for sometime the SAS remained 
27 Stirling, `Origins of the SAS Regiment', 8 November 1948, KCLMA McLeod; Thompson 
(1998), p. 50 
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heavily reliant upon the LRDG for administration, logistics and for the provision of 
navigators and signallers. 
Compared to the myriad of tasks undertaken by the LRDG, the role of the SAS in the 
desert was comparatively simple, they were fundamentally aggressive raiders, as 
described by General Auchinleck as being of `the thug variety'. 29 Their offensive 
mandate was, however, certainly not limited, and their extensive `target set' is 
illustrative of their versatility. Although most successful at attacking airfields, Stirling 
had nevertheless taken measures to expand the repertoire of targets that the SAS could 
tackle. In January 1942 to help facilitate attacks on the harbours of, and shipping at, 
Benghazi and Buerat Stirling had secured the attachment of elements of the 1 Special 
Boat Section (discussed later) to `L' Detachment. 30 
It was in a similar vein that Stirling sought to utilise the advantage offered by 
personnel of the `Special Interrogation Group' (SIG). Raised in April 1942, the SIG 
was an independent unit of platoon strength comprised of fluent German linguists, 
mainly Palestinian Jews of German descent formerly of No. 51 Commando. Led by a 
British officer, Captain Herbert Buck, the unit would don enemy uniforms and 
masquerade as Afrika Korps personnel to infiltrate enemy lines where they could 
undertake intelligence and sabotage tasks. 3' Securing the temporary attachment of the 
SIG to the SAS in June 1942 Stirling hoped that they would help facilitate a raid of 
Free French personnel (similarly attached to `L' Detachment) on Dema. Unfortunately, 
treachery within the SIG ranks, resulting from a German NCO acting as something of a 
double agent, compromised the operation and led to the capture of the majority of the 
force. 32 Equally ill-fated was the SIG's participation leading the deception to facilitate 
the failed large scale raid on Tobruk in September 1942 during which the unit was 
decimated by heavy casualties. Although at times certain special forces would don 
civilian clothes or reap the benefits of ambiguous uniforms, actually employing enemy 
uniform to masquerade as enemy soldiery was, in Anglo-American special forces, 
limited to the SIG. Stirling's use of the SIG and SBS are illustrative both of his 
29 General Auchinleck, `Future of 1" SS Regiment', 26 July 1942, WO 201/728 30 Pitt, Barrie, Special Boat Squadron, (Century: London, 1983) p. 25 
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expansionist desires and his constant drive to search for diverse operational means and 
methods. 33 
Like the LRDG, the SAS also had an instructional role and trained various personnel in 
demolitions and parachuting. 34 Their early misfortunes with parachutes 
notwithstanding, Stirling had insisted that all SAS personnel qualify in their use so as 
to maintain the unit's flexibility; this move had ensured that the SAS would develop 
relatively elaborate training facilities around Kabrit. In light of this, in mid-1942 it was 
even suggested that `L' Detachment be made responsible for training, and providing 
the nucleus of, an entire airborne brigade. 35 Adamant that this would be to the 
detriment of his unit and claiming that the use of his men in such a manner would be 
analogous to `using medical specialists as stretcher bearers', Stirling was, however, 
consistently able to lobby against such dramatically expanded instructional duties. 36 
Due to the facilities at Kabrit, however, until late-1942 the SAS instructors would be 
responsible for all of the limited parachute instruction that occurred in the Middle East. 
`Errant captains' were rarely as instrumental in the creation and operation of their unit 
as was Vladimir Peniakoff, `Popski', commander in the Desert War of both the Libyan 
Arab Force (LAF) Commando and, later, Popski's Private Army (PPA); for in both 
instances he `created, controlled, directed and inspired' the formations. 37 Early in the 
war Popski had joined the LAF but was frustrated with the lack of action. Ile thus 
proposed using his knowledge of desert travel and of the Cyrenaican Arabs honed 
before the war to establish an intelligence network `covering the Jebel Akhdar from 
Derna to Benghazi - to take control of the friendly Arab tribes in that area'. In April 
1942, in a climate of desperation following Rommel's recent advances, Popski was 
granted permission to form the LAF Commando for these purposes; a rather grand- 
sounding name for a unit comprising Popski, one Arab officer, a British sergeant and 
22 Arab soldiers which served, in Popski's words, as little more than a `personal 
bodyguard'. 38 The main occupation of the LAF Commando was to be embedded in, as 
opposed to patrolling, the Jebel Akhdar to fulfil an intelligence collecting, analysing 
33 Ibid., p. 141 
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and disseminating function. From May 1942 the unit began to undertake more 
aggressive roles when Popski was ordered to spread `alarm and despondency' and 
target enemy fuel supplies; something it did successfully; sabotaging an Italian petrol 
dump at El Qubba on 19 May 1942 destroying an estimated 100,000 gallons of 
petrol. 39 The LAF Commando, alongside the LRDG, also had a role in assisting 
`Advance A Force' (M19) in aiding evaders and escaped POWs getting back to Allied 
lines 40 
Almost six months after the LAF Commando's inception it was disbanded, and when 
Popski returned from deployment Colonel John Hackett, heading the Raiding Forces 
Branch of GHQ MEF, suggested `that a unit operating on the lines of Popski's parties 
but with bigger means and transport of its own', would be able to do useful service 
harassing the enemy's withdrawal following El Alamein. 41 Popski sought to fulfil this 
proposition commanding a LRDG squadron, believing that so doing he `would achieve 
results far greater than if ... saddled with the responsibilities of a unit' of 
his own. 42 
This did not, however, transpire and consequently, on 3 November 1942, No. l 
Demolition Squadron, PPA was established as the smallest independent unit in the 
British Army and Popski was given fourteen days to recruit, equip, and organise his 
twenty-man 'army'. 43 The rapid creation of PPA as an autonomous motorised special 
force at this late stage in the campaign highlights the continued ascendancy and 
desirability of such methods in the Desert War even after the strategic initiative had 
been regained with El Alamein. 
In the short space of time that it took PPA to be raised, equipped and deployed, 
however, Eighth Army had liberated Cyrenaica and the purpose for which PPA had 
been formed had ceased to exist. The move towards Tunisia meant PPA would be 
operating over unfamiliar terrain without the benefit of Popski's unique contacts, 
furthermore, the shortening of the Axis lines of communication ensured that petrol 
supplies (which in light of El Qubba, Popski was viewed as somewhat of a specialist at 
attacking) were becoming both less of a problem for Rommel and less accessible to 
raiders. 44 Rather than being disbanded, PPA found alternative employment operating in 
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close conjunction with the LRDG (to whom they were briefly attached) performing 
reconnaissance and topographical survey. Later, operating independently, and more by 
accident than design, PPA was the first complete Eighth Army unit to link up with 
First Army from whose lines they would subsequently focus on `harassing enemy 
convoys and on raiding headquarters and landing-grounds'. 45 Following North Africa, 
PPA would deploy to Italy (and much later Austria) where their modus operandi 
remained largely unchanged. The unit would utilise their mobile autonomous patrols of 
proportionately heavily armed jeeps to conduct both `alarm and despondency' 
harassment and intelligence gathering activities behind the enemy line, as well as 
occasionally serving in a short-range reconnaissance capacity for conventional 
formations. 
The Desert War was a theatre uniquely apposite for the proliferation and use of special 
forces. It was a theatre in which special forces were able to gain a gradual but definite 
ascendancy over their Commando counterparts. Just as `L' Detachment rose from 
remnants of the original `Layforce' Commandos, it was equally fitting that the newly 
expanded 1st SAS Regiment, created in September 1942, came up to establishment 
from the disbandment of the underutilised Middle East Commando (or, as it had 
become known, the 1s` SS Regiment). 46 The importance of the SAS gaining regimental 
establishment almost exactly one year after their first operation should not be 
underestimated. It validated special forces tactics, ended much of the talk of private 
armies, and showed that, in the desert at least, these bodies were preferable to other 
irregular means. 
Whilst the American adoption of ranger formations, as has been noted, was inherently 
linked to the example of the British Army Commandos, the US conception of special 
forces units, on the other hand, occurred broadly independently of the British. Unlike 
in the British instance, the majority of US special forces capabilities arose under the 
aegis of one organisation: William J. Donovan's COVOSS. In July and December 
1940, at the request of President Roosevelt and Frank Knox, Secretary of US Navy, 
Donovan had embarked upon a worldwide fact finding tour of British military and 
subversive commands in which he fostered a clear idea of America's need to develop 
45 War Diary of No. l Demolition Squadron, PPA, March 1943, WO 169/11083; Historical summary 
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both intelligence and covert operations capabilities. 47 Convincing the President of such 
a point, in July 1941 Roosevelt appointed Donovan as Coordinator of Information 
(COI) with the mandate to `direct the New Deal's excursion into espionage, sabotage, 
"black" propaganda, guerrilla warfare, and other "un-American" subversive 
practices'. 8 As COI, and later head of OSS, Donovan fulfilled an important role in 
developing American specialist warfare capabilities. Although many of the concepts 
were inherited from the British, as Paddock emphasised, `only a man of his stature, 
perseverance, and personal dynamism could have successfully applied those 
unorthodox concepts in the face of the intense opposition and competing bureaucratic 
interests'. 9 
Three months after becoming COI Donovan undertook moves to define his `special 
operations' responsibilities and in October 1941 established the SA/G ('Special 
Activities/ Goodfellow') Section with the responsibility of making arrangements for 
guerrilla and special operations. Discussions within this branch led by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Solborg and Captain James Roosevelt (again influenced by his recent 
observation of British developments) aired the possibility of raising 2,500 `elite troops' 
which could serve as guerrilla battalions behind enemy lines. 50 Following Pearl 
Harbor, on 22 December, Donovan was able to formally outline the SA/G Section's 
responsibilities, which contained, alongside subversive and fifth column activities, 
proposals for guerrilla warfare, including: `The establishment and support of small 
bands of local origin under definite leaders'; and `the formation in the United States of 
guerrilla forces military in nature'. 51 
By May 1942 Donovan had modified his ideas in such fields and proposed the 
formation of numerous region-specific `guerrilla battalions' each made up of highly- 
trained and linguistically-talented personnel. 52 At this, time, however, these schemes 
were rejected by the War Department, not only because (akin to the Independent 
Companies) they were somewhat impracticable, but also because there was significant 
opposition towards a quasi-civilian agency undertaking military operations over which 
the War Department would have no direct jurisdiction. In spite of this, any reticence 
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towards such activities as being 'un-American', had by this stage been largely 
suppressed and Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, concurred in the basic idea 
presented by Donovan that `the conduct of organised sabotage in areas occupied by the 
enemy has become an essential mode of warfare'. 53 
It was only with the creation of OSS, in June 1942, however, that Donovan was 
officially able to assume responsibility for `special operations' which prompted the 
formation of the Special Operations (SO) branch (from the nucleus of the SA/G 
section) with a mandate for its conduct. Progress was, however, slow. It was not until 
23 December 1942 that JCS permitted OSS to undertake approved `special operations' 
including clandestine sabotage, psychological operations, the orchestration and 
conduct of coup de main attacks, and guerrilla warfare. But there was a continued 
reticence towards involving significant numbers of US service personnel in such 
activities and it was made explicit that: `.... personnel to be provided for guerrilla 
warfare will be limited to organisers, fomenters, and operational nuclei'. 54 Despite this 
limiting proviso, special forces units were a natural concomitant of this directive, and 
the `operational nuclei' would ultimately be manifested in the various OSS Operational 
Groups (OGs). The OGs were the most significant American special forces unit 
created during the war, each comprising small numbers (30 men per group) of highly- 
trained bilingual uniformed soldiers with the role of acting as `nuclei' for indigenous 
guerrilla movements, they typified the dominant American notion of special 
operations. 55 
There remained, however, significant opposition to Donovan forming a `private army' 
and considerable red tape had to be surmounted before OSS had access to anything 
approaching its own military units. Thus despite having received authorisation for the 
OG concept, OSS was not permitted to begin recruiting. 56 The catalyst for the 
concerted creation of OGs came in April 1943 when General Eisenhower at AFHQ, 
who had been given an outline of OSS capabilities, requested the dispatch of `four to 
eight operational groups or nuclei, to be used as organisers, fomenters and operational 
53 Stimson to Donovan, 8 July 1942, RG 226, Entry 136, Box 140; Folder 1464 
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nuclei in areas adjacent to this theatre'. 57 In the expectation of similar requests from 
other theatre commands, on 13 May the OGs were granted branch status within OSS 
(which remained subordinate to the SO branch at this time) and were thus enabled to 
recruit personnel and deploy them in the field. 58 Recruiting for the OGs from the US 
Army thus began, first with native Italian speakers and subsequently extending to 
French, German, Norwegian, Yugoslav and Greek speaking personnel. 59 Although 
many of OSS's moves in the Second World War were strongly influenced by the 
British, the composition and mandate for the OGs was quite unique. The OGs were a 
solely American endeavour and Britain would form no comparable formation, in either 
organisation or raison d'etre, during the war. 
The Desert War experience had highlighted the potential of special forces in both 
independent action and in support of the main campaign. It had created, as Gordon 
contended, a `cult of special forces' which ensured `by spring 1943 their prestige 
virtually ensured that new roles would be found for them as the war shifted to the other 
side of the Mediterranean. '60 It. was abundantly clear, however, that the uniquely 
apposite circumstances and conditions of the Desert War would not be replicated in 
other theatres and that special forces would have to adapt both their establishments and 
methods to new operating conditions and roles. As eyes turned towards the conduct of 
operations on Continental Europe, the British conception of autonomous special forces 
would have to adapt to operations occurring at an increased depth and involving an 
increased level of cooperation with indigenous guerrilla movements. 
In March 1943 after some debate, in which both disbandment and a transition to non- 
combatant duties were swiftly ruled out, it was agreed that the LRDG's experience in 
conducting independent operations in depth and their excellent navigation and 
signalling skills would make them ideal GFIQ liaison troops for operations alongside 
partisans in Greece and the Balkans . 
61 To help facilitate such roles, and thus increasing 
their versatility, the LRDG underwent a period of supplementary training including 
basic language skills, parachuting, mountaineering, skiing and, under the instruction of 
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the Special Boat Squadron (to be discussed below), small boat work. 62 After such 
preparations, the LRDG, alongside the SBS (Squadron), formed part of `Raiding 
Forces Aegean' with the initial task to land on a number of the small islands in theatre 
and act as an `advance guard' for the arrival of larger British forces en route. 63 
The primary role of the LRDG in Greece and the Aegean remained that of intelligence 
gathering and reconnaissance. Offensive operations and liaison with partisans were 
considered secondary tasks. 64 On various Aegean and Yugoslavian islands LRDG 
patrols would undertake valuable `shipping watches' reporting the movement of enemy 
shipping and personnel and directing strikes against these by the RAF or Royal Navy. 65 
Deployment to the Aegean did, however, embroil the LRDG in the desperate efforts to 
cling onto the `island prizes' that had been gained with the Italian capitulation. In such 
a climate the LRDG faced a number of inappropriate deployments such as their 
casualty-rife attack on the island of Levitha, or their use in the defence of Leros. 
Subsequent LRDG operations highlighted the continued versatility of the unit as its 
patrols were gainfully employed throughout Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia in both 
intelligence and pathfinding advance guard tasks (occasionally in depth via parachute), 
as well as undertaking more aggressive activities both independently and alongside 
various conventional, indigenous and Allied specialist formations. 
Before the close of operations in North Africa, the newly-expanded SAS Regiment 
would undergo many organisational changes in an effort to adapt to post-desert 
operations. The predominant catalyst for change was the capture of David Stirling, the 
architect and leader of the SAS, in early-1943. The removal of such a significant and 
influential figure from the scene created real complications in long range planning for 
the unit. 66 Following Stirling's capture the lack of a similar unifying figure was a real 
limitation; and Stirling's spiritual (but not technical) successor, Major Robert Blair 
`Paddy' Mayne, lacked Stirling's social connections and skills of high-level 
diplomacy, and was unable, or unwilling, to argue for the retention of the force in its 
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existent form. 67 Although there was faith placed in SAS methods, as seen with both the 
15` SAS's regimental expansion and the creation of the 2nd SAS Regiment under 
Lieutenant-Colonel William Stirling (brother of David) at AFHQ in early- 1943, it was 
widely understood that aggressive autonomous raids on assets in the enemy's rear, the 
primary occupation of the SAS in the desert, would become much more difficult in 
other, less apposite, theatres. High-level discussions in Casablanca in February 1943 
favoured turning the SAS `into a normal SS unit [i. e. Commando] for raiding overseas 
and a small SS squadron for small-scale sabotage-and-scuttle raids'. 68 The decision 
was consequently taken to split the 1s` SAS Regiment into two independent formations: 
the Special Raiding Squadron [SRS] under the command of Mayne and the Special 
Boat Squadron [SBS] under Major George Jellicoe. Between these two formations, and 
the newly created 2°d SAS Regiment, there would be significant diversity in function 
and employment. 
When it was created in February 1943 it was decided that the SRS should `form a unit 
of similar characteristics [to a Commando] in the near future', and planners had 
assigned the unit a spearheading role in the invasion of Sicily. 69 In preparation for such 
a role the SRS underwent amphibious training and made alterations to their 
organisation and tactical approach. Their small jeep-borne patrols were largely 
dissolved and replaced with a troop-centric establishment in which each troop was 
equipped with a mortar, engineer and signals section. 7° At `Husky' the SRS took to the 
commando role with elan and skilfully neutralised the Cape Murro di Porco coastal 
batteries during the initial assault. Links with the Commandos were further 
strengthened when the Squadron was deployed in a nominal brigade with Nos. 3 and 
40(RM) Commandos under Brigadier John Durnford-Slater for the commencement of 
the Italian offensive, taking part in operations in the `toe' of Italy and later 
participating in the Termoli landings.? The SRS severed its links with the Commando 
model in December 1943 when it was decided to revive the i SAS Regiment for 
operations in support of the invasion of France, a decision which resulted in the SRS 
being transferred to Britain where it was expanded and renamed. 
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The function of the Special Boat Squadron (later Service), defined at the same time as 
the SRS, was much more closely related to those Casablanca plans for a `small SS 
squadron for small-scale sabotage-and-scuttle raids'. Its general mandate was to 
undertake independent small-scale raids on land-based targets that could be 
approached from the sea as well as undertaking `attacks on shipping and harbour 
installations'. 72 The offensive employment of the SBS was broad, the unit would 
undertake various small-scale sabotage raids against Sicily, Sardinia, Crete, and in the 
Aegean and Adriatic; participate in larger combined operations such as their attack on 
Simi in July 1944; and perform more protracted duties, both independently and in 
support of conventional forces, such as during the liberation of Greece or in Eighth 
Army's actions near Lake Commachio. 73 The SBS was not, however, of the `thug 
variety', and its more cerebral capabilities were well illustrated in the deployment of 
political liaison groups with surrendering Italian garrisons in the Aegean; their liaison 
with partisan formations in Greece and Yugoslavia; and their widespread undertaking 
of ferrying, reconnaissance and shipping watch operations. In many deployments the 
SBS worked very closely with the LRDG and in both the Aegean and, later, the 
northern Adriatic, the two units worked `together in harmony' sharing and 
complementing each other's responsibilities perfectly. 74 
The 2nd SAS Regiment was raised in early-1943 with the core of its personnel coming 
from the Small Scale Raiding Force. This Force had its origins in an SOE-maintained 
mission that was formed in spring 1941 from a small nucleus of men from No. 7 
Commando. It covertly operated the small Maid Honor vessel off the coast of West 
Africa and performed a variety of roles including agent transport and reconnaissance. 75 
The mission returned to Britain at a time when Mountbatten, CCO, sought to raise a 
small `amphibious sabotage force' which would be able to undertake pin-prick coastal 
raids without many of the bureaucratic complications confounding larger Commando 
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deployments. 76 The `Maid Honor Force' provided the perfect nucleus for what in 
March 1942 became the SSRF. 77 
The raison d'etre of the SSRF was the small-scale `smash-and-grab' operation, 
principally directed at prisoner capture for intelligence purposes, and throughout 1942 
the unit was relatively widely employed in such a capacity. 78 Although generally 
successful, by late-1942 a number of factors transpired to threaten the Force's 
existence. An unsuccessful raid near the Cherbourg Peninsula on 12 September 
resulted in the loss of eleven men of the small unit including both Major Gustavus 
March-Philipps and Captain Graham Hayes, the unit's commander and second-in- 
command respectively. 79 The loss of such experienced personnel, architects of the 
unit's existence, hit the small force hard, and it is testament to the character of the 
remainder of the personnel that the unit was not dissolved there and then. Instead, in 
November 1942, the unit was actually expanded beyond its initial establishment via the 
attachment of personnel from No. 12 Commando, and was placed under the command 
of Lieutenant-Colonel William Stirling. 80 Despite this expansion, SSRF operations 
were being increasingly curtailed for fear that their very modest results did not justify 
their stirring up of the enemy's coastline. When Generals Eisenhower and Alexander at 
AFHQ began to call for the formation of an SAS-style organisation under their 
command in Algiers, the personnel of the underemployed SSRF, conveniently 
commanded by David Stirling's brother, was thus the obvious candidate to be sent to 
North Africa to form the nucleus of the 2 °d SAS Regiment. 81 
The 2 °d SAS's first operations from North Africa and Malta were small reconnaissance 
raids undertaken against the small Mediterranean islands of Pantellaria ('Snapdragon') 
and Lampedusa ('Buttercup'), actions which no doubt benefited significantly from the 
presence of experienced SSRF hands. 82 Plans to employ the 2°d SAS overland in North 
Africa in a manner analogous to the ls` SAS in the desert were, however, generally 
thwarted by unsuitable terrain, few accessible targets and a more concentrated enemy. 
Prior to the invasion of Sicily, William Stirling pressed for a wide-ranging deployment 
76 Mountbatten to COS, 19 February 1942, WO 106/4117 
" The SSRF was occasionally referred to as the Small Scale Raiding Company or by its cover name 
of No. 62 Commando. 
78 C-in-C Plymouth to Secretary of the Admiralty, 4 November 1944, ADM 116/5112 
79 Appleyard, pp. 123-127 
80 Ibid., p. 134 
81 See various COHQ correspondence, January 1943, DEFE 2/957 
82 Appleyard, p. 172; and various operational reports, WO 204/1950 
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of his Regiment and recommended the dispatch of large numbers of small autonomous 
groups via parachute in a concentrated effort to overwhelm enemy lines of 
communication on the island. 83 The scale, depth and ambition of these proposals was a 
marked departure from any previous SAS operations and they were ultimately rejected 
both because of a lack of transport aircraft and because of an unwillingness to employ 
the SAS in penny packets. In the event, Stirling's Sicilian ambitions occurred only in 
token form with two small operations mounted in direct support of the invasion: 
`Narcissus', a naval assault on a lighthouse on the south; and `Chestnut' a largely 
ineffective parachute deployment targeting lines of communications in Northern Sicily. 
The Regiment also conducted two more indirect operations in support of the invasion: 
`Waterlily' targeting railroads in Genoa, and `hawthorn' against Sardinian airfields. 84 
For the invasion of Italy Stirling repeated his suggestions for a wide and coordinated 
deployment of his Regiment. He believed, somewhat naively, that: 
Jeep patrols brought in by WACO gliders could fight their way to vital 
objectives with explosives by the ton. In concert with a major operation, 
mountainous areas could be infested with small parties, which if sufficiently 
numerous, will saturate completely local defences, and paralyse 
communications unhampered. 85 
Nonetheless, similar limitations as those before Sicily ensured that only five small 
parties were dropped in support of Salerno. A frustrated Stirling argued that what was 
required was: `Not five parties ill-equipped, but 50 or 100 parties with adequate 
equipment' to adequately disrupt enemy communications and isolate and delay 
reinforcement to a beachhead. He argued that had this been laid on, German supply 
and reinforcement to Salerno `by rail ... would 
have been negligible. Telephone 
communication, power supplies and road transport would have been reduced to a state 
of chaos'. 86 That the unit was not deployed as such at this time was, however, a result 
of more than reticence on the part of AFIIQ: material constraints on aircraft were 
severe; intelligence about rear areas was scant; and the Italian partisans were only in 
their formative periods. 
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With hindsight and an understanding of the problems in deploying, supplying and 
coordinating even a handful of small groups, it seems likely (assuming all parties could 
be equipped and deployed as intended) that following an initial impact, which may 
well have caused surprise and briefly impeded enemy communications, that the effect 
of these groups would have been short-lived; underexploited by other arms; and would 
have been swiftly suppressed with significant loss to the SAS. At this stage of the war 
SAS operations were still a very new concept and parachute operations in Italy were 
far removed from the vehicular patrols that had operated so successfully in the desert. 
The potential gains expounded by Stirling were largely theoretical and there was 
certainly no tangible evidence that such activities would be able to cripple enemy 
communications to any great extent. The high command cannot be blamed for not 
being willing to risk squandering this unit, and the resources to support it, on such 
ambitious schemes. 
After the initial landings in Italy, therefore, the 2nd SAS Regiment spent much of its 
time operating in the manner of a reconnaissance squadron undertaking foot and jeep 
patrols at the immediate front of conventional Allied units. 87 Proportions of the unit 
also deployed at the Termoli landing alongside the SRS. Those few specialist 
deployments that were undertaken, such as those in support of Salerno, or later, the 
handful of operations conducted for the benefit of Anzio did, however, show that there 
was some potential in using small groups for disruption and harassment behind the 
enemy lines in concert with larger conventional landings. 88 
SAS activities in Italy did, however, attract the eye of the `Overlord' planners and in 
early-1944 the 2nd SAS and SRS were dispatched to Britain to form the SAS Brigade 
which would include the two British Regiments alongside two Free French Regiments 
(known as the 3`d and 4`h SAS) and one Belgian parachute battalion (known as the 5`h 
SAS). General Montgomery believed that the SAS Brigade could `assist in forming a 
wide and sustained belt of small independent parties round the "OVERLORD" 
bridgehead area' that would obstruct German lines of communication and delay the 
movement of German mobile reserve formations to the beaches during the early stages 
87 Colonel Franks, Report on SAS Regiment in Italy, period Taranto-Termoli, WO 218/176 88 Strawson, John, History of the SAS Regiment, (Grafton: London, 1986) pp. 139-143; Thompson 
(1998), pp. 276-281; Farran, Roy, Winged Dagger, (Cassell: London, 1998) p. 158 
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of the operation. 89 Although this bore some similarities to Stirling's suggestions in 
Italy, it lacked the crucial element of depth. Montgomery's scheme represented a 
fundamentally tactical deployment of the SAS widely thought to be unsuitable for 
reasons of `security, unsuitability of terrain, the difficulty of the force being landed and 
resupplied in this area, shortage of aircraft around D-Day and the unlikelihood of the 
force achieving results commensurate with casualties'. 90 Although such a use of the 
Brigade may have caused localised confusion and discomfort for German formations 
in the beachhead areas, it would have been very difficult to mount and, with non- 
existent Resistance infrastructure at the edge of the battle area, impossible to sustain. It 
could have potentially resulted in the destruction of the entire SAS Brigade. 
Although by this stage the SAS were increasingly regarded as a useful and effective 
formation, this same respect did not extend in all quarters to a widespread knowledge 
and understanding of their potential roles and employment. Montgomery's suggestions 
were made in the face of a growing body of understanding, emanating from AFIIQ, 
about the best use of the SAS. In January 1944 AFHQ, under advice of Stirling and 
Co., had recommended that `the most suitable employment for the Regiment is in 
small [3-5man] long range raiding parties in a strategic rather than tactical role. '9' A 
slightly later appraisal, again contradicting Montgomery's projected use of the 
Brigade, stated that: `The SAS task is to break the weakest link in the chain of enemy 
communication and to keep that link broken. The weakest link and the most effective 
point of attack coincide - usually between 75 and 150 or more miles behind the line. '92 
It was not until May 1944, and after significant debate that led to Stirling's resignation, 
that plans for SAS employment in France were altered to a `strategical role in back 
areas.... To harass enemy lines of communication' and `in conjunction with SOE to 
link up with and assist the ... 
French resistance'. 93 
Elements of the SAS Brigade were sent to France from D minus 1 onwards and, 
although varied, their role can be broadly divided into three categories that were not 
mutually exclusive: sabotage and small-scale offensive operations from static bases or 
89 General L. C. Hollis to Prime Minister, 27 January 1944, WO 106/4158; SIIAEF memorandum, 
`NEPTUNE - Action of SAS Troops', April 1944, WO 218/189 90 Lieutenant-Colonel Collins, GSO-1 (SAS), `Notes on the Organisation, History and Employment 
of SAS Troops', May 1945, KCLMA McLeod 
91 AFHQ summary on 2nd SAS Regiment, 24 January 1944, WO 204/10242 92 AFHQ, 'Scope, Employment and Organisation of SAS Troops', 13 February 1944, WO 204/1949 93 Lieutenant-General Browning, GOC Airborne Troops to Chief of Staff, 21 Army Group, 8 May 
1944, WO 218/189 
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`strongholds' in enemy territory; roving flying column operations or `peripatetic 
affairs'; and operations in direct support of organised resistance. 94 The use of static 
bases by the Brigade, established at various locations from D+1 onwards, represented 
one of the more controversial changes in the SAS's modus operandi. 95 The 
`strongholds' were intended to serve as mounting bases for operations and as havens at 
which supplies could be stored and Resistance forces given instruction. 96 Despite being 
an important requirement for undertaking protracted operations in depth, the 
development of extensive static strongholds arguably sinned against the well- 
established maxims of small-scale, surprise and mobility which had dominated earlier 
successful SAS operations. That certain of the strongholds, such as `Bulbasket', were 
compromised and attacked by superior forces, resulting in heavy SAS losses, certainly 
opens up debate, not so much as to whether strongholds should have been used, but as 
to whether so many men should have been employed in static positions undertaking 
conspicuous actions with so few defensive measures. 97 A further limitation was that 
many SAS operations were hamstrung by a lack of mobility in the field. Ford believes 
that the general absence of jeeps `certainly detracted from their effectiveness'. 98 Once 
the strategic situation had become more fluid, however, it was possible (if not 
essential) for the SAS to deploy mobile patrols in harassment operations. 
The SAS Brigade in France was also tasked with a number of more unique 
deployments: `Haft' and `Defoe' were reconnaissance operations specifically intended 
to relay targeting information to the Allied air forces; `Titanic-4' was a deception 
operation in which six SAS men were dropped on the eve of D-Day alongside large 
numbers of dummy paratroopers to suggest a large-scale airborne assault; whilst 'Gaff' 
saw a patrol tasked with the assassination of Field-Marshal Rommel. 99 The latter 
operation is an example of an infrequent task for wartime special forces: the deliberate 
targeting of enemy leaders for assassination or kidnap. Other examples of such 
activities are `Flipper', undertaken by former personnel of No. l1 Commando that 
94 Ford, Roger, Fire from the Forest - The SAS Brigade in France, 1944, (Cassell: London, 2003) 
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formed something of a `private army' under Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes to target 
Rommel in November 1941; the kidnapping of pro-Axis Persian General Zahidi in 
late-1942 by SAS Captain Fitzroy Maclean; or SOE's kidnap of General Kreipe on 
Crete in April 1944. It is interesting to note the general absence of similar operations 
undertaken by US special forces. The closest they came to such tasks was an aborted 
Alamo Scout (to be discussed later) operation of May 1944 to kidnap Lieutenant- 
General Adachi in New Guinea. 100 US specialist formations were, conversely, much 
more prone to be deployed to help counter such activities, both the Rangers and 
Raiders occasionally being used as headquarter guards, and the Alamo Scouts forming 
part of General Krueger's personal bodyguard and escort in New Guinea. '01 
In addition to their more familiar harassment and aggressive coup de main operations, 
the SAS Brigade in France had a common mandate to organise, train, and provide 
junior leadership to indigenous resistance movements. Whilst the French SAS 
Regiments were widely employed in such activities in Brittany (as at the `Samwest' 
and `Dingson' bases), there was a definite reluctance to burden the British SAS 
Regiments with such tasks lest they unduly detract from their independent offensive 
activities. 102 Soon after D-Day, Brigadier McLeod, commanding the SAS Brigade, 
warned that the SAS `are military forces carrying out military as opposed to political 
tasks' and that they should not be employed `more than necessary' in organising 
partisan formations, 103 
Other SOE and OSS groups would have a clearer mandate to work directly alongside 
the Resistance in France. One such group whose raison d'etre were such activities, 
were the SOE/SO inter-Allied Jedburgh Teams. Though bearing certain conceptual 
similarities to both the Independent Companies and the work of Wingate's Gideon 
Force in Ethiopia in 1941, the idea for the creation of these groups can be traced back 
to May 1942 discussions between two SOE regional directors: Major Peter Wilkinson 
100 Colonel H. V. White, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Sixth Army to General Krueger, 22 May 
1944, RG 338, Records of Sixth Army G-2 Section, Box 1. The deliberately planned interception of 
Admiral Yamamoto's aircraft in April 1943 by USAAF aircraft from Guadalcanal, which is 
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being any cultural reticence towards such operations being somehow `un-American'. 
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and Robin Brook. If indigenous partisan movements were to be of benefit to 
conventional Allied operations Wilkinson and Brook understood that there was a 
cardinal requirement for guerrilla bands to be adequately equipped and properly 
directed. They thus proposed the formation of dedicated uniformed specialist groups 
which could be dispatched into occupied territories to arm, exploit and coordinate 
indigenous forces in concert with the conventional campaign. 104 This concept was 
tested and validated in front of a multinational audience in the `Spartan' exercises of 3- 
1° 11 March 1943. The OSS, Free French and Belgian representatives observing 
`Spartan' had been sufficiently impressed with the concept to seek direct participation 
in the programme. 106 The project, soon named `Jedburgh', thus became a multinational 
endeavour and recruiting proceeded from SOE, OSS, Free French, Dutch and Belgian 
sources with expectation that three-man teams would be created, each comprising one 
SOE or OSS officer, one bilingual officer (preferably native of the occupied nation), 
and one trained radio operator. 107 
Dispatched into France both independently, and alongside SAS and OG missions, from 
D minus 1 onwards the principal function of the Jedburghs remained that as first 
expounded in May 1942: they were to `make contact with local authorities or existing 
SOE organisations, to distribute the arms, to start off the action of the patriots, and, 
most particularly, to arrange by W/T communication the dropping points and reception 
committees for further arms and equipment'. 1°8 Once contact had been made with 
partisan formations, the Jedburghs had three key areas of responsibility: `Liaison', 
`organisation' and `leadership'. 109 They were to instruct, organise and equip the 
partisans whilst at the same time advise SHAEF on their capabilities. The Jedburghs 
would also act as reception bodies for both SAS and OG elements, and were 
subsequently capable of acting in a liaison capacity between these groups and the 
Resistance. 110 The Jedburghs were, however, considered too small and `too precious' 
104 SOE document, `Co-ordination of activities behind the enemy lines with the actions of allied 
military forces invading N. W. Europe', 6 April 1943,11S 8/288; Foot, SOE, p. 190 
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to participate directly in offensive operations, which would be catered for by the SAS 
and OGs. 111 
The other Anglo-American special forces unit to be widely employed in support of the 
invasion of France were the `French' and (in light of a lack of opportunity for original 
mission) `Norwegian' OSS OGs. As has been previously noted, the OSS OGs were 
created to serve as `operational nuclei' for guerrilla formations: providing a bilingual 
nucleus of military professionals to raise, train, support, and operate indigenous forces. 
The OGs did, however, have a versatile mandate and were also tasked with 
undertaking independent direct action and coup de main missions in a manner similar 
to that of the SAS. There were, however, obvious points of divergence between the 
SAS and OGs such as the linguistic talents of the OSS men and their more explicit 
focus on operations with partisan formations. ' 12 Nor did the OGs employ vehicles in 
the same manner as did the SAS for mobile harassment. An OSS assessment of 
operations in France would later indicate that in the breakout and pursuit stages of 
operations, the OG's absence of vehicles certainly `limited their usefulness'. 113 
It is interesting to note that although America was willing to emulate and cater for 
most special forces roles as exhibited by the British, they never sought to mirror the 
British proclivity for mobile harassment actions. This absence is perhaps most 
attributable to a divergence of perception about the roles of these units. The British 
conception of special forces was forged from the successful and highly mobile 
operations undertaken in the desert. The US never had such a learning experience, and 
by the time of their entry in the war the potential for such activities had declined 
(although, as proven by the likes of the SAS or PPA, not disappeared). The US 
perception of special forces were instead forged at a time when partisan-sponsored 
actions were coming to the fore: special forces were thus viewed primarily as a reserve 
which could be used to harness indigenous forces in support of the main effort rather 
than as actors capable of independent effect. As such, there would be no requirement 
for US special forces to be independently mobile after initial insertion, they would 
operate until they were overrun by conventional arms, at which point their mission 
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would be accomplished. This American perception of the principal role of special 
forces remained throughout the war and beyond. "4 
The initial concept for use of the OGs in France proposed that they would infiltrate the 
coastal area and `conduct hit and run warfare on advance enemy munitions and oil 
dumps, supply columns, armoured columns, and communications'. ' 15 As with early 
schemes for the SAS Brigade, such shallow deployment in a heavily defended area in 
which the majority of the civilian population had been removed would doubtless have 
resulted in only temporary results and would likely have led to heavy casualties 
amongst the Groups. This role was discarded before the invasion and the OGs were 
ultimately tasked with operating as a `strategic reserve' to be dispatched after the 
initial landings into areas in which there was a clear need for their capabilities. 16 By 
deploying proportionately heavier weaponry, including light machine guns, mortars 
and modest anti-tank weaponry, the OGs were particularly well suited to reinforcing 
and providing `stiffening' to both Jedburghs and the Resistance (as with `Percy Red' or 
`Louise'). Although it was projected that the OGs could undertake those offensive and 
coup de main operations which the Jedburghs were unsuited towards, few such 
deployments occurred in France. Most commonly, working closely with the 
Resistance, OGs would undertake harassment operations (such as `Christopher' or 
`Adrian') and perform counter-scorch work (as with `Patrick', `Lindsay' or 
`Donald'). ' 17 In France there was no `typical' deployment for the OGs per se, and the 
objectives and results of each operation was greatly affected by the time at which they 
were employed, the area to which they were dispatched, and the state of readiness and 
composition of partisan formations therein. 
It will be noted that there existed a certain inexplicit overlap between the varied roles 
of the OGs, Jedburghs and SAS Brigade in France. This duplication of effort, 
particularly over responsibilities in dealing with the Resistance, exacerbated by 
command and control problems (discussed later), was at times a source of confusion 
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and animosity in the field. Jedburgh team `llugh', for instance, was particularly critical 
of the lt SAS `Bulbasket' mission with whom they worked. Their after-action report 
stated: 
.... we never considered that uniformed troops, foreign to the country and its language, could carry out sabotage in better conditions than the resistance. On 
the contrary, they attract far more remark, and consequently draw danger not 
only on themselves, but also on all the Maquis in the region. .... The 
employment of `Jeeps' by the SAS at that early stage, showed how little they 
appreciated the true position. " 8 
The manner in which the SAS dealt with the Resistance could be a particular matter of 
contention for the Jedburghs. With scant regard for politics the SAS were generally 
willing to `assist any group, no matter what its political persuasion, to obtain arms if it 
showed any sign of wanting to use them to kill Germans'. 119 Jedburgh `Frederick' 
found it `very difficult' to work with the SAS `Samwest' operation because `they had 
ideas about arming the partisans and rather intruded on our job. We do not mind the 
maximum number of men being armed naturally, but when hasty preparations are 
made and the parachutings fail the effect is bad on the Maquis'. 120 In the field the SAS 
were also prone to take command of the Resistance, something that ran contrary to the 
Jedburgh's mandate to only provide direct leadership when essential. Furthermore, it 
was a role that, as Mackenzie emphasised, the `admirable thugs of the SAS were not 
selected or trained for ... some of their rank and 
file seem to have been a little heavy- 
handed in their dealings with the natives'. '2' Such problems were not, however, 
universal. In stark contrast to Jedburgh team `Frederick's' findings, for example, team 
`George' found the SAS `Dingson' base very capable of operating with the resistance 
claiming they `worked wonderfully .... 
[the SAS] was never a nuisance or a burden to 
us'. '22 
Following the breakout of Normandy and the development of a fluid Allied offensive 
the opportunity to use special forces in depth declined with the advancing front. In this 
situation the function of the SAS, after some speculation, became the provision of 
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jeep-based reconnaissance at the point of advancing Allied armies. 123 In a manner akin 
to the use of 2 °d SAS Regiment in Italy during 1943, their role became `similar to that 
of a reconnaissance regiment as there was not ... any requirement 
for jeep parties to 
break through and operate behind the lines. 124 An exception to these later deployments 
in Belgium, Holland and Germany was Major Farran's newly created 3rd Squadron of 
the 2'' SAS which in December 1944 began conducting operations in depth in 
Northern Italy. 12' After France a number of Jedburghs were deployed to Holland and 
seven teams dropped in support of `Market Garden', others were sent to Italy, 
Yugoslavia and Burma. 126 Plans for Jedburgh deployments in Denmark, China and 
Malaya, although advanced, were never put into effect. 
Although the OG deployments in France highlight well their function alongside 
resistance elements, it is their extensive, but generally ignored, employment in other 
theatres that best highlights their overall versatility. The earliest OG deployments were 
in the Italian theatre, but initially bore little relation to their principal mandate to set up 
and lead indigenous guerrilla forces. 127 In October 1943 personnel of the `Italian' 
Groups participated in the liberation of Corsica helping both in gaining the complicity 
of the Italian garrison and in harrying the German withdrawal. 128 Corsica subsequently 
became the headquarters for `French' and `Italian' OG operations and from the island 
these Groups, often in co-operation with Free French forces, mounted a number of 
`highly successful and effective' small-scale reconnaissance, shipping watch, and 
offensive sabotage raids against the coasts of southern France, northern Italy, and 
various western Mediterranean islands. 129 It was not until July 1944 that AFIIQ 
became willing to exploit the value of Italian partisans and, coinciding with the 
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upsurge in partisan activities elsewhere in Europe, these OGs began to undertake the 
tasks for which they originally had been created. From this point onwards small teams 
of OGs were widely deployed throughout northern Italy and Slovenia to coordinate and 
support partisan formations and disrupt enemy communications. 130 
The most varied of OG operations were undertaken by the `Greek' and `Yugoslav' 
Groups. In early-1944 just over one-hundred OG personnel were sent to the island of 
Vis to serve alongside No. 2 Commando where their role became similar to that of the 
LRDG and SBS in the Aegean, including both offensive raids against neighbouring 
islands and shipping, often mounted alongside Commandos and Yugoslav partisans, as 
well as the establishment of radio stations and shipping watches. 13' From April 1944 
the `Greek' OGs were deployed as part of the `Noah's Ark' operation to harass the 
German withdrawal from Greece. Inserted into Greece and Albania these OGs, often in 
co-operation with elements of the British Raiding Support Regiment (RSR), conducted 
a protracted series of operations to interdict key highways and railroads and provide 
`supporting fire' and assistance to Andartes partisans. 132 Raised in October 1943, the 
RSR was to provide additional fire support to both partisans and the specialist units 
forming part of `Raiding Forces Middle East' and Force 133 in the Adriatic. ' 33 
Equipped with a range of proportionately heavy direct- and indirect-fire weaponry, the 
RSR was also capable of undertaking independent offensive action missions, as seen 
with their late-1944 operations along the Dalmatian Coast, and their participation in 
the `Noah's Ark' operations in Greece. ' 34 
Arriving in Britain in December 1943 the Norwegian OGs, like both the FSSF and 
No. 14 Commando before them, had little opportunity to deploy against Norway. 
Instead, a deficit of trained personnel available for deployment to France would ensure 
that they would deploy alongside the `French' OGs. This was a course of action that 
showed that although the linguistic talents of the OGs were not always of tangible 
value, the personnel involved were sufficiently versatile. It would not be until early- 
1945 that the men of the Norwegian OGs, reorganised into the NORSO (Norwegian 
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Special Operations) Group, were able to deploy, albeit on a limited scale, against 
Norway for the conduct of coup de main operations against rail networks and 
bridges. 131 
The Far Eastern theatre would become as prolific a playground of Allied special forces 
as was France and the Mediterranean. The initial shock of Japanese gains in theatre 
had resulted in a spirit of ad hoc proliferation of `mobs for jobs' which was certainly 
analogous to that occurring in the Desert War 1940-1941. Fine example of such, is the 
creation of `Force Viper' during the Japanese invasion of Burma in January 1942. 
Created under Major Duncan Johnston `Force Viper' comprised a composite group of 
Royal Marines in Ceylon, formerly of MNBDO 1, who volunteered to patrol the Gulf 
of Martaban to help prevent the advancing Japanese from encircling the retreating 
British forces. Utilising an improvised flotilla (consisting of motor launches and a 
paddle steamer) the Force would harass the enemy's advance, guard the flanks of the 
retreating 17`x' Division across the Irrawaddy, and conduct raids and demolitions with 
Major Mike Calvert's 2°d Burma `Commando' (another scratch force). '36 Of the 107 
men who embarked on these operations 58 eventually made it back to India at which 
time the ad hoc force was disbanded. 137 Equally illustrative are those hastily arranged 
stay behind parties in Malaya orchestrated by No. 101 Special Training School (a 
branch of SOE) which conducted harassment and sabotage operations amongst 
indigenous guerrillas following the Japanese advances. 138 
In September 1942, before concepts such as the OGs had been properly solidified, OSS 
activated its first operational detachment of the war: Detachment 101. This group, 
which ultimately would become the most extensive American special forces `unit' 
used during the war, began as a group of less than thirty men seeking to conduct 
intelligence and sabotage operations in Stilwell's CBI theatre. Ultimately deployed to 
northern Burma, the Detachment forged links with anti-Japanese Kachin tribesmen 
whom they armed and formed into units of `Kachin Rangers'. The Detachment initially 
focused on establishing intricate intelligence networks but gradually, and especially 
with the commencement of Stilwell's Burma Road offensive, broadened their role with 
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136 Hampshire, A. Cecil, `The Exploits of Force Viper', The RUSI Journal, (February 1968), pp. 41- 
50 
137 Documents of Major Duncan Johnston, KCLMA Johnston D 
138 For a personal account of such actions, see: Chapman, F. Spencer, The Jingle is Neutral, 
(Granada: London, 1977) 
88 
an emphasis on ambushing and harassing Japanese forces and in providing guides and 
screens for both British and Chinese regular forces as well as for the Chindits and 
Marauders. 139 Detachment 101 underwent significant expansion during the war, with 
their number approaching some one-thousand men by 1945. Alongside this growth, the 
Detachment became the nominal OSS mounting authority in theatre, and with the 
subsequent attachment of both Maritime Unit (discussed below) and OG veterans from 
Europe, its potential repertoire of roles gradually increased. 140 
Detachment 101 also established extensive networks for the recovery of Allied pilots 
downed over Burma which, over the course of the war, succeeded in returning 425 
downed airmen to Allied lines. 141 Furthermore, on the eve of the Japanese surrender a 
number of personnel formerly of Detachment 101 (which had been deactivated in July 
1945) were chosen to parachute into Japanese POW camps to help ensure the correct 
treatment of allied prisoners therein. 142 SHAEF had formed a unit with a similar role 
on 29 March 1945: the `Special Allied Airborne Reconnaissance Force' (SAARF). 
Operating from 25 April SAARF deployed three-man multinational `contact and 
reconnaissance teams' by parachute and land infiltration into POW camps in 
Germany. '43 
In southern Burma SOE (after the creation of SEAC known, in theatre, as Force 136) 
was paralleling Detachment 101's operations in the north and were broadly successful 
in harnessing the local Karen populations into guerrilla forces. Of particular note was 
their operation `Character', launched in February 1945, in which Force 136, supported 
by Jedburgh teams, sponsored and led a large-scale Karen uprising across southern 
Burma to harass the withdrawal of the Japanese 15`h Division. 144 Also of significance 
in this theatre, specifically along the Indo-Burmese border, was `V Force'. Originally 
raised in April 1942 as the `Assam Organisation' from British Army personnel and 
elements of the Assam rifles (armed police), its purpose was to recruit local tribesmen 
139 History of OSS Detachment 101 by Lieutenant-Colonel Peers, CO, November 1944, RG 407, 
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and operate as a post-occupational stay behind force. Deployment saw `this polyglot 
band of endearing thugs', at times alongside Detachment 101 and Detachment 404 (an 
OSS mounting authority-in southern Burma and Southeast Asia), 145 do `magnificent 
work' for Fourteenth Army providing accurate, if occasionally sporadic, intelligence 
on enemy movements; acting as guides and pathfinders; and deploying in a harassment 
capacity. 146 In China, the US Navy operated a similar organisation known first as US 
Naval Group China, and later as SACO (Sino-American Cooperative Organisation), 
under Commander Milton E. Miles. Predating Detachment 101, it had a similar role in 
organising and providing training for Chinese guerrillas as well as the unique role of 
establishing meteorological stations and providing trained weathermen to monitor 
developing weather patterns over China for the benefit of Allied naval and air elements 
in the Pacific. '47 
Perhaps the most versatile example of an independent US special forces unit raised 
during the war was the Sixth Army Special Reconnaissance Unit, or the Alamo Scouts. 
The Scouts arose to fill a gap caused by inadequacies of conventional forces, and the 
motivation, if not the mechanism, behind their creation was certainly analogous to that 
behind the establishment of the LRDG in 1940.148 Their `champion' and, in the 
American model, architect of their design was Lieutenant-General Walter Krueger, 
GOC Sixth Army, who in late-1943 was `concerned about the lack of reliable ground 
intelligence available to his command..... Such intelligence was hard to obtain in the 
dense jungles of the Southwest Pacific'. 149 Although Krueger benefited from 
intelligence from Australian Coastwatchers and US maritime-orientated special 
reconnaissance units, problems with the dissemination of such intelligence led Krueger 
to identify a need for a special intelligence unit that would be at his personal 
disposal. 150 In November 1943, having canvassed ideas from other formations, Krueger 
tasked Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Bradshaw with creating the Alamo Scouts 
Training Center ('Alamo' was the codename of Sixth Army) in New Guinea. 15' 
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The purpose of the Training Center was to qualify Sixth Army volunteers `for the 
efficient performance of scouting and patrolling duties under all conditions of terrain, 
weather, and vegetation found in the Southwest Pacific; and to train teams capable of 
landing near, and reconnoitring, areas of future operations'. 152 Only a proportion of the 
personnel graduating from the Center would be formed into Scout units whilst the 
remainder were returned to their units to disseminate the techniques learned. This 
approach was unique to American formations and, as has been noted, was also the 
motivation behind the creation of the Rangers: to improve the whole by training the 
few. 
The primary purpose of the Scouts was, like the LRDG, the provision of human 
intelligence via small four- to eight-man patrols, and the undertaking of road and 
coastal watches. 153 Deployment in the Southwest Pacific ensured that the unit would 
have a strong amphibious focus and would be called upon to supply both military 
intelligence as well as, as at Leyte, to furnish information on beaches and topography, 
and prepare maps. The Scouts were also excellent guides for both conventional and 
specialised forces, as illustrated by their reconnaissance and guidance of the 6`h 
Rangers for their raid on Cabantuan. Deployment in the Philippines saw the Scout's 
role expand with the unit liaising with guerrillas and organising intelligence networks. 
Although the Scouts were `specifically indoctrinated with the idea of avoiding combat 
except when essential to the accomplishment of their mission', their inherent flexibility 
ensured that small-scale raids, roving ambushes, and demolitions were all part of their 
intended repertoire. The October 1944 raid on a prison camp on Moari in New Guinea 
to rescue thirty-two natives is a good example of their more aggressive capabilities. '54 
In addition to the various special forces mentioned above, both Britain and the US 
would develop an extensive range of maritime-orientated special forces. As compared 
to the broad, and at times indistinct, roles of land-orientated special forces, maritime 
special forces tended to have better defined, more individualistic, roles that were 
subject to much less transition. Despite this, with little or no precedent to follow, the 
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earliest maritime focused special forces were, like the first land-orientated examples, 
by no means inflexible in the roles that they were intended to undertake. 
The first maritime special force conceived during the war was the Special Boat Service 
(SBS) created in July 1940. Its inception, analogous to many early British formations, 
occurred at the hands of an `errant captain': Lieutenant Roger Courtney, pre-war game 
hunter and experienced canoeist. 155 As a member of No. 8 Commando training in 
Scotland, Courtney developed ideas about the military potential of canoe-based raids 
and reconnaissance and promptly illustrated these to sceptical superiors with a 
successful, if unorthodox, demonstration. Admiral Keyes, DCO was impressed, 
promoted Courtney and allowed him to raise a 12 man `Folbot Section' for his 
Commando. '56 Sent to the Mediterranean with the `Layforce' Commando group this 
Section would be renamed 1s` SBS in April 1941. The unit was subsequently attached 
to the 1 S` and 10h Submarine Flotillas in Alexandria and Malta where SBS pairs were 
given carte blanche to undertake operations during submarine sorties as and when 
opportunities arose. 157 Throughout 1941 they undertook an extensive range of 
operations that broadened their initial role to include beach reconnaissance, pilotage, 
sabotage operations, raids and personnel transport. 118 Their attachment to submarines 
ended after a year, and following a period of costly operations that made continued 
independent existence difficult, the unit became linked to `L' Detachment SAS in a 
`shotgun marriage'. 159 
As if to highlight the inevitability of the SBS idea, almost concurrent to the creation of 
Courtney's unit, No. 6 Commando had also independently conceived of, and created, 
its own Folbot troop, known as 101 Troop, for much the same purpose. Operating from 
mainland Britain, however, the Troop was not afforded the same ad hoc flexibility that 
the 1st SBS achieved in its attachment to submarines in the Mediterranean, and its 
operations were confined to sporadic attacks on enemy shipping using `Limpet' mines 
and limited reconnaissances of the French coast, tasks often hampered by unsuitable 
weather and water conditions. 160 In May 1942 calls for the expansion of the SBS led to 
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101 Troop be re-designed the 2°d SBS. Sent to the Mediterranean, 2nd SBS mirrored the 
versatility of its forebear by carrying out a number of diverse intelligence-and 
offensive-orientated roles. Soon after the 2°d SBS's creation, Major Guy Courtney 
(brother of Roger) formed `Z' SBS that retained close links with submarine flotillas 
and undertook many clandestine reconnaissance and transportation roles, most notably 
landing General Mark Clark in North Africa and recovering General Giraud from 
France. 161 Later, in 1944, when deployed to the Far East the `A', `B', and `C' SBS 
groups, each formed around a nucleus of experienced SBS personnel who had served 
in Europe, managed to maintain a flexible and innovative approach to both offensive 
action, reconnaissance and transportation tasks along the Arakan coastline and the 
Chindwin and Irrawaddy rivers. 162 `Z' SBS, also sent to the Far Eastern theatre in mid- 
1944, would primarily conduct ferrying and clandestine operations with Force 136.163 
Soon after the inception of the SBS and 101 Troop yet more maritime special forces 
with an offensive mandate developed, each justifying their independent existence by 
the provision of a niche role or technique. In November 1940 another `errant captain', 
Major H. G. `Blondie' Hasler, RM `a natural small boat man' who sought to emulate 
the success of Italian `human torpedo' attacks, wrote a paper to the Admiralty 
`proposing a method of attack on ships in harbour employing a type of single-seater 
submersible canoe manned by a shallow water diver'. Analogous to the fate of 
Bagnold's first suggestions for the LRDG, both this paper and a subsequent one 
(emphasising reconnaissance) submitted in May 1941, were rejected as being 
impracticable and unwarranted. 164 It was not until the effectiveness of Italian 
developments were vividly illustrated by the successful attacks on the Battleships 
Queen Elizabeth and Valiant in Alexandria Harbour on 14 December 1941 that the 
establishment was suitably shocked into action. 165 
Hasler was subsequently attached to the Combined Operations Development Centre 
(CODC) with the task `to study, co-ordinate and develop all methods of stealthy 
seaborne attack by very small parties'. Having spent much time developing and 
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trialling an explosive motor boat of the kind of which had been demonstrated by the 
Italians (named the `Boom Patrol Boat'); Basler believed the best way to employ these 
craft would be to use `Cockle' canoes alongside them to negotiate enemy harbour 
boom defences. Believing that it was necessary to develop the use of Cockles and the 
BPBs within a single unit to ensure the best possible cohesion, on 6 July 1942 
Mountbatten would accordingly authorise Hasler to recruit 46 men and form the Royal 
Marine Boom Patrol Detachment (RMBPD). 166 The niche specialisation, and sole 
operational occupation, (in which Major Hasler hoped to gain a level of proficiency 
unsurpassed by any other formation) of the Detachment was to be the attack of dock 
installations and ships in harbour utilising new CODC technologies. 167 
The first deployment of the RMBPD, operation `Frankton', is easily their most 
noteworthy action. Mounted in December 1942 it was a bold but costly attempt to 
attack blockade running shipping in the docks of Bordeaux. Although neither the target 
nor method of attack was truly unique (in April 1942 101 Troop had sunk a 7,000 ton 
tanker in Boulogne harbour using such means)168, in both depth of deployment and in 
method of exfiltration, however, the operation is almost without parallel. 169 
Transported via submarine to the mouth of the Gironde River, the unit deployed canoes 
to paddle the entire length of the watercourse to reach their targets before having to 
escape and evade overland through France to Spain. Out of the ten `Cockleshell 
Heroes' that launched their canoes, it was a feat managed by only Hasler and his 
partner Bill Sparks. 17° In late-1943 the RMBPD was sent for service with `Raiding 
Forces Middle East' where they would undertake a number of sporadic deployments, 
the most notable of which being their successful attack on two German destroyers near 
Leros in June 1944 which facilitated the SBS (Squadron) and Greek Sacred Squadron's 
raid on Simi in July. "' The activity in which the RMBPD was most active, however, 
was their non-operational provision of personnel for the development and trial of new 
166 Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. G. Langley, Commandant CODC to CCO, 12 May 1942, DEFE 2/988 
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equipment and technologies, such as the BPBs and `sleeping beauty' submersible 
attack craft. 172 
Another offensively-minded British maritime special forces formation with a niche 
role was the Sea Reconnaissance Unit (SRU). 173 Predictably, the idea for its inception 
came from one junior officer, Lieutenant Bruce S. Wright, RCNVR. An experienced 
pre-war swimmer, Wright was patrolling a Newfoundland harbour boom in January 
1941 when he struck upon the idea that teams of `abalone divers' could be used to 
infiltrate harbours and attack shipping therein with mines. Although the Italians had 
used similar methods against Gibraltar, Wright claimed no knowledge of this fact. 
Submitting his ideas to COHQ, Wright was eventually called to Britain to demonstrate 
his proposed methods. Upon arrival Mountbatten sent him to the RMBPD to see if they 
could adapt to his techniques but it was soon made apparent that the requirements of 
canoe-specialists were not the same as those for combat swimmers. Mountbatten thus 
permitted Wright to form a 40 man unit from scratch. Hasler dutifully helped him 
recruit his force. 174 
Like the RMBPD, the SRU had gained establishment by forging a unique approach to 
existent tasks. Its niche was the use of both surface and underwater combat swimmers 
to undertake offensive and intelligence tasks against `objectives not otherwise 
attainable by canoes or other craft'. 175 Training in California and Nassau had 
accustomed the unit to tropical conditions something which later precluded their 
deployment in coldwater operations from Britain before D-Day. 176 Eventually being 
deployed to SEAC, from February 1945 the SRU retained its unique tactical approach 
to undertake small-scale reconnaissance and offensive raids against river and shoreline 
targets in Burma. "' Joining these other maritime special forces in the Far East in early- 
1945 was Royal Marine Detachment 385. Raised in March 1944, the Detachment was 
to specialise in the full gamut of small boat work including offensive, intelligence and 
transportation tasks. 178 Comprising eight troops, each of thirty men, it was to conduct 
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operations requiring greater strength than was possible with the other smaller maritime 
special forces. 179 The nature of Detachment 385's deployments has definite similarities 
to the actions of a `special' OG which had been raised in early-1944 for reconnaissance 
and ferrying operations in this theatre. ' 80 
Contrasted with the British, the US developed offensive special maritime capabilities 
comparatively late in the day, and when they did so they were heavily influenced by 
the British. This delay in creation did, however, ensure that when America began to 
develop such capabilities they occurred, as with the OGs, in a centralised manner, 
under the OSS Maritime Unit (MU) branch, instead of the cumbersome variety of 
disparate formations which had proliferated in Britain. Despite the confusing 
nomenclature, the MU was not a coherent formation but was instead, as with the OGs, 
an OSS operating branch comprising a collection of different elements each 
responsible for a slightly different operational niche or area of operation. 
The creation of the MU owes much to the British example. In February 1942 
Commander H. G. A. Woolley, an experienced British naval officer and advisor on 
combined operations to the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, was loaned to 
COI to advise Donovan `on British methods of training operatives and raiding forces'. 
In late-April 1942 Woolley suggested that COI establish a maritime training school for 
clandestine agents and thus with his guidance 'Area D' was created on the Potomac 
near Quantico. 18' By January 1943 this fledgling organisation had become the OSS 
MU and, placed under the aegis of the larger SO branch, began to take responsibility 
for the development of specialised equipment and the organisation of operational units. 
In June 1943 the MU was granted branch status that enabled it to put personnel into the 
field. 182 
The MU had three broad responsibilities: `clandestine ferrying', `maritime sabotage' 
and, from October 1943 (following a split with the OSS main R&D branch), the trial 
and development of new technologies in a manner similar to that of the RMBPD. 
183 
The `clandestine ferrying' branch of the MU was broadly responsible for catering to all 
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OSS small boat needs including the infiltration of clandestine personnel and supply of 
resistance groups. The first deployment of the MU in this role came with the 
establishment in Cairo of a clandestine ferry service for Greece and the Aegean. Its 
role was, however, limited by an absence of suitable craft and competition with various 
other agencies charged with the same role, including `Z' SBS and the Admiralty's 
`Levant Schooner Flotilla'. 184 
In October 1943 the MU had created a `special maritime group' closely mirroring the 
role and composition of the British SRU. This group underwent offensive swimming 
and `frogman' training in close conjunction with the SRU in both California and 
Nassau before a proportion of it was dispatched to Britain for deployment. Their use 
from Britain was, however, greatly hamstrung by a number of problems with weather 
and water conditions (as experienced by the SRU) as well as by the general absence of 
US shipping from which to mount independent operations; a common impediment to 
the use of US maritime special forces in all theatres bar the Pacific. 185 This group was 
subsequently sent to Burma in an effort to extend Detachment 101's operational 
repertoire and, later still, elements would join an expanded MU organisation in Ceylon 
as a part of Detachment 404 to conduct clandestine transportation tasks analogous to 
those performed by `Z' SBS for Force 136.186 
The individual MU group that had the most frequent and versatile deployment was that 
commanded by Lieutenant Richard Kelly in the Italian theatre. Working from June 
1944 onwards this group benefited considerably from the attachment of experienced 
Italian personnel formerly of the `San Marco Battalion' to its ranks. ' 87 The first 
deployments of this group were the `Ossining' series of operations against the coast of 
northern Italy and Istria which, somewhat analogous to early SBS deployments, 
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involved seaborne infiltration for the destruction of coastal roads and railways. ' 88 This 
group would subsequently be widely employed in a range of offensive, intelligence- 
orientated and ferrying tasks that were conducted alongside, or for the benefit of, 
partisans, Allied subversive agencies, and other special forces. '89 
Not all specialist seaborne units were created with an offensive expedient in mind, 
however, and a far more important requirement was the provision of beach 
reconnaissance and assault pilotage. It was a field in which Britain and the US 
independently of one another would simultaneously develop parallel capabilities. The 
British pioneer in this field was Nigel Clogstoun-Willmott, RN. Having taken part in 
the Norwegian campaign, Willmott understood the complexities of amphibious warfare 
and the value of beach reconnaissance in its conduct. 190 In March 1941 Willmott was 
appointed Navigational Officer for proposed amphibious landings against Rhodes, and 
in this position he persuaded GHQ MEF to allow him to conduct a survey of the 
island's beaches via canoe, something that he did alongside Major Roger Courtney of 
the SBS. 19' This was, however, a unique experiment. Despite Willmott and Courtney 
maintaining some unofficial liaison and the SBS's conducting occasional limited 
military reconnaissances, there were, at this time, no concerted moves to develop a 
dedicated beach reconnaissance and survey capability! 92 
The requirement for such units received increased attention following inadequacies of 
hydrographic and beach reconnaissance during the Dieppe raid where `the gradient of 
the shingle beach was calculated from a post card of the sea front'. 193 With operation 
`Torch' in the pipeline the need to rectify such deficiencies became even more 
pronounced. Thus in mid-September 1942 Willmott was ordered to raise a formation to 
fulfil these tasks. This formation, made up of naval volunteers that had been trained by 
the SBS in small boat techniques, ' 94 comprised two groups: `Koodoo' which sought to 
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perform pre-invasion reconnaissance; and `Inhuman' which was to undertake approach 
marking and pilotage. 195 Although `Koodoo's' reconnaissance was, in light of security 
concerns, limited to that undertaken by periscope only, `Inhuman' performed well and, 
from their perspective, `the Assault operation was a great success'. 196 Although 
following `Torch' `Koodoo-Inhuman' was disbanded, the value of such units had been 
established. Subsequently, on 27 November 1942 Willmott was given responsibility 
for forming a proper organisation and of supervising the creation of nine Combined 
Operations Pilotage Parties (Copps). 197 Their role, as broadly defined, was before an 
assault to `provide all the non-air-photo reconnaissance required' on both main and 
subsidiary beaches, and during the assault to provide `pilotage, assault marking, 
demolition guides, mine guide, and Royal Engineer assault guide duties'. '98 
From `Torch' onwards (Koodoo-Inhuman's forays inclusive) such roles had become 
considered an essential prerequisite to all future major amphibious actions and COPPs 
would serve in all major European amphibious landings (bar Anvil/Dragoon) and 
would participate widely in numerous smaller operations in the Adriatic, Aegean and 
Mediterranean. Prior to `Overlord' COPP teams undertook both offshore soundings 
from LCNs as well as shore-side canoe and swimmer reconnaissances from the newly- 
developed `X-Craft' four-man submersibles. Later, in the subsequent drive on 
Germany, the European COPPs would be called upon to undertake reconnaissances of 
the Rhine and Elbe rivers. From Autumn-1944 COPP teams had been deployed to the 
Far East in preparation for both projected amphibious landings as well as numerous 
river crossings. 199 This theatre also saw COPPs occasionally perform more diverse 
activities removed from their initial mandate, such as COPP 3's demolition of mines 
and stakes obstructing a landing on the Myebon Peninsula in January 1945; 200 or 
COPP 9's participation in overland reconnaissance in conjunction with OSS agents and 
indigenous forces in April 1945.201 
American developments in beach reconnaissance and pilotage although developing 
broadly independently of the British, would occur at almost the same time. USMC and 
195 Lieutenant-Commander Willmott to Naval Commander in Chief, Expeditionary Force, 20 
September 1942, DEFE 2/741 
196 Outline history of COPPs prepared for War Diary, 26 November 1943, DEFE 2/1116 
197 Minutes of COHQ meeting, 27 November 1942, DEFE 2/4 
198 Reports for the historical record of SBU, 26 January 1944, DEFE 2/1035 199 COPP War Diary, DEFE 2/741; documents in ADM 179/347; DEFE 2/1101 
200 Outline history of COPPs prepared for War Diary, 26 November 1943, DEFE 2/1116 201 Lieutenant I. Morison, CO COPP 9, Report on `Natkan', 17 April 1945, DEFE 2/1204 
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Army landing exercises conducted on New River, North Carolina in July-August 1941 
had highlighted the initial requirement for these units. 202 Consequently, Colonel Lewis 
B. Ely was assigned the task of developing reconnaissance and marking capabilities 
and began to perform trials on a variety of techniques including the deployment of 
small reconnaissance groups from submarines. Rudimentary assault pilotage 
techniques began to be developed from March 1942 from the `Boat pool' of the 
Amphibious Training Base (ATB) at Solomons Island, Maryland, and subsequently, at 
Ely's recommendation another ATB was set up in Little Creek, Virginia where 
assorted volunteers created the Amphibious Scout and Raider School (Joint) on 15 
August 1942.203 The US Scouts and Raiders (S&R) trained at this school represented 
the first American maritime special force established during the war. The unit's 
operational forte was shoreline reconnaissance, beach survey and assault pilotage. The 
`Raider' element of their training (and nomenclature) largely being only for self- 
preservation. 204 
The first operational deployments of S&R personnel was, like `Koodoo-Inhuman', at 
`Torch' where S&R teams had the objectives of cutting harbour booms and anti- 
submarine nets before providing pilotage. 205 Later, S&R personnel would, both 
independently, and in close cooperation with the COPPs, undertake similar activities 
throughout the Mediterranean and Adriatic, as well as performing soundings prior to 
'Overlord'. 206 Common to many special forces, the S&Rs also had a significant 
training and instructional mandate; their school at Fort Pierce, Florida providing 
instruction to the 2°d and 5`" Rangers, the FSSF, and the USMC Reconnaissance 
Companies. 207 In July 1943 S&R instructors, alongside Australian personnel, were also 
responsible for the creation of the relatively short-lived `Special Service Unit 1' in the 
Southwest Pacific to perform amphibious scouting. This unit would later provide a 
nucleus of instructors for the Alamo Scouts. 208 The range of tasks which S&R-trained 
personnel would ultimately undertake was exhaustive and would include employment 
202 Dwyer, John B., Scouts and Raiders, (Praeger, 1993) pp. 3-4 203 03 This school would subsequently relocate to the Fort Pierce, Florida ATB. Ibid. pp. 5-6 
204 Commander J. C. Hammock, USNATB Fort Pierce, Florida on `Training Activities', RG 24, 
Historical Records of Navy Training Activities, 1940-1945, Box 28; Folder ATB Fort Pierce, 
Florida 
205 Marquis, Susan L., Unconventional Warfare, (Brookings Institution: Washington, 1997) p. 21 
206 Admiral B. H. Ramsay to CCO, 11 December 1943, RG 331, Entry 12, Box 14; Folder 
SHAEF/6RX/INT 
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as 'UDTs, Scout Intelligence Officers, Beachmasters and Control Officers'. Towards 
the end of the war twenty S&Rs would be sent to join SACO in China under the name 
`Amphibious Roger' to help train Chinese guerrillas. 209 Joining this group in this role 
were a number of European- and Burma-experienced OGs which were sent to China to 
raise and train twenty Chinese `Commando' groups. 210 
To cater for operations in the Pacific the USMC also sought to develop its own 
independent special amphibious reconnaissance capabilities, and by October 1942 a 
comprehensive document on `Reconnaissance Patrols Landing on Hostile Shores' had 
been drafted. This highlighted the need to develop mechanisms for tactical and 
hydrographic beach reconnaissance, assault pilotage, deception operations, and small- 
scale direct action missions. Z" This document served as a call to arms, and in January 
1943 the USMC created the Amphibious Reconnaissance Company (later Battalion) 
under Captain James Logan Jones. The Reconnaissance Company working in the 
Central Pacific shared a number of the roles of the Underwater Demolition Teams 
(UDT), albeit often maintaining a more clandestine focus, and, in addition, was 
capable of undertaking both overland reconnaissance and modest offensive action tasks 
(well illustrated by their deployment against Apamama atoll in November 1943). 212 
With the development of the Central Pacific drive this unit was gradually expanded, 
first with the creation of a second company, and later gaining battalion strength. The 
unit's growth and employment in the numerous amphibious landings in the Central 
Pacific, in direct contrast to the comparative decline of the USMC Raiders, shows that 
despite their apparent reticence towards elite units, the USMC were still willing to 
utilise them when necessity determined it. 213 
Another pressing problem confronting the Allies that specialist seaborne units arose to 
help alleviate was that of overcoming underwater, beach and shore-side obstacles (both 
natural and man-made) and defences that might impede amphibious landings. On 6 
May 1943 Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief US Navy, issued a directive 
209 Dwyer (1993), pp. 34; 135; 143 210 For information on OG activities in China, see: RG 226, Entry 154, Boxes 162-166 211 Colonel G. B. Erskine, Corps intelligence order 4-42 `Reconnaissance Patrols Landing on I lostile 
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proposing the training of men for permanent `Naval Demolition Units'. 214 King was 
sparked into this by an `urgent requirement' for approach channels to be opened up for 
the landings on Sicily. 215 To this end, a scratch unit of US Navy `SeeBees' comprising 
three officers and fifteen men, was formed as `Demolitions Unit No. P at the Solomons 
Island ATB, given basic instruction, and deployed to Sicily. Although the unit was not 
required as expected at `Husky', the potential value of such units had been highlighted 
so that when the men returned to the US they became the nucleus for the newly- 
authorised Naval Combat Demolition Units (NCDUs), each comprised one officer and 
five men. 216 
The direct British `equivalent' to the NCDUs were the Landing Craft Obstacle 
Clearance Units (LCOCUs), initially referred to as the `RN Boom Commando' or 
`Boom Clearance Parties', which, like their NCDU counterparts, developed just before 
the Sicily invasion. 217 Both units were utilised, with varying levels of responsibility, in 
all major European amphibious landings from Sicily onwards. Their work was 
gradually supplemented, occasionally by direct attachment, by personnel of the US 
Army Corps of Engineers, Royal Engineers and the Royal Marine Engineer 
Commandos who would be responsible for demolitions above the high-watermark in 
the assault. 2'8 It was not until shortly before D-Day, however, that inter-service co- 
operation on these tasks was firmly established and `gap assault' teams were created 
from a combination of both Naval and Army personnel. 219 
Although the S&R concept had expanded to the Southwest Pacific with the creation of 
the 7`h Amphibious Force Special Unit I in March 1943 under Commander William B. 
214 Inter-service tensions and confusion over the responsibility for shoreline and high-water mark 
demolitions had caused the US Army's Corps of Engineers to parallel a number of the NCDU 
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instigation of the US Navy's programme. Unlike the Navy, however, the Army assigned this role to 
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Coultas, and the USMC had created their Reconnaissance Company, on the whole, 
however, the development of specialist reconnaissance and demolitions units in the 
Pacific was, in light of potential requirement, surprisingly slow in coming. 220 The real 
catalyst for change, the identification of need, stemmed from assaults on Tarawa and 
Makin in November 1943. The difficultly experienced in crossing the coral reef 
illuminating `the crying need for scout-swimmers'. 221 Although immediately prior to 
Tarawa, Admiral Nimitz `had directed his own gunnery officer Captain Tom B. Hill to 
assemble a beach reconnaissance and demolition unit', time was too short for it to be 
properly used in the operation. 222 Following Tarawa and Makin, Rear-Admiral 
Richmond Kelly Turner, Commander Fifth Amphibious Force, conducted an analysis 
of lessons learnt and identified the cardinal requirement for a naval demolition and 
reconnaissance unit. Subsequently, on 26 December 1943 Turner called for the 
formation of nine Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) and the creation of an 
Experimental and Tactical Underwater Demolition Station on 1lawaii. 223 Following 
some initial guidance from the NCDU teams at Fort Pierce, the first UDTs were 
established. Comprised 100 men of all ranks, their creation absorbed a large quantity 
of NCDUs and by May 1944 the NCDU programme at Fort Pierce was converted into 
the larger UDT organisation. 224 
Formed from a combination of personnel that included men of the NCDU, S&Rs and 
OSS MU, the UDTs had a somewhat broad range of capabilities. Their role was not 
limited to demolitions, therefore, but also included reconnaissance and pilotage 
activities. The first UDT deployments were in operation `Flintlock' against Roi Namur 
and Kwajalein. Despite these operations being somewhat ad hoc because the `Teams 
lacked permanence, cohesion, discipline and military experience', they did, however, 
prove the `value of night reconnaissance in rubber boats' and of obstacle demolitions 
and led to the development of seven more UDTs. 225 Unlike the prevailing night-time 
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and clandestine approach to reconnaissance and pilotage tasks that dominated all 
amphibious operations before `Overlord' in the European theatre, the methods of the 
UDTs in the Central Pacific, in correlation with the prevailing amphibious doctrine 
that sacrificed surprise for firepower, were more overt in focus, often conducted in 
daylight under the cover of supporting fires. The exception to this general rule was 
UDT 10 which, formed from a nucleus of OSS swimmers who had trained with the 
SRU, also undertook a number of clandestine reconnaissance tasks from submarines, 
226 as seen before the landings on Palau, Yap and Truk. 
The increasing importance of amphibious operations during the war not only called for 
beach reconnaissance, combat demolitions and pilotage roles, but also for deception 
and diversion operations. In April 1942 COHQ created the `Camouflage Training and 
Development Centre B', later known as the `Combined Operations Scout Unit' 
(COSU), to conduct sonic, aural, visual, and wireless deceptions before amphibious 
landings. 227 Inspired by this unit, in March 1943, the US Navy had formed the `Beach 
Jumpers' with a similar mandate. 228 Both British and American units would work as 
part of the `A Force' deception plans for the large-scale amphibious landings on Sicily 
and Italy as well as in smaller operations in the Adriatic. 
Although this chapter has only covered the inception and employment of Anglo- 
American special forces in broad brush strokes, it is quite evident that in comparison to 
the commando and ranger variety of unit, the processes of inception and use of the 
various special forces during the Second World War were considerably more complex. 
The speed and extent to which British specialist formations proliferated during the first 
years of the war is illustrative of their cultural enthusiasm for such means. They would 
develop from various sources, both high-level policy decisions and from the grass- 
roots ideas of junior officers. The latter ad hoc and informal process of innovation and 
acceptance, the relationship between the `errant captain' and `champion', was uniquely 
British. There were no American counterparts to the likes of Bagnold, Stirling, 
Courtney or Hasler etc. as innovators and practitioners. Instead, for the US, it was so 
often the higher-commander which played the essential `founding father' role 
inception, as with Donovan's role with COUOSS groups; General Marshall laying the 
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foundations for both the Rangers and the FSSF; or General Walter Krueger's raising 
the Alamo Scouts and 6th Rangers. 
As nascent creations the roles of the earliest special forces, such as the LRDG and ist 
SBS, were uniquely broad. These units initially offered unknown potentials and their 
ad hoc and highly individualistic patterns of inception had ensured that their exact 
function and projected manner of employment was left largely undefined. In their 
formative periods, therefore, there was a certain proclivity to view these units, often 
derisively, as `private armies', as temporary, small-scale expedients that did not require 
an explicit expression of purpose. It was the rise and use of these formations in the 
Desert War that was of the greatest significance in defining the genre of special forces; 
successes in both offensive and intelligence tasks led both to the expansion and 
legitimisation of these units. By the end of 1942 these formations had escaped the 
stigma of the `private army' and were increasingly viewed as useful, if not essential, 
adjuncts to conventional operations. 
That the growth and legitimisation of offensively-orientated special forces shadowed 
the transition of the commando role was no coincidence. Special forces such as the 
SAS and SSRF were created because of growing frustrations with the ability of 
commando formations to undertake raiding operations at the required frequency, scale 
and depth. That special forces were proving themselves to be a more cost-effective, 
versatile, and simpler alternative to the committal of commando formations certainly 
hastened the general evolution of the commando role. For many special forces, 
however, small-scale autonomous raiding, the brief raison d'etre of the commando 
formation, would represent only one occupation within their much broader range of 
other responsibilities. 
In many regards the proliferation and use of special forces was in direct contrast to that 
of the commando and ranger formations. Whilst from the summer of 1944 onwards the 
commando, and particularly ranger, formations faced gradual decline in deployment 
and even disbandment, the special forces, conversely, continued to grow in both 
establishment (with units such as Royal Marine Detachment 385 or SAARF being 
created at a relatively late stage) and use, as the concerted employment of various 
special forces in virtually all theatres throughout 1944-45 attests. The divergence in 
employment is most pronounced with the US example. Whilst in 1945 the personnel 
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employed in their ranger-style formations had declined to approximately 1,350 men, 
the number of men in their special forces was at an all-time high of approximately 
4,770 men, a figure that even exceeded the comparative number of 3,870 men within 
the British special forces at this time. It is quite clear therefore that, unlike with the 
rangers and commandos, both Britain and the US (contrary to much historical opinion) 
almost equally embraced both the development and use of special forces units. 
The role and employment of special forces evolved alongside transitions in the overall 
strategic picture. Alongside heralding the formal transition of commandos and rangers 
towards spearheading and flank guard duties, the amphibious invasions of North Africa 
and Sicily also witnessed the creation and employment of dedicated special forces to 
cater for hydrographical and topographical reconnaissance, underwater and shore-side 
demolitions, assault pilotage, and deception operations. Similarly, whilst the stresses 
and strains of protracted overland campaigns had propelled commando formations into 
more conventional deployments, they offered special forces the potential to conduct 
operations in depth to support main force activities in a more indirect manner. Most 
significantly, perhaps, was the gradual inclusion of special forces within the resistance 
war and the coordination of their activities with emergent partisan movements. The 
summer of 1944 saw a distinct acceleration in the employment of special forces in such 
a capacity as Allied subversive agencies aimed to coincide the upsurge of many 
European partisan movements with the invasion of France in order to recoup the 
greatest disruptive benefit to the German war effort. Before this date, and despite some 
concerted lobbying from the likes of the SAS and OGs in Italy, special forces were 
rarely able, or permitted, to deploy in depth to the scale which they desired. 
In the later stages of the war operations alongside partisan formations became both 
more common and an increasingly important function for many special forces, even for 
those units without an original mandate for such roles. Operating in depth, special 
forces were increasingly called upon to act as political liaison groups and civil affairs 
officers. As Mackenzie stated, `the guerrilla leader, and the officer attached to him, had 
to be as much politician as soldier, and it was rarely possible to undertake serious 
operations without considering political consequences'. 229 The dispatch of Major 
Jellicoe of the SBS into Rhodes to negotiate with the Italian garrison soon after Italy's 
surrender is a prime example of such a role, as is the dispatch, with similar 
229 Mackenzie, p. 41 
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motivations, of Lieutenant-Colonel Serge Obolensky of the OSS OGs to both Sardinia 
and Corsica. Specialist forces such as the LRDG, SBS and OGs also undertook civil 
affairs or `hearts and minds' operations, helping to gain the complicity and support of 
local populations by the provision of supplies and medical care etc.. Prime example of 
such a role was `Antagonist' an OG operation in France in which an OSS medical 
officer was dispatched to support the `Percy Red' group and organise medical services 
to the Maquis and local population. 230 
Links with partisans was a natural concomitant to operating in depth, a nucleus of pre- 
existing indigenous support being an important pre-requisite for the committal of 
uniformed special forces. The use of special forces in enemy controlled territory with 
no nucleus of support imposed severe limitations on the activities that they could 
expect to undertake. Conversely, with resistance formations in existence (or in sparsely 
populated areas such as in the desert), the potential for special forces became widely 
extended. Deployment of special forces alongside partisans was oflen a mutually 
beneficial arrangement. Indigenous forces provided special forces with both guides and 
intelligence, and if properly equipped and trained, additional manpower for security 
cordons and reception committees etc. thus freeing up the special forces personnel for 
other activities. Special forces, for their part, could provide partisans with guidance, 
training, direction, leadership, equipment and `stiffening'. 231 Such roles were common 
for both the SAS and the OGs in France, and was the raison d'etre of the RSR. 
In a number of areas Britain and the US would raise special forces for similar 
purposes, such as those catering for beach reconnaissance, pilotage, underwater 
demolitions, and deception tasks; and, as with the Jedburghs and SAARF, even formed 
units of a multinational composition. Despite this, and unlike the commando and 
ranger formations in which there was a definite inter-Allied commonality, there were 
some notable differences between the variety of special forces that Britain and the US 
raised, and in the manner in which they would operate. There was, for example, no 
American effort to cater for autonomous mobile harassment operations widely 
undertaken by the likes of the SAS or PPA; no comparable effort to emulate to the 
same extent the broad gamut of British maritime special forces; no units utilising 
230 EMFFI Operational Brief No. 3, operation `Antagonist', 8 August 1944, RG 226, Entry 148, Box 
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enemy uniform such as the SIG; and little effort to decapitate enemy leadership via 
assassination or kidnap. That the US did not undertake such roles, or form specialised 
units for their conduct, was partly due to their cultural perception as to what were 
acceptable roles for these formations, but was also greatly affected by the state of the 
strategic situation when they were conceiving their units. 
Conversely, amongst the British there was no concerted effort to emulate either the 
strategic reserve role of the OGs or their bilingual talents for dealing with indigenous 
forces; nor was there the same proclivity to create special forces from institutions such 
as the S&R School or the Alamo Scouts Training Center, which could train units and 
disseminate their specialist techniques; nor did the British, largely because of the 
drastically different amphibious warfare doctrine that developed in Europe, make any 
effort to emulate the size, scale or the methods of UDT operations. Despite these 
doctrinal and organisational differences, one cannot escape the prevailing impression 
of just how close the Anglo-American alliance was in the field of specialist forces and 
irregular warfare. The next requirement of this thesis is to examine in greater depth the 
significance of this `special relationship' on the rise, development and use of both 
British and American commando and special forces. 
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Chapter 3 
Allied co-operation and interdependency 
It is a widely established truism that by 1944 the US military had matched, and was 
beginning to exceed, the British contribution to fighting the Second World War. 
Britain was gradually becoming the lesser partner in the global alliance. Study of the 
fields of irregular warfare and of specialist formations, however, presents quite a 
different picture. During the course of the Second World War Britain not only helped 
the US identify a need for specialist formations, but also willingly provided them with 
the model on which to base their first nascent creations; Britain provided the US with 
establishments, equipment, instructors and means through which experience could be 
gained in this field. Moreover, British hegemony in irregular operations survived the 
more general decline of importance of Britain's strategic contribution. Utilising 
specific examples, this chapter will assess the value and importance of the British 
model and experience, and their willingness to share this, on the US creation and use 
of ranger and special forces during the Second World War. It will examine the notion 
of the `special relationship' in irregular warfare and examine the manner in which the 
two allies co-operated with one another in the field. By addressing the issues of Allied 
interdependence and the effects of cross fertilisation of ideas, personnel, doctrine, and 
equipment, a close, and almost symbiotic, relationship between the two nations in the 
field of specialist formations will become clear. 
The scale and importance of the Anglo-American military alliance during the Second 
World War is an exhaustively covered subject, and discussion of the broadest issues of 
alliance strategy and diplomacy has little place here. It is suffice, however, to 
acknowledge that this alliance was, diplomatically and militarily speaking, one of the 
closest and `most successful in modem history'. 1 In such a climate, at least a degree of 
co-operation and mutual dependency between the specialist formations of Britain and 
the US was inevitable. It is equally unsurprising that Britain would dominate the 
alliance when it was first cemented. Britain's two years of practical experience in 
raising, training, organising, equipping, and most importantly, deploying, specialist 
formations contrasted favourably against the practically non-existent US record on the 
issue before their entry into the war. The significance of this early British lead in the 
alliance is obvious and should not be underestimated. Militarily speaking, the US 
Eisenhower, John S. D., Allies: Pearl Harbor to D-Day, (Da Capo Press, 2000) p. xxi in preface 
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entered the war deficient in most areas, and compared to a mobilised and experienced 
Britain, America began the war as the junior partner in their relationship. 
Co-operation between Britain and the US in the field of irregular warfare and specialist 
formations did, however, precede American entry in the war. As David Reynolds has 
emphasised: `In 1940-41 the co-operative element [between the two nations] was 
paramount. Both countries faced common military and ideological threats at a time 
when their strengths and weaknesses were unusually complementary'. 2 Amongst other 
things, these threats caused the US to seek British advice on irregular and subversive 
warfare, clandestine intelligence and raiding operations prior to Pearl Harbor. 
Knowledge of such areas would allow them to prepare for, and to theoretically embark 
on, actions against Germany whilst retaining an isolationist stance. 
The earliest moves made by the US to learn about British approaches to, and 
experiences of, irregular warfare came from Donovan's COI organisation. In both July, 
and December, 1940 Donovan toured British military commands with the intention of 
learning `as much as he could about British secret intelligence, special operations, 
psychological warfare and guerrilla units'. 3 The lessons that Donovan learned during 
these visits were soon put to into practical effect when he was appointed COI in July 
1941. From the outset Donovan saw close liaison with his British counterpart 
organisations to be an essential requirement to the success of his command, he 
accordingly sought to develop with them a symbiotic bond. 4 The British organisations 
including SOE, COHQ and, to a lesser extent, SIS were accommodating and each were 
quite willing to forge a relationship with Donovan and tell him all that he wanted. 
From the outset COI gained `complete entree into the operations and techniques [that 
the British] ... 
had developed during the preceding years'. British willingness to share 
this knowledge was no act of charity, however, and the cost of COI's education would 
be the US yielding a degree of control over their activities to the British. Despite this, 
the US had `little to lose and years to gain' by such propositions, and were initially 
willing to `surrender independence for rapid learning'. 5 
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From September 1941 SOE began offering concerted specialist training to COI 
personnel. It was decided that this would be best achieved by establishing a dedicated 
special training school in Canada (known as School 103 or `Camp X') at which a 
nucleus of British experts could provide training to American recruits and lay the 
`foundations for an American capability in secret warfare'. Although not opened until 
9 December 1941, at which stage it would have been politically acceptable for camps 
to have been formed within mainland USA, `Camp X' was, in the opinion of David 
Stafford, a `godsend' to Donovan's fledgling organisation .6 
With the impediments of 
neutrality removed, in early-1942 COI would establish more camps in both Virginia 
and Maryland to which SOE would continue to furnish the `key instructors'. Even 
when OSS established its first independent training schools in July 1942 there was a 
continued reliance upon a British curriculum and on the rotation of these British 
instructors. 7 The impact of the British on the fledgling COI, and later OSS, should not 
be underestimated. As Harris-Smith contended: `The British felt that OSS, in its 
formative stages, "could not have survived" without their aid. Donovan knew this as 
well'. 8 Were it not for the British example and willingness to share this with the US it 
is certainly conceivable that OSS, or at least its special operations capabilities, would 
not have existed at all. 
In addition to clandestine intelligence, subversion, and sabotage, the US also took a 
pre-war interest in British raiding operations and the Commandos. And, as has already 
been noted, the British influence on the establishment of all US ranger-style formations 
during the war was quite evident. The seeds of this process were sown early. In the 
summer of 1941 a USMC contingent headed by General Julian Smith had toured 
Britain and, in so doing, had observed the Commandos and been provided with 
detailed information on their establishments. 9 It was subsequently arranged that forty 
USMC officers and NCOs be attached to No. 3 Commando (recently returned from the 
Lofotens raid) for two months' training. The Commandos, for their part, were said to 
have `greatly welcomed' such an opportunity to share their experiences with the US 
Marines and glean what they could of American equipment and doctrines. 10 As has 
previously been noted, at least a proportion of the motivation and ideas for the USMC 
6 Stafford, David, Camp X. - SOE and the American Connection, (Viking: London, 1988) pp. 12; 61 7 Yu, Maochun, OSS in China, (Yale University Press, 1996) p. 19; Stafford (2000), p. 153 
8 Harris-Smith, pp. 32-33 
Lieutenant-Colonel T. Ely, Office of DCO to Major Daniell, War Office, 31 July 1941, WO 
193/405 
10 Mountbatten to COS Committee, 23 January 1942, CAB 121/177 
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Raiders would stem from this successful arrangement, which was again repeated in 
April 1942.11 Despite the fact that those USMC personnel who had trained with the 
Commandos were certainly of value in getting the Raiders off the ground, there would, 
after the April 1942 arrangement, however, be no further direct contact between the 
USMC and Commandos. 
Once the US entered the war exchanges of personnel and equipment between British 
and American subversive agencies and specialist formations became much more 
common. These arrangements were an obvious ancillary to the wider trends of Allied 
co-operation developing with the establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and 
grew stronger and more efficient as the war progressed. One of the more significant 
arrangements in this field was the creation of the CCO Representative (CCOR) staff in 
Washington D. C. in March 1942 that would be loosely paralleled by the American 
staff in London established in April under Colonel Lucian Truscott. This arrangement 
served to keep both nations abreast of developments in amphibious techniques and 
equipment, and provide advice on `all matters of combined operations' including the 
development of commandos and special forces. Despite the absence of a direct 
American equivalent to COHQ forcing CCOR to cover much ground `by personnel 
contacts', the arrangement worked well, with the standing practice of monthly 
exchange visits and tours of experimental and training areas. CCOR found the 
`Americans 
... only too keen to help ... 
by keeping us informed of their 
developments'. 12 
The US Army first came into contact with the Commandos during tours of COHQ in 
January 1942 but it would not be until Truscott's COIIQ staff was formed, that the US 
Army began to show any real interest in the Commandos. The creation of the 181 
Ranger Battalion, in both theoretical and practical terms, closely mirrored the 
Commandos: the Ranger TOE closely followed the Commando War Establishment; 
their training occurring at British hands at the Commando school at Achnacarry and in 
exercises with formed Commandos in Scotland; and, for the purposes of tactical 
control, they were placed under the SS Brigade. 13 Despite such influence, the US Army 
remained keen for the Rangers to keep as much of their American identity as possible, 
" Durnford-Slater, p. 56; No. 3 Commando War Diary, 1941, WO 218/23; Vice-Admiral R. L. 
Ghormley, US Special Naval Observer London to CCO, 21 January 1942, CAB 121/177 
12 Historical summary of CCOR, Washington D. C., DEFE 2/780 13 Major-General Chaney, Adjutant General to GOC, USANIF, 1 June 1942, RG 407, Entry 427, 
Box 21066, Folder INBN-1-0 
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they hoped `that all applicable American doctrines and methods will be retained, but 
the special doctrines and methods developed by the British will be adopted whenever 
necessary'. 14 There was an implicit expectation, which was often repeated, that the 
British model could be improved upon. '5 
In addition to providing the inspiration for the Rangers and Raiders, the British 
Commandos also provided some of the initial impetus behind the concept of the OSS 
OGs. Having come into contact with the early Commandos during his visits to Britain 
in 1940 Donovan had come away enthused and inspired viewing the Commandos as a 
unique model of aggressiveness and irregularity. 16 As soon as he was appointed COI in 
July 1941 Donovan thus made a special request that Dudley Clarke (serving at that 
time in Cairo) prepare for him `notes on Commandos'. " In dealing with this request 
the British seem to have held an incorrect impression that the US had already made 
some progress in this field, believing it `unwise' to provide them with a `paper entitled 
"A Suggested Procedure for starting Commandos in the USA Army", as they may feel 
that we are trying to teach our grandmother to suck eggs. ' 18 A more modestly entitled 
paper was thus dutifully prepared by Clarke and DCO personnel and submitted to 
Donovan. 
Remaining impressed with the Commando concept, in July 1942, following the 
establishment of OSS, Donovan dispatched a group under Colonel O'Daniels to 
observe and report upon the Commandos. This mission's findings were, however, less 
than complimentary: 
The [Commando] personnel are not up to the qualifications as laid out in the 
directive setting up the service. As planned the men should be able to handle 
every type of vehicle, every type of weapon. They should be able to handle 
boats, to swim, to know thoroughly demolition and communication. Actually 
the men are small, scrawny individuals but extremely powerful and in better 
shape than anything we have attained with our own troops. They are stupid, act 
like sheep, and have the mentality of a Carolina nigger. ' 
141bid. 
15 Black (1992), p. 17 
16 Hogan, US Array, p. 8 '7 Dudley Clarke, GHQ Cairo to Major A. W. E. Daniell, War Office, 10 July 1941, WO 193/405 
1e Major Daniell, War Office to Lieutenant-Colonel T. Ely, Office of DCO, 23 July 1941, WO 
193/405 
19 Stacey Lloyd to Major Bruce on 'Commando Training and Operations', 5 August 1942, RG 226, 
Entry 92, Box 111, Folder 49 
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It was an analysis obviously marred by a false and unrealistic perception of what the 
Commandos were and what they could achieve (that itself resulted from the original, 
optimistic training mandate setting up the Commandos20), and coloured by a number of 
less than glowing appraisals of the early Commando raids. The report cited, for 
example, the damning fact that some Commandos could not swim and were left behind 
in the `Guernsey fiasco'; it mentions inexperience at Vaagso; and is critical of the 
losses at St. Nazaire, but shows little sense of what was achieved by any of the raids. 
This OSS report concluded that: `If Americans are to develop these units, these should 
be trained as the British say their Commandos are trained, but actually are not' "2 Such 
reports were of importance in shaping the approach that OSS would ultimately adopt 
towards direct action units and thus despite Donovan's earlier interest, when the OGs 
were ultimately formed, they were fundamentally different to the Commandos in both 
composition and role. Despite this ultimate divergence, a number of OGs would still 
benefit from the Commando training establishments in Scotland, as well as parachute 
facilities at Ringway, and various SOE training schools for specialised instruction. 
In both practical and theoretical terms the OSS MU owed more to the British example 
than any other element of COVOSS. In February 1942 Commander H. G. A. Woolley, 
RN was attached to COI to provide advice on maritime methods of agent infiltration 
and transport. In April Woolley established the `Area D' training facility to instruct 
COI on British special maritime methods and, in so doing, really illuminated COI as to 
the `wide possibilities which lay ahead' in offensive maritime activities. 22 Such was his 
influence in this capacity, that when the MU was formerly established in January 1943 
Woolley was appointed as the branch commander. 23 That Woolley was granted the 
unique privilege of heading a foreign unit (a post which he held until October 1943 
when he would become liaison officer between Donovan and Laycock) is illustrative 
of just how symbiotic the relationship between Britain and America in the 
development of these units could be. 
As soon as OSS began considering the conduct of clandestine subversion, sabotage, 
intelligence and special operations it was essential for them to maintain the closest 
possible relationship with Britain so as to avoid the risk of compromise, competition 
20 See for copy: DEFE 2/849 
2' Lloyd to Bruce, op. cit. 22 History of the OSS MU, RG 226, Entry 99, Box 98; Folder 4 
23 Dennis J. Roberts, Acting Chief, MU to Ensign Putzel, 28 October 1943, RG 226, Entry 92, Box 
490; Folder 26 
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and redundancy. SOE or OSS independence would be impracticable and could lead to 
confusion and chaos. 24 As soon as OSS was created in June 1942 an alliance with SOE 
was cemented and plans for world-wide collaboration established. Donovan and Sir 
Charles Hambro immediately proposed dividing up the world and establishing global 
spheres of co-operation and responsibility for the two organisations. Ratified in 
September 1942, the SO/SOE Agreement `set forth the basic elements of cooperation 
in every theatre of war, [it] was based upon the general principle that Americans would 
control areas specifically designated as spheres of American influence, while SOE 
would control special operations in areas dominated by the British'. 25 India, East and 
West Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Western Europe were to be the 
province of SOE, whilst OSS was to have authority over special operations in China, 
Manchuria, Korea, Australia, the Atlantic Islands, Finland and North Africa. Other 
areas were placed under joint control26 This agreement was not, however, definitive 
and in areas in which one nation held `responsibility' the other could still provide 
liaison and assistance. The 'US could assign its own Mission, with headquarters, 
stations and agents to British territory, to operate under direction and control of the 
British "controller"; and vice versa. Differences of opinion would be referred to 
Washington and London, respectively. '27 
In December 1942 Donovan sent his Special Operations (SO) Branch chief, Ellery C. 
Huntington, Jr., on a three-month tour of Europe, Africa and the Middle East to 
prepare infrastructure for the conduct of SO activities (under whose broader control 
both the OGs and MU were originally placed). Huntington initially believed that SO 
should not be "`an adjunct' of SOE and must remain independent of the British". 
28 At 
this early stage, however, the junior status of OSS rendered such desires almost totally 
impracticable, and thus when the SO London branch was established not only was it 
organised in a manner `exactly similar' to the operational division of SOE but was also 
placed under their British counterpart's charge. Redressing his early expectations, 
Huntington subsequently hoped that by June 1944 OSS would be `reasonably 
experienced' to become fully independent. 29 By the later stages of 1943, however, it 
24 OSS/London War Diaries, Voll Chief of Staff, KCLMA MF 204 
25 Roosevelt Vol. 1, pp. 206-207 26 'Summary of Agreement between British SOE and American SO', September 1942, IIS 1/165 
27 JCS 86/1 `Agreements between OSS and British SOE', 26 August 1942, RG 218, Central 
Decimal File 1942-45, Box 369; Folder CCS 385 (8-6-42) 
28 Stafford (2000), pp. 224-225 29 OSS/London War Diaries, Vol. l Chief of Staff, KCLMA MF 204 
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was becoming gradually apparent that in such important theatres independence for 
either SOE or OSS would be quite inappropriate, and, in time, almost perfect synergy 
between the two organisations would be achieved. In January 1944 the relevant 
sections of SOE and OSS became integrated into the SOE/SO organisation 
(rechristened Special Forces Headquarters [SFHQ] in April 1944) and were placed 
under the control of SHAEF. SOE was willing to grant OSS a greater share of 
responsibilities at this stage because the American agency was increasingly proving 
their value to the British, specifically in their provision of funds; manpower; staff 
assistance; supplies for resistance groups; communication infrastructure; and, most 
significantly, providing aircraft for insertion and supply. 30 
Attempts at a similar merger between SOE and OSS in Algiers were initially 
problematic. The SOE branch in this theatre (AMF) was wary of the `American 
temperament [which] demands quick and spectacular results' which they believed 
contrasted negatively to their own `long-term and plodding' approach. They believed 
there were a number of `dangers' to OSS independence: 
I. `The irresponsibility of OSS. 
2. Their permanent hankering after playing cowboys and red Indians. 
3. Their unlimited dollars. 
4. The political necessity of paying spectacular dividends. 
5. Their capacity for blundering into delicate European situations about which 
they understand nothing. '31 
Though such ill feeling did not last long, these perceptions highlight that even as late 
as September 1943 SOE still considered itself as providing the brains and experience 
to any enterprise, viewing OSS as immature, inexperienced and merely a source of 
money and resources. OSS on the other hand, still very much the junior partner, were 
critical of being hamstrung by SOE: the first American officer dropped into France, for 
example, in June 1943 operated firmly under SOE auspices, and future deployments 
were delayed by SOE insistence that OSS agents be screened and trained at British 
installations before deployment. 32 
30 Illustrative of OSS gradually matching SOE's operational contribution is the fact that in March 
1944 the British contribution to supply sorties into France was ten times as many as OSS, but by 
May, a larger OSS allocation of aircraft ensured that OSS were matching the British involvement. 
Harris-Smith, p. 174; Roosevelt Vol. 11, p. 4; Hogan, USArmy, p. 48 31 `SOE/OSS Relations in North Africa', 'AMF' to 'CD' [Gubbins], 27 September 1943, IUS 3/57 
32 Harris-Smith, p. 174 
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Such a policy was not, however, a result of British arrogance. As late as 1944 even 
those formations which had been trained by American instructors in American training 
camps would still find that they benefited greatly from supplementary training received 
either from direct contact with British specialist formations or though attending British 
advanced training establishments. OSS Captain John Tyson reported to the Chief of the 
SO Branch in July 1943 that: `The training any prospective SO agent has received in 
our Washington schools prior to his arrival in this [ETO] theatre is entirely inadequate 
and no trainees should be considered for field operations until they have had further 
training in this theatre, which in many cases will involve a period of three months. '33 
To have deployed personnel with OSS training alone was thought to be suicidal. Major 
Brucker, an OSS SO agent dispatched to France in early-1944 would admit that `SOE 
training was far superior. It made most of my OSS/SO stateside training seem 
amateurish'. 34 Aaron Bank, wartime Jedburgh and the post-war `father of US special 
forces' believed that despite his formative OG training in America (Bank was 
originally a member of the `French' OGs before transferring to the Jedburghs) he had 
only received the `real McCoy' upon arrival in the UK. 35 This view was supported by 
William Colby, a wartime Jedburgh and later head of the CIA, who freely cited 
American inexperience and claimed that it was from the British that `.... we learned all 
the dark arts'. 36 
As a whole, however, it was increasingly understood that between SOE and OSS co- 
operation was more beneficial than conflict and that independence for either agency 
was impracticable. The first quarter of 1944 thus saw SOE, OSS and other Allied 
subversive and specialist commands become increasingly well integrated. The 
multinational Jedburgh programme serves as fine illustration of the positive application 
of the close SOE/SO alliance that had developed in both Britain and North Africa. In 
the training of these groups, first in Scotland and later in Milton hall near London (and 
for some teams, Algiers), the British were dominant and were fully prepared to share 
their experience and methods with the men of the other nations involved. Whilst the 
American contingent more than pulled their weight in regards to the supply of 
weaponry and equipment so as to ensure that `no Jed was without his American 
parachute boots, satchel and carbine'. Throughout the programme `all forms of 
33 Quoted in Briscoe, Charles H., `Major Herbert R. Brucker SF Pioneer', Veritas, Vol. 3, No. 1, 
2007, pp. 72-85 
34 Quoted in Ibid. 
35 Bank, Aaron, From OSS to Green Berets, (Presido, 1986) pp. 6-9 36 Colby, William, Honourable Men, (Hutchinson: London, 1978) p. 36 
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segregation by nationality were very deliberately avoided if not actually banned.... the 
Jeds were quartered together, trained and messed together and, in all matters of food, 
equipment and privileges, were treated identically'. 37 This served to create a climate of 
`remarkable corporate spirit' in which it was possible to form the individual teams by 
self-selection on the basis of personal relationships. 38 For the most part co-operation 
between the various nationalities taking part in the Jedburgh programme was 
remarkably harmonious, with any animosity being in the form of healthy rivalry 
analogous to that `between different regiments in the same brigade, or different ships 
in the same squadron'. 39 
On the whole, SOE and OSS co-operation in Europe was particularly smooth, well 
organised, and controlled. In the Far East, on the other hand, and reflective of the 
generally strained relations between the Allies in theatre, the relationship between 
Allied irregular elements was `never free of antagonism' 40 Although the June 1942 
SO/SOE Agreement established Burma as a theatre of joint SOE/OSS responsibility 
there were significant tensions in the application of this policy. Clinging to the 
possessions of Empire the protective British sought to retain a significant measure of 
control over independent American intelligence and subversive operations in the Far 
East. Unlike in Europe, however, where the British had over a year-and-a-half of 
experience in irregular and special operations before American entry, in the war 
against Japan the British `lead' was considerably narrower and the general absence of 
subversive and special operations infrastructure at the time of Pearl Harbor ensured 
that Britain in the Far East had little justification to claim that they were more 
experienced than their emergent American counterparts. 
This much more balanced situation ensured that when OSS Detachment 101 began to 
commence operations in northern Burma in September 1942 it did so as an explicitly 
separate entity to SOE; coming under General Stilwell's Northern Combat Area 
Command rather than the British GIHQ-India. At this early stage of OSS operations 
such independence from the British was unique, and likely a source of much of the 
subsequent friction. Nevertheless, when it was first created OSS Detachment 101 had a 
37 Brown, Arthur, The Jedburghs: A Short History, (Unpublished memoir, 1991) p. 5 in 1WM Brown 
03/24/1 
38 Papers of Colonel Sir Thomas Macpherson, IWM Macpherson 05/73/1 
39 Foot, M. R. D., SOE: An outline history of the Special Operations Executive 1940-46, (BBC: 
London, 1984) p. 151 
40 Yu, p. 271 
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close relationship with the British. Its initial cadre had been trained at Camp `X' in 
Canada and in recruiting personnel for its first operations it would rely heavily on 
British and Anglo-Burmese officers and men. 41 In a parallel arrangement, the British- 
controlled `V' Force included a handful of American personnel, but these ceded to 
Detachment 101's control in early 1944.2 Despite being independent of SOE, 
Detachment 101 would retain close liaison with them, sharing training establishments 
and jointly recruiting personnel. Even though there could be a degree of duplication of 
effort as well as a degree disharmony in their deployments resulting from personality 
conflicts, these early arrangements were generally acceptable to those in the field 
a' 
Historian Christopher Thorne, in fact, takes time to acknowledge that Detachment 101 
(alongside the USAAF and RAF relationship) provides rare evidence of good relations 
in a theatre in which Anglo-Anglo-American relations were continually afflicted by 
significant tensions and animosities 44 
The principal problems between irregular groups in the Far East arose at the higher 
echelons of command. In early-1943 SOE withdrew some of its teams from northern 
Burma leaving Detachment 101 as the dominant subversive and irregular organisation 
in the area. When Detachment 101 sought to solidify this position and expand the 
scope and scale of its operations, inter-Allied tensions increased. The British, GIIQ- 
India in particular, resented the prospect of relinquishing all control of irregular 
activities in northern Burma to an independent American group; whilst the infamously 
Anglophobic General Stilwell `felt that the risk of OSS coming under British political 
domination outweighed the advantages that would accrue from expanded operations. ' 
By the summer of 1943 the relationship between OSS and the British in theatre was `so 
bad that the status of Detachment 101 itself was being seriously impaired and its very 
existence was in danger' 45 It would not be until the end of 1943 that these tensions 
began to dissipate. At the Quebec conference Donovan had taken the opportunity to 
broach OSS's difficulties with Mountbatten and would subsequently, in a visit to India 
in November 1943, get Mountbatten to tentatively assent to an expansion of OSS 
operations. Consequently, when 7 Division was created in December 1943, which 
41 `Chronology of Detachment 101 to August 31,1944', RG 226, Entry 92, Box 192; Folder 1, 
13982-3, pp. 1-2 
42 Also ceding to 101's control at this time was `Dah Force', a British military mission which sought 
to raise Kachin guerrillas in support of the Second Chindit expedition. Peers, William R. and Brelis, 
Dean, Behind the Burma Road, (Robert Hale: London, 1964) pp. 120; 147 
43 Roosevelt Vol. 11, pp. 369-392 
44 Thorne, Christopher, Allies of a Kind, (Oxford University Press, 1978) p. 228 45 Roosevelt Vol. 11, p. 393 
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served to coordinate all Allied subversive, irregular and special operations units under 
Mountbatten's SEAC, Detachment 101 was recognised as the sole Allied agency 
responsible for conducting irregular operations in northern Burma in support of CBI 
forces and was permitted to expand accordingly; something aided by Stilwell having 
`used all his influence to have ... [SOE] removed from the 
Kachin Bills' 46 To cater for 
OSS operations in other areas of Southeast Asia, which were firmly dominated by the 
British, it was deemed inappropriate to expand Detachment 101, but instead to create 
another diplomatically acceptable OSS group, Detachment 404, which operated in 
`sufferance' directly under SEAC rather than CBI. 47 
As a general rule, however, the most strained relations that OSS would have with the 
British were not concerned with special operations, but were instead in the field of 
clandestine intelligence. There was a relatively pronounced body of opinion within 
OSS that suggested that "`in intelligence, the British are just as much the enemy as the 
Germans". '48 As a statement made by an unnamed OSS officer in North Africa 
highlights: 
This British intelligence service [SISJ holds itself aloof from the SOE as from 
us, and it is a question whether the worst enemy of the SOE is the Germans or 
the SIS..... SIS is an imperialistic organisation closely tied to the Foreign 
Office, and together they form the only British outfit which, in my opinion, we 
have any reason to mistrust. 49 
The same officer, however, paints a very different picture as regards to SOE: 
Probably one of the happiest unions in the history of international relations was 
that which existed, and still exists, between OSS and our British counterpart, 
the SOE. In my experience we worked in complete harmony and unison. Any 
difficulties which arose, and there were very few, were between individuals 
regardless of nationality and not between nationalities. so 
As close as the Anglo-American alliance was, it was by no means innate and `the 
indoctrination in "allied" thinking would take time to develop and vigilance to 
46 Cruickshank, Charles, SOE in the Far East, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1983) p. 173; also 
various documents, WO 106/6092 
47 The War Report of the OSS suggests that: 'Had inter-Allied relationships been harmonious in the 
China-Burma-India Theatre, it is probable that Detachment 404 would never have been created. 
Instead, OSS operations in the territory of the Southeast Asia Command would almost certainly 
have been conducted from an expanded Detachment 101'. Roosevelt Vol. 11, pp. 393-405 
48 Harris-Smith, p. 34 
49 Previously withdrawn OSS NATO documents, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 72; Folder 3 
so Ibid. 
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maintain'. 51 In the earliest stages of the alliance, the British had a tendency to look 
down upon American soldiery as lacking in the training, discipline and diplomatic 
savvy which would enable them to undertake raiding and special operations 
independently and unsupervised. 52 In late-1942, for example, when General 
Eisenhower at AFHQ had expressed a desire for a raiding unit to be formed under his 
command he had hoped that it would include American personnel, but the British 
immediately considered such a move to `be ill-advised' for a number of reasons: the 
Naval forces used for transport would be entirely British; the British had more 
experience and more trained personnel available; and inter-unit transfers of personnel 
with other British formations (the 1sß SAS was cited) would be easier with a British 
unit. Furthermore, in light of the `backward state of training of the American troops' it 
was recommended both that the unit should be, if not entirely British, at least have a 
British nucleus, and that independent American deployments should not occur until 
they had more trained and experienced personnel. 53 Illustrative of the sway of such 
British arguments was the fact that the unit that ultimately arose to fulfil Eisenhower's 
wishes was the 2nd SAS Regiment, comprised entirely of British personnel. 
The most acute military animosities to trouble the wartime Anglo-American alliance 
would occur at the highest levels of command over matters of strategic direction; 
perhaps the most notable conflicts resulting from the incompatibility between 
American desires to prosecute an invasion of France at the earliest possible moment 
and the British proclivity towards an opportunist strategy involving the Mediterranean 
and other periphery theatres. As small-scale, generally low-cost and potentially 
autonomous bodies, specialist formations often transcended strategic debates about the 
committal of forces and offered a means of applying force on almost a global scale 
without traditional impediments. The employment of specialist formations would thus 
commonly circumvent national strategic policy, offering Britain a medium through 
which its more ambitious tangential `Churchillian' strategies could be embraced 
without significant diplomatic backlash; and affording the US opportunity to undertake 
operations in theatres in which the committal of conventional formations was shunned. 
Fine illustration of which is the US policy towards Greece and the Balkans. 
5' Eisenhower, p. 121 sZ Reynolds, David, Rich Relations: the American occupation of Britain, 1942-1945, (1 carper 
Collins: London, 1996) p. 342 53 CMP to CCO, 6 January 1943, DEFE 2/957 
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Following his 1941 tour of the Middle East Donovan had returned to America `a strong 
endorsement of the Churchillian view of the Balkans as the "soft underbelly" of the 
Axis'. 54 Retaining such convictions, in August 1943, at a time when likes of 
Eisenhower, Marshall and Roosevelt were grudgingly assenting to the diversion of 
only a small number of USAAF aircraft to these theatres, Donovan would submit a 
proposal to the JCS asking for permission for OSS to begin operating against Greece 
and the Balkans. The JCS approved Donovan's plans but issued a strict proviso that 
such `activities should be of such a character as will involve no commitment on the 
part of the United States. They should be directed solely to assisting in the defeat of the 
Axis Powers', and be in support of all indigenous elements `without regard to their 
ideological differences, or political programs'. 55 
The latter part of this order, regarding the provision of apolitical support to guerrilla 
movements, is illustrative of an area of notable difference between British and US 
irregular policies. Whilst the British generally preferred to divert supplies away from 
any elements that might act against post-war interests, OSS generally followed the 
broader US policy of postponing political considerations until after the war. 56 The 
British were selective in their dealings with partisan elements, whereas the US, at least 
attempted to remain largely apolitical and were willing to deal with any group showing 
a willingness to fight against the enemy. The variation between these approaches was, 
on occasions, a source of tension between the Allies but, in light of the invariably close 
relations and integrated command arrangements between OSS and the British, such 
divergences seldom led to any greater complications than a degree of duplication of 
effort and confusion and would not subvert the overall effectiveness of Allied support 
to partisan movements. 
Issues of grand strategy and politics aside, between the men at the `sharp end' of 
Anglo-American special operations there was little reciprocal animosity. As General 
Omar Bradley, no stranger to high-level Allied antagonisms, stated: `The suspicions 
and jealousies that split us centred largely in the headquarters commands. The nearer 
one went to the front the more comradely were our relations'. " This sentiment was 
34 History of OSS Cairo, RG 226, Entry 99, Box 54; Folder 2 
55 Brigadier-General John R. Deane for JCS to Donovan, 7 September 1943, WO 201/2263 56 Hogan, US Army, pp. 48-49 57 Bradley, Omar N., A Soldier's Story, (Henry I bolt: New York, 1951) p. 59 
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echoed in a letter Peter Wilkinson of SOE wrote to his wartime OSS colleague 
Franklin Lindsay regarding the 
".... splendid ... mutual trust and cooperation which existed 
between all of us 
`in the field' .... 
There is abundant reference to the sickening intrigues, etc., 
Anglo/American, OSS/SOE rivalries and the rest of it in London and 
Washington and at Headquarters, that I think it is important for someone to say 
loud and clear that in the field it was completely otherwise and we were not 
only indifferent to who got the credit, but resolved above all never to let each 
other down". 58 
Animosities that did occur amongst British and American personnel were most 
prevalent during times of inactivity or training rather than during operational 
deployment, and stemmed primarily from divergences in military uniform, equipment, 
discipline, and pay between the troops. 59 Between personnel in the Anglo-American 
specialist formations, however, such divergences were generally overshadowed by a 
commonality stemming from a culture of volunteerism; a sense of belonging to an 
elite; and an esprit de corps forged from both strenuous and selective training and from 
undertaking unique and dangerous tasks in the field. As Serge Obolensky, training 
`Norwegian' and `French' OGs in England before D-Day remarked, the OGs were 
`popular with the girls. Their pay was much higher than in the British army.... And yet 
there was a certain mutual respect as well, between them and the British'. 60 
The act of British and American specialist formations training together led to some 
strong bonds developing between the personnel of the two nations. It would, however, 
be the stresses and strains of participating in combined special operations that most 
readily led to Anglo-American personnel developing bonds that could transcend 
national identities. The first operational deployment involving both British and 
American specialist personnel were the fifty men from the 1` Ranger Battalion who 
`forged a bond in blood with the Commandos' during the Dieppe raid. 61 In line with 
the policy that the Rangers should closely mirror the Commandos, the majority of the 
Rangers deployed at Dieppe, four officers and thirty-six men, would be attached to 
Lieutenant-Colonel Duinford-Slater's No. 3 Commando; in addition four Rangers were 
attached to No. 4 Commando and six to various elements of the 2"d Canadian Division. 
Before the operation those Rangers attached to the Commandos had a brief opportunity 
5' Quoted in Lindsay, Franklin, Beacons in the Night, (Stanford University Press: 1993) p. 205 59 Reynolds (1996), p. 327 
60 Obolensky, p. 301 
61 Black (1992), p. 46 
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to train with them so that during the operation they could be fully integrated into 
Commando troops. They were `treated as equals ..., given meaningful assignments, 
and in some cases were incorporated into the British Commando system of "Jack and 
John" ['buddy system'] with one Ranger working with one Commando'. 62 In the 
opinion of Captain Roy Murray, the senior Ranger officer on the raid, the Rangers 
`actually became part of 3 Commando', and Murray made a point reporting to Darby 
the `most friendly spirit [that] prevails between the 3 Commando and the Rangers. ' 63 
The Dieppe raid transpired to be the only operation in which, as was originally 
envisioned, `the Rangers fought as students of the British'. 64 The invasion of North 
Africa provided the Rangers with ample opportunity to gain combat experience 
without being attached to the British raiding programme. Despite undertaking similar 
roles during operation `Torch' there was scant co-operation or even liaison between the 
Rangers and Commandos in North Africa. The invasion did, however, bear witness to 
a unique Anglo-American integration within the ranks of Nos. 1 and 6 Commandos. 
Prior to the invasion, in August 1942, the 168`h Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of 
the US 34"' Infantry Division was sent to Scotland to undertake amphibious and 
mountain warfare training, and to participate in exercises and rehearsals in conjunction 
with the Commandos 65 Following the success of these exercises it was decided that 
elements of the 168th RCT should be incorporated into both Commandos to form 
composite units for the `Torch' landings. This decision was taken for two main 
reasons: firstly, to improve inter-Allied co-operation in the Eastern Task Force 
landings; and secondly, to help maintain the illusion, taken for political reasons, that 
the invasion was a wholly American affair. 66 
The `Torch' landings saw ten troops of No. 1 and four of No-6 Commando variously 
integrated with British and American personnel. 67 This Anglo-American composition 
was retained after the initial landings, and British and American sections again fought 
62 Ibid., p. 33 
63 Captain Roy A. Murray to CO 1s` Ranger Battalion, 26 August 1942, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 
21066, Folder INBN-1-0 
64 King, pp. 9-10 
65 For instance see: Exercise 'Pep', September 1942, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 9575; Folder 334- 
INF(168)-0.3 October-December 1942 
66 Eastern Assault Force Administrative Order No. 2,4 October 1942, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 
9575; Folder 334-INF(168)-0.3 October-December 1942; Berens, Robert J., 'First Encounters', 
Army, Vol. 42, No. 7 July 1992, pp. 45-48 67 No. 1 Commando War Diary, 9 December 1942, DEFE 2/37; No. 6 Commando War Diary, DEFE 
2/43 
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together under the same banner in both No. I Commando's `amphibious left hook' 
operation `Bizerte' in December 1942, and in No. 6 Commando's actions against the 
aerodrome at B6ne. 68 Although reports from this period generally speak of a high 
esprit de corps and a degree of mutual respect between the men in these formations, 
the British did note certain problems as regards to the comparable quality of the 
American personnel over the hand-picked and highly trained Commandos. Captain 
Dunne, for example, spoke negatively of the RCT personnel `whose training and 
discipline is greatly inferior to the English Commando troops. ' 69 US personnel in No. 6 
Commando were returned to their units in December 1942 whilst sixty-nine American 
volunteers would remain with No. 1 Commando for participation in regular operations 
until the end of January 1943.70 Thus ended a unique, and for the main part either 
ignored or misunderstood (those few secondary sources citing this arrangement are 
prone to assume that the RCT men were Rangers), historical example of the successful 
integration of British and American personnel within a specialist formation and serves 
to highlight the willingness and ability of both nations to co-operate closely with each 
other in the field in commando tasks. Such instances of short term integration were, 
nevertheless, the exception and not the rule. 
Despite there having been notable commonality between the evolution of the various 
Anglo-American commando and ranger formations, direct co-operation in the field 
between these units was a rare occurrence. The closest instance was operation 
`Avalanche', the amphibious landings against Salerno in September 1943, at which the 
Commandos and Rangers were jointly tasked with spearheading the assault and 
securing the left flank of the beachhead. Prior to the landings, and in preparation for 
their tasks, Ranger Force (1St, 3rd and 0 Ranger Battalions) and Nos. 2 and 41(RM) 
Commandos swapped personnel and liaison officers, Ranger Force HIQ employing 
`several British officers' including Royal Artillery and Royal Navy Fire Observation 
Officers whilst the Commandos received similar personnel as well as six 4.2-inch 
mortars from the US 83`d Chemical Mortar Battalion of `Ranger Force'. 7' 
Possibly the closest co-ordination as occurring between the Commandos and the 
Rangers, however, came from the short-lived, and desperately ad hoc, 29'x' Rangers. In 
68 Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor, CO No.! Commando, Report on operation 'Bizerte', December 1942, 
KCLMA Allfrey 
69 Captain Philip Dunne, to Brigadier Laycock, undated, KCLMA Laycock File 16 70 No. 1 Commando War Diary, 31 January 1943, DEFE 2/37 
71 `History of the Commandos in the Mediterranean', DEFE 2/700 p. 37; Darby and Baumer, p. 143 
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late-1942 with the 15` Rangers employed in North Africa it was proposed that another 
Ranger Battalion be formed in the UK for training and instructional purposes under the 
tactical control of the SS Brigade. 72 Consequently, on 1 February 1943 the 290' 
Infantry Division, the only US combat division in the UK at the time, consented to 
sending ten officers and 166 men to Achnacarry for Commando training. 73 Upon 
completion of their training, the understrength (comprising an HHQ and two rifle 
companies) 29th Rangers were attached to No. 4 Commando for further instruction with 
whom they established good relations. 74 Subsequently, in October 1943, various 
elements of the 29`h Rangers were attached to Nos. 10(IA), 12 and 14 Commandos and 
would participate in a number of small-scale raids against Norway and France. " 
During such operations, which aside from Dieppe would represent the only time that 
the Rangers would participate in the raiding programme, the 29th Rangers built up a 
good reputation with the Commandos `who praised them highly'. 76 Immediately after 
these attachments, however, the 29th Rangers were disbanded with the men returning to 
their original units. 
To have taken this course of action with a trained and partially experienced unit at a 
time when two new Ranger units were being formed in the US from raw material was a 
somewhat surprising, and not altogether cost-effective move. The 29`x' Ranger's 
disbandment was based on three principal factors: firstly, an adherence to the original 
Ranger concept which viewed these units as a training vehicle with the men therein 
being returned to their units once they had received training and gained experience on 
raids. Secondly, was the bureaucratic reason that the Ranger war establishment would 
only allow for a total of two Ranger battalions to be based in Britain. Finally, is the 
plausible judgement, as identified by Black, that the 29th Rangers were disbanded 
because it was expected that those Battalions training in the US were `better trained 
than those who had been trained by the Commandos'. " The latter judgement, for 
which there was no solid basis and, as will be noted, was considered largely fallacious 
by the Rangers themselves, was a result of the US Army's clear motivation to maintain 
72 Major Richard P. Fisk, Assistant Adjutant General, to Adjutant General, Washington, 2 
December 1942, RG 407 Entry 427, Box 24157; Folder 534 
73 Black (1992), p. 65 
74Ibid., p. 72 
75 Macksey (1985), pp. 165; 183 76 Black (1992), p. 113 
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their own identity for the Rangers and their belief that they could take what they 
required from the British model and improve upon it. 
The 2°d and 5th Rangers were thus raised and conducted the majority of their core and 
formative training in the US. When the 2°d Rangers arrived in Britain in late 1943, 
followed shortly after by the 5`h Rangers, it was intended that they should participate in 
the COSSAC Raids and Reconnaissance Programme preceding the invasion of France. 
To this end, Rangers were attached to COIIQ for planning, and elements were 
tentatively assigned to the various `Forfar', `Manacle', `Candlestick' and `Hardtack' 
raids planned for the early-1944 dark periods. 78 In light of their lack of combat 
experience and general unfamiliarity with the equipment and landing craft involved in 
raiding operations it was not, however, thought possible for the Rangers to undertake 
these activities independently. 79 To better prepare themselves for such tasks the 
Rangers thus underwent a brief period of instruction on raiding techniques from the 
experienced personnel of No. 4 Commando at Dartmouth, and Eisenhower granted 
`blanket authorisation for necessary supplies' for the conduct of their raids. 80 Only 
following these measures was it possible to assign Rangers a clear role in the raiding 
programme. It was subsequently proposed that in certain operations, such as `Flardtack 
22' and `Candlestick 4', a relatively substantial number of Rangers (between 70-100 
men) would have the dominant responsibility for the raid whilst the British 
contribution would be limited solely to providing transport and Commando guides. In 
the event, however, bad weather combined with a growing reticence for raids to ensure 
that each of the pre-D-Day operations in which the Rangers were due to participate 
were either cancelled or aborted. 81 
With any pre-invasion role negated, from February 1944, the Rangers underwent 
formal training at the Commando Training Centre in Scotland where they were able to 
forge closer links with the British. This training, in the opinion of the 5th Rangers, was 
considered invaluable: `The hills of Scotland proved to be more than anything that had 
been encountered in former Ranger training [in the US], and here Rangers were made 
or lost..... Too much can not be said for the Scotland training. To it, many of the 
's Lieutenant-General Morgan, COSSAC to CO ETOUSA, 14 December 1943, WO 219/481 
79 Macksey (1985), p. 181 ß° 'A Narrative History of the Second Ranger Infantry Battalion, 1944', RG 407, Entry 427, Box 
21072; Folder 23745, INBN-2-0.3 Ch. 1, pp. 1-3 81 Brigadier Durnford-Slater, 'Report on Candlestick and hardtack Operations' January Dark 
Period, 17 February 1944, DEFE 2/57; also WO 106/4290 
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Rangers owe their lives and their success'. 82 In April 1944 Ranger links with COIiQ 
were formalised and, after a number of requests, Lieutenant-Colonel Rudder was 
authorised to communicate with, and draw supplies from, COIiQ directly thus 
enabling a greater sharing of experience and information between the Commandos and 
Rangers in preparation for their D-Day tasks. 83 Despite such a strong vein of co- 
operation having developed in the areas of training, exchanges of equipment, and 
operational planning etc., once the invasion of France had commenced there would be 
an almost total absence of further contact between the Ranger formations and British 
units, specialist or otherwise. 
The various OSS OGs were probably the closest approximation of an all-embracing 
American special forces unit during the Second World War and despite their having 
broken free of any British model and developed a uniquely American raison d'etre, 
they would remain closely associated to their British counterparts in a wide variety of 
operational deployments. From mid-1943 the 2°d SAS Regiment and `Italian' OGs 
were both aiming to conduct similar offensive operations against northern Italy and, in 
the spirit of cooperation, both William Stirling and Serge Obolensky, commanding the 
respective groups, decided to meet with one another for a mutual exchange of ideas 
and to establish mechanisms for combined operational planning. 84 Soon after this first 
liaison both units participated in the `Simcol' operations of October 1943. Conducted 
for the benefit of `A Force' (M19), this series of operations were focused on aiding 
escaping Allied prisoners of war and saw three small groups comprising a combination 
of both SAS and OG personnel inserted, via boat, along the Adriatic coastline of Italy 
to coincide with the dispatch, via parachute, of eleven OG men near Chieti. 85 
Following `Simcol' greater efforts were made for collaboration between the two units 
and officers for their respective `planning and operations sections' were exchanged. 86 
By the start of 1944 this fruitful arrangement had resulted in the two units jointly 
82 `Lead the Way, Rangers', A History of the Fifth Ranger Battalion by henry S. Glassman, RG 
407, Entry 427, Box 21076; Folder INBN-5-0 pp. 12-13 83 Lieutenant-Colonel Rudder to GOC V Corps, 20 April 1944, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 24385; 
Folder 731 
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conceiving a series of `coordinated tactical operations in northern Italy' aiming to 
target enemy communications in support of Anzio. 87 But, as was noted in the previous 
chapter, the majority of such proposals were rejected. Shortly before the 2°d SAS's 
transfer to Britain ended this brief but fertile period of co-operation it was even 
suggested that Stirling command a grouping of the 2°d SAS, OGs and the French 
Bataillon de Choc for operations in support of the `Anvil' landings on the south of 
France. 88 
Given the fledgling degree of co-operation between the OGs and SAS in Italy it is 
curious to note the general absence of a similar relationship in their deployments in 
France. Despite OG operations being closely wedded to the actions of both the 
partisans, Jedburghs, and, via a convoluted command structure, the SAS Brigade, the 
OGs had negligible direct co-operation with their British SAS `counterparts' in France, 
and only a modicum with the French SAS in Brittany. Before the invasion, however, 
elements of the OGs had certainly sought a closer relationship with the SAS, with the 
likes of Major Edwin Black, responsible for OG planning at SFIIQ, suggesting the 
establishment of a joint SFHQ-SAS committee and the attachment of SAS officers to 
SFHQ for training. 89 In light of the complex command arrangements and the degree of 
mutual suspicion which was endemic to the pre-invasion planning for these groups 
(issues to be addressed in the next chapter), such suggestions were, however, largely 
ignored. Once in the field, different areas of operation; different timetables of 
insertion; and a slight diversity in roles generally transpired to preclude significant 
contact between the SAS and OGs. On the few occasions when OGs did come into 
contact with the SAS, such as with the OG operations `Adrian' or `Percy Red', any 
collaboration was opportunistic and strictly tactical. 90 
Although the `French' and `Italian' OGs forged a modest bond with their SAS 
colleagues, and in Far East Detachment 404's OGs had infrequent collaboration with 
varied British specialist elements based in Ceylon, " it would be the `Yugoslav' and 
`Greek' OGs, however, that had the closest and most frequent co-operation with 
87 Colonel Glavin to G-3 AFIIQ, 11 December 1943, WO 204/12980; Colonel Glavin and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AM IQ, 13 December 1943, WO 
204/12837 
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British formations. In January 1944 twelve officers and 120 men of these OGs were 
sent to Vis alongside No. 2 Commando and placed under the local tactical control of 
Brigadier Churchill's 2 °d SS Brigade. Living and working closely together on Vis 
ensured that close bonds developed between the British and American personnel. 
Michael McConville, a Royal Marine Commando officer on Vis, found the OG's 
`refreshingly frank', when first deployed `they admitted cheerfully to complete 
inexperience, they would put themselves in the hands of Jack Churchill [CO No. 2 
Commando]. If he thought their concepts sound, well and good. If not, they would do 
whatever he advised. ' The Commandos on Vis provided an improvised training 
programme for the OGs during which `American open-mindedness and enthusiasm 
continued to impress'. 92 In return for such instruction, the OGs would, with their 
linguistic talents, help foster smooth relations with their Yugoslav hosts, and would 
93 provide interpreters for operations in conjunction with partisans. 
From Vis the OGs mounted a number of operations alongside the Commandos, notable 
examples being the 26 January 1944 raid on the island of Hvar where thirty OGs 
joined Nd. 2 Commando in the attack, 94 or the March 1944 raid on Solta in which 
almost the entire OG complement on Vis co-operated with the Commando on what 
was later dubbed a `model combined operation'. 95 The OGs also acted in a supportive 
capacity and, as at Mljet and Brac in May and June 1944, respectively, would perform 
`headquarters security' for the Commandos' attack. 96 In April 1944 when offensive 
raids from Vis were being curtailed by inadequate and out-of-date intelligence Major 
Lovell of the OGs suggested to Brigadier Churchill that his men could help alleviate 
this deficiency by establishing wireless coast watch stations on outlying islands. In so 
doing, the OGs established and ran a complete operations room on Vis that became the 
`intelligence and planning centre' for both OSS and the Commandos. 97 On the whole, 
as acknowledged by both parties, the relations between the OGs and the Commandos 
92 McConville, Michael, A Small War in the Balkans, (Macmillan: London, 1986) p. 118 
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on Vis were excellent, and the planning and execution of their operations against the 
Dalmatian coast well integrated. 98 
The OGs on Vis also developed close relations with the Raiding Support Regiment for 
whose heavier weapons troops they would often provide escort and security-99 In May 
1944 this relationship was further strengthened when the `Greek' OGs joined elements 
of the RSR undertaking `Noah's Ark' operations in Greece. When the two units were 
deployed together their actions in the field were mutually supportive. During operation 
`Kirkstone' of June 1944 which targeted rail networks north of Kaitsa, for example, the 
OG men would undertake reconnaissance tasks and provide close protection for RSR 
mortar teams and demolition parties. '°° Living and working together behind enemy 
lines led to the OGs and RSR personnel developing some very close bonds. In the 
opinion of OG Captain Cronje, the men `get along very well. No distinction is made 
between the two groups. "01 The OGs praised the RSR as being `highly skilled and 
tremendously effective in support of the Operational Groups and Andartes, and were 
likewise a fine example of aggressive and competent soldiering'. ' 02 The only American 
gripe of operating with these British elements seems to have been directed, as was 
quite common, towards the quality of the food and cigarettes available. 103 Personnel of 
these `Greek' OGs would subsequently operate with the LRDG who provided both 
guides and reception committees to OGs operations in exchange for the attachment of 
OG men to serve as interpreters. '04 These various OG deployments thus provide clear 
illustration of harmonious, multifaceted cooperation between British and American 
specialist formations in the various fields of training, planning, and execution of 
operations. 105 
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In the training, development and equipping of maritime special forces the Anglo- 
American alliance was just as significant as it was with those land-orientated 
formations. The British naval-orientated special force with the most intensive 
relationship with the US military was the SRU. Because of the unsuitability of British 
coastal waters for the training of combat swimmers CCOR had arranged for the SRU 
to conduct its training on the coast of California. Based at the USMC's Camp 
Pendelton, the SRU developed its own training regime independent of the Americans 
but was aided by the attachment of a liaison officer, Captain E. 11. `Dutch' Smith, 
USMC, who helped Wright develop his exercises. 106 At Pendleton the SRU came into 
contact with both the 4th Raider Battalion and the emergent USMC Reconnaissance 
Company which would provide the Unit with much `valuable and willing assistance' 
and co-operate in various exercises, experiments and training procedures. ' 07 
In October 1943, following discussions between Donovan and Mountbatten, the MU 
had raised a 40-man combat swimmer unit along SRU lines. 108 This MU group 
established their training establishment only one-hundred-and-fifty yards away from 
the SRU base at Pendleton and would copy their training programme `in every 
respect', with Captain `Dutch' Smith becoming the MU training officer. 109 Wright 
provided comprehensive `information regarding the objectives and schedules of their 
training', and for a two month period the two units operated closely with one another 
mutually investigating the still untrammelled area of underwater and surface 
swimming for sabotage and reconnaissance. ' 10 The SRU benefited as much from the 
relationship as did the MU, and Laycock was quick to express to Admiral King the 
`great value ... [of] the liaison afforded with 
US Units working on similar lines. '" 
Upon completion of their training in California, the OSS group followed the SRU to 
Nassau, and later, a group of nine men were sent to Britain. This relationship which 
was so solid in training and development would, however, never extend to operational 
deployment. ' 12 
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The MU London Branch was established in June 1943 and, unsurprisingly, developed 
strong links with its British counterpart organisations. In the belief that they had 
`everything to gain' from forging close relations with the British, the MU personnel 
immediately toured various British specialist units, including the SBS, COPPs, and 
RMBPD and, finding some `damned good allies' therein, received `general instruction' 
on British techniques and methods. 113 In a familiar pattern, the Americans hoped that 
attachment these elements would enable them to `learn, perfect, and if possible better 
the Commando [sic. ] technique in Small Boat Operations. ' 14 Despite the disparity in 
size and experience, COHQ and the various British special maritime formations also 
had much to gain from cooperation with the MU, benefiting principally from the 
exchange of information and equipment, not to mention the welcome reinforcement to 
overstretched operational requirements. 115 With such motivations in mind, COIiQ and 
OSS were able to establish an 'efficient exchange arrangement' whereby `COSD 
[Combined Operations Supply Depot] would supply MU and other US groups 
wherever possible and in turn ... 
OSS and other US groups such as the USMC, NCDU, 
etc. would meet the requirements of CCO in various theatres'. 16 Arrangements such as 
this would help lead to a greater degree of standardisation of specialist equipment, and 
ergo methods, between Anglo-American specialist maritime formations. ' 17 Ultimately, 
however, the London MU had little opportunity to conduct operations from Britain 
being hindered both by increasingly unsuitable strategic circumstances and by a 
general absence of US Naval support. In a common theme for maritime special forces, 
therefore, British patronage became a cornerstone for the MU's deployment. As the 
MU freely recognised, without the `generous and understanding help' of their British 
counterparts they would have been `able to do very little, if anything'. 118 
The closest operational link between a MU group and the British occurred in Italy with 
the MU headed by Lieutenant Richard Kelly. As with those MU groups in Britain, this 
unit remained heavily reliant on the use of Royal Navy fast surface craft for its 
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operations but, unlike from Britain, in the Italian theatre there remained ample 
opportunities for deployment. 119 By August 1944 a successful series of operations by 
this MU in providing clandestine transportation for various British agencies had 
proven `the feasibility of cooperating with the British and obtaining their wholehearted 
aid in MU operations'. 120 This MU was subsequently placed under the general control 
of Eighth Army and its operations became closely integrated with the work of SOE, 
M19 and PPA. By 1945 this group had become so well regarded by the British that it 
was appointed the `responsible boating organisation' for British-dominated operations 
around Lake Commachio, a commitment which would see it work in close co- 
operation with both the Commandos, COPPs and the SBS (Service). 121 In addition to 
such activities, this Italian MU would also lend personnel to the LRDG to serve as 
liaison officers and translators for their September 1944 operations in Istria'22 and, 
later still, would work alongside PPA in their operations around the mouth of the Po 
and during their advance towards Venice. 123 
Whilst in discussion with General Donovan in late-1943 Mountbatten made a request 
for personnel to help share the burden of undertaking beach reconnaissance tasks in 
SEAC as he believed that it was `impossible, and improbable' that the COPP Depot in 
Britain would be able to provide this theatre with enough personnel to accommodate 
the demand. 124 Donovan accented, and in early-1944 MU personnel destined for the 
Far East were introduced to British COHQ specialist personnel in London and were 
given `complete explanations of CCO techniques and equipment'. 125 Upon arrival in 
theatre the MUs, who would remain heavily reliant on British shipping (particularly 
submarines), forged close relations with their British counterparts and both parties 
benefited from `a mutual exchange of facilities and an opportunity to compare 
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respective methods of operation'. 126 Although tactical co-operation between the MU 
and their British counterparts within SEAC was rare, there was a notable amount of 
combined planning and operational-level integration between these units. 127 
Although the influence of the British model and of British assistance on American 
adoption and development of irregular capabilities during the period 1940-43 was 
pronounced, the pattern of the British `teacher' and American `student' was not, 
however, uniformly correct. For, as has been previously noted, in the areas of beach 
reconnaissance, assault pilotage, and combat demolitions American capabilities and 
methods were developed either independently, or through direct, mutually supportive, 
collaboration with the British. The manner in which the US NCDUs and British 
LCOCUs developed is illustrative of this. In January 1943, following a tour of British 
establishments, Captain Alfred G. Hoel, USN submitted a report which served to 
illuminate the US Navy Engineer Board to early British experiments into underwater 
demolitions and provided notes on their training of `Boom Commandos'. ' 28 Hoel's 
recommendations were followed by a combined mission consisting of Major Kennedy, 
US Army and Major Fairbairn, Royal Engineers which was sent to the Maryland and 
Fort Pierce ATBs in early-1943 to advise on `special demolition problems', and it was 
this mission that subsequently helped to forge the NCDU syllabus and help train the 
first teams for operation 'Husky'. 129 Despite providing such assistance, the British 
were by no means further advanced nor more experienced in these fields than were the 
Americans. Their first `Boom Commandos' (later renamed LCOCUs) were not trained, 
nor ready for deployment until February 1943 and had had no operational deployment 
until `Husky', at which stage the first NCDUs had been created. From mid-1943 
onwards, therefore, there was much liaison between British and American groups and 
regular exchange visits at which information and methods were shared. 130 Once the 
UDT organisation emerged to cope with the exigencies of the Pacific War the British 
126 Report on MU in SEAC, RG 226, Entry 99, Box 64; Folder 5, p. 14 
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capacity to be `student' was well highlighted as they undertook initiatives to learn and 
assimilate the emerging American techniques, lessons and equipment. 131 
To deal with amphibious reconnaissance and assault pilotage Britain and the US 
almost simultaneously, but independently, developed their COPP and S&R units. 
Despite a notable absence of any Allied interchange of ideas in the inception process of 
these units, there would ultimately be a pronounced spirit of Anglo-American co- 
operation within these fields. The `Torch' landings bore witness to significant Allied 
integration in pilotage tasks with the S&R men being responsible for the pilotage and 
guidance of No. 1 Commando's landing, 132 whilst the COPP forerunner `Koodoo- 
Inhuman' conversely guided the landing of the lst Rangers at Arzew. 133 Following 
`Torch', it became widely understood that, for the benefit of forthcoming major 
combined amphibious landings, the development of a standardised Allied approach to 
beach reconnaissance and pilotage was essential. Thus as soon as the COPPs were 
formerly created, it was recommended that Lieutenant George Hoague, USN `be 
represented on the [COPP] Training Sub-Committee'. 134 Meanwhile the likes of US 
Army Captain George Bright were schooled in British techniques before being sent to 
the S&R School. 135 
In April 1943 S&R personnel were dispatched to Malta to help alleviate the shortage of 
COPPs available for reconnaissance and pilotage tasks against Sicily. To the 
overstretched British, whose lack of properly trained personnel had been exacerbated 
by the recent loss of a number of COPP personnel in pre-'Ilusky' reconnaissances, the 
prospect of reinforcement was enthusiastically greeted. Upon the arrival of the 
Americans in Malta, however, the British impression of the state of the S&R's training 
and equipment (much of which had been left in the US because of an oversight) was 
generally unfavourable. 136 Lieutenant Mclarg, CO COPP 4, believed the S&R's 
methods of operating `a portable echo sounding set from a rubber dingy' to be 
unsuitable for pre-invasion tasks as they were `much too clumsy for use from 
submarines and their silhouette too big to escape detection on well guarded 
131 See, for example, Reports on Leyte Operation, DEFE 2/963 132 Dwyer (1993), p. 21 133 Macksey (1985), p. 148 134 Minutes of COHQ meeting, 27 November 1942, DEFE 2/4 135 O'Dell (2000), p. 20 136 C-in-C Mediterranean to First Sea Lord, 1 May 1943, DEFE 2/741 
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beaches'. 137 It would not be until they had received instruction from the British on their 
favoured reconnaissance tactic of utilising canoes launched from submarines that S&R 
personnel were ultimately able to participate alongside the COPPs in the Sicily 
reconnaissances. 138 Before and during the subsequent landings against Salerno and 
Anzio there would be much closer co-operation, in both reconnaissance and pilotage 
tasks, between the COPPs and S&Rs. 139 
Preparations for the invasion of France provided further incentives for the development 
of a harmonious Allied approach to COPP and S&R tasks. Following their 
participation in the Anzio landings two S&R teams (each of one officer and four men) 
were sent to Britain to be stationed with COPPs in preparation for pre-invasion tasks. 
Initially it was hoped that the S&R personnel would work alongside COPP 2 (later 
expanded as the 712`t' LCP Survey Flotilla) in undertaking soundings, yet a range of 
factors would transpire to deny concerted use of S&Rs in such a capacity. 140 Because 
of `an apparent error in their orders' the S&Rs had arrived in the UK without any of 
their special stores or equipment; they were thus heavily reliant on British generosity 
and patronage. Although the Admiralty was willing to provide a LCN for the S&Rs, it 
was thought unwise to have a single American craft (the two S&R teams were only of 
a size to man a single LCN) operating in an otherwise exclusively British flotilla. 
Furthermore, unlike COPP 2, the S&Rs were not thought properly trained in the 
specialist techniques of taking soundings and sonic bearings from LCNs, nor were they 
trained in the `X-Craft' submersible which other COPPs were utilising for `Neptune' 
reconnaissances. 14 1 These limitations, combined with the fact that many of the 
projected tasks were adequately catered for by existent British formations, ensured the 
ultimate employment of the S&Rs from Britain was limited to sporadic sounding tasks 
undertaken via individuals paired with COPP personnel. 142 Although Britain 
dominated the special reconnaissance operations for both the British and American 
Normandy beaches, on D-Day itself the pilotage tasks of these units were generally 
137 Lieutenant N. T. McHarg, CO COPP 4 to OC COPP Depot, 2 August 1943, DEFE 2/741 
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conducted on national lines with only a handful of British personnel working alongside 
US Naval forces. 143 
Between the Anglo-American specialist formations of the Second World War there 
was certainly a strong vein of co-operation, and on occasions, dependency between the 
two allies. The significance of the Anglo-American alliance in the evolution of 
wartime specialist formations was acute. For the US it was crucial. Had it not been for 
the British example and their willingness to both share this and encourage the US to 
embark on irregular ventures, it seems unlikely that they would have participated in 
this field to the extent which they ultimately did. This is particularly apparent in the 
motivations behind the US adoption of ranger-style forces; but also applies, at least in 
part, to their establishment of OSS and its ancillary special forces such as the MU or 
OGs. Although the US proved more than capable of raising specialist formations in 
response to specific exigencies (as with the Alamo Scouts) or to cater for certain tasks 
(such as amphibious reconnaissance and demolitions), had an accessible British model 
not been in existence, it would appear that American forays into irregular warfare 
would have been significantly subdued. 
During the formative periods of practically all American specialist formations the 
British were further advanced. The years 1942-43 have been called "`the period of 
British strategic hegemony"' and the development of specialist formations certainly 
appears to mirror this. 144 Two years' of practical experience had ensured that, in this 
area, Britain was the dominant partner in the alliance, and would thus provide the 
models for many of the first US specialist formations. The path which the US would 
have to follow in order catch up with this British lead required them to accept an initial 
position as student, to bow to British experience and, to an extent, sacrifice control for 
knowledge. In the British-dominated European and Mediterranean theatres, therefore, 
US formations were heavily reliant on British patronage and often would have to 
conform to British standards and doctrines in order to gain employment, as seen with 
the examples of OSS agents being subject to SOE vetting and training before their 
dispatch to the continent; the US-trained 2"d and 5`" Rangers being trained by 
Commandos before they could be committed to the pre-D-Day raiding programme; or 
143 Trenowden, p. 140 14 Danchev, Alex `Great Britain: The Indirect Strategy' in Reynolds, David, Kimball, Warren F. 
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the S&Rs having to perfect British submarine-launched reconnaissance techniques 
before they could be employed before `Husky'. The British model prevailed to 
dominate the American practice of special operations. 
With a few exceptions, such as Detachment 101 in Burma, it would not be until 1944 
that the US had become sufficiently experienced and mobilised to be in a position to 
properly contest the British lead in irregular operations. By this stage, however, 
independence was largely impracticable, and parity was becoming a practical reality. 
Once the US had two years' of experience under their belt they began conducting 
almost the full gamut of specialist activities in practically every theatre of operation. 
David Reynolds has claimed that in Europe D-Day `proved the fulcrum' for a 
transition towards American dominance, and it is by no means a coincidence that 
concerted American use of special forces, often matching British contributions, 
occurred primarily after D-Day. 145 By 1945 it was clear that in the broader alliance 
Britain had become the junior partner and, although Britain never quite relinquished its 
wartime dominance in irregular fields, it is certainly worth acknowledging that by 
1945 US special forces units, but not their ranger formations, were as widely employed 
as their British counterparts. 
The British had a substantial role in influencing, both actively and passively, the 
Americans to adopt specialist formations and to develop irregular capabilities. Despite 
the best efforts of the US military to take only what they needed from the British 
model, and to retain their national identity (which certain formations like the OGs 
managed to do), the British laid the foundations for many American units. Whilst the 
British commonly provided both model, experience and, occasionally, the means, for 
the American creation and deployment of specialist formations; American value to the 
British, was, with few exceptions (such as the sharing of NCDU and UDT techniques, 
or the accommodation of the SRU in California), more intangible. The greatest 
contribution of the US to British irregular efforts was in alleviating the burden of 
mounting operations, and the provision of additional personnel for their conduct; 
something particularly valued following the dramatic expansion of effort that both the 
resistance war and the conduct of large-scale combined amphibious assaults required. 
Also of great significance was the US providing Britain with welcome reinforcement 
in aircraft, supplies and resources through which the prosecution of plans with 
145 Reynolds (1996), p. 15 
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partisans could be expressed; as well as, when sufficiently experienced, the American 
contribution to developing new tactics and equipment such as firearms, explosives, 
radios, swim fins, breathing apparatus, and small surface and submersible craft. 
One perception that definitely prevailed in certain quarters throughout the war was that 
the British supplied the brains and the experience, and the Americans the resources. '46 
In the field of specialist formations this perception was partially borne out. The British 
`brains' and `experience' are well illustrated; and in the areas of supplying aircraft and 
equipment for extended operations in depth the US, from mid-1944 onwards, certainly 
took on much of the burden. There were, however, exceptions to both these trends, 
where American `brains' in the examples of the S&Rs, NCDUs and UDTs were 
certainly welcome; and in the provision of training establishments and operational craft 
for deployments, the British certainly pulled their weight. Mackenzie emphasised well 
this complex interdependency when he noted, in regards to the close relationship 
between SOE and OSS: 
OSS could hardly move without British organisation and British knowledge, 
cramping though it sometimes found them: SOE drew largely on American 
stores, above all on American aircraft, and American brains and energy 
contributed much to the liveliness of an organisation which might have easily 
become narrow and over-tired as the war went on. 147 
In application to the alliance as a whole, David Reynolds has emphasised that: 
`Ultimately, the British needed the Americans more than the Americans needed the 
British, 148 In application to the, albeit, niche area of specialist formations, however, 
this seems to be reversed with Britain remaining the dominant partner throughout the 
war 
An examination of the Anglo-American relationship within the context of special 
operations well illuminates a number of clear examples of integration and very close 
co-operation between British and American personnel at the `grassroots' level in both 
training, planning and (albeit less frequently) operational deployment. During the 
strains of training and in the rigours of battle, relationships developed between the men 
of the two nations which often transcended national identity. It is not without 
significance that, as Kenneth Macksey has emphasised, much `extensive cementing' of 
146 See Eisenhower, p. 394 147 Mackenzie, p. 393 148 Reynolds (1996), p. 15 
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the Anglo-American `alliance at ground level was performed by the arbiters of 
raiding'. 149 Nor it is without significance that the overwhelmingly good relations 
between' British and American specialist formations transcended many of the more 
general animosities that troubled the broader alliance. The small-scale and cost- 
effective nature of special forces provided a politically-acceptable mechanism through 
which both Britain and the US could conduct military operations on a global level 
without many of the traditional limitations or dilemmas which troubled alliance 
strategy. Although this field represents only a tiny area of a global alliance, the 
example of Allied co-operation in the field of specialist formations provides a window 
of, what at times, was model co-operation between Britain and the United States. Had 
the alliance not functioned as smoothly and as successfully as it ultimately did, it is 
clear that the US adoption and development of specialist formations would have been 
severely curtailed; and had this occurred, and with the full burden of mounting 
irregular operations falling on the British, it is equally likely that their enthusiasm for 
such ventures would have been significantly reduced. Simply put, the Anglo-American 
alliance was an essential factor in forging the manner and extent to which both nations 
adopted, developed and utilised specialist formations and waged irregular warfare 
during the Second World War. 
149 Macksey (1985), p. 210 
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Chapter 4 
Command and Control 
The command and control of specialist formations presents what is perhaps a uniquely 
difficult prospect. For, to be effective, it requires, almost at the same time, two 
contradictory and often intractable mechanisms. On the one hand, there is the 
requirement for a malleable, innovative and loose approach to command that gives a 
degree of independence and autonomy to individual units, and which does not to stifle 
their individual initiative and flexibility. On the other, there is an even greater 
requirement for a suitably restrictive centralised control mechanism capable of 
harnessing these units and directing their actions to the best benefit of greater 
operational and strategic plans; lest they become wasteful, redundant, or come into 
conflict with the activities of other actors. Centralisation is also important so as not to 
burden unnecessarily small operational units with the dilemmas of administration and 
logistics etc. and equally, so as not to allow these units to place undue strain upon the 
conventional channels having to cater for them. These requirements and the best 
method of employing these formations were, however, far from understood at the 
outset of the Second World War. There was little or no precedent in place to guide 
commanders on how irregular forces should be organised, directed and controlled. 
Mechanisms, methods and practices for the effective command, administration and 
application of these formations thus all had to be virtually invented over the course of 
the war. This chapter serves to highlight the Anglo-American command perceptions of 
specialist formations, and to chart the evolution in the manner in which they were 
commanded, controlled and coordinated. Understanding the development of these 
approaches is central to comprehending the broader evolution and utility of 
commandos and special forces during the course of the Second World War. ' 
Although at times enthusiastic, command preconceptions of specialist formations were, 
more often than not, marked with scepticism and animosity. Military resentment of the 
unconventional is understandable. The unique composition, recruitment practices, 
missions, equipment, discipline and methods of administration that separated specialist 
formations from conventional forces led to suspicion, whilst their exclusivity and aura 
of mystery (or, conversely, pronounced publicity) undoubtedly fostered an impression 
' See Appendix I for various organisational charts of command hierarchies highlighted in this 
chapter. 
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of favouritism and led to resentment. Mass armies do not like elites; their very 
existence is an implied slur on the martial and `non-special' attributes of everybody 
else. The result; as Peter Fleming contended, was that the `unorthodox warrior always 
fights on two fronts'. 2 For every Churchill, Wavell, or Gubbins, those `champions' of 
specialist formations, `a thousand regular officers existed', in both Britain and the 
United States `who, wedded to conventional military tradition disdained irregular 
warfare'. 3 Friction with those irregular characters so often prominent amongst these 
units went no way to improving matters and much animosity was directed at this 
`gallant madman ... for he is himself unorthodox, impatient of discipline and 
invariably ignorant or casual regarding service custom and procedure, so that unless 
properly led and instructed he gives offence through this same casualness or 
ignorance'. 4 The expansionist and `prima donna' behaviour so often associated with 
these individuals was (and still is) particularly resented and, if unchecked, could 
rapidly escalate `to an active and mutual antagonism with negative consequences for 
operations'. 5 
Although a number of formations received high-level support from `champions' in 
their inception, it should not be assumed that these units faced fewer obstacles. The 
opposite may well in fact be the case. Staffs and subordinates who had to directly deal 
with the demands of irregular units were seldom enthusiastic about catering to the 
needs of the `playthings' or `pets' of politicians and high commanders. 6 Unorthodox 
and relatively junior officers bypassing bureaucratic normalcy and getting a 'direct- 
line' to the top could be the cause of significant resentment and jealousies amongst 
command hierarchies. As Churchill emphasised in reference to the Commandos, 
`resistances 
... increased as the professional ladder was descended. '? Such opposition 
had the potential to cause genuine problems for the use of specialist formations, for as 
William Stirling expressed whilst vying for the employment of his 2nd SAS Regiment 
2 Fleming, Peter, `Unorthodox Warriors', Journal oJRUSI, Vol. CIV, No. 616, (November 1959), 
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in support of the invasion of Sicily, `when the staff ... gets between the [higher] 
commander and SAS Regiment, the latter has little prospect of useful employment'. ' 
Overcoming the obstacles of orthodoxy was not easy, yet with time and, most 
importantly, tangible successes in the field, progress was made. The LRDG's early 
successes opened up many orthodox minds within GHQ MEF to the potential of 
special forces and helped ensure that by operation `Crusader' they were willing to 
sponsor other specialist ventures to aid their offensive. The Commando successes on 
Vaagso, the Lofoten, or St. Nazaire similarly gave a boost of confidence to the 
Commando idea which was flagging as a result of their first operations having been of 
negligible value. The American experience has similar comparisons: the actions of the 
USMC Raiders on Tulagi and Guadalcanal was sufficient to lead to the temporary 
silencing of some of their critics who had steadfastly resisted the idea of an elite within 
an elite, and led to an expansion of the concept; the Ranger's performance in North 
Africa `won over their superiors'; 9 whilst the FSSF's assault on Monte la Difensa and 
Monte la Remetanea ensured the Force became `idealised' by General Mark Clark. 10 
Successes aside, certain units were held in higher esteem within the establishment 
purely because of the roles that they undertook. Opposition to units focused on 
intelligence gathering or reconnaissance was significantly less acute than that towards 
those `pirates' or `thugs' engaged in the `ungentlemanly' pursuits of raiding and 
harassment. " Similarly, conventional mindsets were more prone to accept the military 
value of commando formations or `shock troops' for hazardous tasks than they were of 
special forces performing nonregular missions. 12 
Alongside a lack of sympathy and support for specialist formations lay another, more 
serious, and not always unrelated, problem: a lack of knowledge and understanding 
about their function and potential utility. Colin Gray has emphasised a `trained 
incapacity, a deformation professionelle, on the part of conventional military minds to 
grasp the principles of special warfare..... If superior commanders do not appreciate 
or do not like what special operations forces might do, the strategic utility of those 
forces will be strictly moot'. 13 The proliferation of special forces and commandos in 
8 Stirling to 15 Army Group, 1 July 1943, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 41; Folder 713 
9 Hogan, Raiders, p. 29 
10 Adleman and Walton, pp. 154-155 11 Cohen, p. 53 
12 Gray (1996), p. 167 13 Ibid., pp. 150-151 
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the Second World War represented a fundamentally new approach to warfare, utilising 
new methods and equipment and occurring at an unprecedented depth. The 
mechanisms by which to control and wield this new weapon were by no means innate, 
and there was little precedent in place to guide on the best approach. Broader 
understanding of the potential of irregular units would only develop with experience 
and the creation of dedicated command branches and staffs to direct these formations. 
The most significant command arrangement for British specialist formations was 
Combined Operations Headquarters. Developing immediately after the inception of the 
Commandos, COHQ had, as part of its broader mandate, both the responsibility for the 
administration, training and tasking of the Commandos under its SS Brigade, and the 
planning and mounting of amphibious raids from Britain. In actually fulfilling this 
directive, however, COHQ would face many bureaucratic difficulties. Its creation as a 
brand new agency answerable only to the Chiefs of Staffs (COS) had antagonised a 
number of powerful figures in a sceptical Whitehall, and following the earliest 
Commando raids being of dubious worth the confidence in Admiral Keyes's ability to 
conduct these operations had notably declined. By September 1941 it was decreed that 
no amphibious operation, however small, would be mounted by COIIQ against the 
Channel coasts without the express authority of both GHQ Home Forces and the COS. 
The COHQ role thus became limited to planning, training for, and providing advice on 
raiding operations (powers technically shared by Home Forces), with regional Home 
Commands having the mounting authority for operations launched from their areas of 
responsibility. 14 Only against Norway, an `administratively easy target' because it 
came under the jurisdiction of C-in-C Home Fleet, was COIHQ able to undertake 
raiding without the `web of conflicting red tape'. '5 Operations against the Channel 
coastline, the originally envisioned target for Commando raids, were at this time, 
however, heavily hamstrung by the lack of `any precise system for planning, mounting 
and executing' Commando operations. It was a fact Keyes vehemently emphasised to 
the House of Commons upon his dismissal as DCO: "`Inter-services committees and 
sub-committees had become the dictators of policy instead of the servants of those who 
bore full responsibility; by concentrating on the difficulties and dangers of every 
14 COS Committee directive to ACO, 17 October 1941, CAB 80/31/29 
15 Ladd (1978), p. 27; Seymour, p. 15 
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amphibious project .... the planners have succeeded in thwarting execution until it is 
too late". '16 
The (somewhat controversial) appointment of Lord Louis Mountbatten as Advisor on 
Combined Operations (later CCO) in October 1941 injected the organisation with a 
new aura of vitality. In March 1942 Mountbatten was promoted to Vice-Admiral, 
granted a chair on the COS Committee, and appointed `the sole co-ordinating authority 
for all raids on the western seaboard of Europe'. Despite COIIQ's increasing powers, 
Mountbatten's ability to conduct regular raids remained hindered by significant 
bureaucratic hurdles. Any COHQ plan still had to be submitted for approval by the 
COS Committee (but no longer GHQ Home Forces), and if authorised, would then be 
placed under the command of a Naval C-in-C of a Home Port for execution. 
Furthermore, this naval commander, the three Army Home Force Commanders 
(Southern, South-Eastern and Eastern), and the RAF authorities all could veto the 
execution of an operation. '7 In July 1942 a frustrated Mountbatten complained that he 
`found it difficult to translate this responsibility [for raiding operations] into practice 
because of the system of divided control which at present guides operations of this 
nature'. He recommended that a new streamlined system should be instigated which 
would, if not grant him executive powers, at least make the process of planning and 
mounting operations reliant upon the `smallest number of authorities that is 
permissible'. 1$ 
Mountbatten was a keen advocate of the idea of conducting fortnightly raids against 
the continent but would find such ambitions greatly hamstrung by the convoluted 
command procedures through which even minor raids were authorised. Thus, as part of 
his suggestions for administrative reforms, Mountbatten proposed a `more flexible 
procedure for planning and approving' minor raids and suggested retaining one 
Commando in readiness at Portsmouth with the necessary naval links already in place 
so that operations could be planned and mounted quickly having received only oral 
approval from the COS. 19 Such suggestions led to the establishment of the Small Scale 
Raiding Force as a means of swiftly undertaking minor raids with the minimum of 
bureaucratic red tape. Although the SSRF initially worked directly under CCO, its 
16 Quoted in Lord Lovat, March Past, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1979) p. 223 
'7 Mountbatten to COS Committee, 21 March 1942, CAB 80/35/57 
'a Mountbatten to Secretary, COS Committee, 23 July 1942, WO 106/4117 
19 Mountbatten to COS Committee, 9 May 1942, CAB 80/62/55 
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ability to conduct frequent operations was further enhanced when it was placed under 
the operational control of Admiral Hughes-Hallett's `Force J' (a naval command 
formed after Dieppe to provide COHQ with a force capable of `brigade sized lift'), a 
move which gave the SSRF access to a dedicated naval planning staff with a greater 
capacity to mount operations. Hughes-Hallett described this arrangement, stating: 
.... we 
hardly ever interfered with the military part of the plan. We did find it 
necessary however to go into considerable detail in connection with 
navigational problems, and escort and cover, and it was not in the least 
surprising that the Small-Scale Raiding Forces should have failed to achieve 
anything so long as they were entirely independent. 20 
Increasingly, however, the divergent requirements of SIS and SOE activities made the 
conduct of even minor raids from Britain once again problematic. There was mounting 
concern from these agencies that COHQ raids were making the insertion of agents and 
the gathering of clandestine intelligence, particularly on the lightly-defended Brittany 
coastlines, more difficult. Because the SSRF held a virtual monopoly over small-scale 
COHQ raiding in these areas, it was their activities which became a catalyst for debate 
over the relative priorities of raiding operations versus clandestine intelligence and 
sabotage activities? ' The debate was extensive, but ultimately concluded in favour of 
SIS whose intelligence was deemed more valuable than that obtainable by the 'smash- 
and-grab' methods of SSRF. The COS therefore decreed that in the event of conflicts 
between SOE, SIS and COHQ, SIS would `ordinarily be given priority', and appointed 
C-in-C Home Fleet to mediate over any further conflicts of interest between these 
different agencies. 22 SSRF activities were thus heavily curtailed and, with the Force's 
principle advantages subverted (notably the ease and frequency in which operations 
could be executed), the unit's raison d'etre ceased to exist and it was ultimately 
disbanded. 
As preparations for the invasion of France increased, even more stringent controls 
upon amphibious raiding operations from Britain were necessary lest they jeopardise 
or preclude essential reconnaissance; compromise invasion plans; or alter unfavourably 
the disposition of enemy forces and defences. Furthermore, as clandestine 
20 Jlughes-Hallett, Rear Admiral J., 'The Mounting of Raids', Journal of RUST, Vol. XCV, No. 580, 
(November 1950), p. 587 21 This occurred despite the fact that the original personnel of SSRF, formerly of Maid l lonor Force, 
remained jointly administered by SOE and COIIQ. CO SSRF to Mountbatten, 1 January 1943, 
DEFE 2/957 
22 Minutes of COS Committee meeting, 4 January 1943, DEFE 2/1093 
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reconnaissance operations by units such as the COPPs and S&Rs were increasingly 
coming to the fore, it was necessary to establish mechanisms by which their operations 
could be properly directed towards answering specific questions as posed by the 
supreme commander and his intelligence and planning staffs. 23 In October 1943, 
therefore, the COSSAC Raids and Reconnaissance Committee was established as the 
chief arbitrator of all raiding operations within COSSAC's sphere. Although the 
planning and mounting of raids would technically remain a COHQ responsibility, the 
Committee's role would be `to allot priorities for and co-ordinate all such raids and to 
ensure that the best use was made of all means and resources available'. 
24 This 
arrangement was both sensible and constructive and, at the suggestion of Admiral 
Ramsey, additional `Reconnaissance Committees' were established on the staffs of 
other theatre commanders. 25 
The transition of the Commando role away from independent raiding activities and 
towards spearheading and protracted light-infantry tasks necessitated changes in the 
manner in which the Commandos were organised, administered and controlled. North 
Africa had highlighted many limitations with the Commando organisation, not least of 
all the restrictions of being reliant upon the UK-based SS Brigade for the 
administration of individual Commandos in the field. Before the invasion of Sicily, 
therefore, Brigadier Laycock established a subordinate SS Brigade HQ under AFIIQ to 
act as a theatre-wide body to coordinate the assignment of the Commandos and deal 
with their administrative concerns. He also strove to alter the Commando 
establishment to ensure that each individual Commando possessed adequate `transport 
and administration personnel for maintaining themselves in the field' lest they incur 
the charge of being `parasites' constantly reliant on the patronage of neighbouring field 
formations 26 
The creation of six more Royal Marine Commandos in August 1943 (joining the two 
already in existence) provided an even greater impetus for an effective command 
structure capable of orchestrating the deployments, and catering to the needs, of 
various Commandos potentially separated by large geographical distances. As the use 
of the SS Brigade IIQ subdivision had worked well in Sicily it was decided, in October 
23 G. E. Wildman-Lushington, COS to CCO to Secretary of the Admiralty (M Branch), 20 
September 1943, DEFE 2/741; Dwyer (1993), p. 41 
24 Minutes of Reconnaissance Committee, 6 November 1943, WO 106/4117 
ZS Admiral Ramsay to Secretary of the Admiralty, 5 November 1943, ADM 1/13228 
26 Laycock, `Reorganisation of SS Brigade', I April 1943, DEFE 2/1051 
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1943, to group all full-establishment `regular' Commandos into four individual SS 
Brigades (each comprised four Commandos), and place all of these under a newly 
established SS Group in Britain headed by General Sturges, RM. This move would 
decentralise their administration and help alleviate the problems of reinforcement, 
logistics, and command and control which were becoming exacerbated by the 
increasingly large distances separating the individual Commandos. 27 
Attached to various divisional, corps, and army commands, in the field the SS Brigade 
organisation remained flexible. In France and northwest Europe the deployment of SS 
Brigades was relatively conventional; from D-Day +2 onwards the Commandos of the 
1s` and 4"' SS Brigades under 21 Army Group deployed as complete units maintaining 
a similar relationship with their Brigade as that which a conventional Infantry Battalion 
would have with an Infantry Brigade. 28 For the 2°d SS Brigade in Italy and the 
Mediterranean and, to a lesser extent, the 4`h SS Brigade in SEAC, however, cohesive 
deployments of Commandos directly under a Brigade were rarer. The 2nd SS Brigade's 
individual Commandos, in particular, were often separated from their Brigade IIQ for 
protracted periods, working in subdivisions widely dispersed throughout Italy, the 
Balkans and Greece. 29 In such instances Brigade HQs would merely serve as a theatre- 
level administrative and advisory post on the best methods of deploying Commandos 
in an independent manner; individual Commandos were granted much more latitude 
retaining only loose links with the Brigade through the exchange of liaison officers 
etc.. " 
Overall, the SS Brigade structure can be viewed as highly successful. It was a flexible 
arrangement capable of adapting to both independent activities and more conventional 
mainline deployments. It helped mould the Commandos into the British order of battle 
for conventional operations; eased both the attachment of Commandos to field 
formations, and the attachment of supporting arms to the Commandos themselves; and 
helped the inter-service integration of Army and Royal Marine Commandos. As the 
war progressed the powers of the SS Brigade to train, plan for, and administer its 
individual Commandos would steadily increase, and by the closing stages of the war 
27 Mountbatten to CIGS, 4 May 1943, WO 32/10416 
28 Major-General de Guingand, COS 21 Army Group to SIIAEF, 7 June 1944, WO 205/136; 
Samain, p. 44 
29 21 Army Group Staff Study No. 8 `Employment of Commandos and Rangers', 27 December 
1943, RG 331, Entry 199, Box 32; Folder 322 Rangers 
30 'History of the Commandos in the Mediterranean', DEFE 2/700, p. 397 
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the 3`a Commando Brigade HQ (as the SS Brigades were renamed in December 1944) 
in India, for example, had developed auxiliary sections encompassing a `Holding 
Commando', RM Engineer Commandos, Brigade Defence Sections, Medical 
Commandos, as well as quartermasters, provost marshals, workshops etc.. 31 The SS 
Brigade served an important role in coordinating the actions of the Commandos, aiding 
their employment and catering for their logistical and administrative needs; yet most 
significantly, it performed an `essential' role in advising higher commanders on the 
Commandos' `employment and technique'. 32 Furthermore, the more conventional 
reorganisation, alongside the Commando successes in spearheading and assault roles, 
helped submerge much of the opposition and suspicion previously directed at them. 33 
Although in many regards there was a close commonality between the Commandos 
and the US Army Rangers, one of the most notable areas of divergence was in the 
manner in which the formations were administered and controlled; and it is fair to say 
that the Rangers suffered from the absence of a similar arrangement to that of COIIQ 
and the SS Brigade. Throughout the war the Rangers lacked a formally constituted 
command structure which could give them legitimacy; provide high-level 
representation; advise higher commanders on their capabilities and tactics; set 
organisational and doctrinal precedents; and cater for their logistics and administration. 
During the war, all Ranger formations were directly attached to field formations, 
commonly at Divisional level or lower, and, with the possible exception of the 6`n 
Rangers, there was no real effort to instruct higher bodies on Ranger capabilities or 
employment, nor was there any adequate apparatus for their administration. 
Consequently, the tasking and use of Ranger formations became solely dependent on 
the willingness of the higher headquarters, to which they were attached, to employ 
them. 
In April 1943 prior to the invasion of Sicily, and following the creation of the 3'd and 
4`h Rangers, Darby had requested (almost simultaneously with the creation of the first 
nominal SS Brigade) that a Ranger Force Ileadquarters be authorised to provide for the 
`direction of training and operations and for the purpose of facilitating administration 
of the three battalions'. Unlike the requests that Laycock had made, however, Darby's 
requests were rejected with the explanation that the Rangers were 'considered to be of 
31 HQ SACSEA to GHQ India, 3 May 1945, WO 203/4594 
32 Laycock to Under Secretary of State, War Office, 10 October 1944, WO 32/10415 33 Laycock to Brigadier Mills-Roberts, 28 March 1945, KCLMA Mills-Roberts Folder 3/17 
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a transient nature and to have no permanent place in army organisation'. The `Ranger 
Force' that did deploy in Sicily was thus merely a cosmetic grouping with no separate 
headquarters, no special powers, and no formerly appointed commander (although 
Darby, CO ls` Rangers, was de facto commander of all three Battalions). 34 Following 
Sicily, there were further calls for the creation of a formal Ranger Force headquarters 
and the acknowledgement of the battalions in a permanent organisation. Major Roy 
Murray, CO 4`h Rangers, argued that such a Headquarters was essential and believed it 
should be `patterned after the British Combined Operations staff, to handle the 
administrative problems, intelligence, long range planning, the allocation of 
assignments to the various battalions, and, most important, to decide if the assignment 
is a proper one for Rangers'. 35 Darby went as far as suggesting that: `If ... it is the 
opinion of the War Department that battalions of this nature are not permanent, it is 
requested that these battalions be disbanded and reformed as a regularly approved 
organisation with a table of organisation already fully recognised by the War 
36 Department'. 
Lieutenant-General George S. Patton, Jr. was firmly behind the proposals of the 
Rangers, and `in view of the excellent work performed by these units while under ... 
[his] command', he recommended that the battalions `be consolidated into a Ranger 
Regiment, given suitable headquarters' under the command of Darby, and be 
permanently assigned to his Seventh Army for operations. 37 Despite such high-level 
support, General McNair, Army Ground Forces, remained adamant that these units 
were provisional expedients only and accordingly refused all such proposals. The only 
concession ultimately made was allowing the Rangers to establish a small provisional 
tactical headquarters for the invasion of Italy, and later, before Anzio, General Mark 
Clark promoted Darby to Colonel and allowed him to establish a temporary combined 
headquarters, called 6615th Ranger Force, Provisional. 38 In its brief existence, however, 
this grouping had no real authority aside from administration and tactical 
considerations, and in no way compared to a SS Brigade. 39 In May 1944, prior to the 
deployment of the 2 °d and 5`h Rangers in the Normandy landings another ad hoc 
34 Darby to Eisenhower, 10 August 1943, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 21066; Folder INBN-1-0 
's Major Murray to General McNair, 28 November 1943, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 21075; Folder 
INBN-4-0.1 
36 Darby to Eisenhower, 10 August 1943, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 21066; Folder INBN-1-0 
" Correspondence between Patton and Eisenhower, 12 August 1943, in Ibid 3e Correspondence between 'AWG' and Clark, 14 October 1943, in Ibid. 39 Report of Action, 22 January 1944- 5 February 1944, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 21067; Folder 
INBN-1-0.3 
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Provisional Ranger Group was established under Lieutenant-Colonel James E. Rudder 
(who outranked Major Max Schneider, his counterpart in the 5`h Rangers), yet this too 
remained solely concerned with logistics and administration and ceased to operate 
shortly after D-Day. 4° 
The refusal to grant the Rangers a permanent headquarters to formalise their command 
and control provides clear illustration of the dominant US perception of ranger 
formations as being ephemeral bodies for which there was little requirement once 
conventional arms had come into contact with the enemy. Although this overarching 
policy precedent would have notable implications for the `correct' employment of the 
Rangers (as the next chapter will highlight), it did not, however, universally impede the 
development of effective command structures. The 6th Ranger Battalion's command 
arrangements are of particular note and, for two main reasons, would surpass those 
which had developed for the other Ranger Battalions in Europe. The first important 
difference between the 6`h Rangers and the other Battalions were a result of the theatre- 
specific conditions of the war in the Southwest Pacific and the Philippines which 
promoted an inherent focus on the use of small groups and decentralised control. 41 The 
second, and more significant factor, was that that the 6t' Rangers, like the Alamo 
Scouts, maintained a close and constructive relationship with the man ultimately 
responsible for their tasking: General Krueger, GOC Sixth Army. Having personally 
orchestrated the establishment of the 6' Rangers in the first instance, Krueger was 
unwavering in his support for them; something that helped guarantee the development 
of uncomplicated and effective command paths between his G-2 and G-3 infrastructure 
and Colonel Mucci's Rangers. Such a relationship was undoubtedly central to the 6`h 
Ranger's success at Cabanatuan 42 
As compared to the Army Rangers the command and control of both the FSSF and 
Merrill's Marauders was very conventional. The FSSF was organised into three 
nominal `regiments' and a `group HQ' under Colonel Frederick and was perpetually 
deployed, as a complete unit, via direct attachments at the divisional and corps level. 43 
The Marauders were comparably structured, consisting of three `battalions' and an IIQ 
40 'A Narrative History of the Second Ranger Infantry Battalion, 1944', RG 407, Entry 427, Box 
21072; Folder 23745, INBN-2-0.3, Ch. 1, p. 8 
41 Hogan, US Army, pp. 90-91; 138 
42 Chae, Chelsea Y., 'The Roles and Missions of Rangers in the Twenty-First Century', Thesis, Fort 
Leavenworth: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996, p. 47 
43 Springer, pp. 67; 123 
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and, in light of being the only US ground forces in the CBI theatre, had a 
uncomplicated chain of command operating directly under Stilwell's Northern Combat 
Area Command. Although both the Marauders and FSSF each had a composition and 
role largely foreign to conventional arms, their scale and organisation was, however, 
more familiar. Because both units were loosely based around the `triangular' system as 
adopted by conventional US Army units, and because each unit possessed its own 
headquarters element, the command and control of the Marauders and FSSF, and their 
integration into operations involving field formations, was an inherently easier 
proposition than it was for many other specialist formations. 4 That is not to discount, 
however, a proportion of problems endemic to the use of these formations in an 
irregular manner. The rigours of the Marauder's long-range penetration activities, in 
particular, required the development of more unconventional procedures to cater for 
the employment of columns widely reliant on air supply and often separated from one 
another, and their HQ, by both distance and the limitations of communications. 
Somewhat ironically, considering their early disbandment, it was the USMC Raiders 
that had perhaps the clearest command and control mechanisms of all US ranger 
formations. In their deployments against both Tulagi and Guadalcanal the IS` Raider 
Battalion fitted smoothly into the existing D-2 and D-3 infrastructure of the l` Marine 
Division. The 2d Raiders, by comparison, having conducted the Makin raid under the 
direction of Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Fleet, would maintain looser and more irregular 
command structures during their time on Guadalcanal. Of particular note are the 
command arrangements which were made for Carlson's `long patrol' from Aloa Bay in 
November and December 1943. Although the operation was authorised and overseen 
by General Vandergrift, GOC Is` Marine Division, Carlson was granted a rare level of 
autonomy for its conduct. Although Carlson would maintain regular contact with the 
D-3 branch, forwarding situation and intelligence reports, and organising resupply 
missions etc., Vandergrift explicitly ordered that his staff should make no effort `to 
give him [Carlson] anything whatever in the way of orders or instructions'. 45 As the 
success of this operation was in large part due to Carlson's irregular talents, credit 
must also fall upon the flexible and open-minded command and control system of the 
1 s` Marine Division and its willingness to give Carlson the latitude through which his 
methods could be exploited. 
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In March 1943, following Guadalcanal and the creation of two more Raider battalions 
the decision was taken, almost at the same time as Darby's proposals for the 
reorganisation of the Rangers were first rejected, to organise the heretofore 
independent Raider battalions into the First Marine Raider Regiment. In September 
1943 the 2°d and 3'" Raiders were removed from this command and placed under a 
newly-created Second Regiment. Both organisations served to coordinate the 
administration, but not control, of the individual battalions. Their establishment would, 
however, mark the beginning of the end for the original raider concept as more 
orthodox officers came into the organisation and placed the battalions on a more 
conventional footing. 46 This step towards conventionalisation was a leap towards the 
ultimate disbandment of the Raiders; the removal of the likes of Carlson from the 
organisation (via promotion) providing `a momentary glimpse of the dark side of the 
upper levels of the Marine Corps showing inflexibility of thought and a compulsive 
suspicion of all things new and untried'. 47 
As a whole, the deployment of commando and ranger formations in close conjunction 
with the main battle was effectively achieved and, aside from administrative and 
bureaucratic dilemmas, would cause relatively few problems during the war. The same, 
however, cannot be said for the command of control of special forces (or for 
commando formations deploying in an irregular manner). Operating in depth, highly 
individualistic, and with even more unfamiliar methods and equipment, the use and 
control of special forces was uniquely complicated. As nascent creations special forces 
offered largely unknown potentials, and initially the best manner by which to utilise 
these formations was to provide them with significant latitude to plan and conduct their 
own operations. Although leadership should not be confused with command and 
direction, during the formative period of a number of special forces the two were offen 
symbiotic. The relationship between the `errant captain' and the `champion' so often 
defined the early mechanism for the command and control of these formations and 
inherently promoted informal procedures. Individual units would be given a loose 
mandate, timeframe, or area of operations, and then had the latitude to plan and 
conduct operations, within these restrictions, as they saw best. Such arrangements were 
often resented and helped to germinate the negative notion of the `private army'. 
a6 Hoffman (1995) 
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When Bagnold established the LRDG he immediately sought `GIIQ control' directly 
under Wavell. 48 Bagnold assumed that only by being responsible to the highest 
practicable authority in theatre would it be possible for his unit to be correctly 
deployed with their activities wedded into the broader operational and strategic 
picture. 9 Bagnold had set a precedent and thus when Stirling established `L' 
Detachment he attained a similar arrangement with Auchinleck. 50 For much of their 
time in the desert both the LRDG and `L' Detachment would work independently 
under GHQ MEF (with liaison officers attached to Western Desert Force/Eighth 
Army) with little formal organisation of command and control. Their administration 
and training was performed from within, and whilst the LRDG would conduct 
planning alongside the Director of Military Operations (DMO) so as to provide 
direction to their intelligence gathering activities, the SAS would be broadly 
responsible for its own planning. 51 Because of the unique conditions of the Desert War, 
the barren terrain; vast distances; open lines of communication; expansive flanks; and a 
strategy uncomplicated by inhabited areas, autonomous raiding was eminently possible 
and profitable, and the command arrangement of these special forces, as was admitted 
by Lieutenant-General R. L. McCreery, CGS MEF, `may be untidy in principle but in 
practice it works'. 52 
From mid-1942, however, the proliferation of these units ensured that a tighter manner 
of command and control became necessary not only to protect them from competition 
and overlap, but also, more importantly, so as to not jeopardise, detract from, or 
impede conventional operations, lest `plans of enormous moment [be] spoiled by the 
wild depredations of a handful of adventurers'. 53 The `raiding circus' was getting out 
of hand, and the informal autonomous mechanisms of control began to falter. Moves 
were thus undertaken to formalise the command and administration of these special 
forces. It was thought desirable to provide one body with the authority to coordinate 
the activities of all the disparate groups. The first efforts to do this occurred in April 
1942 when the LRDG was made responsible for the coordination of all activities 
`behind the enemy's lines' in Libya which included, whilst in the field, all desert 
48 Bagnold, p. 125 
49 Hackett (1952), p. 34 
so Hoe, p. 61 
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special forces, as well as Middle East Commando, SOE, SIS and M19 personnel. In 
practice, however, this move was soon found to be impracticable as it placed too much 
of a burden on the LRDG and threatened to reduce their operational efficiency. 54 
By August 1942, following extensive discussion with the relevant parties, it was 
decided to appoint an officer at GHQ MEF with the specific duty to coordinate the 
various desert special forces. 55 In addition, to further streamline this process, it was 
thought essential to amalgamate the 1" SBS, `L' Detachment and the ls` SS Regiment 
(Middle East Commando) so as to increase co-operation and eliminate competition 
over resources and targets. 56 Although both Stirling and Lieutenant-Colonel John A. 
Graham, CO of 1st SS Regiment, sought control of this grouping, Graham had neither 
Stirling's flair for backdoor lobbying nor his social contacts and record of success with 
which to backup his plea. In characteristic style, Stirling's grab for expansion came off 
the back of a meeting with Winston Churchill, 57 to whom he wrote, the day after 
Graham's proposal was submitted, stating that not only should `L' Detachment be 
enlarged, but that: `Control to rest with the Officer Commanding `L' Detachment and 
not with any outside body superimposed for purposes of co-ordination. .... 
The 
planning of operations to be carried out by `L' Detachment to remain as hitherto the 
prerogative of `L' Detachment'. 58 Although Stirling would win his point about 
expansion, when in late-September the 1 SS Regiment and SBS were incorporated 
into the ls` SAS Regiment, even he could not avert the need for a coordinating branch 
for all special forces in the theatre. 59 
In September 1942 a general staff branch under the DMO, GIIQ MEF was established 
to coordinate the various desert special forces. This branch, known as G(Raiding 
Forces) [G(RF)) became the responsibility of Lieutenant-Colonel John `Shan' Hackett 
whose roles were `to rationalise the kaleidoscope of special forces without diminishing 
54 'LRDG's part in the 8`h Army Operations, April 19`h - May 26`h', 7 June 1942, WO 201/813 ss Minutes of GHQ MEF conference, 23 August 1942, WO 201/732 
56 Lieutenant-Colonel Graham to GHQ MEF, 8 August 1942, WO 201/732 
57 Stirling benefited greatly from allowing Winston Churchill's son Randolph to `join' his unit on a 
raid on Benghazi following which Randolph dutifully recounted all to his father in a suitably 
embellished letter that reads like a Boy's Own novel. Thus when the Prime Minister visited the 
Middle East in August 1942 he invited both Stirling and Fitzroy Maclean (who as an MP Churchill 
was already acquainted) to dine with him, an event which, in the opinion of David I Ioe, `alone 
could be important to the long-term survival of the unit'. floe, p. 148; Major Randolph S. Churchill 
to Winston Churchill, 24 June 1942, File 24 KCLMA Laycock 
58 David Stirling to the Prime Minister, 9 August 1942, WO 201/728 
59 General McCreery to General Alexander, September 1942, WO 201/732 
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the priceless individuality of the men in each'; to improve inter-army cooperation and 
make special operations more palatable to high command; and to ensure that individual 
unit commanders would not be able to harass army or theatre commanders without first 
going through him. 60 Before the G(RF) branch could become operational, however, the 
failure of a coordinated series of raids involving all special forces in the Middle East 
only served to highlight one of the foremost reasons for its creation. The failure, of 
`Agreement' on Tobruk, in particular, proved that a complex operation could not be 
run by an array of disparate groups and highlighted the need for a `properly constituted 
planning staff of a limited number of select personnel. The flaws of `Agreement', as 
well as the SAS attack on Benghazi ('Bigamy') and the SDF raid on Jalo ('Nicety'), 
lay not with the personnel involved, but instead, with limitations of organisation, 
planning, intelligence and, most clearly, the lack of security. 6' G(RF) thus began its 
existence with vivid illustration of its importance. 
Historian John Gordon has claimed that the `chief flaw of the desert special-operations 
venture' was the failure to devise controlling apparatus to `keep pace with ... 
proliferation'. Whilst admitting that G(RF) was valuable, he postulated `how much 
more effective it might have proved had it been expanded into something more 
substantial -a "Joint Desert Special Operations Command". '62 Such a move, however, 
was neither practicable nor strictly necessary in the unique conditions of the theatre 
which, for the most part, welcomed autonomy and freedom of action. If there was a 
flaw in command, it was not the absence of a complex controlling body, for ultimately 
G(RF) was more than adequate in catering for the unique single-service special 
operations as occurring in theatre, but was in the late development of any controlling 
apparatus. Had G(RF) been created earlier it would have helped ensure the best 
possible application of special forces, may have prevented some of the wilder schemes 
(not least such debacles as `Agreement'), and have led to a better organised and more 
cost-effective use of personnel and resources. 
Despite the increasing requirement for coordination of planning, administration, and 
tasking of special forces it remained important to still provide them with a degree of 
60 Hackett in foreword to Messenger, Charles; Young, George and Rose, Stephen, The Middle East 
Commandos, (William Kimber: Northamptonshire, 1988) p. 9; GI IQ MEF to Hackett, 28 September 
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6' 'Operation - AGREEMENT, Lessons from the Military Aspect', undated, WO 201/745; Lessons 
of 'Bigamy' and 'Nicety', October 1942, WO 201/748 
62 Gordon, pp. 187-188 
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independence, flexibility and latitude in both planning and mounting operations. Much 
was gained by assigning units broad areas of operations in which they could have a 
virtually free hand, particularly in harassment and `alarm and despondency' operations. 
As Churchill asserted: `If you want to use the inventiveness and audacity of the people 
who are best adapted for the job ... you must give a good 
deal of latitude lower down 
in how they operate'. 63 The G(RF) system was effective not least of all because 
Hackett, something of a kindred soul to the `errant captains' under his charge, had a 
sound understanding of their roles and tactics. Under G(RF) the individual units 
remained independent of one another and Hackett was `reluctant to try to impose too 
much control', understanding that in the field `faced by situations that changed rapidly, 
the special-force commander on the spot sometimes seemed the individual best 
qualified to make decisions about what targets to hit'. 64 
The Desert War proved that so long as their area of operation is clearly defined and 
broad controls are placed on their deployments, granting special forces freedom of 
action and autonomy within a given area could certainly be very effective. The 
opportunities for such an approach were, however, particular to the unique conditions 
of the Desert War and, as a rule, the more complex or important the issues at hand, the 
less potential there was for autonomous activities by special forces. Should real estate 
become limited then controls on these units became essential; if for no other reason 
than to prevent them from being a nuisance and attempting to coerce higher 
commanders into accepting missions of dubious worth and of limited operational 
value. Because of the many and complex variables effecting deployment of special 
forces in depth in other theatres: conventional offensives; politics; partisans; the 
necessity for security and deception; limited availability of transport or support 
resources etc., the employment of special forces increasingly required more co- 
ordination and control in both planning and execution, not just for tidiness and 
efficiency, but for the most successful prosecution of Allied strategy. 
G(RF) set a precedent for an effective method of controlling special forces, but became 
redundant soon after its creation as special operations were curtailed following the 
advances of Eighth Army and operation `Torch'. With an eye to future deployments, 
on 8 March 1943, Lieutenant-Colonel II. J. Cator was appointed to command a new 
63 Churchill Vol. 11, p. 4I3 64 Gordon, p. 156 
158 
GHQ ME sub-division, `Headquarters Raiding Forces', which would absorb the G(RF) 
branch in a move to `centralise and improve' the administration, reinforcement, 
logistics and discipline of its special forces. 65 This organisation, however, was short- 
lived and was broken up by the separation of the units under its charge for differing 
deployments in the Eastern and Western Mediterranean. In September 1943, this 
branch's lineal, but not direct descendent, `Raiding Forces IIQ Aegean' was created 
under Brigadier D. J. T. Turnbull. Responsible to GHQ ME, this branch was to maintain 
the same relationship with its varied special forces that an infantry brigade HQ 
maintained with an infantry battalion. 66 
Raiding Forces Aegean, however, suffered some notable teething problems. The 
LRDG in particular were not impressed by its activities and resented having to be 
reliant upon them for logistics and intelligence. Lloyd Owen believed that 
`inexperience and a lack of knowledge' led to Raiding Forces not appreciating the 
`intricate and careful planning that is essential for success of LRDG patrols'. 67 This 
was exacerbated by the fact that Turnbull, by all accounts no John Hackett, was 
personally inexperienced knowing `nothing about any form of special work'. The 
situation was only partially resolved by the appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Prendergast, formerly in command of LRDG, as Turnbull's second-in-command 68 
Although the wider direction of the Aegean `folly' was not the fault of Raiding Forces, 
nor the units therein, the branch did little, in the earlier stages, either to promote 
suitable, or prevent inappropriate, deployment of the formations under its charge. Early 
raids in the Aegean were plagued by the very problems that Raiding Forces IIQ had 
been established to prevent. Operations were `poorly coordinated, without central 
planning' with the individual special forces generally operating independently of one 
another with much "`overlapping, wastage, and friction". '69 Gradually, however, this 
branch grew more successful and, as broader ambitions in the Aegean were curtailed, 
the personnel of Raiding Forces were increasingly used as intended. 
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Although US ranger-style formations were hindered by the absence of a direct 
equivalent to either COHQ or the SS Brigade, many US special forces benefited 
greatly from William Donovan and the OSS as an organisation dedicated to their 
interests. OSS provided a centralised unifying body for American special operations 
which, in terms of administering and directing disparate special forces on a global 
scale, certainly had the potential to be a more efficient arrangement than the 
cumbersome multi-agency approach of the British. As early as May 1942 Donovan 
clearly understood the need for a centralised approach to irregular activities, a COI 
Memorandum stated: 
.... 
decentralisation into isolated groups engaged on independent and unrelated 
missions is improper. A definite command in the military forces should be 
created to plan and conduct this type of warfare through the war. Without such 
centralised planning and control, the full possibilities of sabotage and guerrilla 
warfare cannot be utilised. 7° 
In the processes of developing American special forces capabilities OSS bears more 
similarities to COHQ than it does to their more obvious counterparts of SIS and SOE. 
The fierce opposition that Donovan faced in June 1941 as COI, particularly over his 
proposals for special operations, or `supplementary activities', was certainly analogous 
to that which Keyes first faced as DCO. 7' Nor was the opposition solely limited to 
Washington. Suspicion and animosities precluded OSS development in both the 
Pacific and Far Eastern theatres. The starkest opposition came from General 
MacArthur who saw OSS requests to operate in his theatre to be `an outrageous 
infringement upon his own territory'. 72 Although not adverse to special operations, as 
exhibited by his sponsorship of the Philippine guerrillas, AlB, the Alamo Scouts, and 
the 6th Ranger Battalion, MacArthur was reluctant to cede control to what he saw as a 
suspicious external agency with dubious political motives and accordingly barred all 
OSS elements from the South West Pacific theatre. 73 OSS operations in the Central 
Pacific were also heavily curtailed with Admiral Nimitz limiting participation to only 
MU and R&D Branches. This move was, however, based more on the lack of 
requirement and opportunity than it was from any particular animosity. 74 
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Similarly at odds with OSS was General Stilwell. Fundamentally an orthodox soldier, 
he was `fervently prejudiced against "irregular" military activity' and disparaged 
`guerrilla tactics as "illegal action" and "shadow boxing". '75 Although willing to grant 
Commander Milton Miles's Naval Group China (later called SACO) `free and 
exclusive control over special operations in CBI', Stilwell was initially unwilling to 
award the same access to OSS Detachment 101. Naval Group China `enjoyed virtual 
autonomy as far as any American military authority in Asia was concerned, both 
because of Tai Li's [head of the Chinese intelligence service as recognised by the 
Chungking government] directorship and because the Navy Department in Washington 
fully supported Miles' position'. For operations in China OSS had no choice but to 
accept Miles as a nominal regional head. 76 Detachment 101 was ultimately confined to 
Burma and maintained very little contact with SACO. This separation was not, 
however, a result of any inter-service divisions or animosities, for when first meeting 
Miles, Major Carl F. Eifler (commanding Detachment 101) claimed they `hit it off 
from the moment we met', and the pair came to a mutual agreement that `we could 
work a lot better and accomplish more if we worked together but gave the opinion to 
the outside world that we disliked each other'. The separation was fundamentally a 
political move made for the benefit of the Chinese who were suspicious of Eifler's 
associations with British agencies that they considered untrustworthy. " 
With any conflict with the Chinese averted, Stilwell ultimately embraced Detachment 
101 in Burma and gave them a `free hand' to operate independently; sending Eifler 
into the jungle with the mandate that all he wanted to hear from them were 'Booms'. 8 
Detachment 101 thus established a main base station at Nazira in the Assam from 
which its operations in the field were directed. This centralised command system 
worked well, but with 101's dramatic expansion to cater for Stilwell's Burma Road 
offensive it began to become overstretched. It was thus deemed necessary to develop 
an `Area Control' system by which northern Burma was divided into four regions, each 
under an individual commander responsible for all subsidiary 101 activities within his 
area. This was an effective method of dealing with the complications of expansion; it 
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removed the burden from Nazira and greatly improved communications and logistical 
arrangements; its rewards, as Colonel Peers, Detachment 101's CO, stated, `were 
initiative and flexibility such as we had never known. 79 
Within Europe, no doubt affected by the British influence, attitudes towards OSS were 
significantly more mellowed. The first overseas COI branch in London was small, 
`characterised by informality' and had no `elaborate chain of command'. 80 By the 
summer of 1942, however, with the creation of OSS `the presence of such an 
independent quasi-civilian agency, conducting highly operational activities' was 
becoming `incompatible with the rigid organisational pattern' rapidly enveloping the 
theatre. To alleviate these tensions and promote more efficient operational 
mechanisms, in February 1943, OSS/London sought to be incorporated into the 
Theatre framework via `militarisation', a process granted on 4 June 1943 when 
OSS/London was officially recognised as a military detachment and made responsible 
to the Assistant-COS, G-2 ETOUSA. 81 Such a move, mirrored in other theatres, 
provided OSS with a Table of Organisation and Equipment and an allotment for the 
recruitment and promotion of personnel etc.. This reorganisation was not, however, a 
panacea for OSS inexperience and in many of its first operational deployments the 
initial position of OSS was `inevitably that of a new agency about whose functions and 
relative position neither its own members, nor those to whom it was immediately 
responsible were sure'. 82 
The OGs were awarded branch status in May 1943 which authorised personnel to be 
dispatched to the field. When deployed to a theatre the OGs would operate under their 
own `Area Staff that was responsible for controlling `all Groups operating within and 
from the Theatre', this staff, however, remained subservient to the larger SO (Special 
Operations) Branch headquarters for all matters of planning, administration, tasking 
and direction. 83 Soon after the OGs first took to the field, however, this arrangement 
was deemed undesirable. The `general character and duties' of the OGs were so 
divergent from the rest of OSS that many OGs `felt they had little in common' with the 
79 Peers and Brelis, pp. 117-118 80 Roosevelt Vol. 11, p. 143 81 Ibid., pp. 6-7 
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larger organisation. 84 Furthermore there was a genuine concern that the SO branch did 
not sufficiently understand the qualifications or mandate of the OGs. 85 Lieutenant- 
Colonel Russell Livermore, commanding the first operationally deployed OGs in 
Corsica, highlighted the need for 
... a good tough guy with some rank as head of OG who is not afraid to yell bloody murder and protect our rear in matters of allotment, etc..... Having 
much trouble here with command and administrative channels within OSS, it 
being a crazy civilian agency. I hope to get OG reorganised in this theatre as a 
regular military regiment with a different name and under OSS command only 
at the very top. 86 
On the basis of such justifications, on 21 June 1944 the various OGs in the Italian and 
Mediterranean theatre were placed on a more military footing and renamed Companies 
`A' (Italian), `B' (French), and `C' (Yugoslav and Greek) of the 2671st Special 
Reconnaissance Battalion Separate (Provisional). It was a move undertaken for a 
variety of reasons: to improve the planning and application of the OGs; to make their 
use more palatable to the military high command and remove suspicion over their 
utility; to ease the attachment of groups to higher formations for operational control; 
and rather naively, it was hoped that it would help protect OG personnel from Hitler's 
Commando Order. The gradual OG separation from the SO Branch was completed in 
November 1944 with the creation of the `OG Command' under Livermore which 
represented a separate `military unit' of OSS responsible directly to Donovan. 87 These 
moves towards independence for the OGs increased the potential for their employment, 
giving them greater powers and more efficient structures for the conduct of operations. 
The effectiveness of these measures is well illustrated by the extensive and widespread 
deployment of OGs from the summer of 1944 onwards. 
The gradual rise of resistance activities and the increasing deployments of SOE, OSS 
and varied special forces in the Mediterranean theatre increasingly highlighted the 
importance of co-ordinating the activities of all Allied irregular elements working 
`behind enemy lines' under one clear banner to improve their administration and 
tasking. By February 1944 the volume of work that these varied elements were 
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generating 'had increased to such an extent and had become interwoven with such high 
level policy decisions' that it was necessary to establish several regional staff branches 
to specifically coordinate the conduct of `special operations' (defined as those `military 
operations within or behind enemy lines'). 88 These were: Special Operations G-3 
Algiers (AFHQ) for co-ordinating operations on the Western Mediterranean and the 
South of France; Special Operations G-3 15 Army Group for operations in support of 
AAI; and Force 266 for operations in Yugoslavia and Albania. 89 
In April 1944 `Special Operations: Mediterranean' [SOM] was established under 
Major-General W. A. M. Stawell to co-ordinate these three separate branches, and the 
forces within their respective areas of operation, under one head; prepare plans and 
initiate these for command approval; advise AFHQ on the capabilities and 
availabilities of these forces; coordinate such activities with commanders of lower 
echelons; and allot priorities for use of air and naval craft. 90 Stawell would be the 
`technical adviser to SAC [General Wilson] on special operations' and act as 
`commander of such SOE/OSS units as are not assigned to subordinate commands, and 
controller of all special operations and SOE/OSS activities in the Mediterranean' 9' 
Although SOM was a joint Anglo-American branch, OSS remained somewhat 
separate, retaining an independent headquarters, headed by Colonel Ed Glavin, under 
AFHQ. Whilst this alternative channel did not cause significant complications for the 
deployment of the OGs and MUs it did remain an extra bureaucratic hurdle for 
coordination with wider OSS activities. 92 
Command arrangements had to adapt swiftly to alterations in the strategic situation and 
did so dramatically in mid-1944. The stepping up of activities in the Balkans 
necessitated the creation of the Balkan Air Force (BAF) in June 1944 with 
responsibility over all trans-Adriatic operations. With this move, Force 266 was 
disbanded and the forces previously under its charge (including Commandos, LRDG, 
OGs and RSR) became the responsibility of the Land Forces Adriatic (LFA) sub- 
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90 Ibid.; AFHQ Memorandum, `Functions of G-3, Special Operations', 8. February 1944, AIR 
51/105 
91 `Channels of command for special operations and SOE/OSS activities in the Mediterranean 
Theatre', April 1944, WO 193/620 
92 AFIHQ instructions to Major-General Stawell, 14 April 1944, WO 204/10392; Beevor, J. G., SOE 
Recollections and Reflections, (The Bodley head: London, 1981) p. 85 
164 
division of BAF headed by Brigadier Davy (who was familiar to many special forces 
having previously been DMO GHQ MEF during the Desert War). 93 
By far the most important changes occurred, however, in preparation for the invasion 
of France, where the magnitude of the events at hand necessitated concerted efforts to 
centralise the control of the special forces that would be used in support of the 
invasions. In spite of the importance of the theatre, mechanisms for the co-ordinated 
control of special forces and resistance formations in France were established 
relatively late in the day. It was not until May 1944 when the inter-allied branches of 
Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) in London and the Special Projects and 
Operations Centre (SPOC) in Algiers (formerly the AFHIQ-controlled G-3 Special 
Operations branch) were established under SHAEF. These organisations would 
coordinate the planning, dispatch, administration and control of SOE/OSS agents and 
their Jedburgh and OG special forces in the North and South of France, respectively, 
and most importantly, would advise the Supreme Commander about the capabilities of 
both these units and the Resistance, and provide him with a means of employing them 
for best effect. 
From July 1944, however, the command and control of the Jedburghs and OGs became 
more complex as the direction of the Resistance, SFHQ, and SPOC ceased to be the 
direct responsibility of SHAEF and was placed under Etat-major des Forces 
Francaises de 1'Interieur (EMFFI) commanded by General Koenig. 94 Although this 
transition in command was not fully implemented until mid-August, the timing of the 
reshuffle created some significant disruption and many bureaucratic headaches. 
Macksey has claimed that: 
The unevenness of clandestine performance [in France] must largely be laid at 
the door of the Allied Higher Command .... 
Had [FMFFI command] been 
implemented when FFI was formed in March all might have been well, since 
the new headquarters would have had time in which to shake down after being 
pitched into action. 95 
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Instead, experienced staff officers from SOE and OSS faced notable problems working 
in a foreign bureaucracy with inexperienced French officers. 96 Although a historical 
study by Lewis has discounted the damage caused by this transition claiming that it 
was `largely a political and cosmetic measure, because Koenig's deputies from SOE 
and OSS maintained the mechanisms of command, communication, and supply'; its 
timing was, nevertheless, ill-thought out and `counter-productive, causing disruption 
and confusion at a critical time'. 97 
A further source of difficulties affecting the command and control of the Jedburghs 
and OGs in France stemmed from the unevenness of relations between SPOC and 
SFHQ. Whilst those OGs that operated from SPOC benefited from an existent and 
`splendid' staff (formerly Special Operations G-3, Algiers) experienced in OG 
operations that `properly understood the manipulation of the OG as a weapon', those 
OGs under SFHQ, on the other hand, were hindered by the absence of proper OG 
infrastructure and were forced to rely on planning and administrative staffs that had 
little `proper understanding of the function' of the OGs. This situation amongst the 
OGs in Britain was subsequently aggravated when their CO Lieutenant-Colonel Serge 
Obolensky, an officer well experienced in OG work, accompanied his men into the 
field leaving `the administration of his groups in France to SO'. 98 Whilst the OGs 
worked better from SPOC than SFIIQ, the reverse seems applicable to the Jedburgh 
teams, whose entire infrastructure began, and largely remained in Britain. Teams were 
only sent to Algiers in April, and SPOC was unable to develop a proper staff to deal 
with their coordination and dispatch. As one Jedburgh reported, the `greatest mistake' 
of SPOC was 
.... the lack of one head. Duplicity or even triplicity of command ... 
leads only 
to confusion and lack of clear directives..... The lack of an administrative 
officer to look after the Jeds in the field was a big mistake. The Jed officer 
cannot be expected to do briefing, resupply, and field telegrams, as well as 
administration. 9 
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Such confused command arrangements risked leading to misunderstanding and 
confusion between the Jedburghs and OGs in the field and, on occasions, led to 
potentially dangerous situations as occurred on 8 June when Jedburgh team `Quinine' 
arrived at the same drop zone as OG `Emily' without any prior warning and with 
neither group having knowledge of the other's mission or intentions. 100 It could also 
lead to a degree of resentment between groups because of the differing procedures of 
allotting supplies and aircraft priorities. Jedburgh team `Willys', for example, was 
aggrieved that OGs `Louise' and `Betsy', with whom it worked closely, `seemed to 
receive everything they requested from Algiers almost as soon as the ink was dry on 
the signals pad' while they `had to wait, sometimes for weeks, for scraps'. ' 01 
The problems with the command and control of the SOE/OSS units were exacerbated 
by the separation of the SAS Brigade from the SFIIQ and SPOC infrastructure. Upon 
its creation the SAS Brigade came under the control of I Airborne Corps, because 
`neither 21 Army Group nor SHAEF ... were prepared to take the 
SAS under direct 
command, and in fact Airborne was the only Headquarters with the transport, 
knowledge, and experience for the job'. 102 Under Airborne IIQ, however, the SAS 
Brigade were able to retain a great deal of independence, receiving direct guidance 
from SHAEF and undertaking most of their own planning, intelligence analysis, and 
operational command and control. The Brigade was, however, `on the horns of a 
bureaucratic dilemma', and the lack of clear links with SFIIQ was certainly an issue 
(the absence of links with SPOC was of less significance as the SAS did not deploy 
extensively in the South of France). SAS Brigade independence led SFIHQ to perceive 
the SAS as `a potential usurper and drain on scarce resources' rather than as an 
organisation with complementary aims and methods to their own. 103 
Such mutual suspicion and antagonism prevented the establishment of a joint SAS- 
SFHQ committee and, aside from the permanent attachment of an SAS staff officer, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Collins, to SFHQ to help plan the SAS role in `strategical 
resistance' operations, there was no direct communication between SFIIQ and SAS 
Brigade. '04 In light of a reliance upon improvised and informal command 
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arrangements, relations between the SAS, the OGs and the Jedburghs were prone to be 
marred by confusion in planning, duplication of effort, and competition for aircraft 
sorties and supplies; factors which all were to the detriment of their effective 
tasking. 105 Whilst in the field, these command and control problems could lead to 
practical difficulties resulting from different signal procedures, supply arrangements, 
and aircraft allotments etc.. 106 
The convoluted manner via which irregular elements and the Resistance formations 
were controlled in France also led to problems in synchronising their activities with the 
operations of field formations. Military formations in the field were only able to 
communicate with, and receive reports from, the Jedburghs and OGs via SFIIQ or 
SPOC and though `Special Forces Detachments' which were placed in Army and 
Army Group headquarters and with field formations. But the SF Detachments 
themselves, and ergo the field formations, had no direct means of communicating with 
Jedburghs and organised partisan groups without first going through the overstretched 
SFHQ and SPOC networks that were plagued with problems with both the quality of 
communication and the sheer quantity needing to be analysed. 107 The result of this 
inadequate system ensured that in France much of the Allied officer corps, 
`particularly at the senior levels ... remained unaware of the capabilities of 
SOF teams 
beyond postlinkup tactical assistance. "08 In light of the nascent nature of special 
operations in depth, the magnitude of operations occurring, and the complicated 
problems of joint and combined operations, such problems would have been hard to 
avoid entirely, but their effects could have been significantly lessened had a unified 
command system that was properly wedded into the strategic decision making process 
existed. 
The pattern, visible from 1943 onwards, which saw heretofore autonomous special 
forces become increasingly centralised under dedicated command branches is equally 
apparent amongst the varied maritime special forces. In the wake of the rampant 
proliferation of these units each under COIIQ, Mountbatten would, in June 1943, call 
for the centralisation of each of these groups under a single coordinating authority. He 
believed such a move to be essential so as to `avoid overlapping and duplication of 
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function' and lead to `a simplification and standardisation of training'. 109 This 
arrangement would also remove the burden of administration from small operational 
units; a move welcomed by the likes of Lieutenant-Commander Willmott, CO COPP 
Depot, for example, who had already complained that `successive storms from on high 
... [were] increasingly hard and wearing to resist' and had requested that he could 
`dissociate myself entirely from questions of equipment and facilities'. ' 10 By July 1943 
Mountbatten's proposals had been formalised and `FUMS Rodent', the `Small Boat 
Unit' (SBU), was created to centralise the administration (if not the training or 
operational control) of the many disparate maritime special forces. "" 
The SBU also fulfilled an important role in serving as an educator, informing and 
instructing higher commands, via COHQ, in the functions and availability of its units. 
For instance, before Sicily the COPPs had been under-utilised by Naval Authorities not 
`properly aware of their function and purpose'. Yet by October 1943, their roles were 
`generally understood and appreciated' with SBU helping to make it `clear that these 
units are not a clandestine free-lance party sent out by the Admiralty, but a section of 
the Naval Forces with a definite function and duty to perform in preparation for the 
Assault'. 12 Despite its varied benefits, by mid-1944 the declining requirements for 
special maritime operations from Britain would ensure that the SBU became largely 
redundant, and in August it was subsequently disbanded. Running concomitant with 
the SBU in Britain was the Admiralty's DDOD(I) branch. Created in May 1943, this 
branch sought to co-ordinate the Royal Navy's irregular shipping needs (primarily 
agent transport) from Britain and the Mediterranean. At various stages SBU formations 
had contact with DDOD(I) operations and, with the decline of SBU's responsibilities, 
DDOD(I) would lobby for the transfer of various SBU naval units to its command; 
ultimately succeeding in gaining control of both the RMBPD and SOE's maritime 
assets. 113 
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Before the SBU was disbanded, however, many of its charges had been sent to the Far 
East as a result of Mountbatten's call for `his boys' to join him in his new appointment 
as SACSEA. ' 4 Following the arrival of these units Mountbatten established the `Small 
Operations Group' (SOG) to co-ordinate their activities. 115 In its creation 
Mountbatten's motivations were much the same as they were in 1943 with the creation 
of the SBU: he considered such a group essential to avoid confusion; to reduce the 
number of independent organisations with which higher commanders had to deal; to 
`simplify administration and provide a common base'; and to `ensure that as far as 
possible training and equipment of parties were standardised and that all units 
benefited from the experience gained in operations and training. ' 116 Furthermore, like 
SBU, SOG would be extremely important in leading to an `increased appreciation' 
amongst higher commands as to the roles of the formations under its charge. 117 
SOG was an Admiralty dominated organisation: commanded by two Royal Marine 
Officers, Colonel H. T. Tollemache and Lieutenant-Colonel Hasler, and operating 
under the overall control of C-in-C Eastern Fleet. As such, the Army personnel of the 
SBS were concerned about the lack of a `friend at court' and feared being `discarded' 
under this regime. ' 18 As experienced units they, and a proportion of COPPs, were also 
`inclined to be a little scornful' of the new SOG organisation. Particularly distasteful 
were suggestions that the experienced SBS and COPP training staffs in Britain be 
disbanded, and that SOG be solely responsible for the training of all new recruits for 
these formations, a move, the SBS argued, would be to the clear detriment of the 
overall quality of their units. ' 19 Although such concerns were alleviated, in part, by the 
transfer of essential personnel from Britain to join the SOG training sections, they did, 
however, prompt Major Courtney's `Z' SBS (the closest maritime formation to a 
`private army') to shun SOG entirely and instead seek employment directly under 
Force 136.120 In operational deployments SOG was flexible, capable of attaching its 
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units to corps or divisional jurisdiction (commonly under XV Corps in the Arakan), but 
also remaining capable of planning and mounting independent operations of its own 
creation, or those devised directly by Mountbatten or C-in-C Far Eastern Fleet. 121 
The activities of SOG, alongside Force 136, OSS, SIS, and V-Force in SEAC were all 
coordinated, in a manner analogous to the SOM organisation, by the theatre-wide `P 
Division' headed by Captain Garnons-Williams, RN. Established in December 1943 
`P' Division would coordinate and approve plans for all `British and American quasi- 
military organisations and irregular forces' within Mountbatten's command., 22 The 
command arrangements of SOG and `P Division' are together illustrative of how the 
methods of administering and controlling disparate special forces had evolved towards 
the end of the war. They were uncomplicated and dedicated command branches, 
directly responsible to the highest practicable authorities. By centralising and 
coordinating the planning, administration and deployments of special forces, they 
helped to ensure their most efficient application, as well as help avoid the risks of 
compromise, duplication of effort, and competition etc.. Furthermore, these 
organisations played a vital role in making other commands aware of the capabilities 
and existence of specialist formations and helped reduce much of the animosity 
directed towards them. At the same time, however, they also remained broadly 
flexible, giving enough latitude to their subordinate formations so as to not stifle 
initiative or sacrifice the esprit de corps of the individual units. 
The all-embracing nature of the OSS MU Branch subverted much of the need for the 
US to develop similar command arrangements as to the British SBU and SOG; it was 
an inherently sound and efficiently organised structure for the training, supply and 
dispatch of special maritime personnel on a global scale. Furthermore, the MU's OSS 
Branch status, like that of the OGs, further streamlined the manner via which its 
operational parties could be attached to other commands (such as G-3 Special 
Operations, 15 Army Group in Italy, or Detachments 101 and 404 in the Far East) for 
deployment. 123 In the Mediterranean non-OSS US maritime special forces were 
April 1944, DEFE 2/1036; Major G. B. Courtney, CO 'Z' SBS to CCO, 26 April 1944, DEFE 
2/1203 
121 CCO brief on Special Parties in SEAC, October 1944, DEFE 2/1035; Colonel Tollemache, SOG 
Bulletin No. 1,31 July 1945, DEFE 2/1203; Record of SOG, March 1946, DEFE 2/1747 122 SACSEA Directive, 18 December 1943, RG 226, Entry 92, Box 491; Folder 15 
123 Captain Alfred M. Lichtman, MU Area Operations Officer to Lieutenant William 11. Pendelton, 
Chief, MU NATO, 12 April 1944, RG 226, Entry 143, Box 5; Folder 77 
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integrated into a `Special Operations' sub-section of the War Plans Section of the US 
Eighth Fleet. This section, something of an equivalent to the Admiralty's DDOD(I) 
Branch, was charged with devising and developing plans for naval diversions, 
amphibious raids, and cover and deception plans. Through this mechanism both the 
Beach Jumpers and attached S&R personnel operated under the direction of Task 
Group 80.4, a small flotilla with the mandate for deception operations and air-sea 
rescue. 124 
Ultimately the most prolific deployment of US special maritime formations occurred 
with the extensive UDT organisation that developed in the Central Pacific theatre. The 
first UDT deployments in January 1944 during operation `Flintlock' in the Marshall 
Islands were somewhat uncoordinated affairs in which the UDTs were not adequately 
integrated into the main landings. Subsequently, however, lessons were learnt and, 
following lobbying from the commander of UDT-1, more efficient arrangements were 
made, particularly over communications, that led to greater coordination of UDT 
activities with the overall landing plans. 125 Despite this, up until the capture of Leyte in 
December 1944, each UDT was managed independently of one another under the 
`administrative cognizance of Commander Amphibious Forces, US Pacific Fleet 
[Turner]' and each would be independently assigned to various Task Force 
commanders for operational deployment. This was not the most efficient arrangement. 
The lack of centralised procedures made the training and administration of the Teams 
difficult, and their cooperation and any institutional sharing of information and 
techniques much more problematic. 126 
It was not until shortly before the Lingayen Gulf landings on Luzon that a new UDT 
command mechanism developed with the appointment of Captain B. Hall Hanlon as 
`Commander Underwater Demolition Teams, Amphibious Forces, US Pacific Fleet'. 
This new UDT Command put both the UDTs, their fast transport craft, and Close Fire 
Support Groups (DD and LCI(G)) all under one head and allowed a flexible and 
effective tactical framework to develop that 'provided almost instantaneous response 
on order from a central authority, that could take care of predictable exigencies' before 
124 Admiral Cunningham, C-in-C Mediterranean, 'US Navy "Special Operations" Units', 7 March 
1944, WO 204/8425 
125 Commander E. D. Brewster, UDT 1, Report on operation 'Flintlock', 8 February 1944, RG 38, 
World War II Action and Operational Reports, Box 787 226 Commander UDT Squadron Two to C-in-C US Fleet, 31 August 1945, RG 38, World War II 
War Diaries, Box 535 
172 
and during an assault. 127 Later still, in June 1945, in readiness for the projected 
invasion of the Japanese Home Islands, the UDT command was enlarged, with the 
Teams divided into two operational Squadrons and placed under a UDT Flotilla under 
Captain R. H. Rogers, who would have `direct command' of all UDTs and any ships `in 
which these teams are embarked'. 128 Command arrangements were thus able to keep 
pace with the extensive growth of the UDT organisation. What had begun as a 
collection of autonomous formations individually operating under one body had, in 
less than two years, become, a large and efficient joint command organisation that 
encompassed not only the personnel of the special forces, but also the resources and 
personnel involved in their transportation and support. 
The importance of clear command structures was essential to the correct application, 
and ergo the effectiveness and value, of wartime specialist formations. The 
development of clear methods and structures of command and control for these units 
during the Second World War followed a definite and prominent learning curve. Early 
command approaches for specialist formations were often widely inadequate, either 
too restrictive and convoluted or, conversely, too informal and decentralised. In time, 
however, and a natural concomitant to the growing martial proficiencies of the Allies, 
the structures of the control and employment of specialist formations became more 
professional and efficient. Specialist formations were increasingly integrated into 
regular military mechanisms and, as this occurred, understanding about their existence, 
methods and utility naturally increased whilst reticence and antagonism towards them 
declined. As Field-Marshal Slim well highlighted: `It was not until the activities of all 
clandestine bodies operating in or near our troops were coordinated, and where 
necessary controlled, through a senior officer on the staff of the commander of the 
area, that confusion, ineffectiveness, and lost opportunities were avoided'. 129 It was 
natural that proper command channels and `educated consumers' would develop with 
time, once knowledge had been amassed; people with direct experience had risen in 
rank; lessons had been learnt; and organisations to advise higher commands about the 
potential of special operations had developed. 
127 Captain B. Hall Hanlon, Commander UDTs, Iwo Jima After Action Report, 12 March 1945, RG 
38, World War II Action and Operational Reports, Box 787 128 UDT Squadron Two War Diary, RG 38, World War II War Diaries, Box 535 
129 Slim, Field-Marshal Sir William, Defeat into Victory, (Cassell: London, 1956) pp. 548-549 
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Although the uniquely apposite circumstances of the Desert War highlighted that 
special forces could be profitably employed autonomously with very loose command 
mechanisms, as a whole, however, this arrangement was not practicable. As the Allies 
regained the initiative the autonomy of these units had to decline, not only to make best 
use of them in less suitable theatres, but also to prevent competition; tie these units into 
the regular battle; and prevent them from jeopardising other operations. Strict control 
was difficult, but essential. By the start of 1943, therefore, it was becoming widely 
accepted that the best manner for special forces to be used was to form dedicated 
command branches, responsible to the highest possible authority in theatre, to cater for 
their administration and coordination. Such moves centralised (and to an extent 
conventionalised) their establishment, reduced animosity (via a reduction of their free- 
booting or bandit image), and led to better tasking of these units thereby increasing 
their potential value. Despite this, the more successful of these organisations still 
granted individual formations a notable margin of latitude for their own planning, 
training and tactical control. 
Commensurate with their transition and conventionalisation of role the command and 
control of commando formations became, at least in the British example, gradually 
adapted to a more regular brigade organisation, a move that increased their opportunity 
to undertake protracted deployments and operate in support of the conventional battle. 
Many British specialist formations were fortunate to have arisen under the patronage of 
COHQ, which as an organisation with a chair on the Chiefs of Staff Committee, could 
directly look after their interests and lobby for their employment. The lack of anything 
approaching the British COHQ and SS Brigade organisation was clearly to the 
detriment of the command and control of most US ranger-style formations. The 
American perception of elite light-infantry units as temporary expedients largely 
precluded the establishment of any centralised or theatre-level command infrastructure 
to cater for the command and administration of these units. The absence of clear 
arrangements through which higher commands could be advised on the tasks, 
capabilities, requirements and availability of these units, as well as the lack of any 
formal mechanism through which their activities could be planned and vetted, would 
(as the next chapter will highlight) place unnecessary complications on the proper 
application of these formations. Such omissions were the most severe for the US Army 
Rangers, and would afflict both the FSSF and Marauders to a somewhat lesser extent 
because of their more `familiar' organisational structures. Of the US ranger-style 
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formations, it was only the 6`h Rangers and USMC Raiders that were ultimately able to 
forge a workable integrated command and control system; the former because the 
unique conditions of theatre and the patronage of Krueger; the latter, ironically, 
stemming from USMC motivations not to harness the irregular but to conventionalise 
it. 
In the field of special forces, however, US command and control mechanisms were, as 
a whole, very effective and, in places, more efficient than those of the British. Their 
later entry into the Second World War enabled the US to learn from the mistakes their 
ally had made before them. The US induction in irregular warfare would avoid many 
of the pitfalls and problems that the British previously experienced with the command 
and control of special forces; they were able to avoid the depredations of the `private 
army' and circumvent many of the inter-agency and inter-service control 
complications. The existence of OSS as a body to centralise a large proportion of 
American special operations (not to mention intelligence activities also) was of the 
utmost importance to the effective command and control of many US special forces. Its 
existence ensured that the command infrastructure for operational units such as the 
OGs and MUs were actually in place before the units took to the field; something that, 
because of the exigencies of the situation upon their inception, was not the case with 
early British formations which would be subjected to much trial and error before a 
workable framework for their command would develop. The effective control of US 
special forces would, of course, follow a learning curve. Even with command 
infrastructure in place it would take time for the best arrangements to be established - 
a point well illustrated, for example, both by the frustrations that the OGs had working 
under the SO Branch, and by the late development of a unified UDT Command - as a 
whole, however, it seems clear that this curve was, in places, significantly shallower 
for the US than it had been for the British. 
Even with the existence of organisations such as COHQ and OSS, it remains clear that 
the command and control of specialist formations during the Second World War was 
certainly hindered by the existence of many cumbersome and confused organisations 
each with vested irregular interests that uneasily coexisted in a climate of mutual 
suspicion and secrecy. Unity of command amongst all these irregular groups, in midst 
of the many complexities facing the Allies in the Second World War, was, with the 
exception of the Southwest Pacific (due to Krueger and MacArthur's sponsorship and 
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direct control of only the units that they had authorised), an unreasonable and 
unobtainable goal. It would have required a massive effort, a total upheaval of early 
mechanisms, not to mention a clear idea of what specialist formations were for and 
what they could achieve, to have developed a unified (let alone Allied) `Joint Special 
Operations Command' or equivalent organisation. Given the complex inter-service and 
inter-organisational problems to surmount as well as the political and military 
complications of total war, these limitations are understandable. With no pre-existent 
doctrine in place to guide on how to control and use specialist elements, these had to 
be discovered almost by trial and error. The command and control of the Anglo- 
American specialist formations must be viewed as evolutionary; gradually becoming 
more efficient and effective as the war progressed. When it is considered that it was 
not until 1987 that both Britain and the US established integrated joint-service 
organisations for the control of SOF (in UK Special Forces and USSOCOM), the 
achievements in developing complex branches and control mechanisms for the nascent 
creations of the Second World War, exemplified well by the SOG and `P Division' or 
the extensive UDT organisation, appear quite considerable. 
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Chapter 5 
Misapplication, misuse and disuse 
With one eye firmly on the past Colin Gray has written that specialist formations are 
'probably uniquely vulnerable to misunderstanding and misapplication'. ' The study of 
Anglo-American specialist formations of the Second World War certainly seems to 
bear out this contention. Within the history (be it narrative, war diary, or biography) of 
almost every wartime commando or special forces formation there is mention, however 
fleeting, of their having been used inappropriately; tasked with undertaking an 
unsuitable role; or having been frustrated by unemployment or neglect. The `correct' 
use of specialist elements assumes many factors: a well-defined and clear cut role and 
doctrine for their employment; a dedicated command organisation to cater for their 
application; an educated consumer versed in, and amenable to, their employment; an 
equally informed or innovative practitioner; and apposite circumstances and means 
available for their use. The interaction between these variables largely determined the 
manner in which specialist formations were utilised during the war. The existence of 
these factors was, however, far from universally present; they often evolved in time, 
and their interplay was prone to significant fluctuations. This chapter serves to 
examine where and why misuse and disuse of specialist formations occurred, and 
highlight how these occurrences formed part of the greater evolutionary process 
governing their application in the Second World War. 
The previous chapter illustrated two distinct limitations: that command preconceptions 
towards specialist elements could be rife with suspicion and animosity; and that the 
manner in which specialist elements were directed and controlled was not clear-cut, 
well understood, nor, at least in their formative stages, particularly efficient. These 
limitations alone could be of clear impediment to the `correct' application of specialist 
formations. Unless given a distinct carte blanche for autonomy of action (a rare 
occurrence), specialist formations remained reliant upon sensible `tasking' for their 
use, which, in turn, had as a cardinal requirement, direction by higher commanders 
who, if not adverse to their existence, were at least educated in their use. As Gray 
states: `The strategic utility of special operations forces depends at least as much on the 
imagination and competence of their political and military masters as it does on their 
1 Gray (1996), p. 164 
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tactical effectiveness' . 
2. One of the clearest reasons for the misuse or disuse of 
specialist formations stemmed, dislike and distrust aside, from widespread ignorance 
and misunderstanding amongst higher echelons as to the existence, purpose, and 
manner of employing irregular forces. 
As nascent creations, an element of ignorance and confusion in the use of specialist 
formations was to be expected. There were no manuals at Camberley or Leavenworth 
to advise on their employment, and, there was no guarantee that even after efforts were 
taken to instruct conventional elements (via command branches and liaison officers 
etc. ) in special operations that these would be either understood or embraced. 
Ignorance, distrust, and misunderstanding resulted, at various stages, to misuse and 
misapplication. The protracted and much derided deployments of Nos. 1 and 6 
Commandos in the line during the North African campaign was, for example, in the 
opinion of the Commandos, caused by the `ignorance of all staffs to understand the 
roles of Commandos. '3 As Laycock subsequently stated, Force Commanders 
.... are only too willing to use Commandos to their 
best advantage during the 
initial landings, but that subsequently they regard them as unwanted and 
unnecessary units, with the result that Commandos are invariably allotted tasks 
for which they are neither organised, trained nor equipped, and which would be 
better undertaken by regular infantry. 4 
These North African deployments of the Commandos were, however, educational and 
endemic to the learning process about the use of these formations. Understanding the 
difficulties that they faced in such deployments, the Commando establishment was 
accordingly altered to better deal with protracted deployments, and by the invasion of 
Sicily `the conception of Commandos had become definite and well-established. Their 
organisation was well-tried and battle-proved; their capabilities well-known and their 
limitations appreciated'. ' 
Similarly instructive was the misuse of the LRDG in the summer of 1941 when, 
despite earlier successes, the unit was deployed in both tactical reconnaissance and 
static defensive roles at Kufra, actions deemed inappropriate for a mobile long range 
reconnaissance force. Such deployments led, however, to no great disaster and, 
2 Ibid., p. 149 
3 Captain Philip Dunne to Laycock, undated, KCLMA Laycock, File 16 ° Laycock, `Reorganisation of SS Brigade', 1 April 1943, DEFE 2/1051 
5 `History of the Commandos in the Mediterranean', DEFE 2/700 
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according to Lloyd Owen, `everyone learnt some excellent lessons from all this, and 
the LRDG were seldom again used on tasks best carried out by reconnaissance aircraft 
or by armoured cars. '6 Patrol Commander Crichton-Stuart went as far as stating that 
`.... much of the ultimate success of the LRDG could be traced, in retrospect, to the 
lessons of that "wasted" summer of 1941'. The Alamo Scouts in some of their earlier 
deployments also faced similar misapplication. During deployment in Ilollandia- 
Aitape, for example, I Corps, which had no experience in their methods, used Scout 
teams inappropriately in risky tactical combat patrols that duplicated the functions of 
their existent regular reconnaissance units. 8 This misapplication was however, as with 
the LRDG, educational and led, in part, to the development of more efficient practices 
for the deployment of Scout teams and the creation of a special staff under Sixth 
Army's G-2 Section to coordinate their deployments. 
Misuse as part of a learning process was, however, reliant on the willingness, or 
ability, of the broader military organisation to learn and adapt. Despite having faced 
similar problems to the Commandos during their evolution of role during the North 
African campaign, the Rangers never adapted either doctrinally or organisationally as 
well as the Commandos did. The constant refusal to make anything more than tactical 
concessions (in support weaponry etc. ); the rejection of a Ranger Force Headquarters; 
and the concomitant absence of a Ranger doctrine, a formal statement outlining their 
capabilities and limitations, undoubtedly paved the way towards their greatest misuse 
at Cisterna where the I't and 3`d Ranger Battalions were annihilated. The absence of a 
proper Ranger Force Headquarters prevented long range planning and offered no 
advice on whether an `assignment is a proper one for Rangers'. 9 Their perpetual 
provisional status ensured commanders had no guide towards the employment of 
Rangers and consequently, `commanders were left with only a vague, intuitive sense of 
the purpose of such troops. ' 10 As a consequence, the Rangers were prone to face 
`mission creep' as commanders tended to deploy the units in the conventional manner 
with which they were versed. With these limitations in place, misapplication at 
Cisterna was made all the more likely. However, as Jeff Stewart has accurately stated: 
6 Owen, D. L. (2003), p. 46 
Crichton-Stuart, Michael, G Patrol: The Story of the Guards Patrol of the Long Range Desert 
Group, (Tandem: London, 1958) p. 87 
8 Zedric, p. 114 
9 Major Murray, CO 41h Rangers to General McNair, 28 November 1943, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 
21075; Folder INBN-4-0.1 
10 Hogan, Raiders, p. 26 
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`In order to declare misuse of the Rangers [at Cisterna], it must first be established 
what their proper use would be. This was never done. " 1 
Cisterna cannot, however, be blamed on command ignorance. At the time of the battle 
Ranger Force was under the control of General Truscott's 3rd Infantry Division and 
neither Truscott, who had first conceived of the Rangers and `knew more about their 
capabilities and limitations than any other general officer', nor Darby, their 
commander, actually opposed the deployment; both `considered the mission a proper 
one, which should have been well within the capabilities these fine soldiers'. 12 
Misuse thus did not only stem from ill-informed or sceptical higher commanders, but 
also, at times, from the personnel and leaders of the units themselves. As an emergent 
genus, not even the practitioners of special operations were, from the outset, fully 
versed in their art or optimum manner of employment. Gray has drawn attention to 
instances where `opportunities for special operations were arguably lost because no 
one, including the special warriors themselves, were sufficiently unconventional in 
their thinking..... Unconventional war is a state of mind as well as a mission and a 
distinctive set of tactics. ' 13 Certainly a number of commanders charged with leading 
specialist formations did not adequately understand, or even believe in, their 
unconventional mandate, and accepting employment in a more conventional manner, 
were disinclined to push for tasking in the same manner that a more unorthodox 
character, or an individual better versed in irregular warfare, might have done. It is 
quite fallacious to assume that despite the proficiency and professional qualities of 
specialist formations, that all involved, higher commanders and practitioners alike, 
immediately realised, understood, or cared about the best manner for their 
employment. The latitude given to certain special forces commanders to perform 
autonomous acts presupposed that they had the `necessary strategic, tactical and man- 
management skills'. As Ford assessed in application to the SAS Brigade in France: 
`Some did; some did not, and the results their operations produced reflected their 
abilities'. " 
" Stewart, `Ranger Force', pp. 46-50 12 Ibid., p. 49; Truscott, p. 314 13 Gray, Colin S., Modern Strategy, (Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 290 
14 Ford (2003), p. 22 
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Such problems were perhaps most acute in the ranger example; an undoubted 
concomitant both to the widespread American perception of specialist formations as 
being fleeting and provisional expedients, and to the general absence of `errant 
captains' or `founding fathers' as seen amongst the British examples. William Orlando 
Darby, commander of the I", 3rd and 4`b Ranger Battalions, although a justifiably 
lauded fighting leader, was arguably one such character. Darby had a `conventional 
outlook' and was, in the opinion of Hogan, `hardly the maverick one so often finds in 
command of a special unit. Lacking commitment to a concept of special operations, he 
perceived his unit more as an elite fighting force than as a formation with a unique 
mission, and he does not seem to have opposed the use of his men as line infantry', 
and, as has been noted, he did not object to the use of his force at Cisterna. is Similar 
cases could be advanced regarding Merritt Edson of the 15t Raider Battalion who, like 
Darby was undoubtedly a solid fighting leader, but lacked the unorthodox streak of 
Carlson, his counterpart in the 2nd Raider Battalion; equally pronounced is Brigadier 
Merrill of the Marauders who was neither unorthodox in outlook, nor physically up to 
the challenge of leading the Marauders in the field. Furthermore, his close association 
with Stilwell did not make him the best man to fight in the Marauder's corner when 
lobbying for correct employment. 
These issues were compounded by the fact that, being perceived as temporary units, 
many American commanders had no path for advancement within irregular 
communities. Just as the `errant captain' was foreign to the inception of American 
specialist formations; once they had proven their mettle Darby, Frederick, Rudder, 
Carlson et al. were, albeit often reluctantly, promoted out of specialist formations and 
returned to the command of conventional units. Within the US specialist formations 
there were few comparable figures to the Stirlings, Courtneys, and Churchills who 
forged careers at the helm of specialist formations, nor the likes of Wingate, Calvert, 
Franks or Mills-Roberts who, in addition to having practical experience in the field, 
were to have a hand at commanding and directing these formations at a higher level. 
There was certainly no American equivalent to Robert Laycock, for example, a man 
who in addition to commanding some of the first Commandos (and participating in 
actions such as the evacuation of Crete and the `Rommel raid'), also commanded, on 
two separate occasions, early attempts at nominal Commando Brigades, before 
eventually assuming the post of CCO that placed him at the helm of all Commandos 
15 Hogan, Raiders, p. 18 
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and ancillary units. American commanders, because of both the absence of an 
equivalent to COHQ, or the SS Brigade, as well as the stigma of these temporary 
formations, had little equivalent to the `special forces community' of the British (aside 
from perhaps OSS, which itself was seen as provisional and treated with suspicion), 
and their ability to learn lessons and develop clear doctrines suffered accordingly. 16 
Social connections, patronage, and the `old boy network' featured heavily amongst a 
number of British specialist formations. As OSS officer Franklin Lindsay observed 
whilst in Yugoslavia: 
All his [Fitzroy Maclean's] officers appeared to be old friends and several had 
been together in North Africa fighting against Rommel's forces. These British 
officers who were drawn to irregular operations seemed not only to have been 
together in early wartime operations but also to have had many close school 
and family ties. In contrast, in three years overseas I had met only one person I 
had known before the war. '? 
The Maclean example is particularly pronounced; the `casually opportunist' manner in 
which he first orchestrated the dispatch of specialist formations to Vis providing fine 
illustration of the British social system at work within irregular fields. In late-1943 
military activities in support of Tito in Yugoslavia were dominated by a special forces 
`educated' group of people. Maclean had personally assessed the validity of mounting 
special operations and raids from Vis with his former SAS colleagues Vivian Street 
and Randolph Churchill; and in late-1943 Maclean arranged the deployment of No. 2 
Commando to the island on the basis of casually meeting Brigadier Tom Churchill 
(CO 2nd SS Brigade) at a new year's eve party in Molfetta. All arrangements were put 
in place before Maclean approached General Alexander for authorisation, who 
subsequently lent him his own airplane to fly to Tehran to confer this scheme with the 
Prime Minister. 18 Aside from the initial recruiting practices of OSS, and the 2 "a 
16 After the war, however, the resurgence of US special forces capabilities would stem from 
`founding fathers' who had learnt their craft during the Second World War. Fine examples are 
provided by Aaron Bank (a Jedburgh) `the father of US special forces' and Russell Volckmann 
(leader of guerrillas on the Philippines) who together helped develop the US Army Special Forces; 
Roger Hilsman (a Marauder and in OSS Detachment 101) who, working for the State Department, 
became Kennedy's advisor on irregular warfare and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
Affairs; or William Colby (Jedburgh and later leader of NORSO group) who later became head of 
the CIA. 
17 Lindsay, p. 248 'a McConville, pp. 108-109; 174; Maclean, pp. 410-412 
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Raider's `Roosevelt connection', 19 there were few comparable examples of such 
informal social networks at play behind American specialist formations. 
Misuse based on command reticence or ignorance was, however, less prevalent than 
misuse as a result of necessity. Hard-pressed and under-reinforced commanders who 
had a group of well trained and experienced men under their charge would often be 
only too willing to thrust specialist units info the breach if expedient, almost regardless 
of the role they would be asked to perform. In the event of an unfavourable or 
deteriorating situation on the ground specialist forces could thus merely represent a 
source of readily available manpower. The potential for forces to be misused as such 
was pronounced, and it would take great wisdom, foresight and confidence for 
commanders not to employ specialist elements incorrectly in desperate circumstances; 
to not ruin a thoroughbred by having it plough the field when the mule is down. As 
McMichael observed: `Once a unit arrives in theatre - its special capabilities 
notwithstanding - its availability irresistibly tempts commanders to employ it. '20 Gray 
similarly contended that: `Because they are unusually well endowed with warrior 
virtues, commanders tend to use elite units - and special operations forces - much as 
teenagers drive sports cars and with similar and predictable results. '2' The attachment 
of a specialist formation to a field command could result in the force swiftly becoming 
overworked as the command became over-reliant on the force, utilising its willing and 
capable `warriors' for every difficult assignment including the more mundane day-to- 
day activities (such as tactical reconnaissance and combat patrols) which conventional 
forces would have been more than capable of undertaking. 22 
Such instances occurred almost as soon as the first varieties of specialist units reached 
the field. The desperate situation on the ground in Norway in 1940, and an absence of 
alternative resources with which to tackle it, had soon dispelled any notion that the 
Independent Companies would be able to act as guerrillas and they were almost 
immediately used in line infantry duties. The fate of Nos. I and 6 Commandos in North 
Africa was, in a similar vein, partially blamed on an `obvious temporary shortage of 
19 `As one wag remarked, "Second Raiders will never need any artillery support. Carlson's always 
pot twenty-one guns in his hip pocket". ' Twining, p. 178 ° McMichael, p. 211 
21 Gray (1996), p. 167 22 Laycock, `Reorganisation of SS Brigade', 1 April 1943, DEFE 2/1051 
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Infantry troops in the forward areas. '23 As General Kenneth Anderson, GOC First 
Army wrote to Mountbatten as the Commandos were withdrawn from North Africa: 
I know I misused them, strained them to the utmost and kept them far too long. 
But we were hard pressed in those days, and every single man had to do the job 
of ten without rest or respite. The Commandos naturally never complained and 
always fought brilliantly..... Alas their losses were heavy..... I was sorry to 
lose them, but glad to be able at last to let them go. 24 
The similarly inappropriate use of the 1s` Rangers in this campaign principally occurred 
because, as far as General Terry Allen of the ls` Infantry Division (to whom the 
Rangers were attached) was concerned, `the Rangers were proven troops that were 
available. Faced with an uncertain battlefield situation, he would not hesitate to throw 
them into the breach. '25 
Stilwell's mishandling of the Marauders was also comparable. Colonel Charles Hunter, 
second-in-command of the unit (but often de facto leader in light of Merrill's ill- 
health), reflected at the end of their campaign, `the unit had been badly misused and 
had suffered unnecessarily' and placed the blame on the `personality and personal 
ambition' of Stilwell . 
26 The ultimate abuse of the Marauders was over-employment, 
Stilwell was too reliant on them and used them to the point of decimation. As the only 
US ground forces at his disposal Stilwell saw the Marauders as a source of dependable 
personnel to shore up and rectify deficiencies with his Chinese forces. Such was their 
perceived value to him that by appointing Merrill, one of his most trusted officers, to 
their command Stilwell had actively sought to maintain a hand on their planning and to 
actually prevent their misuse. 27 Their first operation, against Walawbum, was thus 
conducted as intended, a successful medium-range penetration which cost the 
Marauders few casualties and, most importantly, saw the unit be swiftly relieved by 
Chinese forces. 28 In later operations, however, Stilwell's increasing reliance upon the 
Marauders ensured that he employed them to undertake a series of costly blocking 
operations without granting them adequate time to rest and recover their strength. 
Despite Hunter's claims, however, Stilwell's over-reliance upon and misuse of the 
Marauders principally stemmed from the political imperative he faced to keep the only 
23 Captain Dunne to Laycock, undated, KCLMA Laycock, File 16 24 Anderson to Mountbatten, 23 May 1943, WO 32/10416 
26 
25 Hogan, Raiders, p. 26 26 Quoted in Bjorge, Gary J., Merrill's Marauders, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1996) p. 2 
27 Prefer, pp. 71-72 
28 Bjorge, p. 23 
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US ground forces in theatre employed and to demonstrate to coalition members his 
commitment to the war in Burma. 29 It would have been quite unthinkable for Stilwell 
to have withdrawn the Marauders whilst continuing to remain reliant on British and 
Chinese formations under his charge. As Gary Bjorge has asserted: `Without Galahad 
to help hold up the coalition banner of shared suffering, the combined force would 
have lacked a crucial unifying element and a catalyst for action', the Marauders were 
thus not so much victims of hubris as they were of `the exigencies and requirements of 
coalition warfare and combined operations. 930 
The squandering of highly-trained, experienced, corps d'elite in a role for which they 
were neither prepared, nor equipped, was of course, ultimately not cost-effective, 
however, should adverse circumstances require their committal in alternative roles or 
in less apposite conditions, the use of specialist formations in such a capacity was not 
necessarily improper. The use of large commando and ranger formations in non- 
specialised or inappropriate roles because of operational imperative was both common, 
and at times, quite understandable; to be cost-effective specialist formations cannot 
exist in isolation and must remain subservient to the direction and requirements of the 
greater campaigns they assist. For example, although the use of Nos. 7 and 50/52(ME) 
Commandos to cover the evacuation of Crete was a role for which they were neither 
trained nor, most importantly, equipped for, and one that ultimately caused the two 
Commandos significant loss, it was, nevertheless, a role that they undertook with 
determination and which was of value in aiding the evacuation of a number of other 
personnel from the island. Although both unplanned and costly, this deployment, so 
often considered inappropriate, was arguably of more value than these Commandos' 
earlier `correct', but failed, actions at Casterlorizzo in February or Bardia in April 
1941. The use of specialist troops in extremis, whilst costly, was not a true misuse; and 
gradually, particularly following the commando transition in role, the use of specialist 
personnel in a `fire brigade' or strategic reserve role became more common. In Italy, 
for example, both the Rangers and the FSSF attached to Fifth Army were particularly 
prone to be used as such; Fifth Army's shortage of personnel ensured that General 
Mark Clark `could not afford to hold special formations in reserve until suitable 
missions presented themselves'. 31 
291logan (1995), p; 110; Larrabee, Eric, Commander in Chief, (Andre Deutsch: London, 1987) 
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The 6`i' Ranger battalion was, for a variety of reasons, considered unique amongst its 
counterparts as having been the only Ranger Battalion to have not been `misused' as 
line infantry at some stage during the war. 32 Despite this, had Sixth Army been faced 
with a desperate operational situation, such as a Kasserine Pass or an Edson's Ridge; 
or a crippling shortage of personnel, as encountered by Fifth Army in Italy or Twenty- 
First Army Group in Northwest Europe, it seems likely that the 6th Rangers would have 
been used in any manner possible to alleviate the situation, even if that meant so-called 
misuse in conventional tasks. To have done so would have been quite correct. Both 
higher and unit commanders alike seemed to have had an appreciation of this. Despite 
having constantly lobbied for independent and specialist employment of the 
Commandos, Laycock clearly appreciated that in extremis Commandos could, and 
should, be used in any capacity, writing in 1943 that: 
SS troops should never be given tasks which could equally be well carried out 
by Infantry unless the Commander can satisfy himself that .... 
There are no 
other troops available.... [or that] he, or superior or neighbouring 
Commanders, will not require them for more important specialised tasks at a 
later stage in the campaign. 33 
General Bradley displayed similar logic writing, in application to parachute troops, that 
they are `too expensively trained to be spent as conventional doughboys unless an 
emergency warrants their employment in this way'. 34 
Much more damning, and potentially far more damaging than the use of a commando- 
style light infantry force in a conventional infantry manner when necessity demanded, 
was the deployment of smaller special forces units in similar circumstances. Few 
examples illustrate this contention better than the employment of an experienced and 
intelligence-orientated LRDG squadron in an assault to recapture the island of Levitha 
in October 1943; a task for which they were neither trained, equipped, nor suited. The 
LRDG were desperately opposed to mounting the operation, but `no appeal to the GOC 
[Maitland Wilson] would rescind his [somewhat nebulous] orders that it was vital to 
the Navy that the enemy garrison should be liquidated'. " As David Lloyd Owen was 
to state: `We knew the raid was pointless, we knew it violated all the principles by 
32 Ibid., pp-88-90 
33 Laycock, `Reorganisation of SS Brigade', 1 April 1943, DEFE 2/1051 34 Bradley, p. 132 
35 LRDG War Diary, September - November 1943, WO 201/818 
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which our small hit-and-run attacks were guided and we had no confidence in its 
direction by commanders who had few ideas how to handle us', he believed it was a 
`wicked and misplaced' political move to `to regain by a spectacular success the 
confidence that Cairo had lost in the direction of the Aegean battle'. 36 Of the fifty men 
on the raid, forty-one experienced and trained specialists were lost, killed or captured, 
more casualties sustained in one operation than the unit had lost in the three years 
prior. Soon after this unnecessary and costly operation, the LRDG were to suffer 
another great blow when tasked, alongside elements of the SBS, again inappropriately 
(but more understandably because of operational, if not strategic, necessity) with, 
forming part of the garrison on Leros. The fall of which, in November 1943, led to the 
small unit taking further losses, ten men killed including its commander Jake 
Easonsmith, and a nearly-crippling over one-hundred men captured (although a large 
proportion of which would later escape captivity to return to the unit). As the War 
Diary of the LRDG acknowledged, the garrison duties on Leros were `a gross misuse 
of LRDG Patrols who were trained and equipped for special tasks, and not for mere 
garrison duties the job of the normal infantryman'. 37 
Clearly, therefore, being held in high regard (which the LRDG at this stage certainly, 
and rightly, was) was no protection against misuse. It could even exacerbate the 
situation, a unit's prior successes, their reputation or aura of elitism, could provoke 
false estimations of their abilities. The fate of Ranger Force at Cisterna can be blamed, 
at least in part, on their track record of success and `their leaders' [including Darby] 
absolute faith in the Rangers to accomplish any mission'. 38 As if to emphasise this 
point, General Bradley stated that the Rangers `formed as professional combat unit as 
existed in the American army..... the Rangers became so competent that by the war's 
end I honestly believe there was nothing they could not do'. 39 Perception of misuse of 
specialist formations is often tinged with hindsight, however, and generally follows 
tactical failure and, or, heavy casualties. Levitha was an inappropriate role for the 
LRDG, but had they carried the day and their attack been a success, with little or few 
casualties, it may well have been regarded as another notable achievement for a 
versatile formation. 
36 Lloyd Owen, The larder was often bare, (Unpublished memoir) in IWM Lloyd-Owen 
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There is a thin line between successes and failure in special operations and even heavy 
casualties are not necessarily indicative of misapplication: some of the more famous 
and indeed lauded `correct' deployments of specialist formations (such as the St. 
Nazaire raid or the capture of the Irsch-Zerf road) could result in quite startling 
casualties. A GHQ MEF appraisal actually perceived the Commandos as being `in fact 
expendable and the rule guiding their employment is largely "Is this operation worth 
the number of casualties it will cost"? '40 Such a mentality was certainly a concern, in 
July 1943 Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce Lumsden of the newly formed No. 41(RM) 
Commando expressed resentment of an attitude, he believed to be prevalent in the SS 
Brigade, `that unless a Commando Unit has heavy casualties the job is not any good', 
and expressed fears that his unit would be `used in a pointless Operation evolved for 
the benefit of the Special Service Brigade rather than the furtherance of the job in 
hand'. 41 
The loss of personnel, even proportionally horrendous losses, in the right application 
was rarely, however, considered inappropriate so long as the ends justified the means. 
This was an understanding equally applicable to special forces, as highlighted perfectly 
by a 1943 statement regarding the employment of the SBS, that stated: `.... forlorn 
hopes should not be undertaken and that the lives of valuable and highly trained men 
should not be endangered unless there is reasonable chance of direct success and 
unless the objective is worthwhile'. 42 Furthermore, for special operations, as Colin 
Gray has asserted: `Tactical failure at the right time, in the right way, and for the right 
reasons can amount to strategic success'. 3 Thus whilst the June 1944 raid on the island 
of Brac (`Flounced'), for example, was a costly `tactical failure' for the Yugoslav 
partisans, Commandos and OGs taking part, it did succeed in its objective of diverting 
almost 2,000 German soldiers to the Dalmatian coast and away from the offensive on 
the mainland threatening Tito at this time. In the opinion of McConville, at the time a 
RM Commando subaltern, the raid represented a `worthwhile contribution to the 
achievement of the overall strategic objective'. 44 
40 `Raiding Forces - the story of an Independent Command in the Aegean, 1943-1945', WO 
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If losses, and even certain inappropriate additional duties such as acting in a `fire 
brigade' exigency capacity, were to be expected, tolerated, and even made legitimate, 
what was potentially more damning than use in a non-specialised role, was disuse: 
holding back valuable formations for an indeterminable amount of time until apposite 
circumstances for employment developed. There was a fine balance between 
potentially wasting specialist elements in inappropriate use, and of negating their value 
entirely by letting them wither on the vine. Constant deployment of specialist 
formations was an unattainable goal, to remain `special' they often required at least 
some (occasionally much) time to train and recruit, or, in the instance of casualties, to 
refit, reinforce or recuperate. Yet in instances where specialist formations were 
underemployed for long periods of time, it is possible to argue that any employment, 
even inappropriate, would have been of more value than their not having been used at 
all. After all, the value of a unit remains proportionate to its use. 
Fine example of the ills of disuse are seen with the Middle East Commando (later 
known as the 1s` SS Regiment). Principally recruited from `Layforce' remnants, 
predominantly No. 51(ME) Commando, the unit suffered from an identity crisis, lacked 
any clearly defined role and `never had the esprit de corps and cohesion of its 
forebears'. 45 Initially it was thought the Commando could be incorporated into the 
regional SOE pool as a `fifth column force', but such plans came to nought. 46 In an 
effort to gain employment, in March 1942 `C' Squadron of the Regiment was attached 
to the LRDG, but `met with many misfortunes' because, as the unit's commander 
stated, `the men of this Regiment have never received training in this type of work and 
are entirely unsuited for it. '47 In a similar proposal of May 1942 it was suggested that 
`A' Squadron of the Regiment be deployed in `short or medium range reconnaissance 
and sabotage activities'. 48 This again, did not transpire. Inactivity and comparative 
failures gave ammunition for detractors, whilst many of the `not unnaturally ... 
depressed and restless' personnel in the unit would apply for transfer to the various 
special forces. 49 The Regiment was continually frustrated and never able to find 
suitable employment. Their fundamental problem was one of unnecessary retention of 
a Commando-modelled formation in a theatre unsuited towards their use. One year 
43 Messenger et al., p. 120 46 Brigadier Davy, DDO to CGS, 25 April 1942, WO 201/732 
47 Reports of Lieutenant-Colonel John Graham, CO 1°` SS Regiment to GI IQ MEF, 13 July 1942, 
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before their eventual disbandment Laycock had warned that in the Middle East there 
were simply `too many commandos, and not enough work'. 50 GIIQ MEF had similarly 
advised that it was `wasteful to keep first-class material in units whose opportunities 
for employment are exceedingly rare'; General Auchinleck likened this disuse to 
`keeping a valuable cow and milking it once or twice a year'. 51 Despite these concerns, 
the Regiment was to languish for over a year, undertaking little worthwhile 
deployment, before its inevitable disbandment in September 1942 paved the way, 
almost in Darwinesque terms, for the creation of the l' SAS Regiment. 
Wartime debate over the relative merits of use over non-use of specialist formations is 
nowhere better illustrated than the high-level discussions that occurred over the 
employment of the FSSF. In September 1942 plans for the Force to be used against 
Norway, as originally intended, were postponed indefinitely, and rather than disband 
the formation General Marshall, Field-Marshal Dill, and the Force itself all pressured 
for deployment, in almost any capacity, so as to maintain their esprit de corps that 
risked becoming eroded with inaction. 52 Mountbatten and Churchill amongst others, on 
the other hand, were keen for the Force's skills in arctic warfare not be squandered in 
unrelated deployments, believing that `to yield to impatience seems most unsound 
militarily', and would, in the opinion of Lieutenant-General Andrews, be a `grave 
mistake'. 53 With no such deployments on the horizon, however, and the Force 
reportedly `growing stale', deployment in an alternative environment, or disbandment, 
became the only options. Yet to disband would have had been a total waste of an 
expensively and intensely trained cohesive unit, and whilst its eventual deployments 
against Kiska, Italy and France were not as initially intended, they do, however, show 
the merits of use, even if somewhat removed from original intention, over non-use. 
Conversely, however, withholding from deployment smaller special forces that had 
undergone extensive training could be preferable to risking their misuse in 
inappropriate roles or circumstances. Solid example of this is provided by the SRU 
combat swimmers who, following tropical water training in Nassau, were withheld 
from numerous cold-water deployments from Britain and the Mediterranean. To have 
so Laycock, `Note on Commandos', 11 September 1941, WO 201/731 51 Minutes of COS Committee, 2 August 1941, WO 193/405 
52 Field-Marshal Dill, Joint Staff Mission Washington to War Cabinet, 3 March 1943, WO 106/1974 
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deployed COHQ's only tropically-orientated combat swimmers in an ad hoc role (such 
as clearing mines in French ports) in Europe would have been wholly inappropriate, 
and it was correct that the unit's time was spent in supplementary training until it could 
be sent for deployment in the Far East. 54 Similar restraint of employment was shown 
with the COPPs sent to SEAC in early 1944. For over six months these Parties were 
widely unemployed, both because of the lack of information about their value and 
there having been little opportunity for large-scale amphibious operations in this 
theatre at that time. There was concern that if this unemployment continued these units 
would be used for `very elementary reconnaissance and pilotage work .... nothing like 
commensurate with their training and qualifications', a course of action that would 
have led to unnecessary risks and would have lowered the `standard and morale' of the 
Parties. 55 Those OSS MU groups deployed to this theatre were equally reluctant to 
undertake non-specialist occupations for the sake of employment. 56 In light of the 
potential for future large-scale amphibious operations in this theatre, however, the 
disbandment or transfer of such units was not an option, and they, like the SRU in 
Britain, were thus prescribed more 'imaginative training' so as to retain their standard 
and keep them occupied until more suitable tasks opened up. 57 
There remains, however, a world of difference between small maritime special forces 
and large commando formations like the FSSF being left idle for extended periods. The 
forty men of the SRU, for example, could be withheld from deployment without being 
a significant drain on resources and manpower and without hard-up commanders 
looking to use them; yet to have withheld the deployment of 2,500 first-rate men of the 
FSSF for any period of time would have been widely impracticable. Despite this, with 
pressing exigencies and no opportunity for niche deployment on the horizon, the use of 
special forces with very specific roles, in alternate, but related, occupations could also 
be of value. For example MU Group No. l (also known as Group `A') that had trained 
in Nassau with the SRU in an offensive=orientated combat swimmer role, was sent to 
Hawaii in June 1944 and asked to perform a rubber-boat beach reconnaissance of 
Saipan. Although the Group's commander, Lieutenant Choate, objected to the task 
34 Wright, pp. 71-77 55 CCO brief on Special Parties in SEAC, October 1944, DEFE 2/1035; Major-General G. E. 
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stating it was `unfair to use us to carry out this operation', his objections were, 
however, quite reasonably overruled. 58 At this time in the Central Pacific there was a 
shortage of personnel capable of undertaking such roles, and the Group's specialisation 
remained applicable to the task being asked of them. Furthermore, it was very unlikely 
that the Group would have had opportunity to carry out its original offensive 
swimming mandate in this theatre at that time. 
The effective deployment of the smaller and more `niche' formations was certainly 
hindered by the lack of knowledge about their precise speciality. It was a problem 
exacerbated by the degree of secrecy, both inevitable and enforced, that surrounded a 
number of these units. For example, in early-1943 Mountbatten released a paper to 
theatre commanders on the organisation and function of the COPPs to help educate 
them in their employment, 59 it transpired later, however, that this `TOP SECRET and 
PERSONAL' document was not circulated beyond the Commanders-in-Chiefs to 
whom it was addressed `with the result that planning staffs were not given a clear idea 
of what a COPP could do'. 60 Although developing command structures certainly 
helped to educate higher commanders in the potentials of specialist formations, their 
efforts could still thwarted by the needs of secrecy and security. Colonel Tollemache, 
CO SOG believed that these needs led to the `quite straightforward work [of SOG] 
being considered as "Black Art" not only by the units themselves, but also by the staffs 
of the regular formations who could best make use of them. '61 Such problems could be 
further aggravated by the nomenclature of units and their, on occasions, taking 
deliberately innocuous names for cover. One can hardly blame poorly informed 
commanders wishing to use the Special Air Service in a conventional airborne role; the 
Alamo Scouts for tactical reconnaissance; wondering what possible utility a Long 
Range Desert Group could have in the mountains and coastlines of Italy or Greece; let 
alone trying to fathom what the Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment could be used 
for. 
Disuse was not always a conscious decision, however, and the correct employment of 
specialist elements required both opportunity and means. Material considerations could 
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be a significant impediment. Most clearly, aircraft and shipping had to be available in 
sufficient quantity to facilitate insertion and exfiltration, as well as supply and 
reinforcement. Early Commando operations, from both Britain and in the 
Mediterranean, and later operations in the Far East, were often hamstrung and confined 
to a small - scale by an absence of landing craft and supporting shipping (or the 
unwillingness to risk their loss). 62 Such shortages could hinder even minor raids, as 
was found by both the SSRF in 1942, and the MU throughout 1944.63 Competition for 
resources obviously increased with the commencement of larger operations. The 
invasion of France, in particular, saw the Jedburghs, OGs and SAS Brigade all facing 
competition for dispatch and supply operations from the limited numbers of aircraft 
available. 64 Despite having the declared role of being a `strategic reserve' to be used 
subsequent to, and in support of, the main invasions, many of these formations 
believed that they were committed too late, believing that the delay in their dispatch 
(which could be up to two-and-a-half months after the invasion) was a clear 
impediment to their effectiveness. The clearest reasons for these delays were material 
shortages in `lift'; poor weather conditions; political considerations; unimaginative 
tasking; and as was noted previously, the lack of a unified control system for the 
disparate groups. 6s 
Many of those groups dropped into France as late as August 1944 (particularly those in 
support of Anvil/Dragoon) never had time to adequately perform the role for which 
they had trained before being overrun by advancing Allied forces. Subsequently, many 
remained adamant that they would have achieved more had they been sent earlier. 
Jedburgh Team `Cecil', for example, deployed on 25 August to the Aube area, 
concluded that `we feel it was greatly to be regretted that a very good job was 
prevented from being an even better one by the failure to send us on, or even before D- 
Day, by which time we were already fully trained and prepared'. 66 Major U. N. Marten, 
CO Jedburgh Team `Veganin' concurred, stated that the timing of deployment 
.... has been probably the most criminal matter in the whole history of the Jcds. 
.... for some reason the majority of the teams were left waiting until the very last moment before they were sent in and it was impossible for them to do any 
62 Minutes of COS Meeting, 8 June 1943, WO 106/4117 63 CCO to Admiral Hughes-Hallett, 14 January 1943, DEFE 2/957 
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good whatsoever..... It was a lamentable appreciation by the higher authorities 
to delay this departure. 67 
Similar claims were made by the OGs, Major Alfred T. Cox commanding the OGs in 
the South of France stated that: `All are in unanimous agreement that the teams should 
have been put into FRANCE much earlier than they were. Everyday spent training the 
Maquis brought increased dividends in their combat effectiveness'. 68 General 
Browning, GOC Airborne Corps would support this opinion when he stated that the 
`last minute distribution of arms only results in badly trained MAQUIS taking part in 
actions and being more nuisance than they are worth'. 69 
Even those Groups dropped earlier were prone to suggest that they would have been 
better employed up to three months before the invasion of France. Lieutenant William 
H. McKenzie 111, commanding OG `Louise' believed his operation should have been 
`laid on during March' as they could `have played a greater part in training and 
organising Maquis'. 70 Roger Ford's later historical appraisal of the Jedburghs shares 
such perceptions, stating that if the Jedburgh's had an `operational flaw, it was the 
decision 
... not to insert at least some of them before the 
invasion got underway'. 7' 
Such comments, easy with hindsight, are, nevertheless, still not necessarily correct. It 
should not be overlooked that, as SOE's history of the Jedburghs reminds, 
the Jedburgh Teams [and OGs] formed part of an operational reserve of 
trained personnel. Where the work of interfering with rail and 
telecommunications could be carried out by existing Resistance Groups, there 
was nothing to be gained in committing this reserve. On the other hand, there 
was good deal to be lost by encouraging clandestine Resistance to take overt 
action before the time was ripe, inviting heavy repressive action from the 
enemy in areas it was vital to him to control, and risking the breakup of the 
Resistance Groups. 72 
Although delayed, these formations were not misused; the situation on the ground had 
to be ripe for the committal of such groups. The dispatch of special forces before the 
commencement of the invasion would have been costly, they would likely have 
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achieved little and, if detected, risked compromising resistance groups and invasion 
schemes alike. Despite this, in alternative theatres where the enemy was less dense and 
terrain more favourable, early dispatch does seem to have been beneficial, those 
Jedburghs later deployed to Burma, for instance, considered that they were more 
effective precisely because they had more time to operate. 73 It should be noted, 
however, that Burma was an active theatre when these teams were dispatched, and thus 
much of the complications that prevented dispatch before the invasion of France did 
not apply. 
In a similar vein, although those later actions of the SAS Brigade in northwest Europe 
(which were more akin to a conventional reconnaissance force) have been criticised for 
being a misuse of a `strategic' force in a `tactical' role, this employment, in light of the 
rapidity of the Allied advance, remained the best use of the SAS at that time. Any 
`traditional' SAS role in depth (presuming it could be planned and mounted in time) 
would have been impracticable and it was believed `doubtful' that operations mounted 
with no resistance elements in place, and an assumed 100 percent hostile population in 
German regions, would have achieved results commensurate with casualties. Such 
operations would likely have been a waste of resources and merely served as a 
diversion from the main effort. 74 The possible exception, however, would have been to 
have made use of these units during operation `Market Garden' in which they could 
have furthered the advance of XXX Corps or harassed German counterattacks on 
beleaguered airborne units. 75 On the whole, however, at this late stage of the war to 
have deployed the SAS in the `strategic' role in depth, for which they had lobbied for 
some time, would have been a grave misuse; whilst tactical deployment, so often 
derided, became the only option lest the SAS face disuse or disbandment. 
The spectre of disbandment, or disuse, was a threatening proposition for irregular 
warriors who, in frustration, were prone to consent, albeit often reluctantly, to almost 
any task so as to retain their esprit de corps and justify their existence to sceptical 
superiors. Specialist forces were, as Eric Morris states, `vulnerable to a form of moral 
blackmail which meant they took on tasks and missions which they were singularly ill- 
73 Thompson (1998), p. 414 74 HQ SAS Brigade meeting, 19 November 1944, WO 218/189 75 Major-General R. N. Gale, Commander, I British Airborne Corps to GOC, First Allied Airborne 
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equipped to handle'. 76 In fighting for a permanent establishment for his Rangers, 
Darby for example, was unwilling to take too firma stance against the misapplication 
of his force lest he denigrate his arguments about their flexibility and value, and thus 
actually hasten the disbandment of his command. 77 Similarly illustrative of these 
pressures is `L'-Detachment SAS's first disastrous operation against the Tmimi/Gazala 
airfields, which was mounted despite indications that atrocious weather would make 
successful parachute drops impossible. Stirling was, however, conscious that if the 
operation was called off it would not only invalidate his sentiments about the 
flexibility of the SAS idea (which he had sold on the very basis of the constant 
cancellation of Commando operations in theatre), but would also give his detractors 
the opportunity `to pervert the reasoning for calling off the job and use it as a lever 
either to have the force disbanded or to make life even more difficult subsequently'. 78 
Once units had had successes such pressures could actually increase leading to the 
expectation of repeated results. Perhaps it was in such a vein that Stirling, conceivably 
with an eye to gaining a regimental establishment, agreed to take part in the costly raid 
on Benghazi, an operation that he would later claim, sinned against every principle of 
the SAS. 79 Later still, with the desire to guarantee the SAS a role in future campaigns, 
Stirling also pushed his unit hard in operations ahead of Eighth Army into Tunisia 
which, in light of more difficult terrain, hostile Arabs, and a more concentrated enemy, 
were more costly and ultimately led to his own capture. Similar pressures `to keep the 
SAS on active service' propelled them to, much later, accept the role of performing 
tactical reconnaissance for 21 Army Group's advance into Germany. 80 Such demands 
were, in the words of Thompson, 
.... a hazard which faces all `special' troops, who by their temperament usually hanker after action. As an advance nears its objective, the amount of suitable 
`real estate' available for behind the lines operations may be reduced. So the 
special troops in question will be tempted to take whatever roles, or targets, are 
on offer. To have left such skilled troops sitting on the sidelines in an advance, 
where reconnaissance is always at a premium, would have been unthinkable; 
nor would the SAS have wanted this. $ 
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Towards the end of the war, in spite of better command mechanisms and staff 
practices, there remained a definite prospect of misuse occurring because of an often 
mutual (consumer and practitioner) desire to keep these formations employed, almost 
regardless of circumstances, so as to reap the benefit of their training. In March 1945 
the NORSO group (formerly Norwegian OGs), finally able to operate in Norway, 
mounted operation `Rype' to target bridges and disrupt German rail communications. 
The mission, although achieving its goals, was costly: horrendous weather and 
inexperienced aircrews caused one aircraft transporting elements of the group to crash 
into a mountain with the loss of all on board, and another to mistakenly drop its 
personnel into Sweden. Lieutenant-Colonel Leflesen, of the OSS planning staff, 
commented that in this regard the NORSO mission `represents a sad chapter in the 
history of our activity, one which I am constrained to add might have been avoided'. 82 
Although a comparison could be drawn to `L' Detachment's first operation, also costly 
in men and machines but not successful, the SAS operation, taken in the desperate days 
of the `Crusader' offensive was, perhaps, a risk worth taking. `Rype' however, 
although technically successful, did not warrant the risks and the loss of such trained 
and experienced men in the destruction of non-valuable assets in a strategic backwater 
at this late stage of the war. It is indicative of waste, and of deployment for the sake of 
employment. 
It is clear, therefore, that throughout the course of the Second World War the 
experiences of the Anglo-American specialist formations could be quite mixed. 
Although often created with a specific role or speciality in mind, many would, at least 
at some point, either find themselves employed in circumstances, or undertaking roles, 
for which they were not prepared; or, alternatively, would be withheld from 
deployment for protracted periods of time. The `correct' use of irregular formations 
had broad requirements which assumed the existence of informed consumers and 
practitioners that make logical and far-sighted decisions; as well as both the 
opportunity and means for their employment. In an evolving military situation with the 
absence of clear doctrines and precedents for the use of specialist formations the 
chances of their misapplication and misuse is made more likely. 
Definition of misuse requires a rigid definition of role, something that was far from 
prevalent amongst many specialist formations of the Second World War. To remain 
82 OSS/London War Diaries, Vol. 8, KCLMA MF 209 
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employed, and be of use, specialist formations had to continually adapt and evolve 
their role to the requirements on the ground, and charges of misuse were often a 
counterpart to such transitions of role. When a conversion of role first occurred it could 
be viewed as an abhorrent misuse, but, in time, when the units adapted, what was once 
wrong could subsequently become perceived as normal. For example, the first time the 
Commandos faced conventional or protracted deployments in North Africa they were 
ill-prepared and suffered accordingly, with claims of misuse soon following; yet with 
their transition in role and alterations to their organisation and establishment, their 
future deployments in Italy or Northwest Europe in `shock troop' and `seize-and-hold' 
operations were conducted as part of the Commando repertoire without anywhere near 
as much negative comment. 
To remain viable and useful, and not subvert their inherent value of being cost- 
effective (of potentially providing greater result than was the sum of their investment) 
specialist formations had to remain employed. They had to remain subservient to the 
necessities and course of the war as a whole. Operational necessity could pervert the 
ability for specialist formations (particularly of the commando variety) to deploy in the 
manner for which they had prepared, and there was an oft repeated propensity to thrust 
available units into the breach whenever necessary to help stem battlefield reverses. 
Commanders under pressure, who had neither been adequately briefed about the 
employment of specialist assets, nor had little appreciation of the `cost' of raising and 
training these elements, were particularly prone to act as such, moves that although 
often costly and not cost-effective (as will be discussed in a later chapter), were 
understandable and, at times, even excusable. Without relying on hindsight, there is 
great difficulty in actually condemning many of the instances in which specialist forces 
were misused in the Second World War. 
Arguably more reprehensible than misapplication, however, was disuse: perpetually 
delaying the committal of specialist formations, waiting continuously for apposite 
circumstances, or holding out for a `model mission' which, in an evolving situation, 
may never occur. The cost of training and equipping a force, not to mention the 
manpower tied up in their establishment, could represent a noticeable investment, and 
should there be no opportunity for it to deploy in the capacity as originally intended, 
any use of the force (as with the FSSF) was arguably preferable to holding potentially 
large formations in reserve in the hope that opportunities would arise for their use. For 
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special forces, however, as misuse is potentially far more threatening, disuse, even for 
prolonged periods, can be viewed as both more preferable and more excusable. 
Misapplication, misuse and disuse of specialist formations, must, therefore be viewed 
as an essential component of the broader learning curve regarding their employment 
over the course of the Second World War. Both because of the embryonic nature of 
specialist formations; the lack of understanding about their use; and, perhaps most 
importantly, the exigencies and requirements of total war, misuse was to be expected; 
and in evolutionary terms, cannot always be seen as having been counterproductive. 
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Chapter 6 
The impact of specialist forces 
In January 1981 M. R. D. Foot posed a refreshingly simple question: `Was SOE any 
good? ' Concluding his analysis with an emphatic `yes', Foot's article remains a 
relatively rare example of an attempt to contextualise the import of special operations 
on the course of the Second World War. ' This chapter serves to modify Professor 
Foot's question, to ask: `Were the Anglo-American commandos and special forces any 
good? ' Focusing on what commandos and special forces achieved in the war, this 
chapter seeks to examine their impact in both independent action and in conjunction 
with other arms; it seeks to examine not only the direct, but also the intangible and 
more abstract, consequences of their deployments and to relate these to tactical, 
operational and strategic utility. This chapter is not, however, a breakdown of the 
impact, either qualitatively or quantitatively, of individual units and operations: any 
attempt to do so would prove exhaustive; instead it serves to illustrate themes by the 
use of specific examples. 
There is inherent ambiguity in any attempt to determine the impact and value of any 
one element during the course of the war as a whole; and the fundamental problems 
with accurately determining impact need to be highlighted before the question of the 
value of specialist formations can begin to be addressed. Physical problems are the 
most obvious: problems that relate to a lack of clear information about costs, losses 
and results; that relate to divergences in claims, the lack of adequate reports, and an 
indeterminable chain of causation. Independent effect is seldom ascertainable. For 
example, an accurate `tally' of the achievements of the SAS Brigade in France is 
coloured not only by the impact of other specialist formations (the OGs and 
Jedburghs), but also the impact of the Resistance, clandestine circuits, and the Allied 
air forces. Analytical problems are more complicated. There is definite difficulty in 
extrapolating the value of an individual tactical outcome to the course of the wider 
operation, campaign, or entire war. Whilst tangible results like the destruction of 
personnel or materials give some impression of value, ascribing to such isolated 
activities a margin of effect, or causational impact, upon later events, is, however, 
practically impossible. What impact, for instance, does the loss of a number of aircraft, 
' Foot, M. R. D., 'Was SOE Any Good? ', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. ], (January 
1981) pp. 167-181 
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or the delay of enemy reinforcement, have on the course of a campaign? Even greater 
difficulty is seen in assessing the value of the myriad of intangible, but no less 
significant, effects of special operations. What, for example, was the value of COPP 
reconnaissances of beaches, or the import of UDT demolitions before a landing? Or, 
how valuable was intelligence provided by the Alamo Scouts or LRDG? How many 
lives were saved, how much faster was success achieved by special forces aiding or 
facilitating conventional deployments? 
Underlying this chapter is the expectation of the provision of strategic utility, that is to 
say, effects that shape the course and object of the conflict as a whole. Although it is 
certainly possible for specialist formations to reap, both actively and passively, 
strategic benefit (although never decisively so in high-intensity conflict); their means, 
methods and tradecraft, remain tactical. This apparent dichotomy between tactical 
means and strategic impact is a source of confusion; resulting, at times, in both an 
underestimation and an inflation of the value of specialist forces and operations. In 
their own words most Second World War practitioners of special operations viewed 
themselves as `strategic' troops. This perception was, however, principally a result of 
the depth at which they operated, the duration of their deployment, or the fact that they 
were commanded at the GHQ-level; rather than being in reference to their utility or 
effectiveness of their operations. The perception of special forces as being wholly 
strategic actors tends to lead both to a condemnation of `tactical' employment and, as 
has been noted in the previous chapter, to the erroneous impression that their use `as 
close adjuncts to conventional military efforts ... 
[was] an abuse or waste of their 
unique capabilities'. 2 Independence of operation was seen as the gold standard, yet to 
decry operations alongside, or in support of, the conventional battle is not only 
fallacious but also neglects some of their clearest claims of strategic utility. Gray 
accordingly believes that `.... the notion that there is an inherent distinction between 
strategic and tactical missions is both false and counterproductive. '3 Special operations 
have the potential for a degree of impact at all levels of war; they `may have strategic 
value whether they are intended to have immediate effects on a battle, on a campaign, 
or on a war as a whole..... Moreover, special operations have strategic value whether 
2 Gray (1996), p. 148 3 Ibid., p. 148 
201 
one uses them on independent missions or whether they coordinate their action with 
regular forces'. 4 
Independent offensive action, typified in the raid, tends to dominate discussion of the 
impact of special operations. Yet individual raids by both commandos and special 
forces taken in isolation, totally disconnected from the actions of conventional arms, 
had little impact on the Second World War. These operations were often self-declared 
`pinpricks' which served, as in the initial conception of the Commandos, not so much 
to cause material attrition as to strengthen national resolve, regain the initiative, gain 
experience and frustrate the enemy. Early examples of the raid (from both Britain and 
the Middle East) were amateurish in conception, of a small-scale, and invariably 
unsuccessful; and in general would have little inherent military value in terms of 
material impact. Despite growing proficiencies and a concomitant increase in the 
likelihood of cost-effective attrition later in the war, this contention still remained 
largely applicable to individual raids taken in isolation. 
Not all raids, however, were conducted on a small-scale, and a number of commando 
operations were undertaken with loftier expectations. Solid example is the bold 
Commando raid on St. Nazaire in March 1942. The motivation behind `Chariot' was 
ostensibly strategic in character: to destroy the dry docks of St. Nazaire to deny their 
use to the Tirpitz and so alter the course of the Battle of the Atlantic. Churchill would 
call the raid `a deed of glory intimately involved in high strategy'. 5 Although the raid 
was costly, it was undeniably a great success, succeeding in its primary purpose 
rendering the Normandie dock inoperable for the remainder of the war. With hindsight, 
however, the raid cannot be seen to have had any significant strategic utility. By 1942 
Hitler had no intention of risking his remaining large surface vessels in the Atlantic nor 
would the denial of the maintenance facilities at St. Nazaire preclude the Tirpitz from 
operating in the North Sea against convoys bound for Russia. Resultantly, Gray sees 
the raid as `a heroic example of doing the wrong thing well for the right reason. The 
raid was a critical blow against the German naval strategy of 1940-41, not of 1942- 
45'. 6 McRaven has stated categorically that the risks taken were not worth the potential 
gains, and contrasts it unfavourably with the later X-Craft submersible attack on the 
4 Ibid., p. 165 S Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War - Volume IV. - The Hinge of Fate, (Cassell: London, 
1951) p. 106 
6 Gray (1996), p. 142 
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Tirpitz, operation `Source' of September 1943, which rendered the ship inoperable 
with far fewer losses. 7 
Potentially the most directly `strategic' independent special operation carried out in the 
war was `Swallow/Gunnerside', an SOE-sponsored operation conducted in February 
1943 against the Vemork hydroelectric plant in Norway, a target significant because of 
its heavy water by-product (an essential moderating component in the establishment of 
a nuclear reactor). Arrangements for the mission first occurred in September 1942 
when four SOE-recruited Norwegians, `Grouse', were parachuted into the vicinity of 
the plant to provide advance reconnaissance and act as guides for `Freshman', a 
demolitions force of thirty Royal Engineers which were to sent by glider to attack the 
target in November. Whilst `Grouse' went to plan, the `Freshman' gliders crashed 
upon approach, those that survived were captured and subsequently executed by the 
Germans. `Grouse', however, remained in position, and in February 1943 
`Gunnerside', a force of six SOE-Norwegians, was parachuted in as a second strike 
group to meet with `Swallow' (as the `Grouse' group was renamed). 8 These groups 
combined and subsequently successfully attacked the plant to place it out of action for 
a number of months. The resultant denial of heavy water production thus went at least 
some way to preventing German experimentation with atomic devices. Considering the 
obvious ramifications had these been developed, David Stafford believed this 'may 
have been the most important act of sabotage by either side during the Second World 
War'. 9 Illustrative of the problems with ascribing credit to a chain of causation, 
however, is the fact that the German failure to develop atomic weapons had more to do 
with the lack of heavy water alone; as well and the fact that `Gunnerside' did not 
permanently stop the plant: credit must also be shared with both a February 1944 SOE 
mission whereby two Norwegians sunk, via sabotage, a ferry transporting half-a-year's 
heavy water production from the newly repaired plant, and with the USAAF, whose 
raids would keep the plant inoperable. '0 
On the whole, however, independently strategic special operations were the exception 
and not the rule. Despite often being perceived as the gold standard, few special 
operations had the potential for independent strategic effect in a conflict the magnitude 
7 McRaven, pp. 43; 230 a Cookridge, E. H., Inside SOE, (Arthur Barker: London, 1966) pp. 516-524 
9 Stafford (2000), p. 298 10 Cookridge, p. 524 
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of the Second World War. The much more pronounced contribution that special 
operations made to the strategic situation came when their actions, however 
individually insignificant, were wedded to the activities of conventional formations 
and the main campaign. The value of specialist formations acting in a contributory role 
in facilitating, enhancing, or aiding the development and continuation of conventional 
operations is potentially much more significant than any independent and self- 
contained operations that are divorced from the deployment of conventional arms 
except in the more abstract sense. As General Thompson has stated, `offensive action 
and intelligence gathering, produce the best "return" when carried out as adjuncts of 
the campaign, or battle, being fought or about to be fought, by the main body of the 
army. There are few examples of offensive action far removed from main force activity 
producing a good "return". " 1 Through examination of these more direct contributions, 
the most substantial tangible value of special operations can be seen. As Gray 
contends, the strategic utility of special operations `depends on the context of war as a 
whole' and `corresponds to the significance of the grander-scale military operations 
that they assist'. 12 In the opinion of Kiras, the true strategic value of special operations 
is not in one annihilatory action that achieves strategic paralysis, but in collective 
strategic attrition, to weaken `an adversary's combat power and will to fight'. '3 
It is only when raids are taken as a whole that their value becomes more apparent: 
based on quantity rather than quality the cumulative effects of these operations could 
be greater than the sum of their parts. Small-scale raids, often repeated, could produce 
a very favourable return on investment capable of causing cause clear, albeit localised, 
damage to the enemy war effort. This is a point well illustrated by the prolific, and 
often tactically successful, small-scale raids of the SAS during the Desert War. The 
most feted achievement of which, and potentially their most significant achievement 
during the entire the war, was their destruction of an estimated 350 enemy aircraft 
throughout the campaign. 14 This achievement was undoubtedly significant and greatly 
aided the beleaguered Desert Air Force by materially helping `to tilt the balance of air 
11 Thompson (1998), p. 7 12 Gray (1996), pp. 148-149 
13 Kiras, p. 61 
" The significance of this achievement is illustrated by the Axis aircraft strengths in North Africa: 
in June 1942 it was estimated that there were a total of 183 German and 248 Italian frontline aircraft 
in the North African theatre, a figure which rose to 375 and 283 aircraft respectively in November 
1942. Ellis, John, The World War II Databook, (Aurum: London, 2003) p. 232 
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power in the Mediterranean Theatre'. 15 GHQ MEF was of the opinion that the SAS 
achievements throughout the North African campaign `had a great bearing on the final 
defeat of the enemy in Tunisia'. 16 Even Erwin Rommel would acknowledge their 
contribution, writing in his diary that the SAS `caused us more damage than any other 
British unit of equal strength'. '? Whilst it is certainly clear that special operations by 
the likes of the SAS and LRDG in the desert were of clear value in aiding the course of 
the wider campaign, their achievements should be kept in perspective. They were not, 
as Morgan has contended, `a phenomenal and decisive contribution to the overall 
victory'. 18 These actions were not decisive acts, but ancillary and contributory events 
to the course and conduct of the main campaign. 
For the conventional arms, the most beneficial results which special forces and 
partisans undertaking harassment and interdiction activities in the enemy's rear could 
achieve was not with material destruction, but instead in the disruption of enemy lines 
of communication and logistics: performing strikes on targets which negatively 
affected the enemy's speed of response and ability to manoeuvre. Although there were 
numerous instances in which special operations were able (with varying levels of 
success) to attain such a result, one of the more notable, and indeed contested, 
examples is the value of the SAS `Bulbasket' base in disrupting the arrival of German 
reinforcements to the Normandy beachhead. As a case study it emphasises not only the 
potential value of special operations in this regard, but also highlights some of the 
difficulties of assessing the impact of one event to a broader chain of causation. 
Max Hastings has attributed to `Bulbasket' part of the credit for the delay of the SS 
Das Reich Division reaching the Normandy beachhead. Although the Division was 
delayed significantly by crippled rail networks (caused by airpower and Resistance 
sabotage) as well as the constant spectre of Allied aerial supremacy preventing daytime 
movements, Hastings claims that SAS attacks on rail links, ambushes and crucially, 
their tasking of an air strike against a petrol dump at Chätellerault, where the fuel 
reserves for Das Reich was stored, delayed their arrival at the front for upwards of two 
or three days of their longer hold up. 19 Even if the SAS part in the delay was a matter 
15 Thompson (1998), p. 420; David Stirling, `Origins of the SAS Regiment', 8 November 1948, 
KCLMA McLeod 
16 GHQ MEF, Brief history of `L' Detachment SAS Brigade and 18' SAS Regiment, WO 201/721 '7 Liddell Hart, B. H. (ed. ), The Rommel Papers, (Collins: London, 1953) p. 393 
'B Morgan (2000), pp. 14-15 19 Hastings, Max, p. 187 
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of hours, waylaying such an important division from the Normandy battlefield was 
significant. Thompson has thus contended that the SAS actions `more than 
compensated for the [subsequent] virtual elimination of the Bulbasket Team'. 0 Roger 
Ford, on the other hand, attributes Das Reich's delay principally to the Resistance, and 
argues that it is `difficult to rate it [Bulbasket] as more than a partial success, not only 
because so many lives were lost in its course and it had to be brought to a premature 
conclusion as a result, but also because it actually achieved very little in purely 
military terms' 21 Furthermore, Ford discounts the significance of Das Reich's delay, 
emphasising that when the division did arrive in Normandy it was not committed 
immediately, but was instead held in reserve until early July. 22 Ford's criticisms are, 
however, somewhat misplaced. He overlooks both that it was the SAS who directed 
the strike at Chätellerault and the point that the lateness of Das Reich's committal to 
the line at Normandy was not necessarily by choice, but was a necessity because of the 
disorganised state in which the division had finally arrived at the front. 
As a general rule, the use of commando and ranger formations in conjunction with, or 
in support of, conventional arms would ultimately prove to be of more value than their 
independent raiding activities; a fact which of course underlines their evolution in role. 
Their ultimate occupation as spearheaders, flank guards and shock troops were all 
intended to facilitate, or accelerate the pace of, conventional military operations. They, 
as a post-Sicily appraisal stated, `assist in keeping the battle in a state of fluidity'. 3 
Their greatest usefulness, and the raison d'etre of many commando and ranger 
formations after 1942, occurred when `they came to fight within the larger framework 
of the big invasions ... when their place was 
in the vanguard of the vanguards and on 
the outer wings of the beachheads'. 24 The presence of specially trained and motivated 
troops on the beaches during, or soon after, the initial assault certainly went some way 
to overcoming the daunting problems of mounting amphibious operations. Their value 
in such a capacity is evidenced by the regular proliferation and expansion of these 
formations in the period in 1942-1944 to cater for the expected requirements of ever- 
larger amphibious operations. 
20 Thompson (1998), p. 308 
21 Ford (2003), pp. 75-76 
22 Ibid., p. 56 
23 War Office memorandum, `Points brought out in Ops. "dusky"', WO 201/799 
24 Vagts, Alfred, Landing Operations, (Military Service Publishing Company: Washington D. C., 
1946) p. 629 
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In addition to their value in an amphibious capacity, commando formations also 
displayed their utility in a number of valuable overland deployments where, via 
infiltration and assault, they helped hasten the development of the conventional battle 
by the seizure of important objectives. Three solid, although by no means exclusive, 
examples of commando-type formations proving valuable in such capacity are: the 
FSSF's assaults on Monte la Difensa and Monte la Remetanea, the capture of which 
helped crack the `Winter Wall' and increased the tempo of the main battle. The 
Marauder's seizure of Myitkyina airfield in Burma with Chinese regulars, an action 
that helped open the Burma Road and, by removing Japanese fighter cover over 
northern Burma, ensured that flights over the `Hump' were shorter and safer. And, the 
Commando's seizure of Hill 170 in the Arakan, a stroke which would greatly aid the 
advance of the 25`" Indian Division towards Kangaw. Such examples, in addition to 
those amphibious strokes, such as Termoli or Pointe du Hoc, greatly facilitated 
operational level manoeuvre and helped speed up the pace of the conventional battle; 
yet even those very successful operations cannot be considered, as Hogan erroneously 
claims, to be `critical to the success of conventional forces'. 25 
Although offensive activities tend to dominate much `special operations literature' it is 
equally important to examine the results of their intelligence activities. Yet doing so is 
not without its complications, as John Ferris states, `one rarely has the equivalent of a 
laboratory experiment in which all other variables remain constant and one can gauge 
with precision the effect of changes in intelligence'. 26 The contribution of special 
forces to the intelligence picture should not be underestimated. In the opinion of 
LRDG patrol commander Anthony Timpson, the timely provision of intelligence and 
information was `the most decisive influence which the LRDG could exert'. 27 If the 
SAS contributed to victory in the Desert War by their regular harassment of enemy 
lines of communication and their destruction of aircraft, the LRDG easily matched 
their contribution with their invaluable provision of topographical and human 
intelligence. 
The LRDG `road watch', in particular, has often been hailed as an activity of particular 
value. By physically charting all east- and west-bound traffic along the arterial coastal 
25 Hogan, US Army, p. 32 26 Ferris, John `The Intelligence-Deception Complex - an Anatomy', Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 14, No. 4, (October 1989), p. 731 27 Timpson and Gibson-Watt, p. 17 
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roads, the LRDG helped build up an exceptionally detailed and therefore valuable 
picture of the supply and reinforcement situation of the Axis forces. Brigadier T. S. 
Airey, DMI, GHQ MEF, believed the road watch to be of `quite exceptional 
importance' that provided 
.... an indispensable basis for certain facts on which calculation of enemy 
strength can be based. Without their reports we should frequently have been in 
doubt as to the enemy's intentions, when knowledge of them was all important; 
and our estimate of enemy strength would have been far less accurate and 
accepted with far less confidence. 2 
The intelligence contribution of the `road watch' was initially heralded as having been 
decisive; Constable, for example, recounts that: `When Ritter von Thoma, Rommel's 
deputy, was captured ... the 
German general was shocked to learn that Monty knew 
more about the supply status of the Afrika Korps than he did. Most of this information 
reached Monty via LRDG road watch patrols'. 29 Their contribution must now, 
however, be viewed against the value of intelligence from other sources and, put 
against the significance of the contribution of signals intelligence, notably `Y' Service 
intercepts and `Ultra' decrypts which were undoubtedly the greatest intelligence source 
available to Western Desert Force/ Eighth Army, the contribution of the LRDG is put 
in better perspective. 
Despite the fact that the LRDG did not produce the range of information that signals 
intelligence did, it did have a number of benefits over other available intelligence 
mediums. Signals intelligence sources were not without their limitations: `Ultra' was 
reliant on what was sent via Enigma and consequently could suffer from being patchy, 
delayed, as well as being prone to misinterpretation; whilst `Y' Service was heavily 
reliant on suitable conditions for interception of signals and was often of value only to 
the tactical-level. 30 The `road watches', however, offered a unique means of verifying 
intelligence gained from signals intelligence; as well as having the advantages of being 
proactive, regular, almost continuous and, in light of its well-trained practitioners, 
accurate. 3' LRDG patrols also provided a wonderful cover, a plausible source, to 
which `Ultra' intercepts could be attributed. 
28 Brigadier Airey, Notes on LRDG Road Watch, 14 December 1942, WO 20]/771 29 Constable, Trevor James, Hidden Heroes, (Arthur Barker: London, 1971) p. 141 30 Jenner, Robin; List, David and Badrocke, Mike, The Long Range Desert Group 1940-1945, 
(Osprey: Oxford, 1999) pp. 35-36 31 Kelly, p. 187 
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Set against other forms of human intelligence in this theatre, the LRDG returns were 
particularly favourable. David Hunt, an GHQ MEF intelligence staff officer would 
claim that `.... all the agents' reports ever received through all the cumbrous and 
many-branched organisations set up for the purposes of espionage put together, never 
amounted to enough to be weighed in the balance against the information which the 
Long Range Desert Group supplied'. 32 Against photo-reconnaissance in depth too, the 
LRDG comes off favourably. Despite a growing proficiency in aerial reconnaissance in 
the later stages of the campaign, the RAF could never hope to match the range, time- 
on-target and completeness of intelligence that was attainable by LRDG patrols. 
In the uniquely apposite conditions of the Desert War the LRDG was also of notable 
value to conventional operations serving in a guide and pathfinding capacity. Solid 
example of which is provided by the LRDG finding 'Wilders's Gap', allowing Eighth 
Army to circumvent the heavily defended Mareth Line during their advance into 
Tunisia. General Montgomery's commendation of the unit stated: `Without your 
careful and reliable reports the launching of the "left hook" by the NZ Div would have 
been a leap in the dark; with the information they produced, the operation could be 
planned with some certainty and as you know, went off without a hitch. '33 The results 
caused Eric Morris to call this discovery `one of the most important contributions by 
Special Forces to the land battle in North Africa'. 34 
The closest US counterpart to the LRDG, in both broad modus operandi and in impact, 
was the Alamo Scouts. The combat record and tactical virtuosity of the Scouts is 
arguably without parallel. Throughout the course of their operations the Scouts are 
believed to have accounted for over 500 Japanese soldiers killed, and over sixty 
captured (a phenomenal feat in light of the rarity of Japanese prisoners), all without the 
loss of a single man. 35 It is not in these claims, however, that their value is to be found. 
The Scout's greatest contribution was their provision of intelligence for the benefit of 
the US Sixth Army in the South-West Pacific and the Philippines. Undertaking tactical 
reconnaissance, beach survey, liaison with partisans, pathfinding, as well as important 
road and coastal watches, the Scouts provided direct assistance for General Krueger's 
offensives and were an undeniable asset in his arsenal. With the establishment of a 
32 Hunt, David, A Don at War, (Frank Cass: London, 1990) p. 132 33 General Montgomery to Lieutenant-Colonel Prendergast, CO LRDG, 2 April 1943, WO 201/816 
34 Morris (1989), p. 153 35 Zedric, p. 251 
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`Special Intelligence Subsection' under Sixth Army's G-2 (Intelligence) Section; 
Krueger's staff benefited enormously from being able to task and dispatch a `Scout 
team in any given area on Luzon within 48 hours' either to provide specific 
intelligence, or undertake a gamut of other tasks. 36 Krueger himself would later praise 
the tremendous value of having a reliable and readily-available reconnaissance asset at 
hand capable of producing a `considerable volume of extremely valuable 
information'. 37 
Another fine example of special forces recouping intelligence returns is provided by 
OSS Detachment 101 in Burma. After an awkward first year, once the Detachment had 
become properly established, it was estimated that their extensive intelligence 
networks provided Stilwell `with over ninety percent of the entire Japanese intelligence 
that they got in the [Northern Burma] area', and led to the designation of sixty-five 
percent of all air attacks mounted in theatre. 38 As the unit's commander, Colonel Peers, 
was keen to emphasise: `Considering all of the numerous sources available to that 
command, including Chinese, British and American troops, prisoner of war 
interrogations, aerial photography and a wide variety of other sources, the magnitude 
of the 101 intelligence collection effort can be readily appreciated'. 39 Force 136, `V' 
Force and SACO each recouped similar benefits in their respective areas of operation, 
but none would not quite parallel the expansive successes of Detachment 101 in this 
regard. 
Not all intelligence advances attained by specialist formations came from the conduct 
of clandestine activities, however, and, at times, valuable intelligence was gained as a 
result of conducting offensive operations (indeed No. 30 Commando were created with 
this specific intention in mind). Good example of an offensive raid conducted for 
intelligence purposes was the February 1942 operation `Biting' by C Company, 2nd 
Parachute Battalion: the raid on Bruneval to secure German radar technology-40 The 
successful seizure of which, as claimed by R. V. Jones, gave `first-hand knowledge of 
the state of German radar technology, in the form in which it was almost certainly 
36 See: RG 338, Records of Sixth Army G-2 Section, Box 7 
37 Krueger, p. 189 
38 Colonel Peers on 'Detachment 101 ATB', RG 226, Entry 161, Box 8; Folder 86; Hogan (1995), 
111 49 
Peers and Brelis, p. 184 40 Millar, George, The Bruneval Raid, (Cassell: London, 2002) 
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being applied in our principal objective, the German nightfighter control system. '41 
The most startling intelligence benefit accrued from an offensive raid, however, 
occurred during operation `Claymore', the first Lofotens raid, of March 1941. 
Tactically and materially the raid was very successful (although the men faced little 
fighting), yet its real strategic significance came in the seizure of ciphers, documents, 
and Enigma coding equipment; a haul which significantly aided the evolution of 
'Ultra'. 42 
Arguably the most significant intelligence activities as performed by special forces 
were those directed at facilitating and advancing amphibious operations. Solid 
intelligence about hydrographics, beach gradients, enemy underwater and shoreline 
defences etc., cardinal requirements for the successful prosecution of large-scale 
amphibious landings, were often only obtainable through the use of units such as the 
COPPs and S&R teams. Thompson has claimed that the work of these units `was 
absolutely indispensable to the success of the amphibious operations carried out by the 
Allies, of which Normandy was the supreme example' 43 Of perhaps equal significance 
were maritime special forces undertaking the tasks of beach clearance, demolitions, 
deception, and assault pilotage. Fine example of the value of such operations are seen 
with the UDT activities before the landings on Guam. Admiral Nimitz noted: `Assault 
operations in the Marianas would have been far more difficult, if not almost 
impossible, on some beaches without the capable and courageous work of the 
Underwater Demolition Teams'. 4 It is difficult to assess the precise value of these 
activities, but the consequences of inadequate reconnaissance, pilotage and other pre- 
assault tasks had been displayed all too clearly at, for example, Dieppe or Tarawa. 
Without such benefits as accrued by the use of special maritime groups, many large- 
scale landings could have been a significant gamble, and a greater number of casualties 
would likely have been sustained in their mounting. The activities of these formations, 
if not crucial to success, at times certainly hastened events and saved lives during some 
of the most difficult of all military manoeuvres. 
41 Jones, R. V., Most Secret War, (Ilodder and Stoughton: London, 1979) p. 316 42 Brigadier Haydon, Report on `Claymore', 13 March 1941, DEFE 2/54; and WO 231/2; Durnford- 
Slater, p. 54; Weale, p. 65 43 Thompson (1998), p. 420 44 Admiral Nimitz to Admiral King, 22 August 1944, RG 38, World War II Action and Operational 
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It was not, however, only in their actions against the enemy that specialist formations 
had value. They were also of notable significance in the development of new 
techniques, doctrines and equipment. Commando amphibious raids permitted the 
gaining of experience which could be translated into valuable lessons and doctrinal 
advances in amphibious operations, small unit battle tactics and equipment etc.. James 
Dunning, a wartime member of No. 4 Commando and an instructor at the Commando 
Training Centre would, for example, contend that the Commando role in developing 
`new and innovative standards in military training' proved that `the benefits and value 
of the Commandos went beyond the limits of their operation'. 45 
Early Commando raids were certainly of value in ironing out some of the problems 
inherent to the planning and conduct of amphibious operations. The COIIQ staff 
practices and inter-service co-operation that had developed during the Lofotens and 
Vaagso raids, not to mention the more obvious example of Dieppe, all established 
precedents and mechanisms that were invaluable in future amphibious assaults. 46 It 
should be noted, however, that much of the experience gained in raiding operations 
was of a very specific nature with little general application. Lewis has gone as far as 
suggesting that because `British experiences in amphibious raids were not directly 
applicable to large-scale joint amphibious operations' they may have actually 
`hampered their ability to develop an effective tactical and operational amphibious 
doctrine' giving them false estimations about the value of surprise and mobility over 
the benefits of mass and firepower. 7 
The principal occupation of a number of special forces was to provide training, 
`stiffening' and leadership to indigenous partisan movements. In order to examine the 
impact of these activities it is necessary to briefly consider the efficiency of the wider 
partisan movements which they assisted. Whilst any cumulative analysis of the value 
of resistance movements is greatly complicated by a myriad of different military, 
political, geographical and chronological variables as effecting each individual 
movement, it is broadly possible to surmise, however, that almost universally their 
value increased in proportion to their proximity, in both time and space, to 
conventional Allied operations. Although a contentious subject, Thompson is right to 
as Dunning, James, The Fighting Forth, (Sutton: Gloucestershire, 2003) p. 57 
46 Major-General Haydon to Captain J. li. Devins, 13 February 1962, IWM Ilaydon 93/28/4; JCII 
2/6 
47 Lewis, Adrian, p. 40 
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emphasise the `perfectly respectable point of view which argues that few, if any, 
resistance movements conducted successful overt military operations, unless operating 
in concert with a main, conventional force; even if that force was some distance 
away'. 48 Such a consideration is important: overt military operations by partisan 
formations had to either be in sufficient strength (as in Yugoslavia towards the end of 
the war) or had to occur in conjunction with main force operations, to have any chance 
of significant success and therefore impact. Without sufficient strength, organisation, 
and equipment, or a main force to distract the enemy, resistance formations were prone 
to expend their energies without significant return for the risk. 
John Keegan in The Second World War is particularly scornful of achievements of 
SOE (and by association OSS), which he sees 'largely fails in its claim to have 
contributed significantly to Hitler's defeat'. 49 Keegan bases this contention on three 
very selective `key events' of resistance warfare against Germany: the French 
Resistance (supported by Jedburghs) in Vercors on D-Day; the July 1944 Slovakia 
uprising; and the August 1944 Warsaw uprising. As each of these events ultimately 
resulted in brutal and effective suppression, Keegan is led to the conclusion that `the 
programme of subversion, sabotage and resistance ... must 
be adjudged a costly and 
misguided failure'. 50 The brevity and selectivity of such a narrow assessment does not, 
however, suffice and it ignores the cumulative effects of partisan warfare on the enemy 
war effort. 
It is certainly true that the use of partisans, sabotage and subversion never lived up to 
the idealistic rhetoric to `set Europe ablaze' as first expounded in 1940. Fighting alone 
and reluctant to become embroiled in protracted land battles Britain was grasping at 
straws, they harboured naive and unrealistic views about how the people of Europe 
could rise up and virtually liberate themselves from the shackles of Nazism with the 
minimum of British support. Whilst such a misguided perception arguably lasted 
longer than it should have, by 1942 Britain had begun to perceive partisan movements 
as the Americans had from the outset: as an ancillary bonus to conventional actions 
and not a war winning weapon. The merits of partisan and guerrilla movements should 
48 Thompson (1998), p. 8 
49 Keegan, John, The Second World War, (Hutchinson: London, 1989) p. 495 
5o Ibid., pp. 484-485 
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thus be judged on this latter expectation and not on the adolescent view that they could 
be independently decisive. 51 
Irregular activities in support of the invasion of France provide clear illustration of the 
utility of partisans acting in support of the regular battle. Of particular note are the 
large-scale Resistance uprisings in Brittany, which, Casey has claimed, `must rank 
among the most brilliant and successful of the war'. 52 Their effectiveness was, in no 
small part, magnified by the timely dispatch of various Jedburgh teams and a large 
number of (overwhelmingly French) SAS groups to the area. In Brittany the SAS and 
fourteen Jedburgh Teams managed to arm and organise over 20,000 resisters, whose 
actions were so successful in paralysing German forces that they were able to protect 
the flanks of Patton's encircling drive, allowing him to focus on the front, spare his 
own resources, and speed up his rate of advance. 53 SOE's verdict was that the 
Jedburgh's contribution, in conjunction with the Resistance and the SAS, `saved the 
use of at least one Division in the Brittany campaign'. 54 Even the impact of just one 
three-man Jedburgh Team, able to orchestrate the timely delivery of Allied resources, 
could be significant. For example, Team `Frederick' in a ten-week deployment in 
support of the SAS `Samwest' base is claimed to have trained over 4,000 partisans in 
Brittany. 55 Resistance actions in support of the landings in the South of France, again 
aided by Jedburghs and OGs, were as equally well praised. General Patch, GOC 
Seventh Army, estimated that the contribution of the Resistance in support of 
`Dragoon' as being `the equivalent of four to five Divisions'; certainly no mean feat. 
56 
The arrival of uniformed specialist troops, in advance of conventional arms, into 
occupied territories was an act that could alone be enough to cause spontaneous 
indigenous uprisings and an instant uplifting of morale. The French Resistance, for 
example, was `intoxicated' by the sudden appearance of SAS, OG, or Jedburgh 
personnel in their territory. Their arrival, as Gaujac claims, `was a harbinger of 
liberation and a call to action'. 57 An OSS appraisal of OG work in the south of France 
stated that their `least tangible but probably most important' impact was the 
S' Casey, p. 69 
52 Ibid., p. 122 
53 Dear, p. 188 
54 SOE's 'History of Jedburghs in Europe', HS 7/18 pp. 4-5 
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`tremendous lift given to the Maquis .... Many French leaders have said that even if 
the men had not carried out a single tactical operation their presence alone was of 
enormous value. '58 Any assessment of the value of special forces in such instances 
must, of course, also acknowledge the impact and efficiency of the clandestine circuits 
of SOE and OSS. The work done by these agencies in contacting, organising and 
preparing resistance elements prior to the committal of special forces was very 
important. For example, in the first six months of 1944, before any Jedburgh, OG or 
SAS element was committed to France, SOE and OSS had arranged that by D-Day, 
`about twenty thousand resistance fighters were fully armed; another fifty thousand 
were armed ",.. in some degree". '59 
Previous chapters have highlighted distinct limitations with the employment of large 
numbers of Allied special forces in support of the conventional Allied effort in France, 
and it is certainly worth asking whether these units could have been utilised for greater 
benefit. James Kiras has taken a narrow and critical view of the use of the SAS 
Brigade in France believing little of its actions amounted to strategic benefits. lie 
believes that instead of it being used in a reactionary fashion (as a strategic reserve) 
undertaking an esoteric range of operations, the SAS and other irregular elements 
should have been used in a concerted and proactive manner deliberately targeting 
enemy supply arteries as soon as the invasion occurred. Expanding upon the oft 
repeated discussion of misuse which maintains that these units were committed too 
late, he adds that they were also committed against the wrong sort of targets. Kiras 
maintains: 
The inability of the Allies to conduct a campaign of unconventional attrition 
prior to and during the Normandy campaign was one of the greatest lost 
opportunities of the war: a severely weakened Wehrmacht might have been 
overwhelmed by the Allied and Soviet armies on both fronts as early as autumn 
60 of 1944. 
Such a statement presupposes many things, not least of all being the (quite fallacious) 
assumption that there was a widespread understanding about the possibilities of 
`unconventional attrition' and of the role that special forces would occupy therein. 
Irregular warfare on the scale and depth of that to be conducted during the invasion of 
58 OG Command, 'History of Operations in Southern France', 20 September 1944, RG 226, Entry 
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France was, in 1944, an entirely new proposition; a lack of knowledge about how this 
should be undertaken, and a corresponding reticence in some quarters about its 
potential, was, therefore, quite understandable. The limitations of SAS and OG 
deployments in Italy only five months before the commencement of operations in 
France illustrate that the `learning curve' dictating their employment had not yet been 
properly mastered. With such limitations in mind, the orchestration and use of such a 
large number of Allied special forces groups (each burdened to some extent by 
problems resulting from a rapid expansion in establishment, the requirement to develop 
new methods and tactics, or simply from inexperience) in support of the invasion of 
France appears to be quite the achievement and highlights just how far the 
establishment and acceptance of these units had come by this stage. 
The assumption that any worthwhile `unconventional attrition' could have had 
occurred before the commencement of the invasion is equally erroneous. Until the 
mainstay of German forces were distracted by large-scale continental landings any 
irregular activities would have been easily suppressed. This was the precise reason that 
soon after the landings, once the beachhead had become unexpectedly static, SIJAEF 
ordered a brief suspension of many Resistance activities, so as to ensure that a 
potentially valuable weapon for the benefit of the breakout was not spent prematurely. 
Whilst there were certainly problems with the control and tasking of these formations, 
and definite limitations with the flexibility of response following the rapidity of the 
Allied breakout, it is quite unwarranted, however, to engage in counterfactual and 
hindsight estimations that wrongly assume both that there was a rational and 
comprehensive construct of special operations in 1944 and that the means and 
resources (aircraft in particular) for application were all available. Kiras contended 
that: 
Had the SAS been used to sever some of the tendons of the Westheer and been 
part of an integrated team to run it to ground instead of attempting to 
demonstrate its own `strategic' value and prepare for subsequent operations 
that never materialised, the war might very well have ended earlier, with fewer 
Allied casualties and a potentially different map of post-war Europe. 61 
With this statement Kiras falls into a trap of his own creation: by drawing such 
idealistic conclusions about the potential for far-reaching and decisive effects of 
61 Ibid., p. I II 
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special operations he manages to undermine his own more rational and modest 
concepts about their value being strictly ancillary to conventional success. 
Hogan has asserted that `.... partisan efforts in Italy and the Balkans had only a 
nuisance value and were rarely tied into the operations of conventional Allied combat 
units'. 62 At times the operations of partisans in the Balkans (or Greece for that matter) 
were certainly hindered by divergent political motivations and a lack of both weapons 
and formal military training, but to claim that their effectiveness was only of nuisance 
value is unconvincing. That these operations were not tied-in with an Allied land force 
(other than rather composite forces predominantly made up of special forces and 
Commandos in the later stages of the war) should not necessarily detract from their 
value, the sheer size and frequency of their operations in theatres suitable for guerrilla 
action, were ultimately a significant thorn in the Germany's side: it has been estimated 
that in 1943 that fifty German divisions were tied down in Yugoslavia and Albania on 
occupational and anti-partisan duties, more divisions than then were faced by the 
Allied armies in Italy. 63 
It should be noted, however, that in certain instances conflicts of interest and political 
tensions existing between Anglo-American special forces and partisan elements could 
be a real impediment to the activities of special forces. In both Greece and Yugoslavia 
tensions with emergent communist movements severely curtained the deployment of 
special forces, and towards the end of the war various LRDG and SBS personnel in 
Istria and Yugoslavia were physically detained by partisan forces seeking to gain 
political capital by downplaying the value of Allied assistance in the liberation of their 
areas. 64 Being widely comprised of bilingual first- and second-generation Americans, 
the OGs were a particular source of suspicion amongst the Greek and Balkan partisan 
movements. Despite proving themselves efficient and versatile in operations from Vis, 
the use of OGs on the Yugoslavian mainland was heavily curtailed for fears that their 
arrival would send out the wrong message to partisan elements 65 Similar fears about 
the use of OGs in Greece and Albania had ensured that all `Greek' OG personnel were 
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submitted to a rigorous vetting procedure to root out any unacceptable political beliefs 
66 before they were allowed to be committed. 
The pressure of dealing with partisan movements possessing divergent political and 
military motivations to their own was an understandable source of frustration for the 
various special forces. Major Roy Farran of the 2°d SAS found that although the 
Resistance he came into contact with in France were `quite energetic ... 
[by no means 
universal] the difference between our respective methods made close co-operation 
difficult, and it was better just to maintain a loose liaison'. 7 Similar sentiments were 
expressed by the commander of OG operation `Peg' in France who believed it would 
have been more efficient to have dispatched a larger number of OG men (thirty were 
recommended) than having to rely on `help of untrained [Maquis] men who do not 
understand what is to be done and valuable time is lost telling them what to do and 
how to do it'. 68 Whilst Jedburgh Aaron Bank would contend that: 'OSS would have 
been more effective in their insurgency and sabotage roles without the collaboration of 
the local militias'. 69 Many of the young men within special forces units, possessing 
`little or no political experience', were shocked when they `found that the amount of 
help which they received from the Partisans was governed not only by the military 
situation but also by the political outlook of the Partisan bands themselves'. 70 In 
Albania the RSR and OGs were often frustrated by the lacklustre behaviour of the 
Andartes partisans unwilling to harass German forces finally leaving their country. The 
emergent civil war in Greece between rival ELAS communist and EDES republican 
guerrillas, who were far more interested in fighting one another than the Germans, 
would cause some of the most significant problems for special forces attempting to 
harass and delay German movements in these areas. 
Hogan's appraisal of partisan efforts in Italy being little more than of nuisance effect is 
equally perplexing. For much of the war, until mid-1944 at least, one can see Hogan's 
point, the partisans, small in number and uncoordinated, were of little significance. 
From late-1944 onwards, however, as SOE and OSS began to take serious efforts to 
66 Special Operations Committee Memorandum, `Employment of personnel of the American Greek 
Battalion', 5 September 1943, WO 201/2263 
67 Farran, pp. 234-235 
68 Lieutenant Grahl 11. Weeks, CO OG Section 'Peg', OG Command `I Iistory of Operations in 
Southern France', op. cit. 
69 Heaton, p. 53 
70 War Office `Notes from theatres of war, No. 22: Long Range Desert Group', December 1945, WO 
231/28, p. 37 
218 
organise and control the Italian partisans, they clearly began to have a beneficial effect 
upon the Allied armies in Italy. As General Mark Clark was to write: `The role of the 
Italian partisans in supplementing the operations of the Allied Armies in Italy has been 
a most important one. Their attacks ... during the fall of 1944 and winter of 1944-5 
were a constant and serious harassing problem for the enemy'. '' 
The competence of partisan formations in Italy was thus, to no small degree, down not 
only to the equipment supplied by the Allies, but also to the direction and moulding 
that came from varied special forces and clandestine elements. Just as General Clark 
praised the efficiency of the Partisans, he also contended: `The outstanding success of 
partisan operations ... and the excellent 
intelligence as to enemy dispositions received 
was in large measure due to the presence of these [OG] men and their leadership of 
Partisan formations %12 It was a pattern that the Germans also observed. In early-1945, 
at a time when the Allies were stepping up their support for the partisans, Field- 
Marshal Kesselring reported that the partisans were beginning to 
show clear results. The execution of partisan operations shows 
considerably more commanding leadership. Up to now it has been possible for 
us, with a few exceptions, to keep our vital rear lines of communications open 
by means of our slight protective forces, but this situation threatens to change 
considerably for the worse in the immediate future. 73 
The `commanding leadership' to which Kesselring referred was, at least in part, due to 
the various methods, including the use of special forces, with which Allied subversive 
and specialist elements were attempting to harness the partisan weapon in Italy at this 
time. 
The feat of orchestrating, training, equipping and leading indigenous partisan 
formations is perhaps nowhere better witnessed than in the example of Burma. 
Detachment 101's contacting and marshalling of Kachin tribesmen into `rangers' 
dramatically highlighted the effectiveness of partisans in offensive activities and 
proved that they could 'take the place of sizable regular units'. The commencement of 
Stilwell's Burma Road offensive was the catalyst for an expansion of 101's activities 
and by February 1945 over 10,000 `Kachin Rangers' had been raised. Their value to 
71 General Clark, Commendation of `Italian' OGs, May 1945, RG 226, Entry 99, Box 42; Folder 3 72 Clark to CO, `Italian' OGs, May 1945, RG 226, Entry 143, Box 11, Folder 146 
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Stilwell's offensive was clear: the partisans acted as a screen and a force multiplier, as 
well as being responsible for some 5,447 known Japanese dead. 74 Merrill would claim 
that the Marauder's advance on Myitkyina `could not have succeeded without [the] 
help of 101'. 75 Their achievements are put into perspective when it is considered that 
only 22 US personnel and 184 native guerrillas were killed during the Detachment's 
operations. 76 To put it another way, a battalion-size commitment from the US had 
raised a division-sized unit from indigenous populations, which had then succeeded in 
the destruction of a divisional-sized number of the enemy for the loss of less than a 
company's worth of men. The work of `V' Force and of Force 136 (SOE) in this 
theatre were also of great assistance to the activities of Fourteenth Army in Southern 
Burma. In addition to providing what, at times, was significant intelligence, their 
activities alongside the Karen populations, in particular, produced solid offensive and 
screening results. Force 136's operation `Character' from February 1945, for example, 
marshalled considerable numbers of Karen guerrillas and is estimated to have 
accounted for some 10,964 Japanese dead. 77 
Alongside those formations working in Burma, Naval Group China (SACO) was 
making similar contribution in China. SACO's reports of their achievements state that 
SACO-trained guerrillas `killed over 25,000 enemy troops, wounded 11,642, captured 
508 prisoners of war, destroyed 209 bridges, 82 locomotives, 193 ships and river craft, 
and aided in the rescue of over 76 Allied pilots and crewmen', all achieved without the 
loss of a single American advisor. Certainly this appears a phenomenal achievement, 
but these estimates are widely considered to be heavily jaundiced by the Chinese 
propensity to dramatically inflate claims. Such is the issue of doubt surrounding these 
claims that historians Zedric and Dilley have gone as far as suggesting that SACO's 
most significant contribution was in their provision of weather reports; 78 whilst Asprey 
has emphasised that for all of SACO's successes they were not able to prevent a 1944 
offensive against Chennault's airfields. 79 
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An assessment of the numbers of enemy killed, aircraft sabotaged, intelligence gained, 
or partisans trained, only goes so far into showing the ultimate utility of special 
operations during the war. Any overview of the effects of specialist formations, acting 
both independently and in conjunction with conventional operations, must also 
examine the less quantifiable and more abstract manner through which they have 
strategic utility. One of the clearest benefits to the employment of specialist formations 
is that they have the potential to act as force multipliers. As Gray asserts, `special 
operations can work either as an economical equaliser or - better still - as critical 
leverage for victory'. 80 The LRDG, for instance, was raised with the explicit 
motivation to undertake operations far and wide so that the Italians would be bluffed 
into `the impression of British ubiquity throughout the interior of Libya'. 8' Although 
conducting operations of a very modest scale at this time, LRDG actions in the deep 
interior of Libya certainly helped distract Graziani during `Compass'. In Wavell's 
words, the unit made `an important contribution towards keeping Italian forces in back 
areas on the alert and adding to the anxieties and difficulties of our enemy'. 82 The 
Italian reaction to an incursion of only a handful of men in their rear areas is evidence 
of what is potentially the most significant impact of special operations: to prey on 
enemy insecurities and coerce him to take excessive precautions against further 
operations. 
Special operations have a definite objective to impel the enemy to alter their force 
dispositions unfavourably and expend resources unnecessarily, tying up men and 
material in wasteful tasks. General Hackett believed this to be their most significant 
role, stating: `The aim ... in using these special 
forces is to hinder the most effective 
application of the enemy's resources in war and to secure advantages in the 
employment of our own. '83 The LRDG's first deployments caused the Italians to 
increase their defence of far flung outposts throughout Egypt and Libya, tying up a 
considerable number of personnel and weakening their defence of the crucial coastal 
areas. 84 These and later LRDG and SAS operations provoked similar responses, 
promoting amongst the enemy an ever-growing need to defend and patrol rear areas, 
something that diverted both manpower, materials and resources from the frontlines; a 
consequence almost as significant as the physical destruction of personnel and 
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resources in the raids themselves. The enemy was forced to waste manpower, 
resources, and time in the `feverish and almost ceaseless search for the Will-o'-the- 
wisp that flitted about the enemy's back garden while the whole panoply of Allied 
might was swarming across his front lawns'. 85 
Similar motivations also underlined the original Commando raids. When General 
Bourne was first appointed DCO he considered the aim of raiding to be twofold: firstly 
the destruction of enemy resources; and, secondly to `make him expend his resources, 
and to make his life as hard as possible'. 86 Admiral Keyes succeeded him with the 
directive to continually `harass the enemy and cause him to disperse his forces, and to 
create material damage'. 87 This remained the spirit of practically all cross-Channel 
raiding and were goals that were as equally appealing to the US. When visiting Britain 
in March 1942 General Marshall had faith that whilst preparing for a cross-Channel 
assault `continuous raiding' of the French coast would create `a preliminary active 
front' that would provide combat experience to his soldiers whilst importantly 
diverting enemy resources and attention away from the critical situation on the Eastern 
Front. 88 Soon after, Churchill would write to Roosevelt to advise him that the key goal 
in the employment of the newly-established `Californian Commandos' (USMC 
Raiders) should be `to make the Japanese anxious for their numerous conquests and 
prevent them scraping together troops for further large excursions. '89 
The motivation to tie up a disproportionate number of enemy resources was used as a 
central point of justification for Allied (overwhelmingly British) involvement in the 
Aegean, Adriatic and Greece. Beginning from late-1943 in the Aegean, and from 
early-1944 on the Dalmatian coast, raids were conducted against German occupied 
islands and coastlines with the hope that they would provoke the strengthening and 
retention of over-strength garrisons therein. In this goal the Allied special forces, aided 
by the partisans, were generally successful. Pitt has estimated that raiding in the 
Aegean by the SBS, LRDG and the Greek Sacred Squadron had caused, by May 1944, 
the reinforcement of Aegean garrisons by over 4,000 extra troops within a period of a 
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month; 90 not a bad tally for units, which, in the case of the LRDG and SBS numbered 
no more than around 250 men each. Those special forces and Commandos on Vis 
throughout 1944 represented a continued `thorn in the side of the Germans in the 
Balkans', their efforts are estimated to have been directly responsible for tying down 
three German divisions along the Yugoslav coast and another one in reserve, as well as 
playing a `very notable part' in keeping 25 enemy divisions occupied in Yugoslavia in 
the spring and summer of 1944.91 Although the Allied specialist formations were only 
responsible for a token of the larger anti-partisan and occupational difficulties that the 
enemy faced in these areas, they do, in terms of numbers and materials the enemy were 
forced to expend in response to such actions, seem to have been a worthwhile practice. 
The Commando raid on Vaagso in January 1942 would prey very successfully on 
German insecurities, and resulted in Hitler dispatching significant resources to Norway 
in an effort to protect against potential future Allied landings. Notably the raid, 
alongside other factors such as the `Fortitude North' deception schemes (as its is quite 
unconvincing to attribute the dramatic reinforcement to the raid alone), confined much 
of the German fleet to Norwegian waters and ensured that by D-Day some ten German 
divisions were left idle in Norway. 92 The benefits of German reinforcement was not, 
however, understood by exited Norwegian Prime Minister Nygaardsvold, who stated: 
"`Who could be so blind as to delude himself that this effort could have done anything 
to shorten the ordeal of Norway? .... the 
Germans would now strengthen their defences 
making the ultimate victory even harder to achieve than it would have been if the raid 
had never taken place". '93 As far as Britain was concerned, however, this was an 
acceptable, even favourable, outcome, but Nygaardsvold's point would hold greater 
resonance in application to other theatres of war in which the Allies did intend to 
conduct conventional operations. 
As raiding operations had the power to compel the enemy to alter his dispositions, 
reinforcement schedule and fortification schemes, it became absolutely essential that 
these operations be tightly controlled lest they prompt the enemy to strengthen his 
defences in areas potentially to the detriment of conventional arms. The last thing that 
would be wanted when planning a large-scale amphibious landing, for example, would 
90 Pitt (1983), p. 146 91 'History of the Commandos in the Mediterranean', DEFE 2/700; p. 296-297 92 Keegan, John, Churchill, (Weidenfeld & Nicholson: London, 2002) p. 129 
93 Quoted in Young, pp. 87-88 
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be to find that you faced a stronger or more entrenched enemy because of the 
uncontrolled activities of a handful of raiders. When considering the relative benefits 
of small scale raiding against France in late-1942 Admiral Forbes, C-in-C Plymouth, 
doubted whether the advantages of raiding, such as intelligence gains, material 
destruction or even the dissipation of enemy manpower, outweighed the disadvantages. 
Such operations, he believed, would draw the enemy's attention to `weak spots in his 
defences' which would have adverse ramifications not only for future amphibious 
landings, but also for destroyer and mine laying operations off the enemy coast and for 
the insertion of SIS and SOE agents. 94 Such a reticence about small-scale raids on 
France increased with the advancing preparations for `Overlord'. 
At the start of 1944 Lieutenant-General Morgan, COSSAC, was arguing the case for 
more raids and was `firmly convinced of the necessity for blooding our Rangers and 
Commandos before the day of battle on which they are destined to perform exploits of 
which the success must be assured. ' Instead of curtailing or cancelling operations he 
believed `that we should redouble our efforts. Not to do this is to leave the German in 
undisputed possession of his ill-gotten gains and to forgo our only opportunity of 
giving Commandos and Ranger units much required experience'. 95 Such a scheme met 
with little favour, however, and the potential disadvantages of raiding were seen to 
outweigh the advantages. At this time all raids with the purpose of `beating up' the 
enemy had already been stopped; there were to be no needless operations in the 
`Neptune' area (with at least three cover raids undertaken for every one reconnaissance 
operation mounted); and there was a decree that no raid would `exceed strength of 100 
all ranks', a limitation `imposed with the object of not encouraging the GERMANS to 
strengthen their coastal defences'. 96 
Even with these limitations, and the fact that poor weather during the January `dark 
period' had ensured that few raids were mounted, Major-General de Guingand, Chief 
of Staff, 21 Army Group, began to argue against the necessity of all such raids. Ile 
came to `the conclusion that a policy of raiding anywhere on the BELGIUM/FRENCH 
coast is wrong. ... We have told the enemy that we are going to 
invade the continent 
this Spring. I feel that the best way to fox him as regards the sector which we have 
94 Minutes of Admiralty meeting, 4 November 1942, ADM 116/5112 
95 Correspondence between COSSAC and G-3, SIIAEF, January 1944, RG 331, Entry 29A, Box 
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chosen for the invasion, is to stop raiding altogether'. He argued that all raids risked 
exposing to the enemy his weaknesses, and believed that any information gained from 
commando raids should not be commensurate with the risks that mounting them 
entailed. Furthermore, he believed that even cover raids could potentially draw 
attention to the actual beaches which were chosen to land on or, more likely, provoke a 
universal improvement of defences. 97 Such arguments were considered by the Raids 
and Reconnaissance Committee and generally accepted, with a large proportion of the 
initially intended raids subsequently being cancelled. 
The potential ills of a raid leading to undesirable enemy reinforcement is well 
illustrated by the example of the 2°d Raider's raid on Makin in August 1942. Aside 
from destructive motivations, the raid had, as an explicit goal, the creation of `a 
diversion confusing Japanese plans and diverting forces from the stronger 
concentrations being assembled to attack Guadalcanal in late August'. At face value 
the raid can be said to have succeeded in all its purposes, `inflicting loss of planes, 
ships, supplies, and men, and diverted ships and aircraft, by causing the formation of a 
Makin relief force'. 98 The latter result would, however, have more significant 
repercussions. It has been argued that the raid sparked the elaborate fortification and 
reinforcement of the Japanese garrisons in the Gilberts; most notably on the Tarawa 
atoll (neighbouring Makin), the invasion of which, in November 1943, was infamously 
bloody for the USMC. With this consideration in mind, Alexander believes `the raid 
accrued no strategic benefit. Quite the opposite: Carlson stirred up a hornet's nest in 
what had been a quiet, lightly held backwater of the Japanese perimeter. '99 
Just as there are limitations in praising raids for independently causing the enemy to 
divert his resources (as in Vaagso), there are equal difficulties in proportioning blame 
for events like Makin. Kenneth Macksey has asked that if the Makin raid sparked the 
strengthening of defences, then why was there a delay of a year before the Gilberts 
were reinforced in earnest? Why did this reinforcement occur at the same time as a 
more general Japanese transition to the defensive? loo The strengthening of defences as 
the Axis powers were placed on the strategic defensive would have occurred 
irrespective of the conduct of special operations. As COIIQ emphasised in late-1942, 
97 Correspondence of General de Guingand, 27 January 1944, DEFE 2/1093 
98 Admiral Nimitz to Admiral King, 20 October 1942, RG 127, USMC Geographic Files, Makin, 
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the enemy will not `increase his RDF cover and CD Batteries to beat off small parties 
of men in canoes. Any measures he may take to counter our seaborne activities against 
his coastal convoys, he will take on their own merits. " 01 Furthermore, Makin did result 
in some positive benefits: it highlighted the limitations of rubber boat landings against 
atolls and concomitant necessity for amtracks - an important lesson for the assault on 
Tarawa; it also provided valuable intelligence for the 27"' Infantry Division's eventual 
invasion of Makin. 102 
In addition to attacking the enemy physically, special operations also assaulted his 
morale. By targeting the enemy in areas that he had heretofore considered as being 
under his control special operations could foster paranoia, prey on insecurities, and 
humiliate the enemy. It would, however, be incorrect to assume that the earliest 
infrequent and amateurish Commando raids would have any great effect upon the 
morale of a triumphant enemy. The psychological toll inflicted by special operations 
was not properly manifested until the enemy's situation had deteriorated significantly 
as a result of other factors. On 13 October 1942 Churchill asked Mountbatten to further 
`intensify his small scale raids' because he `was certain that the Germans were being 
worried by them'. 103 Churchill was right. One week later Hitler betrayed his frustration 
by issuing his infamous Commando order (which pressed for the execution of all 
individuals caught waging irregular warfare irrespective of uniform). Concerted 
activities in the rear by partisans, special forces and subversive agencies awakened 
latent German insecurities about a repetition of the `stab in the back' myth of their 
1918 collapse. As irregular activities increased in volume and were increasingly 
wedded to successful Allied offensives, their effect on a harried enemy naturally 
intensified. '04 
In addition to the long-term assault on enemy morale caused by the threat of constant 
action from an unknown angle, there was also the potential for more immediate tactical 
psychological effects, whereby the very presence on the battlefield of elite formations 
(most commonly of the commando-type) could be enough to promote fear amongst the 
enemy. The sight of a red or green beret, or hearing shouts of `Commando! 
Commando! ' in the attack (used just as much for maintaining cohesion and an 
101 COHQ to Director of Plans, 24 December 1942, ADM 116/5112 102 Crowl, Philip A. and Love, Edmund G., Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, (Department of 
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identification of friend and foe, as it was a psychological device) could be enough to 
provoke a response of retreat or surrender amongst poorly led or haggard troops. At 
Anzio, for example, during their period holding the beachhead, the FSSF intentionally 
undertook aggressive patrols, in order to gain the moral ascendancy over their German 
counterparts. The Force clearly emphasised their presence with terrifying night-time 
raids, intentionally provoking fear amongst the Germans they faced, who consequently 
dubbed them the `black devils' brigade'. Reg Seekings, of the SAS, believed elite 
credentials `made a lot of difference. If the British troops knew they were up against 
German paratroopers, they were half beaten already. It's the psychological effect you 
have on ordinary troops. They can't stand up to specialist troops. "°5 This is a 
contention that had vivid illustration in the Aegean, whereby Raiding Forces 
intentionally `created a reign of terror' amongst the German island garrisons, so that 
when the island of Samos was attacked, the enemy garrison of 1,200 men in well 
fortified positions surrendered unconditionally `to a trifling Allied force because they 
were literally frightened for their lives of Raiding Forces'. 106 
The value of special operations causing fear amongst occupying garrisons must, 
however, be weighed against the potential risk of reprisals against innocent civil 
populations. 107 Seymour doubts that any benefits of the earliest Commando raids 
`justified the reprisals sometimes meted out to the local inhabitants. '108 Despite 
attempts by political warfare agencies to keep local inhabitants, and the enemy (so as 
they did not unfairly proportion blame), informed about the intention of raids, there 
were occasional mishaps. In the immediate aftermath of the St. Nazaire raid, for 
example, Lucas Phillips claimed that sixteen109 French civilians were killed and a large 
number wounded because of panicked Germans attributing subsidiary and delayed- 
action explosives to them; and in addition some 1,500 local men were subsequently 
arrested and sent to internment camps. ' 10 
Reprisals against civilians and partisans alike obviously intensified with the 
commencement of open-resistance warfare; because of this, the dispatch of special 
'0' Quoted in Stevens, Gordon, The Originals, (Ebury: London, 2005) p. 290 
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forces to an area was occasionally resented because of the unwelcome attention that 
their presence could bring. This point is vividly illustrated in a report that Commissar 
Mamola of the Second Partisan Sector on Dugi Otok (an island on the northern 
Dalmatian coast) made to an OSS officer, Lieutenant John Hamilton. Expressing 
strong disapproval of the Commando and OG raids against various islands under his 
command he asked: 
"Why do they want to make raids on these Islands? They plan to come here, 
make a raid, kill a few Germans, capture 30 to 40 and then return to Vis with 
all kinds of stories; in the meanwhile the Germans will come over here take 
this island, burn a few villages, kill our civilians and we will have to run away 
to another Island..... Our people must realise that this is NOT SPORT, THIS 
IS NOT RUGBY! ". "' 
The moral cost of the Second World War was very great, and when the gritty realities 
of unconventional warfare are merged with the actions of an enemy wedded to a brutal 
anti-partisan doctrine, such reprisals became practically impossible to avoid. 
One of the more intangible benefits of the conduct of special operations was the fillip 
to morale which they could provide to a nation's military and home front. In both 
Britain and the US specialist formations were (and remain) a source of great 
fascination and interest to the general public. Special operations give the impression of 
speed, dash, finesse and adventure; traits rarely associated with the protracted slogging 
matches of open fronts. As John Newsinger wrote in a unique assessment of this 
phenomena: `.... the story of the SAS in the Second World War is an adventure story. 
Young ex-public-school boys, the cream of the British race, leading their men in 
daring, sometimes foolhardy exploits against a brutal enemy'. ' 12 Special operations 
offered welcome escapism from the realities of modern industrial warfare; they 
personalised conflict and created heroes; and served as a tonic for both conventional 
defeat and inactivity. 113 They rekindled the spirit of T. E. Lawrence and allayed the 
fears of repercussions of the horrors of stalemated attrition of the First World War. 
The creation of popular heroes was of course not limited to specialist formations, but 
for a time, their operations offered a welcome glimmer of hope for harassed and 
strategically defensive, or stalemated, nations; they consequently became an obvious 
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focal point for both press attention and propaganda. As Gray states: `Special operations 
can make the point that a powerful and feared enemy can be outfought on his own 
terms and thereby be denied moral ascendancy'. 114 When conventional operations were 
neither possible nor successful, successes, however slight, could become magnified for 
the benefit of morale, giving hope and renewed confidence in a nation's martial 
abilities. Early Commando raids were undertaken, as much as for any other reason, 
simply `To cheer-up everyone at home'. '" An August 1942 OSS appraisal of the 
Commandos would even suggest that their `main purpose ... 
is that of publicity'. 116 
Roger Beaumont has even gone as far as suggesting that: `.... the dashing image of the 
Commandos transcended any resources the Nazis were forced to allocate to defence or 
damage done'. "' 
The US seized upon the value of special operations for publicity purposes to an even 
greater extent than did the British. As the first ever independent raid undertaken by US 
specialist formations the Raider raid on Makin was an ideal candidate for a publicity 
campaign. Coming at a time when US ground forces had not been actively involved in 
the war, this raid of great daring, outwardly very successful, led by the charismatic and 
easily heroised Carlson and his swashbuckling Raiders, which included the President's 
son, obviously received press attention. Admiral Nimitz would later claim that the 
primary purpose of the raid was `to boost morale'. ' 18 In this goal it certainly succeeded 
and would make a `news splash' which was `almost as stimulating to morale as the 
Doolittle air strike over Japan. i19 At the same time as the Makin Raid the US press 
also reported with alacrity the participation of the Rangers at Dieppe. Four US 
correspondents had accompanied the raid (as compared to three Canadian and two 
British) and the results of their reportage left `an American public ... cheering 
offensive action and wanting more'. Black estimated that the handful of Rangers who 
participated `were worth an army division to the American war effort'. 120 In this 
instance there would, however, be diplomatic ramifications as both Britain and Canada 
1 14 Ibid., p. 175 
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took umbrage to the disproportionate attention lavished upon the mere handful of 
Rangers. 121 
Perhaps the finest example of a special operation receiving press attention is the 6ý' 
Ranger's raid on the Cabanatuan prison camp in the Philippines; an operation whose 
motives were governed more by `sentimental allure' than by any intrinsic strategic 
priority. 122 Colonel Mucci, commanding the Rangers, certainly understood the benefits 
of courting the press and had taken four official Army photographers along with his 
unit on the raid. 123 The raid itself was extremely successful, the Rangers, aided by 300 
guerrillas and Alamo Scouts, had liberated over 500 prisoners and accounted for 532 
Japanese dead for the loss of one Ranger and 26 guerrillas killed. 124 The results were a 
publicist's dream: a deft, tactically masterful mission of mercy to liberate some of the 
famed prisoners of Baatan. It is of little surprise that MacArthur, himself no novice at 
publicity and self-aggrandisement, latched onto the raid's successes claiming that: "No 
incident of the campaign has given me such personal satisfaction". ' 125 
Publicising special operations also had a political agenda. To both allies and enemies 
alike well publicised special operations could promote an impression of an energetic 
and martially talented nation. Raiding operations, most notably Dieppe, helped in some 
way to protect the British against accusations of passivity regarding the opening of a 
second front. They were, in the opinion of Villa, 'a showpiece for the Americans ... to 
dispel the impression of passivity and defensiveness that was doing so much to erode 
the good opinion of British fighting resolve that Americans had formed during the 
Battle of Britain'. 126 As Churchill admitted: `Small scale raids by the Commandos ... 
not only gave us confidence and experience, but showed the world that although beset 
on all sides we were not content with passive defence. ' 127 The US would similarly 
benefit from their employment of specialist units which contributed to an appearance 
of ubiquity: the use of OGs in Yugoslavia and Greece, or of Detachment 404 in the 
Arakan, for example, flew the US flag of participation in theatres in which their 
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presence was otherwise negligible. As the first American ground force in Burma, for 
example, Merrill's Marauders (whose non-official name itself was an invention of 
correspondents attached to Stilwell's Command) had an inherent degree of political 
capital and would attract `a greater share of attention from the press ... than a similar- 
sized unit merited anywhere else'. 12$ 
If overused and over publicised, however, raiding operations could ultimately prove to 
be a source of clear frustration to both the war-weary general public and embattled 
allies, who may come to view such pinpricks themselves as a sign of passivity and 
reluctance to begin large-scale conventional operations. There was also a real danger 
that undue publicity would increase the negative perception of specialist elements as 
being `prima donnas', and be the cause of increased resentment amongst regular troops 
facing the unglamorous realities of frontline combat. As Churchill wrote after Dieppe: 
`It is natural that there should be some resentment in the Army at the undue emphasis 
laid upon the work of the Commandos by the Press. 129 The same resentments were 
seen within the USMC following the press attention bestowed on the Raiders after 
Makin, which many believed was `too extensive, too complimentary'. 130 Such 
resentments are understandable for, as Timpson of the LRDG asserted when assessing 
the value of his unit in the Desert War: 
.... set against Montgomery's nine 
divisions at Alamein, the nine Italian 
divisions and the German Panzer Army's five divisions, the glamour which is 
attached to irregular formations is not entirely fair. An infantryman or trooper 
or gunner or sapper with his unit could do little but try his best to fulfil his duty 
and slog it out. 131 
Despite the aggrandisement and mythologizing of specialist achievements prevalent in 
both wartime and post-war literature (and most commonly found in popular histories 
narrowly focused on one single unit or operation), it should be considered axiomatic 
that special operations did not win the war. Their achievements, whilst often notable, 
were dwarfed by the sheer magnitude of the conflict. As Field-Marshal Slim stated: 
`Armies do not win wars by means of a few bodies of super-soldiers but by the average 
quality of their standard units'. 132 In any assessment of the wartime value of special 
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operations this point must be fully recognised. The achievements of specialist 
formations must be kept in perspective. 
Disconnected from the activities and interests of greater campaigns, the value of 
special operations were, with a few possible exceptions (such the seizure of 
intelligence materials during the Lofotens raid or the strike on the hydro-electric plant 
at Vemork), of less overall value to the course of the war than were those specialist 
activities which were wedded (however intangibly, and at whatever depth) to the 
actions of conventional formations. The utility of the majority of pinprick raids which 
occurred in the early years of the war was strictly moot and, aside from the occasional 
tactical coup, even their irritant effect was negligible against a triumphant enemy. The 
intelligence benefits of these operations was similarly slim; landing on a coast 
snatching a prisoner or two was not a war-winning weapon, and against the 
completeness of signals intelligence, their impact pales in comparison. Perhaps the 
greatest benefit of such undertakings was that they offered a beacon of hope for the 
victory-starved people in Britain. It would not be until the enemy had witnessed a 
general downturn in his strategic position, a result of conventional actions, that 
pinpricks began to represent a cumulative threat for the enemy. 
There is a certain irony about the use of specialist formations. Although commonly 
created in the first half of the war as a means of regaining the strategic initiative and of 
acting as a force multiplier for conventional arms, their greatest effects occurred once 
Allied arms had begun to engage the enemy, or were already beating the enemy in a 
position of material and physical superiority. Their greatest value came in a climate 
where their unique talents were, if valuable, no longer strictly necessary. Victory in 
these later circumstances was reliant on conventional arms, and any effects that 
specialist forces could achieve would be strictly supportive. Their utility, with a few 
exceptions, was reliant upon the performance of regular forces to capitalise on their 
actions. Forcing the enemy to alter his dispositions, for example, is only of value if 
regular forces are able to seize the opportunity and strike at a weakened point. Their 
strategic utility, as Gray asserts, `derives largely from the quality and quantity of 
performance by conventional forces..... War is a team endeavour. A special operation 
can open a door, but the regular forces may not be able to follow through. 133 
133 Gray (1996), pp. 143-144 
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Taken as a subsidiary to conventional deployments, however, where an enemy is fully 
engaged at the front, the whole gamut of specialist deployments have more impact 
helping, in various ways, to accelerate the pace of conventional success. Commando 
and ranger formations were ultimately of more value as elite spearhead and shock 
troops than they ever were as raiders. That, of course, was the reason for their 
evolution in role; beaches had to be taken, mountain tops assaulted, and flanks secured. 
Commando and ranger formations offer numerous examples of undertaking such tasks 
both quickly and successfully. Raiding activities by special forces in support of an 
active campaign could disrupt enemy lines of communication and infrastructure and 
hinder the enemy's ability to control and reinforce his fighting troops. The threat they 
posed also necessitated the enemy to waste valuable manpower and resources in 
guarding rear areas and prompted disproportionately heavy attempts to engage the 
elements doing the harassment. Such a diversion of effort from the front, exacerbated 
by the growth of indigenous guerrilla movements, could be as significant as any 
material destruction which the raids themselves caused. The intelligence benefits of 
special forces were similarly magnified when working for the direct benefit of 
conventional formations; a fact well illustrated by the value of the intelligence that the 
LRDG, Alamo Scouts or Detachment 101 provided. On occasions the intelligence 
provided by these units was unique and obtainable through no other source, at other 
times their intelligence was supportive and of value simply because it could verify 
existing information. 
In 1959 Peter Fleming made the correct prediction that: `There will always be 
controversy about any unorthodox achievements, however valuable they appear to 
be. '134 Although it is true to say that the Allies would have won the war had they not 
adopted irregular warfare or employed specialist units, it does not mean, however, that 
there is no latitude to recognise the contribution which specialist units did have to the 
Allied war effort. However proportionately small, the actions of specialist formations 
would each have impact, none independently decisive, but all contributory to eventual 
Allied victory: at times they could accelerate the pace of success and limit casualties; 
they could provoke a paranoid enemy into making the wrong move; they were able to 
wreak material and physical destruction upon the enemy which, at a local level, 
disrupted his war effort and military manoeuvre; they could serve as a focal point for 
allied morale whilst being corrosive to that of the enemy; they provided a test bed for 
134 Fleming, p. 387 
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new doctrines and methods and enabled experience to be gained and disseminated. 
Even if the impact of these many achievements are impossible to precisely quantify, it 
appears that when assessed fairly, and not in the fantastical expectation of causing 
decisive independent impact, the Anglo-American specialist formations certainly made 




Having highlighted the various achievements of Anglo-American specialist formations 
of the Second World War and their, albeit modest, contribution to the Allied war 
effort, it is now apt to ask, were they cost-effective? Was the expenditure and effort 
exerted in their creation, deployment, and use proportionate with the results that they 
achieved? Was, in the framework which General Thompson has judged effectiveness, 
the `return' gained by these units worth the `investment'? ' These calculations are very 
important and embrace not only the issue of specialist `achievements' but also wider 
issues related to the policies which Britain and America adopted towards the 
procurement, proliferation, expansion and disbandment of specialist formations. These 
calculations are not, however, easy, and any assessment of an individual unit's cost- 
effectiveness turns upon a variety of variables, some readily quantifiable, others more 
abstruse. The most central of these variables are: the scale of a formation's 
establishment; the frequency of its employment; the utility of its actions; and both the 
operational and non-operational costs of its development and use. The interplay 
between these variables was unique to every formation and it thus becomes extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to compare in detail the cost-effectiveness of each unit: 
how can, for example, the relative cost-effectiveness of the clutch of men in the SBS 
be adequately compared to a unit the likes of Merrill's Marauders which was 
undertaking a dramatically different task with an establishment of approximately 2,500 
men? It thus becomes necessary to address the themes of cost-effectiveness in broad 
terms which refer to specific examples for the illustration of argument. 
One of the key theoretical benefits to special operations is that they have the promise 
of reaping disproportionately favourable results that are not commensurate with the 
expenditure of men and materials taken up in their conduct. Whilst this theory, as will 
be seen, was certainly not universally applicable, in a number of instances it does, 
however, have a clear resonance. For the British, there is no better example of a cost- 
effective specialist formation than the LRDG. The virtuosity and value of the unit has 
been well emphasised in preceding chapters, but when it is also considered that the unit 
remained of a very modest size throughout the war (never exceeding an operational 
strength of 250 men and often working with considerably less); that the unit made no 
1 Thompson (1998), p. 7 
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outrageous demands on equipment or resources; and that the unit was almost 
continually employed (there was only a five month total in its existence during which 
no operational patrols were active), a very favourable impression of cost-effectiveness 
becomes apparent. Thompson has thus suggested that the LRDG should be considered 
`the yardstick by which one should gauge those that came after them' .2 Within the US 
example, a comparative `yardstick' is found in the Alamo Scouts. Mirroring the 
successes and flexibility of deployment of the LRDG, the Scouts were also widely and 
consistently deployed (the unit conducted some 106 missions during their one-and-a- 
half years operational existence); made as few demands on resources or on personnel 
(consisting of no more than 140 men during the war) and, unlike even the LRDG, 
would sustain no losses whilst on operations. 3 
Because of their notable achievements and consistent employment at a very low cost, 
for the purposes of this argument, the LRDG and Alamo Scouts can, perhaps equally, 
be viewed as paragons of cost-effectiveness. It would, however, be quite fallacious to 
assume that all specialist formations were able to match the record of the LRDG or 
Alamo Scouts; to assume that formations were always of a modest scale; consistently 
deployed; or successful. Whilst even the most ardent critic of specialist formations 
would have difficulty in arguing against the merits and value of units such as the 
LRDG and Alamo Scouts, there remain numerous critics of the general proliferation of 
irregular formations during the war which contend that, in the words of Field-Marshal 
Slim, special forces were `expensive, wasteful, and unnecessary'. 
4 
One of the most acute criticisms levelled against specialist formations was directed at 
the demands which they made on scarce manpower reserves which, it is claimed, 
deprived the conventional arms, most particularly the infantry, of large numbers of 
good men. John Terraine criticised all specialist formations, or 'private armies', as 
being a `not legitimate, or even sensible' drain on manpower. He believed that the 
Commandos were the 'most famous' of the 'offenders'; saw the Chindits as an 
`aberration 
... allowed to spoil a whole 
Division'; viewed the Airborne Forces as `the 
worst of all'; and was equally dismissive of the LRDG and SAS believing that, though 
few in numbers, they helped to `compound the felony. S John Peaty, studying the 
2 Ibid., p. 33 
3 Zedric, p. 11 
4 Slim, p. 548 
5 Terraine, John, The Right of the Line, (Hodder and Stoughton: London, 1985) p. 642 
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British Army manpower shortage of 1944, similarly claimed that the proliferation of 
special forces `distorted the British Army's manpower distribution and contributed to 
its manpower problems', and that `on any rational assessment the inflated and under- 
employed Special Forces which the British Army possessed during WWII were not 
cost-effective. Quite simply, the benefits did not match the costs'. 
Such arguments are, however, distorted by two principal factors: their adoption of 
rather simplistic conclusions about specialist value and achievements (which 
commonly ignore many of the more intangible benefits of special operations), and 
more significantly, their adoption of an overwhelmingly broad definition of special 
forces that encompasses, in addition to the Commandos and special forces of this 
thesis: the airborne forces, mountain trained units, specially-trained `regular' 
battalions, and the Chindits. Using such a definition, Peaty estimated that in 1944 
within the British Army there was a total of 91 Battalions of special forces, equating to 
some 25 brigades, or ten Infantry Divisions worth of men. 7 These figures are, however, 
misleading. If the definition of specialist formations is restricted to those commando 
and special forces units inclusive of this thesis, the `drain' on manpower becomes 
significantly lessened. Using these narrower definitions, it is estimated that by mid- 
1944 the British had `on the books' a maximum of approximately 13,000 men tied up 
in commando and special forces. The US, at this time, had a slightly smaller figure of 
approximately 10,000 men involved in specialist formations. 8 At the height of the 
Allied manpower shortage, therefore, an approximate 23,000 Allied servicemen were 
in specialist units, enough manpower (at the average figures of the day) to have formed 
slightly under two Infantry Divisions. Although this remains a noteworthy drain on 
manpower reserves, taken alongside an understanding of the wider achievements of 
special operations, these figures do, nevertheless, dramatically lessen the weight of 
argument against their proliferation. 
The quantity of the manpower drain caused by specialist units is further exacerbated by 
the quality of the personnel which these formations absorbed. Because of the nature of 
their roles; the process of volunteerism; the physical demands of training; and the 
necessity of finding the right man for the job, specialist formations tended (and 
6 Peaty, John Robert, `British Army Manpower Crisis 1944', PhD Thesis, King's College London, 
2000, pp. 101; 137 
7Ibid., pp. 103-104 
8 See Appendix II for a breakdown of these estimates and those for other stages of the war. 
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continue) to attract `warriors': enterprising men of initiative, physically and mentally 
fit individuals who wanted to see action; many of whom would likely have made 
excellent NCOs or junior officers had they served in more regular formations. 9 This 
`leadership drain', aggravated by high casualty rates, serves, in the opinion of Gary 
Bounds, to create a "`selection-destruction" cycle that leads to depletion of assets that 
are not readily replaceable'. 10 In an assessment of the utility of the Commandos 
Colonel Twohig would stress how unfavourable this was and emphasised the `many 
shambles' that had occurred during the war resulting from the lack of good leaders. He 
argued that the `gallantry and skill the Commandos displayed did not compensate for 
the dearth of good junior leaders to which their existence was a big contributing 
factor. " Similar arguments were advanced in the US particularly over the 
establishment of the Raiders at a time when the USMC were desperately `struggling to 
flesh out the rapidly expanding divisions on a meagre skeleton of experienced men'. 12 
That specialist formations drained a proportion of talented individuals who would have 
been of good service elsewhere is not in dispute; but at least a degree of diversion of 
such personnel was a natural and unavoidable concomitant to the decision to create 
new formations. Although the process of volunteerism, endemic to the creation of 
many specialist formations, often attracted the most keen `warriors' and weeded out 
those physically and mentally unsuitable, for the majority of units, however, being able 
to `cherry-pick' recruits from existent formations for expansion or reinforcement was a 
rare privilege. The reinforcement and replacement of highly trained personnel was a 
perennial problem for wartime specialist formations. High attrition in protracted 
operations ensured the `problem of reinforcement was often paralysing to the 
Commandos'. 13 The volunteer principle of the Army Commandos and the requirement 
to provide specialist instruction to any new recruits made reinforcement a difficult 
prospect. On average only 20-25 percent of those volunteering for the Commandos 
would actually make it through training to be accepted. Despite the problems this 
caused, for the Army Commandos the volunteer principle remained sacrosanct, as 
Brigadier Haydon of the SS Brigade would write, the Commandos 'should either 
9 For a good discussion of the 'warrior' and the implications of this for modern SOF, sec: 
Henriksen, Rune, 'Warriors in Combat - What Makes People Actively Fight in Combat? ', The 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, (April 2007), pp. 187-223 
'0 Bounds, Gary L., Notes on Elite Units, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1984) " Twohig, Lieutenant-Colonel, J. P. O'Brien, 'Are Commandos Really Necessary? ', Army 
Quarterly, (October 1948), Vol. LVII, No. 1, pp. 86-88, p. 88 
' Hoffman (1995); Isely and Crowl, p. 155 13 'History of the Commandos in the Mediterranean', DEFE 2/700 
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consist of volunteers as it does now or be done away with. It is quite fantastic what a 
fundamental difference it makes and I am certain that the volunteer principle is one to 
which we simply must adhere'. 14 Although the Royal Marine Commandos (created, 
with the exception of `A' Commando, from direct conversions of Royal Marine 
Battalions) did not adhere to this same volunteer principle, they often faced even 
greater problems with reinforcement than their Army counterparts simply because of a 
more general shortage of available Royal Marine personnel. 
American ranger formations also faced particular difficulty in both recruiting and in 
replacing their losses. As General Devers would claim in reference to Italy: `The 
greatest obstacle to overcome in the special forces ... 
has been the problem of suitable 
replacements'. 15 Although for much of the time ranger units remained as dependent 
upon the (much despised) replacement depots as were the rest of the US Army, from 
such sources they were, however, generally able to attract the best and most willing 
personnel available, and then, if time constraints allowed, would commonly submit 
these to an extensive `weeding out process'. When the 3`d and 4`h Rangers were being 
recruited from these sources, for example, Darby was willing to accept `green troops' 
but only an approximate 150 men out of 1,000 volunteers would ultimately be deemed 
suitable for service in the Rangers. t6 
As the war progressed and as manpower shortages became more acute, the majority of 
new specialist units, notably the mainstay of the RM Commandos and the 6`h Ranger 
Battalion, were formed not from volunteers but by direct conversions ('weeding out' 
inclusive) of existent and generally underemployed units. In such instances the idea of 
`drain' becomes negligible and it is easy to advance the case, for example, that the 6`h 
Rangers were of infinitely more use in the South-West Pacific than they ever were as 
the 98`" Field Artillery Battalion. It should further be recognised that at least a 
proportion of the personnel attracted to irregular units would have been wasted, if not 
have been totally misplaced, within regular units. As Foot asserted, many individuals 
'were able to achieve a significant role in the war solely because they were in SOE, 
which provided the unique, unorthodox channel through which their martial abilities 
14 Major-General Haydon to Major-General J. S. Steele, Director of Staff Duties, War Office, 13 
October 1943, WO 32/10417 
15 General Jacob Devers, AFIIQ to War Department, 13 March 1944, RG 165, Entry 418, l3ox 682; 
Folder OPD 320.2 
'6 Brigadier Norman D. Cota, 'Observation of Operation HUSKY', August 1943, RG 165, Entry 
418, Box 1249; Folder OPD 381 
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could be expressed'. " Many men within the Anglo-American special forces of the 
Second World War were not warrior-supermen but gifted amateurs, whose unique 
knowledge and skills (be it, for instance, a virtuosity in desert travel and navigation; an 
expertise in swimming or working with small boats and canoes; or an esoteric aptitude 
for the unconventional) would have been largely squandered in more conventional 
formations. 
Whilst this `manpower drain', on occasions exacerbated by heavy casualties, was 
arguably one of the most notable `costs' of the development and use of specialist 
formations, so long as the men taken up in these units were employed adequately, the 
significance of this `drain' is greatly lessened. The manpower consumption of 
specialist formations should be kept in perspective. During the war numerous sources 
absorbed valuable potential infantry recruits, and any assessment of the merits of one 
branch over another is fraught with difficulty. Cases could certainly be advanced that a 
greater `drain' came from the Allied air forces which, whilst attracting large numbers 
of what certainly were the best and the brightest, also lost large proportions in the 
costly and indecisive strategic bombing campaigns that, as Weiss stated, `demanded 
the combined utilisation of two limited resources, intelligence, well-trained personnel 
and sophisticated technology. These shortages in personnel, aircraft and supplies 
imposed tight restrictions on irregular warfare'. '8 
For those special forces that operated at depth, there is much potential for comparisons 
of cost-effectiveness to be made with the use of Allied air power. When not mutually 
supportive, the parallels between the roles of certain special forces and airpower (such 
as the undertaking of raids, interdiction, harassment, or reconnaissance activities) lend 
themselves to cost-effectiveness calculations. The limitations, or unavailability, of 
airpower to adequately conduct certain roles, such as beach reconnaissance or long- 
range intelligence gathering, would, in a number of instances (such as the LRDG, 
COPPs or Alamo Scouts), actually dramatically underline the need for the creation of a 
special unit in the first instance. In an offensive capacity too, specialist formations 
offered the potential for mounting operations against targets that airpowcr could not 
attack with requisite accuracy, or without heavy losses. Such limitations were the 
17 Foot (1984), p. 249 18 Weiss, pp. 122 
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prime motivations in using specialist formations for the conduct of such operations as 
the Commando raid on St. Nazaire or, on a smaller scale, the RMBPD `Frankton' raid. 
The efficiency of aerial bombardment over the merits of sabotage or coup de main 
attacks by irregular elements is particularly open to debate. Critical of the inaccuracy 
of aerial bombardment, OSS officer Franklin Lindsay stated: 
.... a large number of bombs had to be delivered to ensure that one or two 
hit 
the target..... if one could get next to the target and plant the explosives by 
hand right on the most vulnerable parts of, for example, a bridge, the 
probability of its destruction could be increased greatly and the explosives used 
would be a tiny fraction of that used in aerial bombardment. 19 
As well as being potentially more damaging because of its accuracy, and offering the 
benefit of fewer civilian casualties through indiscriminate destruction, sabotage also 
represented a more moderate outlay in men and materials, and had the further 
advantage, providing insertion of specialist groups and equipment did not greatly 
imperil aircraft, of offering a lower-risk solution. As Courtney of the SBS emphasised: 
`Weigh the possible loss of two men in a canoe against one or more bomber aircraft in 
an attack on a railway bridge and you have an example of cost-efficiency'. 20 Despite 
this, Foot would assert that there were `only a few' instances in which sabotage could 
be seen `as a superior instrument to mass bombing', and cited the examples of the raid 
on Vemork hydro-electric plant (yet even this was eventually repaired and had to be 
attacked by the USAAF), and the attack on Montbeliard whereby a team of SOE and 
French partisans did `what several squadrons of bombers could not' and sabotaged a 
tank turret factory to place it out of action for the duration. 2' 
It is neither possible nor practicable to argue that special operations were a superior 
tool to airpower. They had neither the reach nor the destructive potential that mass 
bombing had. Airpower, particularly in the later stages of war when superiority was 
attained, could reach many targets `both easier and with a much greater devastating 
effect' (albeit with potentially greater losses) than small groups of men could ever 
hope to achieve. Allied aerial and naval superiority in the later stages of the war were 
actually a clear reason for a number of special forces (most notably those concerned 
19 Lindsay, p. 72 
20 Courtney (1983), p. 279 21 Foot (1981), p. 176 
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with maritime sabotage) remaining largely unemployed. 22 Despite these factors, it 
remains clear that on occasions special operations could provide a potentially less 
costly and more accurate alternative, or ancillary, to the use of airpower. Such was part 
of the inherent value of special operations capabilities: they expanded options and 
increased the Allied repertoire of response. 23 Such debates become, however, 
somewhat redundant when one considers how reliant, particularly in the later stages of 
the war, specialist formations became on the utilisation of aerial and naval resources. 
The demands which certain special operations could make upon overstretched 
operational resources were not in anyway modest. The strain which they placed on 
shipping, submarines and aircraft to facilitate transportation, reinforcement and supply 
could be quite exacting. The effort taken to mount even a very minor operation could 
be quite considerable. Operation `Anklet' of December 1941, for example, was a small 
diversionary raid (for the benefit of the larger Lofotens action) involving three troops 
of No. 12 Commando and attached Norwegians. Yet to mount this operation required 
the direct committal of one destroyer, one corvette and one infantry landing ship and 
their crews, plus a much larger escort to the target comprising one cruiser, seven more 
destroyers, one more corvette, three minesweepers, two submarines, two oilers and an 
additional infantry carrier. 24 Various other special operations, particularly those which 
occurred at depth, would require a similar committal of regular forces to support and 
facilitate them. Thus whilst a special operation may Itself only involve a seemingly 
cost-effective handful of men, there were often numerous `hidden costs' involved 
which must not be ignored. 
The diversion or risk of active-service craft, and their crews, dramatically increased the 
cost of mounting special operations and, at times, can be considered to have been 
counter-productive to their inherently low-cost virtues of execution. Early irritant 
commando raids of negligible value, it can be argued, did not often attain results 
commensurate with the expenditure and risk of scarce resources utilised in their 
conduct (the Commandos themselves inclusive). Perhaps the most contentious 
diversion of active-service craft came in the form of utilising both submarines and 
heavy bombers for the transport of special forces; activities which not only placed both 
22 OSS Executive Committee recommendations, 'OSS Underwater Swimming Activities in UK', 22 
June 1944, RG 226, Entry 148, Box 82; Folder 1198 
23 Gray (1996), p. 169 24 Admiralty orders for 'Anklet', December 1941, ADM 116/4381 
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the craft and their crews at risk, but also diverted them away from their regular 
activities, which could potentially be of ultimately greater value to the war than the 
special operation which they were facilitating. Cruickshank, for instance, went as far as 
calling operation `Jaywick', the successful September 1943 SRD raid on Japanese 
shipping in Singapore Harbour, both `insignificant' and 'counter-productive' because 
of its diversion of submarines which, at the time, were regularly accounting for a 
greater tonnage of Japanese shipping than the raid itself had achieved. 25 Despite this, 
so long as the submarine was not subservient to the course of the special operation, 
such costs could be distinctly lessened. Understanding this, the Admiralty would insist 
in `combining clandestine operations with normal submarine patrols' so that units such 
as the SBS would be used if, and when, an opportunity presented itself over the course 
of a submarine's regular patrol. 26 In this manner the specialist units complemented 
rather than detracted from the submarine's own activities. 
If opportunities for active-service craft to deploy in their principal occupations were 
not present, however, their use in special operations became, if no less of a risk, 
certainly more of an adequate arrangement. 27 The use of dedicated landing craft, 
transport aircraft, and even the diversion of bomber aircraft in special operations at 
times when those resources were not required elsewhere can, providing that they were 
not lost or diverted for protracted periods, be generally viewed as an acceptable use of 
resources and being of no real detriment to other operations. Even at times when these 
resources were of potential use elsewhere, special operations would generally only 
represent a minor and fleeting diversion of effort. This contention is backed up by a 
SHAEF report written on the eve of the commencement of D-Day, which stated: 
Whilst it is undesirable as a general principle to divert strategic air effort from 
bombing enemy communications .... The small number of 
heavy day bomber 
sorties required for the support of Resistance when taken in relation to the 
overall air effort available will interfere little, if at all, with the strategic air 
operations. 8 
In spite of this contention, the active support of armed indigenous guerrilla movements 
would represent the greatest diversion of resources and the greatest material costs of 
special operations. Absorbing significant amounts of weapons and stores, these 
2$ Cruickshank (1983), p. 250 26 Roosevelt Vol. 11, p. 397 
Z' 260th SEAC Meeting, 8 July 1945, WO 203/131 
28 SHAEF, `Development of Resistance in France', 4 July 1944, Alit 20/8945 
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activities would also tie up numerous Allied aircraft, crews and ground personnel in 
their dispatch. The infrastructure this required was extensive and the cost could dwarf 
the physical needs of Allied special forces alone29 In light of the fact that the 
effectiveness of partisan formations could, as has been noted, differ significantly, the 
maintenance and supply of indigenous movements cannot always be considered to 
have been cost-effective. Confusion in policy over which guerrilla movements to 
support could lead, as in Greece and Yugoslavia, to a degree of wastage, duplication of 
effort, or the resources being delivered into the wrong hands. In places, much time, 
money and effort was spent arming indigenous groups whose military impact was 
negligible at best. 
Contrary to this, however, and providing vivid illustration of the worth of such a policy 
are the successes of armed indigenous forces in the Burmese theatre. Although the cost 
of Detachment 10 l's operations, for instance, were not immoderate with their dispatch 
of over 1,500,000lbs of supplies into the field each month also requiring much 
diversion of effort, given their successes, however, they certainly appear to have been 
warranted. 30 The Detachment, and the over 10,000 Kachin Rangers which they would 
eventually organise, remained a sound investment capable of an arguably 
disproportionate return. As Hilsman would state as regards to his own Kachin Ranger 
`battalion': 
In terms of cost-effectiveness, it cannot be doubted that the guerrilla efforts of 
OSS Detachment 101 were a resounding success. For our battalion, the cost 
had been the commitment of three Americans and one Englishman, pay and 
supplies for three hundred guerrillas, C-47s and crews to supply us, and radio 
and administrative personnel at headquarters. The intelligence we gathered 
alone would have justified such small costs many times over. 31 
The issue of the `cost' of specialist formations, in terms of both manpower and 
resources, is inherently linked to the issue of scale; and, as a rule, the larger the 
formation, the greater the cost. The fact that commando and ranger formations would 
operate in battalion and brigade strengths thus inherently opened them up to more 
criticisms than those commonly directed at special forces. 32 Even Slim remained 
optimistic about units that were `.... designed to be employed in small parties, usually 
29 See: Sacquety, Troy J., 'Supplying the Resistance', Verilas, Vol. 3, No. 1, (2007), pp. 37-48, and 
documents, AIR 20/8945; 
30 Hilsman, pp. 297-298 
31 Ibid., pp. 289-290 32 Gray (1996), p. 167 
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behind the enemy, on tasks beyond the normal scope of warfare in the field..... Not 
costly in manpower, they may, if handled with imaginative ruthlessness, achieve 
strategic results'. 33 Although most special forces remained subservient to the tactical 
maxim of small-scale in operational deployments, it does not necessarily follow, 
however, that both individually and collectively they did not absorb a significant 
proportion of manpower and resources. Of the previous estimates made on the relative 
numbers of personnel within British and US specialist forces in 1944, special forces 
accounted for approximately 3,870 and 4,525 men respectively, and the proportion of 
men in some units, such as the SAS Brigade, OSS Detachment 101, or the UDTs, 
would ultimately exceed the numbers of personnel involved in certain commando 
formations. 34 
It is undoubtedly true that the small-scale of the LRDG and Alamo Scouts was a 
central factor in their exemplary cost-effectiveness, but would this have been retained 
had their establishments been expanded? It would be easy to assume that providing 
more men, vehicles, and weapons to a fully employed force would lead to a 
proportionate increase in their successes. Although the LRDG, for example, may well 
have achieved more had it been expanded by a patrol or two, to retain overall cost- 
effectiveness, however, the enlarged formation would have to have been deployed as 
frequently, and with the same margins of success, as the original personnel were. One 
only needs to look at the underemployed Indian Long Range Squadron in the later 
stages of the Desert War to see that the expansion of the LRDG concept had its limits. 
There is a definite `cut off point' in scale and too much expansion risked these 
formations becoming less `special' and could potentially subvert their inherent virtues 
of ease of operation, economy of effort, flexibility and autonomy, and thus limit their 
chances for correct employment. Part of the reason that the LRDG and Alamo Scouts 
remained so cost-effective was that they were perpetually kept to a modest size. 
The SAS provides an ideal case study for an assessment of the relative merits of the 
expansion of a special force. Within the space of only three years the SAS grew from a 
tiny force of some sixty men at its inception into a multinational brigade with a 
strength of approximately 2,500 men by mid-1944. Their earliest operations in the 
desert were, without doubt, very cost-effective. Their destruction of aircraft alone `... 
33 Slim, p. 548 34 See Appendix 11. 
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far outweighed the personal score achieved by any aircrew, whose training was both 
long and costly, and who attacked in expensive aircraft maintained by a large number 
of ground crew'. 35 It was these very successes that led to the SAS, in late-1942, 
gaining a Regimental establishment. Yet as a Regiment, in the later stages of the 
Desert War, the SAS began to show diminished results and an increase in casualties, 
Lloyd Owen would claim that the SAS `balance sheet showed too great an excess of 
expenditure over achievement. ' 36 This modest downturn in cost-effectiveness (which 
still did not subvert the overall value of the unit) was, however, not a result of the 
physical expansion of the unit (although rapid expansion in an active campaign did 
lead to the cutting of some corners in the training of new recruits), but rather by 
situational changes resulting from a better prepared enemy, shortened enemy lines of 
communication, and a more hostile environment. Even with higher losses, however, 
these later operations generally remained of value; their results being at least 
proportionate with investment. 
The value of 2nd SAS Regiment's operations in North Africa and Italy in 1943 were, 
however, somewhat more debatable. Despite William Stirling's optimistic estimates 
that a widespread deployment of his Regiment in small groups would be `very 
economical to mount' and be capable of dramatic results, his Regiment was not given 
the opportunity to test his theories in any more than a token form. 37 Instead, either 
broadly underemployed, or facing employment in a more conventional capacity, the 
actual value of the 2nd SAS at this time must be regarded as minimal and, in light of 
this, not particularly cost-effective. 
Whilst the expansion of the SAS into brigade-strength in preparation for the invasion 
of France would increase the potential for their achievement, it also dramatically 
increased the cost of the unit in terms of personnel, resources, and supporting 
infrastructure. The eventual combat record of the SAS Brigade in France, nevertheless, 
makes for impressive reading: over the course of 49 operations in which 1,987 men 
were dispatched (850 of which British), 7,753 enemy casualties were inflicted and 
4,764 prisoners taken (excluding larger numbers who surrendered in conjunction with 
larger Resistance activities); over 400 vehicles were destroyed or seized (some 
accounts place this figure around 1,000); numerous railway lines and roads were cut, 
3s Thompson (1998), p. 420 36 Owen, D. L. (2003), p. 120 37 W. Stirling to 15 Army Group, 1 December 1943, WO 204/1949 
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and trains, bridges, telephone lines etc. thereon destroyed. These results were achieved, 
however, with notable casualties to the SAS Brigade which, excluding 4`h SAS, 
sustained 345 men killed, missing or captured and 115 wounded in action. 38 Even with 
these losses, and the greater expenditure in manpower and resources taken up, or 
diverted, in mounting these operations, it is clear that the results achieved justified the 
expenditure. In these later activities the SAS would remain cost-effective, even if not 
as startlingly so as they had been during their first year in the Desert War. 
The use of the OSS OGs in France represented a much more modest effort than the 
employment of the SAS Brigade, but in terms of tangible achievements would produce 
a proportionately similar return. Undertaking only fourteen deployments, in which a 
total of 27 officers and 155 men were employed, the OGs claimed, in conjunction with 
the Resistance to have killed 461 of the enemy, wounded that number again, and to 
have taken 10,021 prisoners. 39 The OGs would, however, achieve these returns at a 
much reduced cost as compared to the SAS, sustaining losses of only five men killed, 
23 wounded and one missing in action. 40 A comparison of the relative achievements of 
these two units, whilst not necessarily proper (in light of the variations in the methods 
and manner of their operation) does, nevertheless, highlight that an expansion of a 
specialist formation, or at least a moderate increase to brigade-strength, did not 
necessarily result in diminished returns, but rather that they stayed broadly 
proportionate. Expansion of a specialist formation, so long as it occurs in response to a 
definite potential for deployment, is not necessarily to the detriment of cost- 
effectiveness. 
Opportunity for deployment is, however, a pre-requisite of cost-effectiveness, and 
disuse of specialist formations represents potentially the most damning waste of 
resources. To remain valuable, and therefore be cost-effective, specialist formations 
had to be consistently used; that this was not always the case added to the arguments of 
their detractors. Thomas has disparagingly noted the persistent `disparity between the 
sophistication of commando training and the high quality of commando units, on the 
38 `Summary of Casualties Inflicted on the Enemy by SAS Troops during Operations in 1944', 
KCLMA McLeod; and Lieutenant-Colonel Collins, 'Report on SAS Operations', 1 December 1944, 
WO 204/2020 
39 At this late stage in the war in Europe 'surrender' tallies should be taken in moderation as being 
less a reflection of any particular virtuosity and more a comment on the morale of the enemy. 40 OG Command, 'History of Operations in Southern France', 20 September 1944, RG 226, Entry 
143, Box 11 
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one hand, and the insignificance of the objectives assigned to these units and the 
limited tactical employment of commando forces in general, on the other. ' 41 The 
example of the FSSF provides solid illustration of the greater complexities of this 
argument. Outwardly the results of the Force's deployments appear to have been very 
cost-effective. In addition to facilitating operational manoeuvre in Italy the unit, 
numbering approximately 2,500 men, has been accredited with 12,000 enemy killed 
and the capture of upwards of 7,000 prisoners; figures which suggest that one 
commando force alone accounted for almost the same number of the enemy as the total 
number of Allied personnel involved in specialist formations in mid-1944.2 Despite 
such favourable calculations, it is, nevertheless, legitimate to ask, in light of its 
extensive arctic, airborne, and amphibious training being of only marginal tangible use 
(such as in scaling Monte la Difensa, or in the capture of Ile du Levant and Ile de Port 
Cros prior to Dragoon), whether the cost and time of this training, which kept the 
Force unemployed for over a year, was worth the outlay? Dziuban doubts that it was, 
highlighting that the Force `engaged but little in the highly specialised types of 
operations for which it had been trained' and yet it `represented a costly expenditure of 
resources and a complex administrative effort, particularly to Canada because of the 
force's distance from Canadian administrative machinery'. 43 
Although the rigorous training which the FSSF underwent was of little specific 
application, it was not, however, entirely wasted. It formed the foundations for the 
Force's successes; it moulded the unit into a cohesive whole and provided them with a 
skill-at-arms exceptionally valuable for their first deployments. Monte la Difensa 
would certainly have not been taken and held as efficiently as it was, were it not for 
such intensive training. 44 Cohesion, however, rarely survives attrition, and once they 
had sustained heavy casualties the Force's fighting effectiveness, commensurate with 
other formations, such as the Ist Rangers by Cisterna, naturally declined. The only way 
to subvert this and maintain the quality of the instrument would be to take formations 
out of `the line' for recruiting and retraining etc.. This was a fact well understood by 
the British, who had expanded their commando organisation specifically to provide 
4' Thomas, p. 696 42 McMichael, p. 209; Springer, pp. 255-256 43 Dziuban, pp. 267-268 44 Springer, pp. 68; 84-85 
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`sufficient' formations `so as to allow for wastage and rest between operations'. °S In 
light of the exigencies of the battlefield, however, such a policy was rarely applicable. 
The value and cost-effectiveness of even proportionately much smaller formations is 
equally reliant upon correct and consistent deployment. There are various examples of 
special forces which, although remaining of modest scale, can face the charges of 
being expensive, redundant, and underemployed. The excessive proliferation of certain 
maritime special forces each with diverse niche roles, in particular, has left a 
proportion of them open to such criticisms. The RMBPD had somewhat limited 
operational deployment and only two notable successes (the crippling of two 
destroyers to facilitate a raid on Simi being of more significance than the sinking of 
blockade runners during the audacious `Frankton'), and it is certainly debatable 
whether those operations alone justified the time, equipment and personnel taken up in 
forming the unit. Of even less cost-effectiveness was the SRU. Despite being one of 
the smallest independent units created during the war, with just over forty men in its 
establishment, the Unit underwent over two years of extensive and expensive training 
in California, Nassau and Britain before eventually being sent to Ceylon in October 
1944.46 The unit was not operationally deployed until February 1945, and whilst of use 
at this time, most clearly in performing reconnaissance for XXXIII Corps, it was soon 
made redundant after only one month by the crossing of the Irrawadd Y. 47 The 
proportion of time and money spent on training the Unit contrasted negatively with 
their modest successes and time in the field to make the unit, despite its small scale, 
not particularly cost-effective. 
The excessive proliferation in Britain of disparate maritime special forces each with 
niche offensive roles cannot be considered cost-effective. Until these units became 
centralised under the branches of SBU, SOG or DDOD(I) each would also make 
additional demands upon individual training, experimental and administrative 
resources and would spend excessive time and money in developing new methods and 
equipment which, for the most part, had little wartime application and can thus be 
considered `a complete waste of time' 48 Furthermore, in light of their limited 
operational deployments, it could well be argued that the tasks undertaken by these 
43 War Office memorandum on 'Points brought out in Ops. "t iusky"', WO 201/799 4 Wri 
47 7 
§ht, p. 158 
260' SEAC Meeting, 8 July 1945, WO 203/131 
48 Thompson (1998), p. 420; Parker (1998), p. 99 
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units could have easily been catered for by an existent, versatile and equally small- 
scale formation such as the SBS which certainly was cost-efficient. 
These arguments are not necessarily isolated to Britain, however, and although the US 
development of offensive maritime formations all under the aegis of the OSS MU 
certainly was more cost-effective than the cumbersome British approach, the wartime 
application of many MU personnel (aside from the `Italian' branch and those later 
converted to UDTs) was slight. The `London', `North African' and 'Far Eastern' 
branches of the MU, in particular, were constantly hindered by a lack of opportunity 
for employment and inadequate transportation. Illustrative of the frustrations 
proportions of the MU faced are comments made by (the ironically named) Lieutenant- 
Commander A. G. Atwater, the SEAC MU Chief, in May 1945: 
We have approximately 43 personnel that have been training for over a year. 
They have been here almost a year and the work has been nil. A certain amount 
of jobs were found in the Arakan show but it did not require personnel who 
were trained as specialists; in fact, the specialist training was a drawback due 
to difficulties in utilising this type of personnel for regular duties. 49 
At practically all times these niche-skilled maritime formations were in still 
competition for employment with other formations with a similar mandate. 
Redundancy and competition resulted from having too many similar units and not 
enough opportunity for their employment. Colonel H. T. Tollemache, CO of SOG, 
emphasised these problems well when he reflected that: 
Neither functions nor general methods [between units] have been markedly 
dissimilar. 
... The differences consequent of this 
independent function, in 
technique, in composition and in organisation have resulted in lack of economy 
both in personnel and stores due to each type of team "running its own show" 
and to maintaining establishments designed for one theatre while operating in 
another. 5° 
There existed a thin line between a specialist formation being suitably 'specialised' and 
justifying its existence by fulfilling a role that no other force could perform, and it 
becoming too specialised and risk becoming inapplicable to the wider war should the 
unique circumstances for their use never, or too infrequently, appear. Overspecialised 
forces are not desirable; they lose their inherent flexibility and therefore much of their 
49 Lieutenant-Commander Atwater to Colonel Bigelow, Washington, 26 May 1945, P. O 226, Entry 
92, Box 491; Folder 16 
50 Colonel Tollemache, 'Lessons learnt from formation of SOG', 1 October 1945, DEFE 2/1203 
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potential application. As Laycock wrote after the war, `the answer to the question as to 
whether or not you require "specialist" troops for raiding is "Yes". But the lesson is: 
don't raise too many; don't form odd units for odd jobs, because if they are worth their 
salt, they ought to be quite capable of carrying out any particular type of raid. '51 
The `mushroom growth of all sorts of these organisations' during the war risked 
undermining some of their inherent claims to cost-effectiveness. Too many specialist 
formations, and too little divergence in role, meant that resources were wasted as units 
were not employed as designed. 52 Extensive proliferation not only undermined the 
strength of the conventional arms but also impacted negatively upon the quality and 
efficiency of other specialist units, spreading too thinly those individuals with a real 
flair for the conduct of irregular operations and, more significantly, leading to 
duplication of effort, confusion, and competition for missions and resources. Ideally 
Britain would have not needed to have established such a diverse range of offensive 
maritime formations, nor would the US needed to have created the UDTs, NCDUS, 
USMC Reconnaissance Battalions, S&Rs, and elements of the MU, all operating 
independently with overlapping mandates. 53 That these formations were prone to 
develop with significant overlap was a natural consequence of adopting small units, 
which so often developed in an ad hoc manner, to deal with the exigencies of a global 
war. Inter-theatre requirements and, often more significantly, inter-service (or inter- 
agency) confusions directly led to a degree of duplication of effort and ergo a degree of 
redundancy. 54 
One of the fundamental maxims that determined the creation of specialist formations 
was that they were to perform tasks which regular forces either would, or could, not 
carry out within the same constrains of time and space or without sustaining 
disproportionate losses. It follows, therefore, that some of the most acute criticisms of 
specialist units are based on the assertion that their creation was redundant because, as 
Slim stated, `Any well-trained infantry battalion should be able to do what a 
commando can do; in the Fourteenth Army they could and did'. 55 When specialist 
St Laycock, R. E., `Raids in the Late War and their lessons', Journal of due RUST, (Novetnber 1947), 
No. 568, Vol. XCII, pp. 528-540 52 Lloyd Owen, The larder was often bare, [Unpublished memoir] in IWM PP/MCR/CI3 53 O'Dell (2000), p. 21 54 O'Dell (2005), pp. 36-40 55 Slim, pp. 546-547. It is interesting to note that commando formations would occasionally direct 
similar sentiments towards special forces. Prior to the formation of the 2 "d SAS Regiment, for 
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formations undertook more conventional roles such arguments against their 
proliferation would increase, almost irrespective of any successes attained in such 
occupations. For example, as late as May 1945 the War Office stated that if 
Commandos were to be employed in Brigade strength complete with Administration 
units, it `would appear that normal Infantry Brigades on light scales would meet 
requirements equally well'. 56 In such circumstances the high casualties of certain 
special operations would give additional ammunition to their detractors. Units such as 
the Marauders, for example, had a very high rate of wastage, and it is hard to avoid the 
fact that at the time of their operations in Burma, as General Auchinleck stated in 
regards to the Chindits, `Infantry in normal formations having proper Artillery and 
other support are defeating Japs and sustain far fewer casualties. 57 
In Burma there were numerous examples of British and Indian field formations 
undertaking tasks which approached those which were conducted by commando 
formations when deployed more conventionally. As part of the reforms taken after the 
First Burma Campaign to train and prepare British and Indian forces in jungle warfare, 
a number of programmes were instigated which sought to teach irregular techniques to 
certain field formations. The 17`h Indian Division, for example, would take steps to 
become a `Storm Troop Division' and, requesting COIIQ documents to help the 
process, allotted the 16th, 48'1' and 63`d Brigades the specialised roles of acting as 
`shock troops in support of tanks and against strong points'; `jungle warfare shock 
troops'; and 'Combined operations and river shock troops' respectively. In addition, it 
was expected that each battalion would form a `shock platoon' from handpicked men 
that would attend `Commando Camps' and who would be capable of `special tasks'. 58 
These activities should not, however, be viewed as part of any real desire to develop 
independent irregular warfare capabilities, but rather as an effort to better adapt these 
formations to the requirements of the campaign in Burma, to instigate pathfinder and 
short-range divisional reconnaissance companies, and provide troops with experience 
and an opportunity to engage with the enemy. 
example, the SS Brigade had claimed `we cannot agree that the role of SAS differs from that which 
could be fulfilled by any well trained Commando'. General I laydon to CCO, January 1943, DEFE 
2/957 
56 War Office to C-in-C India, May 1945, WO 203/4594 
S' C-in-C India to SACSEA, January 1945, WO 203/3426 
58 17th Indian Division Training Instruction No. 2,24 June 1942, WO 172/475; 63rd Indian Brigade 
Training Instruction No. 4,4 September 1942, WO 172/601 
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It was in a similar manner that both the 3'd and 34'x' US Infantry Divisions would form 
`raider platoons' amongst some of their regiments. These platoons, and the likes of the 
Scout-Sniper platoons as formed by the USMC in Guadalcanal, did not represent 
specialist units as much as they did a cadre of experienced and willing volunteers who 
could be called upon to undertake tactically difficult or dangerous (but quite 
conventional) operations for the immediate benefit of their field formations. 59 In fact, 
because of their volunteer and somewhat ad hoc nature, these units were often `over 
worked' being prone to be `sent on too many missions without adequate rest' and were 
often called upon to hastily undertake operations without having had adequate time to 
plan and prepare. Furthermore, because these units tended to undertake a 
disproportionate share of the more hazardous tasks assigned to a regiment, the ability 
for all ranks in that regiment to gain experience was lessened with potentially 
detrimental ramifications for its quality as a whole 60 
That conventional formations on occasions sought to develop their own organic elite- 
light infantry capabilities was largely reactionary to operational requirements and 
denigrates neither the value nor cost-effectiveness of specialist formations dedicated to 
undertaking similar activities. In a sense the existence of these kinds of formations 
amongst conventional units is a direct complement to specialist formations as 
innovators. As Eliot Cohen has emphasised, `a light infantry unit may perform tasks 
similar to those of conventional units, but its separate existence is justified by its 
ability to inject fresh thinking into the mainstream of military thought'. 6' It will not be 
forgotten that endemic to the US perception of specialist formations was the mentality 
that once training (and even operational deployment) was completed, the personnel 
would be returned, either as a whole or on a rotational basis, to conventional units to 
disseminate information and act as instructional troops. In the instances of the 29`h 
Rangers as well as both the Alamo Scout and S&R Schools this theory was put into 
practice. 
McMichael has argued that because of a `relative scarcity of legitimate missions for 
specialised forces', the formation of these units should have been limited. He further 
contended that when `specialised operations are necessary, they can be undertaken by 
Twining, p. 134 bo Ranger Training Centre Staff Study, 'Ranger Type Units', 26 December 1950, RG 319,0-3 
Operations Records Section, Decimal File, 322 Ranger, Box 380 
61 Cohen, pp. 31-32 
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conventional units provided with special training prior to the operations'. 62 Although 
this argument appears to have some resonance when the `misuse' of certain 
commando-style formations in protracted defensive infantry duties is considered, in 
application to the majority of specialist tasks, however, it is quite erroneous. To have 
made widespread use of conventional forces to undertake specialist roles would have 
taken up a significant proportion of time and resources and would certainly not have 
been in anyway cost-free. Teaching regular formations irregular skills would have been 
potentially wasteful and risked distracting them from their primary, and war-winning, 
occupations. 63 As Dudley Clarke was keen to emphasise in defence of the 
Commandos, they were initially created as separate units precisely so as to avoid the 
disruption or diversion of any normal unit from their pressing tasks of mainland 
61 defence 
Although regular formations could, and with training did, undertake a number of roles 
synonymous with specialist formations - such as spearheading amphibious landings, 
performing overland infiltration, or undertaking the occasional raid - it is certainly 
possible to argue, as many of those involved in the planning of special operations have, 
that even these more `simplistic' operations still required `a special technique, a special 
temperament. 
... Each individual ... must possess special qualifications which are not 
normally found in regular units and which it is not really practical to teach them. "' 
Furthermore, it is quite incorrect to assume that all regular soldiers with, or without, a 
degree of unique instruction could have been relied upon for the conduct of certain 
specialist roles of a particular complexity (such as intelligence operations, beach 
reconnaissance and pilotage, sabotage, or partisan liaison) without dramatically 
sacrificing results. To have relied upon regular formations with only a modicum of 
extracurricular training for the conduct of specialist operations would likely have 
resulted in numerous difficulties. With no standing special operations capabilities, the 
time taken to have raised organic specialist parties from regular formations in response 
to a specific opportunity would have dramatically decreased the potential operational 
speed of response and may well have led to missed opportunities. Peter Young of the 
Commandos would admit, `Any infantry can do our job', but would sum up one of the 
62 McMichael, p. 211 63 Laycock, p. 529 
64 Clarke, 'The Start of "Commandos"', 30 October 1942, DEFE 2/4 bs Laycock, 'Memorandum on reorganisation of Commandos', 13 November 194 1, WO 201/731 
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key benefits of the Commandos by stating that `only we ... can do it in the timt 
allotted'. 66 
If utilising regular elements for the conduct of specialist tasks, it would have been 
essential to have called for volunteers, and desirable to subsequently subject them to a 
`weeding out' process, lest mentally and physically unsuited men subvert the chances 
of success. Further, considering the often ad hoc manner in which a number of `private 
armies' were raised during the war, the net result of any attempt to develop specialist 
capabilities within regular formations in a short space of time would have likely 
resulted in something approaching the earliest specialist formations anyway, but 
probably lacking the greatly significant flair and drive of an `errant captain' at the 
helm. Any such regular unit so converted would also likely have lacked a clear 
mandate, had a much reduced freedom of action, would likely have confused regular 
command and control channels, and would have likely have been open to an abuse and 
misapplication of its budding abilities because of its `regular' identity. In addition, if 
having performed an operation the personnel were to be returned to their company or 
regiment etc., experience and esprit de corps would be sacrificed, and should a future 
requirement for a special operation emerge, it would have been necessary to have taken 
the lengthy and wasteful step of having to recruit another band for its conduct. 
The potential limitations of using regular forces to undertake specialist roles are most 
succinctly highlighted by David Lloyd Owen of the LRDG. Ile stated: 
I would willingly have undertaken many of the tasks we carried out with the 
men of a regular unit. But I could not have done it without rejecting those who 
were not physically fit, those who were not temperamentally suited and those 
who were not prepared to parachute. Then I would have had to train them - for 
the mental strain of being constantly on the watch is something for which 
continual training is required..... To have tried this type of raid and other tasks 
without specially trained and selected men would have been madness. For not 
only would you virtually destroy the structure of a normal unit in transforming 
it for a specialised task but also you would be diverting it from its main 
purpose. 67 
66 Quoted in Saunders, p. 350. Tom Churchill, wartime CO of 2nd SS Brigade, well illustrated this 
point: 'A [regular] battalion can, in a month or two, be trained to step out of landing craft and to 
perform specific tasks, on a specific beach ... 
but it would require at least a year's training to enable 
it to compete with successive and differing tasks ... assigned to the Commandos'. Churchill, T. 13., 'The Value of Commandos', Journal of the RUSI, (February 1950), No. 577, Vol. XCL, p. 87 67 Lloyd Owen, The larder was often bare, [Unpublished memoir] in IWM Pt'/MCR/C13 
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That specialist formations arose as they did was no accident. They were created in 
direct response to the undesirability and limitations of utilising conventional arms for 
the conduct of irregular and specialised operations. This point should not be forgotten. 
Although not all specialist deployments were of low cost and significant value, their 
conduct did require specially organised formations. Those essential roles such as 
intelligence gathering or beach reconnaissance, tasks of great benefit to the application 
of conventional force, required practitioners trained, equipped and suited to the 
particular rigours of that work. Many operations would have been conducted at a 
disadvantage, or with increased losses, had specialist formations not been formed to 
facilitate these tasks. Even though the tasks of liaison with partisans and harassment in 
depth were not, strictly speaking, essential, they remained generally beneficial and 
similarly required special selection, temperament and training. Specialist formations 
arose to fulfil a genuine need: to conduct operations that regular formations could not 
adequately undertake in the time available without significant disruption. So long as a 
requirement for specialist operations was identified, there was little alternative to the 
creation of specialist formations for their conduct. It would have been significantly 
more costly, and would have resulted in much diminished results, had regular 
formations with specialist training been relied upon for such purposes. 
Colonel Twohig has claimed that much of the `suspicion' of the `private army' was 
caused by the `disinclination to disband, and the consequent search for a justifying 
role'. 68 In terms of cost-effectiveness the policy adopted towards the disbandment of 
formations is almost as significant as was the policy of proliferation and expansion. 
Corresponding with their differing military cultures and approach towards the 
establishment of specialist formations, Britain and the United States also had markedly 
different approaches towards their wartime disbandment. Throughout the war the 
British steadily increased the number of both commando and special forces within their 
ranks: as late as 1943 they remained committed to doubling the number of 
Commandos (organising the Royal Marine Commandos for this purpose); by 1944 
they were content to expand existent formations (such as with the SAS Brigade); and 
as late as 1945 they were still establishing new units (as with Royal Marine 
Detachment 385). The steady growth of British formations is illustrative both of their 
68 Twohig, Lieutenant-Colonel, J. P. O'Brien, `Are Commandos Really Necessary? ', Army 
Quarterly, (October 1948), Vol. LVII, No. 1, p. 88 
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continued complicity with irregular solutions as well as their propensity to view 
specialist formations as an investment which they were generally unwilling to disband 
whilst the war continued. 
The US were, on the other hand, much more willing to disband their formations once 
they ceased to be considered cost-effective, or when it was believed that conventional 
operations could proceed reliant on the virtues of mass and firepower, without the need 
for redundant `sideshows' offered by special operations. As many US formations were 
established with a clear mandate for being `temporary' or `provisional' in nature, this 
course of action was as initially intended. Aside from the 2°d, 5`" and 6th Rangers, the 
US disbanded all of their ranger formations well before the closing stages of war. The 
reasons for these decisions varied but had at their core cost-effectiveness calculations. 
The Marauders and the I", 3`d and 4"Rangers were disbanded because they were so 
mauled in their deployments that it was not thought practicable, or necessary, to reform 
units around the remnants of these formations. The 29`x' Rangers were disbanded, as 
intended, to disseminate the experiences of their Commando training to the 29`h 
Infantry Division; although in light of the subsequent creation of the 2nd and 5' 
Rangers this move was rather wasteful. The USMC Raiders were disbanded both 
because the opportunity for their employment in the Central Pacific was unlikely, and 
because the manpower they took up was (because of the manpower `cap' on the 
USMC) impeding the creation of further marine divisions. 69 Whilst the FSSF was 
disbanded both because of complications with the Canadian contingent, whose 
manpower shortage was particularly acute, and also because of the assumption that by 
late-1944, following successful landings on France and the commencement of 
conventional operations, there would be no further call for their unique specialities. 
Despite Britain having disbanded the Layforce Commandos in 1941 after their losses 
and having disbanded Nos. 12 and 14 Commandos in early-1944 because of a 
presumed lack of requirement for small-scale amphibious raids, the British approach to 
wartime disbandment of commando formations was, on the whole, noticeably more 
moderate than that of the US. Heavy casualties and pressing manpower concerns did 
not necessarily deter the British from reconstituting and reinforcing formations, as seen 
with No. 2 Commando's losses following St. Nazaire or those of Royal Marine `A' 
(later No. 40) Commando at Dieppe. Furthermore, the commando transition of role to 
69 Hogan, Raiders, p. 83 
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elite light-infantry did not provoke the same hostility amongst the British as it did 
amongst the US towards ranger formations so that, consequently, the British were 
more willing than the US to integrate their Commando formations into their order of 
battle for conventional offensives. For the British, the culture of small wars and 
decentralised control, their distinct regimental traditions, and the unique `errant 
captain' and `champion' relationship, 70 would all combine to ensure that there was an 
almost sentimental reticence to dissolve units with identity or esprit de corps. 
Throughout the war British Commandos continually outnumbered US ranger 
formations and it is apparent that the US did not seem to have understood, or agreed 
with, the British policy under which these units proliferated. As early as August 1942 
OSS commentators touring the Commandos would report that Britain had formed too 
many Commandos. They would advise that instead of the twelve Commandos which 
(at that time) had been formed, six would have been preferable and two would have 
been sufficient. This assessment was made on the basis that after deployment `the units 
are so badly shot up and lose so much equipment that the needed replacements take 
months to receive. The result is that the Commando unit makes an average of 2 raids in 
two years and the men go very sour in the interval. Two units could be kept replaced 
and kept up in condition'. 7' Whilst the transition to spearhead and elite infantry roles, 
cemented after the Sicilian invasion, prompted the formation of seven additional Royal 
Marine Commandos it only resulted in the correspondently moderate creation of two 
more Ranger battalions (excluding the 6a' Rangers). 
When the ls` and 3rd Rangers were decimated at Cisterna the US Army took the 
decision not to reconstitute them and, in so doing, also decided to disband the 4th 
Rangers. It was believed that the cost of reforming and reinforcing these battalions 
would not be commensurate with their utility, and that any further requirement for 
Ranger units was already catered for by the 2"d and S'h Rangers. Although certain 
individuals, General Marshall in particular, were keen to retain these battalions, the 
ultimate decision to disband them was taken on the basis of cost-effective calculations 
and the belief that at that stage of the war `the general advantage of special trained 
70 As Thompson has claimed: 'The personality of the commander of the force was often a deciding 
factor in prolonging a special unit's existence well beyond its useful operational life'. Thompson 
(1998), p. 421 
71 Stacey Lloyd to Major Bruce, 5 August 1942, RG 226, Entry 92, Box I1 1, [,, older 49 
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forces is not worth the effort spent in special organisation or training'. 72 The 
conclusion of a feasibility study on Rangers, tellingly made on the eve of D-Day and 
arguably the most significant Ranger contribution of the war, outlined perfectly the 
general perception of them being counter to the `American way of war': it stated that 
offensive warfare required not heavily specialised groups, but the 'maximum use' of 
infantry battalions `adapted, to varied and sustained action'. It would conclude that: 
`Limited possible employment for Ranger Battalions in present and prospective 
operations, special replacement problem, and consideration of manpower make the 
reactivation of these Ranger Battalions at this time a questionable investment in 
manpower'. 73 The US appears to have been much more conscious of the costs of 
specialist formations than were the British, and their decision to commonly discontinue 
ranger formations once their utility or purpose was called into question was arguably a 
more rational approach than that pursued by the more sentimental British. 
Without foresight, however, the decision to disband such formations was by no means 
an easy one. Disbandment invariably ruins well-trained, cohesive and potentially 
experienced formations and, if future utility exists, it is almost always a waste. On the 
other hand, should no such obvious future employment exist, then disbandment is 
sometimes the only possible course of action lest a potentially large number of 
personnel are left unemployed, incapable of having impact on the course of the war; or 
risk being wasted in unsuitable tasks if deployment occurs for the sake of employment. 
Thus the decision to disband the FSSF, for example, following the successful invasion 
of France and the development of conventional offensives can, in light of the declining 
potential for such light-infantry formations, be considered a reasonable and cost- 
effective decision. At that stage, however, the future of the war in the Far East was far 
from resolved, and given the likely importance of amphibious actions in future 
operations against the Japanese, there was definite risk in prematurely disbanding well- 
motivated, cohesive, and experienced personnel that had already been of proven value 
in support of such activities. 
In an unclear strategic situation, even when specialist formations were facing disuse or 
an alteration of role, not to disband a formation could be considered the more prudent 
72 General Jacob Devers, AFHQ to War Department, 13 March 1944, RG 165, Entry 418, Box 682; 
Folder OPD 320.2, AFRICA Cases 584-616 
73 Major-General Thos T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, 'Disposition of Ranger Battalions', S 
June 1944, in Ibid. 
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decision. For instance, whilst it would have been wasteful to have formed a special 
force to only perform the reconnaissance roles as undertaken by the SAS in North- 
West Europe in 1944-45, to have retained an existent and available formation for such 
deployments, however, was quite legitimate. To have not used, or to have disbanded, 
this experienced and cohesive formation at a time when a task existed which the unit 
was both willing and capable of undertaking would not have been making best use of 
their abilities. That the SAS continued to be deployed right up until the end of the war 
in Europe highlighted their versatility and their continued return on initial investment. 
In a climate of diminishing opportunities for employment, such issues certainly helped 
provide justification for the British retention of many of their specialist formations. 
Assessing the value of specialist formations will always be fraught with problems. 
Within cost-effectiveness debates it is hard to avoid dubious 'what if...? ' scenarios 
whereby conjectural questions such as `What if the commandos had not been crcatcd? ' 
only serve to promote further enquiry: `Would the personnel taken up in their 
establishment have been better employed elsewhere? '; `Would the results and benefits 
they accrued on the Allies have been achieved more effectively by other means? ' etc.. 
Although specialist formations had a definite, albeit very small, impact on the course 
of events in the Second World War, these were not achieved without cost. Specialist 
formations did not offer a `free lunch'. 74 On occasions specialist formations could reap 
significant impact for very little cost (in terms of personnel involved and diversion of 
effort), at other times they took time and money to establish; absorbed manpower and 
resources that could have been of benefit in other occupations; were underemployed; 
or unsuccessful in endeavours of little value. The value and cost-effectiveness of 
specialist formations varied widely, and turned on many calculations. Yet it is both 
proportionality (in the number of formations raised and the scale of each) and utility 
(the frequency, duration and significance of their use) that are perhaps the most 
significant considerations. 
It is likely that specialist formations were not employed as much as they could have 
been during the war and, with more sensible tasking, it is certainly arguable that more 
value could have been gained from employment of these units. With this in mind, it is 
equally true that too many varieties of specialist formations were formed, each with a 
very specific niche that further impeded application. Special forces, particularly those 
71 Gray (1996), pp. 147-148; 155; 169 
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maritime examples, although generally not taking up as many resources per unit as the 
commando formations, were not always cost-effective and their drain on personnel and 
resources was not always commensurate with results attained. Often rising as ad hoc 
expedients, as `private armies', specialist formations were nascent creations developed 
without a rational plan for structure or organisation. Thai their proliferation, utility, and 
retention did not proceed along the most cost-conscious lines was hardly surprising on 
the basis of their embryonic nature. That there were flaws in their proliferation was 
inevitable, particularly for the British. Entering the war later and benefiting from the 
British example, the US was able to develop a more rational view of specialist 
operations and was able to undertake a more sensible, or professional, route to their 
proliferation, that identified what the requirements were, and resulted in the formation 
of a minimum of organisations for their conduct. 
Had the concept of specialist formations or irregular warfare been a clearly established 
precedent before the war; had commanders and practitioners alike had a doctrinal point 
of reference upon which to refer, a more sensible procurement policy for specialist 
formations may have occurred. The Second World War was, however, the beginning 
of specialist formations as a coherent genus, and at all stages the development and use 
of these nascent creations was part of an evolutionary learning curve. As such it is 
important not to impose upon, or assume, a rational modem procurement policy forged 
with exigencies of peacetime budgets and knowledge of specialist forces and their 
missions. Special formations arose at different times, in different theatres, and because 
of different circumstances to fulfil varied roles, and thus their procurement, 
organisation and use was not always undertaken in the most rational or cost-effective 
manner, 
At times specialist formations were expensive, were prone to misuse and disuse, and at 
times they were ineffective. Yet these problems were not exclusive to specialist 
formations: war is a wasteful endeavour and specialist formations were certainly no 
more wasteful in `costs' than various other arms of service whose contribution is 
potentially more debatable. Contrasted to this, however, is the fact that at times 
specialist formations were able to remain true to the theory behind their existence, and 
carry out important and force-magnifying roles that achieved significant results 
disproportionate to the investment. Although not all formations were as cost-effective 
as one another, taken as a whole, the investment that Britain and the United States 
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made in the establishment and use of specialist formations was worthwhile. In regard 
to the damage inflicted upon the enemy and benefits accrued to the Allies, specialist 




Having taken a holistic view of the rise, application and-value of the Anglo-American 
commandos and special forces of the Second World War, it is evident that extensive 
innovatory and evolutionary processes were at play. To provide illustration of such 
trends it is, at this point, only necessary to undertake a brief chronological review of 
the course of events 1939-1945. Prior to the outbreak of war neither Britain nor the US 
had any coherent concept of special operations or any consistent plans to develop 
organisations or formations for its conduct. Aside from a handful of pre-war 
investigations on the subject, irregular warfare remained a generally ignored, and often 
distasteful, phenomenon thought to be confined to past colonial wars and frontier 
campaigns. It would be misleading, however, to view the absence of pre-war studies 
and initiatives in these fields as neglect: broadly considered, there was simply no pre- 
existent body of knowledge or practicable experience to neglect. When specialist 
formations arose during the Second World War they thus did so not following any 
overarching pre-existent concept, but instead stemmed directly from innovation (or 
assimilation) in response to opportunity and exigency. The absence of pre-war ideas 
and concepts would ultimately prove an impediment to neither Britain nor America's 
ability to, independently and jointly, successfully conceive, develop, and utilise an 
extensive range of specialist formations during the course of the war. 
The first British specialist formations have their origins in the desperate summer of 
1940. Innovation and ad hoc experimentation was a result of frustration and 
conventional weakness. Within a short space of time, and illustrative of the British 
enthusiasm towards these units, a number of 'errant captains' had swinly proposed, 
and 'champions' supported, various unorthodox solutions. Specialist formations were 
naturally attractive. They offered a proportionately low-cost means through which the 
strategic initiative could be regained; they provided a mechanism though which 
amphibious and combat experience could be attained; and offered a focal point for the 
fortification of popular morale. The development of the Commandos. SOE and the 
'private armies' of the LRDG and SBS all in the summer of 1940 was of paramount 
importance in laying the foundations for future irregular success. The years 1940-41 
were, however, part of a formative learning period and many problems and limitations 
with the development and application of these formations were clearly evident. Whilst 
units such as the LRDG and SßS, and emerging units such as the SAS, were certainly 
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showing potential, this period also witnessed Commando formations experience a fair 
few failures and frustrations. Many of their early tribulations wcrc inevitable, and 
stemmed both from inexperience and a more general inability to project force; they 
were broadly symptomatic of a sharp Learning curve about virtually evey aspect of the 
composition and use of irregular units. Britain was learning its trade and would 
surmount these difficulties only by trial and error. 
In mid-1941 the US began its first tentative moves towards developing irregular 
warfare, clandestine intelligence and special operations capabilities. These 
investigations and developments, most significantly the creation of Donovan's COI, 
were noticeably aided and influenced by the British example, and would serve as a 
stepping stone for the development of the first American specialist formations soon 
after Pearl Harbor. In the overall evolution of specialist formations 1942 would prove 
to be a critical year. The year witnessed the apex of the amphibious raid with the 
prolific actions of the likes of Vaagso, St. Naxaire and, in the American instance, 
Makin, occurring alongside numerous smaller pinpricks executed by the likes of No. 12 
Commando and the SSRF. In spite of this, the year also bore witness to a more general 
decline of such operations as the commando and ranger role evolved away from 
independent raiding activities and towards directly supporting the amphibious landing 
of conventional arms. August 1942 was a turning point with the likes of Dieppe and 
Tulagi highlighting the potential of commando formations undertaking spearheading, 
flank guard and shock troop tasks. By the end of the year, operation Torch' had 
crystallised this transition of the commando and ranger role. 
With commando formations being gradually drawn away from raiding activities, the 
mantle of special forces began to expand. By the end of 1942 special forces had 
become a clearly definable genre. Perhaps more than any other factor, it was the 
widespread successes and versatility of the LRDG and SAS in the Desert War and of 
the SBS in the Mediterranean which would lead to the expansion and legitimisation of 
units heretofore regarded as 'private armies'. These units had gradually illustrated their 
cast-effective potential in successfully conducting a range of offensive and non- 
offensive tasks with versatility and speed. Following the gradual development of 
dedicated command and control structures which managed to successfully coordinate 
the activities of such highly individualistic bodies, these units began to escape the 
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stigma of the 'private army' and became increasingly wcll intcgratcd into the 
objectives of the overall military campaign. 
1943 was a year of change and reorganisation for virtually all specialist formations as 
they began to alter their establishments and methods to cater for transitions in the 
overall strategic picture. By this stage of the war, commandos and rangers had proven 
their application in amphibious assaults and, with the ever-looming invasion of France 
at the forefront of Allied minds, the desirability of retaining, and even expanding, these 
formations had become solidified. The experience of North Africa and Sicily would 
nevertheless prove that in order to remain viable, these elite light-infantry formations 
must be prepared to undertake post-assault operations even if that meant, however 
distastefully, utilising them at the front in conventional infantry duties. To cater for 
such a requirement both the Commandos and Rangers would make alterations to their 
establishments. Broadly considered, the British were more amenable than the US in 
facilitating this reorganisation and in granting their Commandos a margin of 
legitimacy. Significantly, ranger formations were adversely affected by an 
unwillingness to create a comparable structure to the effective SS Brigades which 
helped to ease the integration of Commandos into the regular battle whilst still 
enabling the conduct of more independent activities where necessary. In direct contrast 
to the lessons emerging in Europe about the value of commando formations at this 
time, however, was the situation in the Pacific which saw the USMC Raiders 
becoming increasingly marginalised within the firepower-orientated amphibious 
doctrine as practiced by the US Navy/USMC. 
For the various special forces the year of 1943 was also a period of transition and 
change. Following a number of tentative measures during 'Torch', the increasing 
volume of amphibious operations ensured that maritime-orientated specialist 
formations would steadily proliferate. 'husky' would mark the first concerted use of 
special forces both before, and during, a landing to cater for hydrographic and beach 
intelligence, pilotage, approach demolitions, and deception activities. Yet in spite of 
the consistent deployments of the LRDG and SItS (Squadron) in the Aegean, or those 
of Detachment 101 in Burma, 1943 was a proportionately fallow year for special forces 
as they began to adjust to the requirements of supporting the Allied offensives in 
depth. Nascent American units like the OGs were still learning their trade, whilst more 
experienced British units such as the SAS needed to familiarise themselves with new 
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methods and different operational environments. Three principal factors impeded the 
widespread employment of special forces at this time: a lack of knowledge about their 
capabilities; a lack of means to facilitate their deployment; and, perhaps most 
significantly, a lack of practicable opportunity for their use. Despite the idealistic 
expectations of certain protagonists, the situation on the ground in 1943 was simply not 
ready for the committal of large numbers of uniformed special forces in depth. 
The year 1944 represented the zenith of the use of specialist formations as a direct 
ancillary to conventional Allied strategy. The operations of Anzio, Normandy, 
`Anvil'/`Dragoon' and Luzon would all sec the employment of commando and ranger 
formations in support of conventional amphibious landings in either a spearheading 
capacity or, as was more common at this stage of the war, being used to secure flanks 
or important outlying objectives. Following these events, however, once beachheads 
had been secured, American enthusiasm towards ranger formations (with the exception 
of the Marauders and 6`" Rangers) declined as problems were faced in accommodating 
these units in post-assault tasks. Britain, on the other hand, faced no comparable 
difficulties and continued to broadly utilise their Commandos in a wide variety of 
important tasks until the end of the war. 
As contrasted to the gradual downturn in ranger deployments, 1944 was the year in 
which special forces really began exhibiting their potentials in both independent 
operations and working in direct support of conventional forces. The invasion of 
France, the Italian campaign, the peripheral actions in Greece and Yugoslavia, the 
offensives in Burma, and the Central and Southwest Pacific amphibious drives 
occurring at this time would all witness the concerted application of special forces. 
From the summer of 1944 onwards, the distinct acceleration in the activities of 
indigenous partisan movements in support of major Allied offensives resulted in a 
concomitant increase in the application of special forces to harness, control and aid 
these indigenous elements. As this occurred, greater controls and increasingly 
centralised, and often inter-allied, command structures developed to cater for the 
increased volume and complexity of operations. The development of 'special 
operations' branches under various theatre and subordinate commands from 1944 
onwards increased the effective application of these units and serves as evidence of a 
marked evolution in the acceptance and integration of special forces into Allied 
operations and strategy. 
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By the later stages of the war both Britain and the US had developed a definite 
proficiency in employing specialist formations. This gradual increase in aptitude 
occurred in tandem with a more general growth of martial abilities, for, as General 
Browning would state, only a `real expert who has behind him the basic and 
fundamental experiences of his trade can afford unorthodox methods .... Only the real 
expert can depart from comparative orthodoxy'. ' This growth in abilities 
notwithstanding, it is evident that there were certain limitations with the development 
and employment of specialist formations during the war: the proliferation of these units 
was occasionally eccentric; command and control mechanisms could be cumbersome, 
confused and marred with animosity; and misuse and disuse was clearly evident. Such 
factors were, however, to be expected as endemic to the nascent nature of these 
formations. The achievements of these bodies which, with little or no formal pre- 
existent doctrine to guide them, managed to conduct a myriad ofcomplicated activities 
across a wide range of different operational environments should not be unfairly 
judged on the same criteria that one might assess professional modem-day Special 
Operations Forces. It is, as Lewis has stated, not 'surprising that new organisations 
breaking new ground would encounter unforeseen difficulties'. 2 Problems were part of 
the evolutionary learning curve, and by the end of the war many had been overcome 
through practical experience; the development of eflicient command structures; and a 
growing body of knowledge about, and an appreciation of, specialist capabilities. ' 
It has been made abundantly clear that the Anglo-American alliance was, in a number 
of places, an absolutely central factor in the wartime development, evolution and use 
of specialist formations. Such a close relationship, reflective of the broader military, 
diplomatic and political links between Britain and the US during the Second World 
War, was an essential ingredient for the successful conduct of coalition special 
operations lest they be hindered by counterproductive duplication of effort, confusion, 
or competition. Though both partners would ultimately benefit from this mutually 
supportive alliance, it is fair to suggest that the US profited more from this close 
' Memorandum by Lieutenant-General F. A. M Browning, CO Airborne Troops. 1944, t)l: FF 2156 
2 Lewis, S. J. (1991), p. S9 
Certain limitations, however, appear to be endemic to the nature of special operations and have yet 
to be satisfactorily resolved. Grievances over the misuse and disuse of spceiaii%t assets; prohlents 
with rigid definitions of roles and responsibilities; debates over autonomy versus control; inter- 
service and inter-agency conflicts of responsibility; and ignorance or antipathy from conventional 
bodies, remain perennial concerns of lxost"wnr SOI. 
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relationship than did the British. At a time when the US first began considering 
irregular warfare, the British had already developed an extensive range of specialist 
units and were amassing an ever-increasing body of practicable operational experience 
in their application. British willingness to share their established model and guide their 
new ally in this field propelled the American adoption of these units and enabled the 
US to hit the ground running to develop an extensive range of specialist formations all 
within the first six months of 1942. 
For the US such rapid learning was not, howcvcr, without cost. The fcc was that they 
had to firmly accept their position of student and sacrifice a margin of control by 
bowing to British experience. But had the British not been willing to share their 
knowledge or accommodate American requests for information and assistance, then it 
is likely that the US would have faced a longer and more troubled path towards the 
creation of these units than they ultimately did. The delayed US adoption of these 
formations did, however, ensure that by studying the British model, they could avoid 
many of the pitfalls, administrative and inter-agency problems which the British had 
experienced in their awkward 'private army' and 'mobs for jobs' formative stages. 
This learning period ensured that many American formations developed on more 
formal, or centralised, lines than did the majority of the British units. That many 
American special forces developed under the direct aegis of the same body which was 
responsible for catering for clandestine subversion, sabotage and espionage was 
certainly of benefit. Notwithstanding the fact that OSS control could, as the OGs found 
before their 'militarisation', occasionally impede smooth relations between specialist 
units and field commands, this arrangement can generally be regarded as a positive 
advantage that had obvious benefits for the economical proliferation, administration 
and command and control of American irregular units. 
Though owing much to the British example, US perceptions and motivations behind 
the creation of ranger formations would have notable differences from those of the 
British. The Commandos, alongside SOG were conceived at a time of strategic 
desperation and were viewed as an important means of waging offensive war at a time 
of conventional impotence. As such, Britain viewed these units as an important striking 
arm, placing some gravitas behind their creation. American ambitions for ranger 
formations, conceived at a time when the strategic situation had been stabilised (if not 
quite reversed), were much more subdued. Ranger formations were perceived as 
26 
temporary expedients, as a mechanism for gaining and disseminating combat and 
amphibious experience; and as a means to facilitate the conventional battle which was 
to be fought with mass and firepower. Once these goals had been attained; once 
conventional formations had gained experience and were able to conduct operations of 
the required scale and duration, there was, as has been noted, a dclinite awkwardness 
(with the exception of the 6`h Rangers) in the ability and willingness of the US to adapt 
ranger formations to alternate applications. Once these units began to sustain 
casualties, were faced with disuse, or the undertaking of more conventional tasks, the 
US was quick to justify their disbandment in cost-effectiveness terms. The British, on 
the other hand, were much more inclined to retain the services of trained and cohesive 
units, adopting them accordingly to the requirements of the operational situation, rather 
than resorting to disbandment. 
American adoption of special forces units would be far less reliant on the British 
example than were their ranger formations. In spite of this, between the Anglo- 
American special forces there would ultimately be much greater commonality, not to 
mention much greater cooperation in the field, than there ever was between the 
Commandos and the ranger-style formations. In light of the broadly independent paths 
through which these units were created, however, there could be noteworthy 
differences in the composition, methods and roles of the respective British and US 
special forces. Most significantly, there would be no direct American equivalent to 
units such as the SAS, which placed a premium on autonomous small-scale mobile 
harassment; and no British efforts to emulate either the composition or methods 
employed by the bilingual OGs or those of the extensive UDT organisation. Such 
diversity should perhaps be expected as being endemic to different military cultures. 
Although British influence and aid to the US was understandably most prevalent in the 
earlier stages of the war when their ally was still learning. British patronage and 
assistance to America, their provision of instruction, training and operational transport 
etc., continued to be of great importance even in the later stages of the war. \Vhen the 
field of specialist formations is viewed through the lens of the Anglo-American 
alliance it is apparent that the more general trend of US military dominance towards 
the end of the war is broadly reversed. British hegemony in the field of specialist 
formations largely outlasted the declining significance of their overall strategic 
contribution. 
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With the exception of northern Burma, China and the Southwest Pacific, as a whole, it 
would not be until mid/late 1944 that the US in anyway began to approach the British 
volume of special operations. In these later stages of the war, however, it is most useful 
to regard the Anglo-American alliance as mutually beneficial and supportive. Once 
mobilised, American proficiency in these fields increased and, as it did so, information 
and knowledge was increasingly shared between the Allies and, more significantly, the 
burden of mounting and catering for these operations (especially in orchestrating the 
supply of indigenous movements) began to be lined from the shoulders of the British. 
It is thus unnecessary to dwell excessively upon notions of innovation and cultural 
ownership. The fact remains that in the field of specialist formations at the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels of war, Britain and the US developed a relationship that 
was close, harmonious and mutually supportive. 
In the introduction to this thesis it was suggested that it is undesirable to make the 
assumption that the wartime development of specialist formations was in anyway 
based on either pre-war attitudes and experiences, or upon national strategic cultures. 
Although culturally and historically speaking, the British were amenable to the use of 
specialist formations and irregular methods, their use of such measures during the 
Second World War owes much more to the unique conditions, requirements and 
opportunities which confronted them in 1939-1945 than it does to any esoteric concept 
of a historical or cultural predisposition. Before the war, the US certainly had both less 
familiarity and less cultural inclination towards these units than did the British and. 
during the war, the traditional American 'way of war' would certainly appear to be an 
obstacle towards the development of specialist formations: such units went against 
their antipathy of elite units; were ill-suited to their homogenous 'production-line' 
approach to mobilisation; and alien to their big unit focus on mass and concentration. 
Whilst it can certainly be suggested that such factors, though suppressed in the early 
stages of the war, were of ultimate impediment towards the US adoption and use of 
ranger formations, it is not, however, warranted to assume that they were in any way a 
similar obstacle for special forces. Although America had difficulty utilising and 
accepting commando-style formations to the same extent as did Britain, US special 
forces would ultimately proliferate, in numerical terms, as extensively, and in practical 
terms, as cf%ctively as they did amongst the culturally more predisposed British. One 
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only needs to examine the record of the OGs, Alamo Scouts, Detachment 101 or the 
UDTs to see American innovation, adaptability and virtuosity in these fields certainly 
comparable to that of the of-regarded British 'masters'. Special forces found a role 
within the broader American 'way of war' and the likes of Roosevelt, Marshall, 
Eisenhower and Donovan would all develop at least an appreciation of how the 
application of minimal force in the right places could recoup advantages for their 
application of maximum force. 
It is apparent that the conduct of special operations during the war was not subject to 
the same obstacles and common strategic dilemmas of politics, diplomacy or 
geography which effected conventional means. Specialist formations offered the means 
of applying force on a global scale, offering the Allies a sense of ubiquity by enabling 
operations to be undertaken in theatres in which it was politically or militarily 
impossible, unacceptable or unwarranted to conventional deploy. The employment of 
specialist formations could thus both circumvent and reinforce national strategic 
policies: they offered Britain a medium through which its more ambitious tangential 
`Churchillian' strategies could be embraced without significant diplomatic backlash; 
and afforded the US an opportunity to undertake operations in peripheral theatres so 
abhorrent to conventional American strategy. Specialist formations were also a great 
political device; they helped Britain overcome the common criticism that they were too 
indecisive and circumspect, by providing evidence of activity and aggression. They 
would similarly help the US to overcome criticisms of them as being inexperienced, 
undisciplined and too reliant on mass and firepower, by providing evidence that 
Americans were capable of finesse in the professional use of minimum force. 
Although this study has returned a favourable overall verdict upon both the impact and 
value of the Anglo-American specialist formations of the Second World War, it is 
important to note that shortly before, or soon after, the cessation of hostilities both 
Britain and the US would disband and demobilise the overwhelming majority of their 
commandos and special forces, The British policy towards the retention of the 
Commandos after the war rcllected the general enthusiasm with which they had 
embraced the conception and utilisation of these formations during the war. Britain had 
come out of the Second World War with a fine idea about the value of utilising 
Commandos to prosecute amphibious assaults. Their experience of amphibious 
landings was honed in the Mediterranean and European theatres in which the virtues of 
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speed and surprise over the application of firepower had found a clear role for the 
utilisation of specialist amphibious shock troops, spearheadcrs and flank guards in the 
prosecution of landings. In mid-1944 a committee under the chairmanship of Air 
Marshal Sir Norman Bottomlcy was established to consider future inter-Service 
responsibilities for amphibious warfare, paying particular attention to the role of the 
Royal Marines therein. One of the conclusions reached by this committee held that the 
Royal Marines should be given sole responsibility for the maintenance of post-war 
specialist formations connected with amphibious activities. ' Given the amphibious- 
oriented justification for their retention, it was natural that the Royal Marines be 
granted the post-war responsibility for the Commandos. Thus in late-1945 although all 
Army Commandos were disbanded, the Royal Marines were permitted to retain a 
permanent (albeit somewhat scaled down) Commando presence. 
Given the difficulties which the US had in accepting ranger formations during the war, 
it is perhaps not surprising that they did not seek to retain, in the same manner as did 
the British, any of these formations oiler the war. Two principal factors reinforced this 
decision: Firstly, was the fact that in the later stages of the war not only had many 
ranger formations already been decimated by casualties and disbanded, but those 
which were retained (aside from the 6th Rangers) had, at best, been used infrequently. 
Secondly, and significantly, given the key British justification for retention of 
Commandos, was the fact that in the American mindset, any benefits which ranger 
units were assumed to have had in aiding the prosecution of amphibious assaults were 
overshadowed by the USh1C/US Navy-dominant amphibious doctrine. The Pacific 
War had been successfully prosecuted upon the tenets of mass and firepower of 
'amphibious blitzkriegs' and without any clear need for cute light infantry formations. 
For all the successes of commandos and rangers in aiding amphibious assaults, it 
should not be forgotten, as I leilbrunn reminds, that one '.... could possibly draw up an 
impressive list of coastal operations in which Commandos and Rangers did not take a 
leading part. Such incidents in particular led to the widespread belief that Commandos 
had no special function to perform'. s 
Immediately after the cnd of the war the only special forces which llritain and the US 
would directly retain were similarly influenced by calculations of their potential value 
4 Brigadier L. G. I lollis to Churchill. 21 August 1944, BI: Vl 2/132$ 
leilbrunn (1963), p. 48 
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in future amphibious operations. In the American instance, only the UDTs would be 
retained. The extensive UDT organisation, which by carly-1945 had already 
assimilated large numbers of personnel from other wartime maritime special forces, 
was the obvious choice for retention. Evcn in the firepower-centric doctrine of 
amphibious landings as exhibited in the Central Pacific, the UDTs had proven the 
value and necessity. At the end of the war, as the CO of UDT 6 would emphasise, 
these Teams had become `.... considered an integral and essential part of amphibious 
warfare..... regardless of advancements made along more scientific lines; ... hand 
placed demolition charges and reconnaissance will be necessary in securing many 
beachheads. i6 
Britain was similarly motivated. With no desire to lose the knowledge and experience 
gained during the war, and having no aspirations to be 'caught unprepared in any 
future war', it was agreed as early as October 1944 that Britain should retain a 
proportion of its special maritime capabilities after the war. ' In doing so, however, it 
was made abundantly clear that the many disparate specialist maritime units which had 
existed during the war would need to be rationalised. Immediately aller the war, 
therefore, in a continuation of a policy that had been steadily implemented from late. 
1944 onwards, each of the heretofore independent maritime formations were disbanded 
and a new Combined Operations Beach and Boat Section (COI3IIS) was established 
under the Admiralty. Various Royal Navy and Royal Marines personnel who had 
served in units such as the COPPs, RAII3PD and SRU during the war would be 
integrated into this new Section whilst those British Army personnel involved in such 
units (most obviously those in the SIS) were either returned to their parent units or 
demobiliscd. 8 Ilowever distasteful this might have been to some of those personnel 
involved, such a move was, as with the disbandment of the Army Commandos, a 
sensible precaution against those inter-service and inter-organisational problem, which 
had existed during the war. 
Despite various other Anglo-American specialist formations having amassed 
impressive wartime records, neither Britain nor the US would immediately choose to 
retain any other wartime specialist formation at the end of the war. The abiding 
6 Carl P. 1lagcnsen, Report on UI)T 6,30 Septcmbcr 1945.1W 38, World War 11 Action and 
Operational Reports, Box 789 
DDOD(l) Docket on SS Establishment -11N1S Mount Stewart, 29 OQtohcr 1914, AUM U26'RX) "Thompson (2000), p. 419; Various documents, 1)liFFli 2/988 
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impression was that these units were wartime expedients which would have little place 
in lean and professional peacetime armed forces. The outbreak of peace ensured that 
the majority of formations, however successful they had been in the war, became 
regarded as surplus to requirement. For all of the achievements of these units, it was 
clear that the war had not ultimately been won by such ephemeral means. Victory was 
gained not in the shadows but in the application of mass and firepower. Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima punctuated this point, serving as an expression of force so powerful and so 
destructive that it would dwarf anything that specialist formations could hope to 
achieve. Although during the war specialist warriors would fight pitched battles to 
justify the retention, or even expansion, of their establishments, at the close of the war, 
however, the number of such irregular voices to argue for post-war establishments was 
distinctly lessened. Few of the men within wartime specialist formations were pre-war 
professional soldiers and there were definite tendencies for personnel to regard their 
wartime exploits merely as adventures and not recognise, or lobby for, any long-term 
continuation of such means. The majority of these men were as happy to be 
demobilised at the end of the war as were the bulk of other service personnel. 
Conversely, those truly irregular characters who had found a home in undertaking 
irregular activities during the war would often rind themselves having great difficulty 
adjusting to the idea of garrison life in the peacetime military; just as the military itself 
would find problems in accommodating such individualistic personalities. 
Within a relatively short period of time, however, both Britain and the US would face 
various political and military challenges that would compel a re-adoption, or 
redevelopment, of dedicated specialist formations. The gradual, and at times 
tumultuous, revival of specialist capabilities would draw greatly upon the experiences 
of the Second World War which had opened up minds to the potential of irregular 
formations and set a precedent for how future units should he organised, utilised and 
controlled. Although not all post-war units arose as direct lineal descendants of 
wartime formations, the overwhelming majority of the later units would remain greatly 
influenced by, or even be formed around, a cadre of experienced wartime veterans. The 
very existence of modern Special Operations Forces and elite light-infantry units thus 
owe a great deal to their wartime forebears and, in many regards, the seemingly ever- 
increasing prominence of such units in niedern force structures serves as testimony to 
the successes of those units arising in the Second World War. 
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The years 1939-1945 bore witness to many military innovations which rcvolutioniscd 
the conduct of warfare; the development of specialist formations was one such point of 
innovation. The successes which both Britain and the US had in, both independently 
and collectively, inventing and practising a fundamentally new way of waging war 
were significant, and serve as evidence of the overall flexibility, innovatory prowess, 
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Special Service Troops (Commandos and Independent Companies)2 5,000 
Long Range Desert Group 200 
Special Boat Section, No. 8 Commando 30 
101 Troop, No. 6 Commando 30 
Comparison between personnel in commando, or ranger, formations and those its special forces 
Commandos 5,000 




Long Range Desert Group 
`L' Detachment Special Air Service Brigade 
1" Special Boat Section 








Comparison between personnel in commando, or ranger, formations and those in special forces 
Commandos 6,500 
British special forces 320 
1 Tables based on the maximum establishment, the 'on book' strengths, of these units. In many 
instances, however, these are estimates and the disparity between what a force was entitled to have and 
what it actually had could be acute. Because of difficulties with recruitment and casualties formations 
were rarely the size which they were authorised to be. For example, in mid-1943 the Commandos had a 
base figure (as stipulated in these figures) of 7,000 men (based 5,000 Army and 2,000 Marine 
Commandos); yet Ladd in Commandos and Rangers (p. 167) estimates that at this time there were not 
more than 3,700 Commandos. As the disparities between listed and actual strengths are hard to 
ascertain, these figures, whilst estimates, err on the side of maximum totals. Further, these figures are 
made on the basis of combatant personnel and do not take into account the by no means moderate 
numbers of administrative, planning, logistics and support personnel so essential to the application of 
these formations. 
2 On the basis of five 'SS Battalions' each consisting of two 'Companies' each of approximately 500 





Army Commandos' 5,000 
Royal Marine Commandos 500 
Royal Navy Commandos 608 
Long Range Desert Group 200 
`L' Detachment Special Air Service Brigade 200 
Indian Long Range Squadron 100 
Libyan Arab Force Commando 25 
Small Scale Raiding Force 50 
No. 30 (Assault) Commando 250 
Special Interrogation Group 30 
1" Special Boat Section 30 
2"a Special Boat Section 30 
Sea Reconnaissance Unit 40 




US Army Rangers 450 
First Special Service Force° 1,500 
USMC Raiders 1,800 
Scouts & Raiders 150 
OSS Detachment 1015 100 
Navv Grown China (SACO) 200 
4,200 
Comparison between personnel in commando, or ranger, formations and those in special forces 
Commandos 6,108 
US rangers 3,750 
British special forces 1,015 
US special forces 450 
3 Including, in this assessment, the 1 B1 SS Regiment (or Middle East Commando). 4 FSSF estimates, for these figures, are made on the basis of American personnel only; there were an 
additional estimated 1,000 Canadian personnel in the Force. 5 Not all OSS Detachment 101 and SACO personnel were operational but due to the difficulty of 






Army Commandos 5,000 
Royal Marine Commandos 2,000 
Royal Navy Beach Commandos 608 
Long Range Desert Group 200 
2"a Special Air Service Regiment 450 
Special Raiding Squadron 250 
Special Boat Squadron 250 
Popski's Private Army 100 
No. 30 (Assault) Commando 250 
`Z' Special Boat Section 30 
2"a Special Boat Section 30 
Combined Operations Pilotage Parties 100 
Sea Reconnaissance Unit 40 
Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment 60 
Combined Operations Scout Unit 120 
Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Unit 440 
'V' Force6 100 
Us 
US Army Rangers 1,350 
29`h Rangers 180 
First Special Service Force 1,500 
USMC Raiders 3,600 
Scouts & Raiders 150 
OSS Detachment 101 200 
Navy Group China (SACO) 200 
Beach Jumpers 200 
OSS Operational Groups 210 
OSS Maritime Unit 100 
USMC Reconnaissance Company 200 
Naval Combat Demolitions Unit 60 
7,950 
Comparison between personnel in commando, or ranger, formations and those in special forces 
Commandos 7,608 
US rangers 6,630 
British special forces 2,420 
US special forces 1,320 





Army Commandos 4,000 
Royal Marine Commandos 4,500 
Royal Navy Beach Commandos 608 
Long Range Desert Group 200 
Special Air Service Regiments? 900 
Special Boat Squadron 250 
Popski's Private Army 100 
30 Assault Unit 200 
Raiding Support Regiment 600 
`Z' Special Boat Section 30 
2°d Special Boat Section 30 
Combined Operations Pilotage Parties 200 
Sea Reconnaissance Unit 40 
Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment 60 
Combined Operations Scout Unit 120 
Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Unit 440 
'V' Force 600 




US Army Rangers 1,350 
First Special Service Force 1,500 
Merrill's Marauders 2,500 
Scouts & Raiders 150 
OSS Detachment 101 800 
Navy Group China (SACO) 800 
Beach Jumpers 480 
OSS Operational Groups 455 
Alamo Scouts 140 
OSS Maritime Unit 200 
USMC Reconnaissance Battalion 400 
Underwater Demolition Teams 1,000 
Jedburehs(USl 100 
Comparison between personnel in commando, or ranger, formations and those in special forces 
Commandos 9,108 
US rangers 5,350 
British special forces 3,870 
US special forces 4,525 





Royal Marine Commandos 
Royal Navy Beach Commandos 
Long Range Desert Group 
Special Air Service Regiments 
Special Boat Service 
Popski's Private Army 
30 Assault Unit 
Raiding Support Regiment 
`Z' Special Boat Section 
Special Boat Sections8 
Combined Operations Pilotage Parties 
Sea Reconnaissance Unit 
Royal Marine Detachment 385 
Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment 

























US Army Rangers 1,350 
Scouts & Raiders 150 
OSS Detachment 101 1,000 
Navy Group China (SACO) 1,000 
Beach Jumpers 480 
OSS Operational Groups 350 
Alamo Scouts 140 
OSS Maritime Unit 100 
USMC Reconnaissance Battalion 400 
Underwater Demolition Teams 1,000 
Jedburghs (US) 50 
SAARF (US) 100 
6,120 
Comparison between personnel in commando, or ranger, formations and those in special forces 
Commandos 9,108 
US rangers 1,350 
British special forces 3,870 
US special forces 4,770 


























































OO ZD Ö 
Z: Z: 
ppOOÖÖCý; 
Ö O1 oo r- 
D vi -f r. r! 
Bibliography 
Primary Material 
Unpublished - Official documents 
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London 
HISTORY OF 30 ASSAULT UNIT, 1942-1946; GB99 KCLMA Ilistory of 30 Assault Unit, 
1942-1946 
OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries; GB99 
KCLMA MF 204-211 
The National Archives, Public Record Office, Kew 
ADM Series: Records of the Admiralty. Naval Forces Royal Marines Coastguard. and related bodi 
Records of the Navy Board and the Board ofAdmiralty 
ADM 1/12848 COMBINED OPERATIONS (47): Clearance of enemy under-water 
defences during combined operations: use of Boom Commando and 
departmental allocation of responsibilities. 
ADM 1/13185 COMBINED OPERATIONS (47): Army and Royal Marine 
Commands: organisation into Special Service Group. 
ADM 1/13228 COMBINED OPERATIONS (47): Liaison between pilotage party 
units, Cs-in-C and force commanders: proposals. 
ADM 1/13232 COMBINED OPERATIONS (47): Raids on Norway by special 
service forces: policy on use of Norwegian personnel and build-up 
of force. 
ADM 1/15639 ADMIRALTY (5) and COMBINED OPERATIONS (47): Future 
control of Combined Operations Pilotage Parties: Administration of 
personnel. 
ADM 1/15713 ADMIRALTY (5) and FOREIGN COUNTRIES (52): Activities of 
US Pacific Fleet in various fields including submarine warfare and 
combined operations. Admiralty comments. 
ADM 1/16232 ADMIRALTY (5); DEFENCES-UNITED KINGDOM (32) and 
COMBINED OPERATIONS (47): Functions of R. M. Boom Patrol 
Detachment: control of RMBPD transferred from Chief of 
Combined Operations to Admiralty. 
ADM 1/16248 ADMIRALTY (5) and COMBINED OPERATIONS (47) and 
NAVAL STATIONS (50) and FOREIGN COUNTRIES (52): 
Formation of Small Operations Group to obtain additional 
intelligence in respect of enemy occupied coast lines in South East 
Asia Command. 
287 
ADM 1/16957 RN OFFICERS (71): Instructions to acting Captain TB Brunton 
DSC RN Commanding Officer Designate of Special service 
establishment to assume control of units engaged on unorthodox 
offensive warfare. 
ADM 1/16961 FOREIGN COUNTRIES (52): Question of required employment of 
the Royal Boom Patrol in South East Asia detachment. 
ADM 1/21986 ADMIRALTY (5): Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment: history: 
transfer to Admiralty controls. 
ADM 1/26900 Unorthodox offensive warfare units: proposed war establishment 
and post war future of Special Service Establishment 1IMS Mount 
Stewart. 
Admiralty: Record Office: Cases 
ADM 116/4379 Raids on French, Belgium and Dutch Coasts: directives to 
Commanders-in-Chief. 
ADM 116/4381 Operation "Anklet": (combined Allied raid on Lofoten Islands, 
Norway). 
ADM 116/5112 Review of policy concerning operations of small scale raiding force 
and establishment of Special Boat Unit. 
Admiralty: Portsmouth Station: Correspondence 
ADM 179/254 Establishment of raiding force on South Coast: administration of 
force J: minutes of meetings. 
ADM 179/347 Employment of X craft working with COPP units to carry out 
reconnaissance of French coast. 
Admiralty and Ministry of Defence: Royal Marines: War Diaries, Unit Diaries, Detachment 












Boom Patrol Detachment (for Operation 'Frankton'). 
2"a Special Boat Section. 
Special Service/Commando Group: monthly letters. 
288 
Admiralty: Naval Intelligence Division and Operational Intelligence Centre: Intelligence 
Reports and Papers 
ADM 223/214 Appendix 1 (Part 5): History of 30 Commando (later called 30 
Assault Unit and 30 Advanced Unit). 
ADM 223/683 Operation PITCH: Commando raid on Castelorizo Island, Eastern 
Mediterranean. 
ADM 223/697 Operation HARDTACK: intelligence gathering raids on the 
Channel Islands. 
AIR Series: Records created or inherited by the Air Ministry, the Royal Air Force, and related bodies 
Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Department of the Chief of the Air Staff. - Registered 
Files 
AIR 8/1751 Mediterranean: control of special operations by air. 
Air Ministry: Bomber Command: Registered Files 
AIR 14/2413 Special operations. 
AIR 14/2414 Special operations and instructions. 
Air Ministry and Admiralty: Coastal Command: Registered Files 
AIR 15/444 Co-operation with Special Forces. 
Air Ministry, and Ministry of Defence: Papers accumulated by the Air Historical Branch 
AIR 20/8174 OPERATIONS: France and Low Countries CODE 55/2/3: 
Improvements in Special Air Service operations. 
AIR 20/8413 OPERATIONS: Central Europe CODE 55/2/1: Balkan Air Force: 
reorganisation of special operations. 
AIR 20/8819 OPERATIONS: General (Code 55/1): SOE and SAS operations: 
planning and control. 
AIR 20/8822 OPERATIONS: General (Code 55/1): SOE and SAS operations: 
matters arising from operations reports. 
AIR 20/8823 OPERATIONS: General (Code 55/1): Special operations: SAS 
policy. 
AIR 20/8945 OPERATIONS: France and Low Countries CODE 55/2/3: SAS 
troops: operation instructions. 
AIR 20/8948 OPERATIONS, France and Low Countries CODE 55/2/3: SOB and 
SAS: planning and control of operations. 
289 
Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Royal Air Force Overseas Commands: Reports and 
Correspondence 
AIR 23/1678 A. F. H. Q.: weekly reports of special operations. 
AIR 23/1781 Special operations. 
AIR 23/2140 Small operations groups: policy. 
AIR 23/2147 Small Operations Groups: operational and training experience. 
AIR 23/7787 Island of Vis: policy. 
AIR 23/7802 Special Boat Service and Long Range Desert Group: operation 
instructions and orders. 
AIR 23/7935 'S' Squadron S. B. S. (Special Boat Squadrons): outline plan for 
employment. 
AIR 23/8125 Land Forces Adriatic: operation instructions. 
AIR 23/8155 Long Range Desert Group (L. R. D. G. ) Patrols Northern Adriatic: 
Commanders' conferences. 
Air Ministry, Directorate of intelligence and related bodies: Intelligence Reports and Papers 
AIR 40/2564 Special operations: official histories; proposals, policy and 
arrangements. 
Air Ministry: Combined Operational Planning Committee: Papers 
AIR 42/18 Special operations: suggestions. 
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces: Microfilmed Files 
AIR 51/105 SPECIAL OPERATIONS POLICY: Parts 1-5. 
AIR 51/288 Intelligence section: Special Boat Service reports. 
AIR 51/394 AEAF Air Staff files: Employment of SAS troops. 
CAB Series: Records of the Cabinet Office 
Committee of Imperial Defence, Historical Branch and Cabinet Ofce, Historical Section. War 
Histories: Draft Chapters and Narratives, Military 
CAB 44/151 Section V, chapter T: history of the long range desert group in the 
Middle East, 1940-1943, by Brigadier IT. W, Wynter. 
CAB 44/152 Section V, chapter U: history of Commandos and Special Service 
troops in the Middle East and North Africa, 1941 Jan. -1943 Apr. by 
Brigadier 11. W. Wynter. 
290 
CAB 44/153 Section V, chapter V: history of the Commandos in the 
Mediterranean, 1943 Sept: 1945 May, by Combined Operations 
Headquarters. 
War Cabinet and Cabinet: Minutes (WMand CM Series) 
CAB 65/20/7 3. The Commandos. 
War Cabinet and Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes 
CAB 79/7/45 1. RAIDING OPERATIONS. Memo. by Director of Combined 
Operations discussed, 
CAB 79/20/28 2. FORMATION OF COMMANDOS OF ALLIED FORCES. 
CAB 79/20/49 5. OPERATION "RUTTER". 
6. FORMATION OF COMMANDOS OF ALLIED FORCES. 
CAB 79/21/16 4. CHIEF OF COMBINED OPERATIONS'- VISIT TO UNITED 
STATES. 
5. UNITED STATES COMBINED OPERATIONS TRAINING. 
7. AIR SUPPORT FOR RAIDING OPERATIONS. 
CAB 79/59/45 1. French Resistance in National Territory. COS(43)120(0). 2. OSS 
Operations in Norway. COS(43)117(0). 
CAB 79/70/2 4. Commandos for "OVERLORD". 
CAB 79/70/8 3. Commandos for "OVERLORD". 
CAB 79/70/16 1. Combined Operations - Visit of Liaison Officers to USA. 
2. Employment of Greek Troops. 
3. US Aircraft for SOE purposes. 
4. Commandos for "OVERLORD". 
War Cabinet and Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Memoranda 
CAB 80/10/57 NORWAY. INDEPENDENT COMPANIES. Memo. by C. I. G. S. 
covering draft message to F. O., Narvik. 
CAB 80/14/60 RAIDING OPERATIONS POLICY. Memo. by Director of 
Combined Operations. 
CAB 80/21/23 RAIDING FORCES REQUIREMENTS. Report by Director of 
Combined Operations. 
CAB 80/31/24 COMBINED OPERATIONS AND RAIDS. Draft directives to 
Adviser on Combined Operations and C. -in-C., I Ionic Forces. 
CAB 80/31/29 COMBINED OPERATIONS AND RAIDS. Directive to Adviser on 
Combined Operations. 
291 
CAB 80/32/38 RAIDS BY C. -IN-C., HOME FORCES. Memo. by Adviser on 
Combined Operations. 
CAB 80/35/57 RAIDING OPERATIONS. PROCEDURE FOR: Note by Chief of 
Combined Operations. 
CAB 80/56/62 SPECIAL SERVICE TROOPS: RAISING NEW COMMANDOS. 
Note by Secretary. 
CAB 80/58/41 RAIDS. Copy of a Minute dated 18.7.41. from the Director of 
Combined Operations to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
CAB 80/59/6 RAIDS. Copy of a Minute dated 2nd August, 1941, from the 
Director of Combined Operations to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
CAB 80/61/30 RAIDS ON NORWAY. Note by Adviser on Combined Operations. 
CAB 80/61/35 PROPOSED RAID ON NORWAY. Note by Adviser on Combined 
Operations. 
CAB 80/61/46 PROPOSED RAID IN TILE BAYONNE AREA. Memo by Adviser 
on Combined Operations. 
CAB 80/62/55 MINOR RAIDS. Memorandum by the Chief of Combined 
Operations. 
CAB 80/66/50 LIMITATIONS OF SMALL SCALE RAIDING. Memorandum by 
Chief of Combined Operations. 
CAB 80/66/67 SMALL SCALE RAIDING. Memorandum by the Chief of 
Combined Operations. 
CAB 80/76/72 SMALL SCALE RAIDS - RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING 
AND MOUNTING. Note by Combined Operations I leadquarters. 
CAB 80/78/56 PROVISION OF COMMANDOS FOR "OVERLORD". 
Memorandum by Chief of Combined Operations. 
CAB 80/78/77 COMMANDO RAIDS ON "CROSSBOW" SITES. Memorandum 
by the Chief of Combined Operations. 





et Office: Historical Section: Archivist and Librarian Files 
Account of operation "Colossus", combined operations raid in Italy, 
1941 Feb. 10, by Lieutenant A. J. Dean Drummond. 
Syria: report on Commando operations in the Litani river battle. 
Accounts of the actions of the Independent Companies, 1940 May. 
Operations by Long-Range Desert Group in Aegean Sea during 
autumn-winter 1943. 
Cabinet Ofce: Special Secret Information Centre: Files 
292 
CAB 121/177 Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation, Royal Marine Group, 
Special Troops and Commandos. 
War Cabinet and Cabinet Ofce: British Joint Staff Mission and British Joint Services 
Mission: Washington Office Records 
CAB 122/1328 US liaison officers to Combined Operations Headquarters, London. 
DEFE Series: Records of the Ministry of Defence 
Combined Operations Headquarters, and Ministry of Defence, Combined Operations 
Headquarters later Amphibious Warfare Headquarters: Records 
DEFE 2/4 Headquarters. 
DEFE 2/37 No I Commando. 
DEFE 2/37 No 2 Commando. 
DEFE 2/38 No 3 Commando. 
DEFE 2/40 No 4 Commando. 
DEFE 2/43 No 6 Commando. 
DEFE 2/43 No 7 Commando. 
DEFE 2/45 Commando Bombardment Units: progress reports. 
DEFE 2/45 Holding Operational Commando. 
DEFE 2/45 No 10 Commando. 
DEFE 2/45 No 12 Commando. 
DEFE 2/45 No 14 Commando. 
DEFE 2/45 No 2 Special Service Battalion. 
DEFE 2/45 No 3 Special Service Battalion. 
DEFE 2/45 No 4 Special Service Battalion. 
DEFE 2145 No 5 Special Service Battalion. 
DEFE 2/46 No 4 Commando Brigade. 
DEFE 2/48 No 1 (RM) Commando. 
DEFE 2/48 No 40 (RM) Commando. 
DEFE 2/48 No 41 (RM) Commando. 
293 
DEFE 2/48 No 42 (RM) Commando. 
DEFE 2/53 Commando Wing GHQ 2nd Echelon. 
DEFE 2/53 HQ No 3 Special Service Brigade. 
DEFE 2/53 No I Special Service Brigade. 
DEFE 2/53 No 1 Special Service Brigade Signal Troop. 
DEFE 2/54 Special Service Brigade. 
DEFE 2/55 Special Service Brigade, 
DEFE 2/56 Special Service Brigade, GI IQ 2nd Echelon. 
DEFE 2/57 Special Service Brigade, (Main). 
DEFE 2/349 "Lighter" "Copper" "Flipper" and "Exporter" operations at Bardia 
and Litani River and translation of paper entitled The Commandos 
captured from the Vichy French in the Middle East c1943. 
DEFE 2/700 History of the Commandos in the Mediterranean, 1943-1945. 
DEFE 2/701 No 4 Commando Brigade chronological history. 
DEFE 2/740 Special Boat Unit: reports, diaries etc.. 
DEFE 2/741 Special Boat Unit: notes on objectives, reports etc.. 
DEFE 2/742 Special Boat Unit (IIMS RODENT): minutes of meetings, general 
correspondence and signals etc.. 
DEFE 2/766 The Small Operations Group: handbook. 
DEFE 2/780 Histories and accounts of Chief of Combined Operations 
Representative Washington, No 10 Inter-Allied Commando and 
Small Operations Group in South-East Asia. 
DEFE 2/787 Raids and operations in the Middle East: reports. 
DEFE 2/843 Commando casualties 1940-1945. Incomplete returns. 
DEFE 2/849 Special Service Brigade: equipment, appointments, standing orders 
and instructions. 
DEFE 2/927 Special boat unit organisation: minutes of meetings, formation of 
unit, functions, provision of headquarters and re-organisation of 
Royal Marine and Army Commandos. 
DEFE 2/952 RM Boom Patrol Detachment: reports on operations. 
DEFE 2/953 RM Boom Patrol Detachment: formation. 
DEFE 2/957 Small scale raiding force: procedures, responsibility etc.. 
294 
DEFE 2/960 Special Service Brigade: recruitment standards, re-organisation, 
wearing of flashes etc. 
DEFE 2/961 Royal Naval Beach Commandos: complements, organisation, 
reports and policy. 
DEFE 2/963 Clearance of underwater obstacles: organisation of landing craft 
Obstruction Clearance Units. 
DEFE 2/970 Special Boat Unit operations: reports. 
DEFE 2/971 Combined Operations pilotage parties: brief on information 
required, establishment, function and use. 
DEFE 2/977 History of 46 (RM) Commando. Activities of No 10 (Inter-Allied) 
Commando. 
DEFE 2/987 History of Naval Beach Control Parties (formerly Royal Naval 
Beach Commandos). 
DEFE 2/988 Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment. 
DEFE 2/1016 Deployment of Troops in No. 10(1. A) Commando. 
DEFE 2/1035 Special Boat Unit organisation: proposals, requirements and 
administration in South-East Asia Command, disbandment and 
recommendation for awards. 
DEFE 2/1036 Special Boat Unit organisation: proposals, requirements and 
administration in South-East Asia Command, disbandment and 
recommendation for awards. 
DEPE 2/1041 Royal Marine Commandos: formation, re-organisation, move of 3 
Special Service Brigade overseas. 
DEFE 2/1051 Special Service Brigade: role, re-organisation etc.. 
DEFE 2/1073 Special Service Group: monthly letters. 
DEFE 2/1074 Special Service Group: monthly letters. 
DEFE 2/1091 Commandos in action: reports, 
DEFE 2/1093 Small scale raiding force: policy, formation, responsibility etc.. 
DEFE 2/1101 Combined Operations pilotage parties: composition and movement 
of teams, complement, requirements for beach reconnaissance etc.. 
DEFE 2/1105 Requirement for commandos in India and South East Asia. 
DEFE 2/1107 30 Assault Unit (formerly Special Engineering Unit, formerly 30 
Commando, later 30 Advanced Unit): mobilisation, control, 
disbandment, Ilonours and Awards. 
295 
DEFE 2/1111 Combined Operations pilotage party: progress reports and honours 
and Awards. 
DEFE 2/1116 Combined Operations pilotage parties: history and reports. 
DEFE 2/1134 Training policy for Commandos. 
DEFE 2/1152 Combined Operations pilotage parties: progress reports. 
DEFE 2/1192 Combined Operations pilotage parties: use of aircraft for long-range 
reconnaissance. 
DEFE 2/1203 Small operations group: formation, organisation, stores, appraisal 
etc.. 
DEFE 2/1204 Combined Operations pilotage parties: progress reports. 
DEFE 2/1214 Combined Operations pilotage party: awards and medals. 
DEFE 2/1222 Special service group: re-organisation for the Far East. 
DEFE 2/1223 Special service group: re-organisation for the Far East. 
DEFE 2/1224 Special service group: re-organisation for the Far East. 
DEFE 2/1257 Small Operations Group organisation. 
DEFE 2/1325 Disbandment of the Commando Group: Order of the Day. 
DEFE 2/1747 The Small Operations Group, South East Asia Command: 
formation, composition and functions: record of operations carried 
out in South East Asia: pamphlet SOG - The Small Operations 
Group. 
DEFE 2/2084 Combined operations pilotage parties. 
FO Series: Records created and inherited by the Foreign Office 
Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966 
FO 371 /4 1 904 Special operations in France: arming and maintenance of the 
Maquis. 
HS Series: Records of Special Operations Executive 
Special Operations Executive: Far East. -Registered Files 
HS 1/164 Commando group. 
HS 1/165 OSS/SOE cooperation. 
HS 1/212 Liaison SAS/SOE; Force 136; Clandestine ops; SIS reports; SOE 
reports. 
296 
HS 1/279 Military establishments: 92 (Gurkha Force Nucleus) to 94 (Jedburgh 
operations). 
HS 1/287 Jedburgh personnel. 
Special Operations Executive: Group C, Scandinavia: Registered Files 
HS 2/53 SOE/OSS liaison. 
HS 2/116 Jedburghs: personnel. 
HS 2/134 OSS activities in Norway. 
HS 2/219 OSS/SOE co-ordination. 
Special Operations Executive: Africa and Middle East Group: Registered Files 
HS 3/15 OSS/SOE co-ordination. 
HS 3/41 French special services. 
HS 3/56 SOE/OSS coordination. 
HS 3/57 SOE/OSS coordination. 
HS 3/229 Projects: sabotage of enemy ships; storage of material for Greek 
guerrillas; OSS activities. 
Special Operations Executive: Balkans: Registered Files 
HS 5/87 Resistance movements, partisan groups and forces. 
HS 5/445 Syros report; survey of Aegean Islands and political personalities; 
escaped and enticed caiques; reconnaissance of Aegean islands by 
St Nichlos; activities of raiding forces. 
HS 5/608 NOAH'S ARK; codeword infiltration of Raiding Support Regiment 
(RSR) units, list of area commanders. 
HS 5/612 NOAH'S ARK: operational instructions, infiltrations of RSR 
detachments and other groups. 
Special Operations Executive: Western Europe: Registered Files 
HS 6/218 SAS operations. 
HS 6/604 SAS operations under SIIAEF control. 
Special Operations Executive: Histories and War Diaries: Registered Files 
HS 7/2 Special Force headquarters. 
297 
HS 7/17 Jedburghs in Europe 1942-1944. 
HS 7/18 Jedburghs in Europe. 
HS 7/19 Jedburghs in Europe. 
HS 7/117 Force 136: Special Forces Development Centre 1943-1945. 
Ministry of Economic Warfare, Special Operations Executive and successors: Headquarters: 
Records 
HS 8/288 OVERLORD: Jedburghs. 
HS 8/381 SFHQ (Special Forces Headquarters) operational procedures. 
HS 8/833 Selection of title Special Force Headquarters; SO/SOG London 
group. 
WO Series: Records created or inherited by the War Office. Armed Forces. Judge Advocate General 
and related bodies 
War Office and successors: Registered Files (General Series) 
WO 32/9729 ARMY ORGANISATION: General (Code 14(A)): Reorganisation 
of Special Service Units to form Commandos. 
WO 32/9781 ARMY ORGANISATION: Airborne (Code 14(P)): Army Air 
Corps: formation: Glider Pilot Regiment, Parachute Regiment, 
Special Air Service Regiment, Airborne Forces Depot, Airborne 
Forces Holding Unit, Parachute Battalion. 
WO 32/10415 ARMY ORGANISATION: Commandos (Code 14(Q)): Special 
Service Brigade. 
WO 32/10416 ARMY ORGANISATION: Commandos (Code 14(Q)): 
Commandos: re-organisation. 
WO 32/10417 ARMY ORGANISATION: Commandos (Code 14(Q)): Distribution 
of and Policy for upkeep of Commandos. 
War Office: Reports, Memoranda and Papers (0 and A Series) 
WO 33/1668 Commando Training Instruction 1. 
WO 33/1669 Independent Company Training Instruction 1. 
War Office: Directorate of Military Operations and Military Intelligence, and predecessors: 
Correspondence and Papers 
WO 106/1665 Minor operations and raids. 
298 
WO 106/1672 Special Operations: Naval role. 
WO 106/1734 Special operations; demolitions in France. 
WO 106/1735 Special operations; demolitions in St. Malo. 
WO 106/1740 Report on operation "COLLAR"; report on a small raid near 
Boulogne. 
WO 106/1829 Independent companies; instructions. 
WO 106/1867 Movements; independent companies. 
WO 106/1889 Independent Companies for Norway. 
WO 106/1908 Independent companies; situation reports. 
WO 106/1919 Scandinavia Operations: Independent Companies. 
WO 106/1944 Independent Companies; formation of and movement to Norway. 
WO 106/1974 "Plough"; special Force for re-conquest of Norway. 
WO 106/2332 Popski's private Army. 
WO 106/2958 CHANNEL ISLANDS: Operation "Ambassador", attack by 
Commandos on Guernsey: report. 
WO 106/3946 Chiefs of Staff intelligence reports and special operations. 
WO 106/3959 Operations "Maple and Baobab": Jan., 1944: report by Lieutenant 
Worcester 2°d Special Air Services Regiment. 
WO I06/3965B H. Q. Special Operations -Mediterranean. 
WO 106/3966 Special operations: situation reports. 
WO 106/4115 Raid on Dieppe: report by Chief of Combined Operations on lessons 
learnt. 
WO 106/4116 "Chess": reconnaissance raid on French coast by commando troops. 
WO 106/4117 Reconnaissance and raiding operation's procedure. 
WO 106/4158 Commandos and Special Air Services Troops. 
WO 106/4194 "Rutter": combined operation raid on Dieppe. 
WO 106/4290 "Dragoon": Operations "Hardtack", "Candlestick" and "Manacle": 
raids on French coast. 
WO 106/4322A Special operations activities and operational situation reports: 
France and the Low Countries. 
299 
WO 106/4323 Special operations activities and operational situation reports: 
Middle East and Balkans. 
WO 106/4460 "Amherst" and "Keystone": special air services operation. 
WO 106/5450 Special operations planning. 
WO 106/6092 Liaison between Maj Eifler of Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
and British authorities. 
War Ofce: Home Forces: War Diaries, Second World War 
WO 166/4111 5 Training Battalion Scots Guards. 
WO 166/15539 1 Special Services Bde.. 
War Office: British Forces, Middle East: War Diaries, Second World War 
WO 169/11083 1 Demolition Sqn.. 
WO 169/12708 Lt. Repair Sec. att. 1 S. A. S 11. Q. Raiding Force. 
WO 169/17278 Lt Repair Squad Raiding Force. 
WO 169/19917 Raiding Forces (Simi). 
War Office: Central Mediterranean Forces, (British Element): War Diaries, Second World 
War 
WO 170/1364 Raiding Support Regt.. 
WO 170/3962B I Demolition Sqn. Popski's Private Army. 
WO 170/4012 Special Boat Service. 
WO 170/4825 Raiding Support Regiment: Raiding Sup. Regt.. 
WO 170/7362 1 Demolition Sqn. Special Force. 
WO 17017529 Special Boat Service. 
War Ofce: British and Allied Land Forces, South East Asia: War Diaries, Second World War 
WO 172/475 17th Indian Division G Branch. 
WO 172/601 63rd Indian Infantry Brigade. 
WO 172/2267 'B' Special Service Sqn.. 
War Of ce: West African Command: War Diaries, Second World War 
WO 173/307 Special Service Bde. Det.. 
300 
WO 173/308 4 Commando Det.. 
War Of ce:: Directorate of Military Operations and Plans, later Directorate of Military 
Operations: Files concerning Military Planning, Intelligence and Statistics (Collation Files) 
WO 193/74 Institution of "Plough" specialised units and equipment prepared by 
Americans. 
WO 193/77 Composition and mobilization of Special Forces. 
WO 193/384 Independent companies. 
WO 193/405 Special Air Service and Special Service activities. 
WO 193/620 Re-organisation of special operations in Middle East and control of 
funds. 
WO 193/624 Liaison between Special Operations Executive and related 
organisations. 
WO 193/673 General policy, including special Allied Airborne Reconnaissance 
Force. 






es: Military Headquarters Papers, Second World War 
Special service units. 
Liaison with Commandos and employment of, in the event of a raid. 
Formation of Irregular Commandos. 
Enemy invasion or raids : U. S. Army units operational role. 
Reports on commando raids : operations Acid Drop, Archery and 
Bristle. 
War Office: Middle East Forces; Military Headquarters Papers, Second World War 
WO 201/721 Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment: brief history of'L' Detachment 
SAS Brigade and 1" SAS Regiment 1941-1942. Copy of report in 
WO 218/98 and WO 218/173. 
WO 201/724 Appreciation of Operation "Heartless": landing of special force at 
Derna. 
WO 201/727 Raiding Forces: personal file of Lt Colonel J 13 l laselden. 
WO 201/728 Re-organisation of Special Service, 
WO 201/731 Special Forces: operational questions. 
301 
WO 201/732 Special Forces: operational questions. 
WO 201/735 Reports on operations: Raiding Forces at Benghazi. 
WO 201/736 Reports on Operation Anglo by Special Boat Section: attack on 
aerodromes at Maritza and Calato, island of Rhodes. 
WO 201/738 Long Range Desert Group: report on Section 1 and Section 2 raid on 
aerodrome at Benina. 
WO 201/739 Report on operation "Caravan": raid on Barce, Benghazi, Tobruk. 
WO 201/743 Raiding Forces: personal copies of GHQ operation instructions. 
Including Operation Longstop. 
WO 201/745 Notes and reports on individual raids including Operation 
Agreement and Operation Nicety. 
WO 201/747 Special Air Service Regiment: Battle file. 
WO 201/748 "Agreement", "Bigamy", "Nicety": report. 
WO 201/752 Raiding Forces: appointment of Commander. 
WO 201/754 Long Range Desert Groups: operations, 
WO 201/756 Raiding Forces: plans for operations. 
WO 201/760 Long Range Desert Group: summary of operations. 
WO 201/761 Long Range Desert Group: situation report. 
WO 201/768 Seaborne raiding operations: Chief of Staff Committee papers. 
WO 201/771 Long Range Desert Group and Raiding Forces: general policy and 
reports. 
WO 201/784 Raiding Forces: Operation Hess. 
WO 201/785 "L" Detachment Special Air Service Brigade: Special Air Service 
Parachute detachment: history. 
WO 201/787 Raiding operations in the Aegean: employment of special troops. 
WO 201/788 Naval co-operation with First Special Airborne Service and other 
raiding forces. 
WO 201/791 Operation reports of Raiding Forces. 
WO 201/792 Operation reports of Raiding Forces. 
WO 201/796 Aegean: role of Raiding Forces. 
WO 201/797 Reorganisation of raiding forces. Future of Long Range Desert 
Group and Indian Long Range Squadron, 
302 
WO 201/799 Raiding Forces: operational reports in Aegean. 
WO 201/802 Advance Raiding Forces: situation reports, 
WO 201/807 Long Range Desert Group: Diary and narrative. 
WO 201/808 Long Range Desert Group: Diary and narrative. 
WO 201/809 Long Range Desert Group: Diary and narrative. 
WO 201/810 Long Range Desert Group: Diary and narrative. 
WO 201/811 Long Range Desert Group: Diary and narrative. 
WO 201/812 Long Range Desert Group: Diary and narrative. 
WO 201/813 Long Range Desert Group: Diary and narrative. 
WO 201/814 Long Range Desert Group: Diary and narrative. 
WO 201/815 Long Range Desert Group: Diary and narrative. 
WO 201/816 Long Range Desert Group: Diary and narrative. 
WO 201/817 Long Range Desert Group: Diary and narrative. 
WO 201/818 Long Range Desert Group: Diary and narrative. 
WO 201/863 Special Services in Levant (Services Speciaux du Levant): 
personnel. 
WO 201/1653 Operations: raiding force. 
WO 201/1739 G. H. Q. M. E.: op instructions and organisation of Raiding Force. 
WO 201/1755 Dodecanese operations: raiding force. 
WO 201/2152 Captured enemy report: enemy appraisal of British Commandos. 
WO 201/2202 Raiding forces : directive to Commanders. 
WO 201/2263 Balkans : guerrilla operations special forces. 
WO 201/2624 1 Special Service Regiment: provision of personnel for Irregular 
Commandos. 
WO 201/2831 Operation Tenement: attack by raiding forces on the Island of Symi 
in the Aegean. 
WO 201/2836 Raiding forces: history of an independent command in the Aegean, 
WO 201/2839 Special operations in Italy Jan. -Feb. 1944, 
War Office: South East Asia Command: Military Headquarters Papers, Second World War 
303 
WO 203/131 Special Operations Executive: small group operations. 
WO 203/1255 Small operation groups: formation and administrative directives. 
WO 203/1263 Small operations group: formation, function, and organisation. 
WO 203/1740 Commandos: employment in S. E. A. C. formations. 
WO 203/1792 3 Commando Brigade: report on operations in Arakan. 
WO 203/2102 Employment of Commandos: paper No 94/1. 
WO 203/2144 Administration of British Clandestine and Special Forces in 
S. E. A, C.: instruction. 
WO 203/3426 Special Air Service Units: employment in S. E, A. C.. 
WO 203/3437 Small Operations Group: formation and administration. 
WO 203/3449 Royal Marine boom patrol detachment. 
WO 203/3460 Role of combined operations pilotage parties. 
WO 203/3545 Small Operations Group: formation and organisation. 
WO 203/3547 Special Service Brigade: proposals for operational employment. 
WO 203/3607 Commando brigades: operational requirements. 
WO 203/4594 Commando Units: demands. 
WO 203/4796 Combined Operations Pilotage Parties: organisation and activities. 
WO 203/4797 Special Boat Units: organisation. 
WO 203/4800 Small Operations Groups: policy on formation and dispersal, 
WO 203/4802 Employment of Commando Brigades. 
WO 203/5416 Joint and Executive Planning Staff papers No. 94 & 94/1 on 
employment of Commandos. 
WO 203/6386 Duties and functions of OSS in SEAC. 
War Office: Allied Forces, Mediterranean Theatre: Military Headquarters Papers, Second 
World War 
WO 204/1527 Commandos: training, deployment and operational use. 
WO 204/1527 Commandos: training, deployment and operational use. 
WO 204/1532 First Special Service Force (trained for operations in snow): 
proposed employment: movements. Movement of Ranger battalions. 
WO 204/1564 Raiding forces: planning and reports. 
304 
WO 204/1565 Raiding forces: policy. 
WO 204/1949 Raiding forces: policy. 
WO 204/1950 Raiding forces: operational planning papers. 
WO 204/2020 Special Air Service operations in Italy: planning papers and reports. 
WO 204/2030B AFHQ History of Special Operations. 
WO 204/6308 HQ Allied Armies Italy: reports from G. Special Operations. 
WO 204/6806 Special Forces, Commandos, Long Range Desert Group, Popski's 
Private Army etc: administration, employment and movement. 
WO 204/6807 Special Forces, Commandos, Long Range Desert Group, Popski's 
Private Army etc: administration, employment and movement. 
WO 204/6810 Long Range Desert Group operations in the Balkans: administrative 
instructions and reports. 
WO 204/7222 Special Service Brigade: operations. 
WO 204/7289 2671 Special Reconnaissance Battalion, U. S. Army: reports. 
WO 204/7577 Report of a raid by 2 Commando on the island of Solta, Dalmation 
Coast. 
WO 204/7960 Minor operations and raids in the Mediterranean Theatre by Special 
Forces and Special Air Service units in support of Operation I lusky. 
WO 204/8277 Operations in Italy: reports of battles at Termoli and on the River 
Trigno. 
WO 204/8397 War establishment: infantry and commando units. 
WO 204/8425 Special operations in the Adriatic: policy, planning papers, 
appreciations and reports. 
WO 204/8426 Special operations in the Adriatic: policy, planning papers, 
appreciations and reports. 
WO 204/8427 Special operations in the Adriatic: policy, planning papers, 
appreciations and reports. 
WO 204/8461 Greece: report on the activities of 9 Commando and attached units 
(Foxforce). 
WO 204/8491 Operations in North Adriatic by Long Range Desert Group and 
Special Boat Service. 
WO 204/8500 Long Range Desert Group: policy for employment and 
miscellaneous correspondence. 
305 
WO 204/8512 Long Range Desert Group operations against the Italian, Yugoslav 
and Greek coasts: orders and reports. 
WO 204/9681 Raiding forces in the Adriatic: narrative of operations. 
WO 204/10185 Establishment of Military HQ Balkans Land Forces Adriatic and 
Balkan Air Force. 
WO 204/10242 Raiding forces: availability and employment. 
WO 204/10243 Coordination of special forces. 
WO 204/10285 Special Air Service: miscellaneous reports and correspondence. 
WO 204/10306 US Operational Groups: operation orders, mainland of Yugoslavia. 
WO 204/10392 A. F. H. Q. History of Special Operations: Mediterranean Theatre. 
WO 204/10429 British and United States forces operations June 1944 to May 1945: 
report by Commander Land Forces Adriatic. 
WO 204/12836 OSS: operations. 
WO 204/12837 OSS: policy. 
WO 204/12980 OSS Special operations. 
WO 204/12981 OSS Special operations. 
WO 204/12982 OSS Special operations. 
WO 204/12983 OSS Special operations. 
WO 204/12984 OSS Special operations. 
WO 204/12985 OSS Special operations. 
WO 204/12986 OSS Special operations. 
War Office: 21 Army Group: Military Headquarters Papers, Second World War 
WO 205/92 Reports on Special Air Service operations. 
WO 205/136 Special Service Troops: operational command and control. 
WO 205/208 Special Air Services: plans, instructions. Part I. 
War Office: Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence, and Directorate of Military 
Intelligence; Ministry of Defence, Defence Intelligence Staf : Files 
WO 208/1262 Infantry; commandos and special tactical units. 
WO 208/1866 Report on partisan warfare. 
306 
WO 208/2002 Partisan movements; appreciations, historical reports, origin and 
development, operational reports, etc.. 
WO 208/2581 Intelligence report file of the Kami organization (Special Service 
Organization). 
WO 208/3108 Notes from theatres of war 1-17,21. 
War Of ce: Office of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. - Papers 
WO 216/54 Re-organisation and location of Special Service troops: revised 
directive to Director, Combined Operations. 















H. Q. Special Service Bde.. 
H. Q. Special Service Bde.. 
H. Q. Special Service Bde. (Det. ). 
3 Commando. 
12 Commando. 









WO 218/58 14 Commando. 
WO 218/64 2 Commando. 
WO 218/96 1 Special Air Si 
WO 218/97 
2 Commando. 
I Special Air Service Regiment. Includes war diary for 13 Squadron, 
I SS Regiment for Oct 1942. 
1 Special Air Service (1 S. A. S. Regt) including I Special Boat 
Section. Raiding Forces Headquarters, including Special float 
Squadron and Special Raiding, Squadron, I Special Air Service (1 














H. Q. Raiding Force. 
Raiding Support Regt.. 
2 Special Boat Sec.. 
2 Special Boat Sec.. 
M' Detachment I Special Air Service Regiment and M' 
Detachment, Special Boat Squadron, 1 Special Air Service 
Regiment. 
H. Q. Raiding Forces. 
L Detachment SAS Brigade (later I SAS Regt): formation, training 
and report of operations in Mediterranean area. 
2 SAS Regt: report of operations in Italy from Taranto to Termoli. 
2 SAS Regt: report on operations against enemy lines of 
communication in Italy between Arcona and Pescarra. 
Operational employment of SAS forces. 
Employment of SAS troops. 
Long Range Desert Group. 
War Ofce: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force: Military Headquarters 
Papers, Second World War 
WO 219/481 U. S. Rangers: employment. 
WO 219/548 1 Special Service Force: disbandment and brief history. 
WO 219/1872 Redeployment of commando units from the Mediterranean Theatre 
for use in Overlord. 
WO 219/2196 Raids and reconnaissances: reports on minor operations carried out. 
WO 219/2329 Liaison with Special Force IL. Q.. 
WO 219/2389 Operation Overlord: Special Air Service operations. 
WO 219/2398 Strategic planning for resistance and Special Air Service operations. 
WO 21912674 Special Air Service: command and control, war establishments 
equipment and deployment including French and Belgian units. 
WO 219/2877 Employment of the Special Air Service units: policy. 
WO 219/5304 OSS units. 
308 
War Office: Directorate of Military Training, later Directorate of Army Training: Papers 
WO 231/2 Operation "Claymore" (raid on German-held ports in Lofoten 
Islands): brief account. 
WO 231/5 Operation "Archery": report of a raid on Vaagso Island, South-West 
Norway. 
WO 231/28 Notes on the operations of the Long Range Desert Group. 
War Office: Directorate of Staff Duties: Papers 
WO 260/32 SCISSORS: formation of special infantry and independent 
companies: notes on meetings. 
War Office: Headquarters Allied Land Forces Norway, War Crimes Investigation Branch: 
Registered Files (A/GI/WCI Series) 
WO 331/14 Operation MUSKETOON, commando raid on Glomfjord Power 
Station Norway: capture of allied personnel and transfer to 
Germany. 
WO 331/16 Operation FRESHMAN, destruction of heavy water plant at Rjukan 
Norway: killing of survivors of raid at Stavanger, Norway. 
National Archives and Record Administration [US], College Park, Maryland 
Record Group 24 - Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel 
Historical Records of Navy Training Activities, 1940-1945 
Box 28; Training activities at ATB Fort Pierce, Florida. 
Box 34; S&R Training. 
Record Group 38 - Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
World War II War Diaries 
Box 535; UDTs. 
World War II Action and Operational Reports 
Boxes 788-791; UDTs. 
Record Group 80 - General Records of the Department of the Navy. 1798-1947 
Formerly Security-Classified General Correspondence of the CNO/Secretary of the Navy, 
1940-1947 
309 
Box 1009; S76-2/A9-4 to S76-3/QR9 
Box 1452; S76-2/AVP to S76-3 
Box 1762; S76-1/A9-4 to S76-3 
Box 1763; S76-3 
Box 1764; S76-3/A1-1 to S78 
Box 2148; S76-1 to S76-6 
Box 2414; S76-1 to S76-3 
Box 2415; S76-3 to S78 
Record Group 127 - Records of the U. S. Marine Corps 
History and Museums Division, Reports, Studies and Plans relating to World War II Military 
Operations, 1941-1956 
Box 5; NND 984110 
History and Museums Division, Subject Files Relating to World War 11 
Box 7; Beach Reconnaissance (General). 
Box 13; Coastwatchers. 
Box 15; Dieppe. 
Box 46; Reconnaissance. 
Box 57; Ft. Pierce School. 
Box 58; Warfare: Guerrilla. 
USMC Geographic Files 
Box 2; Bougainville. 
Box 27; Gilberts. 
Box 35; Gilberts. 
Box 36; Gilberts. 
Box 38; Guadalcanal. 
Box 39; Guadalcanal. 
Box 40; Guadalcanal. 
310 
Box 41; Guadalcanal. 
Box 42; Guadalcanal. 
Box 43; Guadalcanal. 
Box 44; Guadalcanal. 
Box 45; Guadalcanal. 
Box 183; Makin. 
Box 315; Russell Islands. 
Entry 46B - Records of Ground Combat Units 
Box 66; 1' Raider Regiment War Diary, 15 March 1943 - 30 September 1943. 
Box 69; 2°d Raider Battalion War Diary, I May 1943 - 31 August 1943. 
Box 76; 3rd Raider Battalion War Diary, 15 June 1943 - 31 June 1943. 
Box 77; 4th Raider Battalion War Diary. 
Box 78; Fifth Amphibious Force UDT Recommendations Based on Flintlock, 14 
March 1944 - 14 March 1944. 
Box 79; V MAC [Fifth Marine Amphibious Corps] Amphibious Reconnaissance 
Battalion Readiness Reports, April 1944 - June 1944. 
Box 100; Historical Branch Account of Makin Island Raid, 16 August 1942 - 18 
August 1942. 
Record Grout) 165 - Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs 
Entry 418 - Office of Director of Plans and Operations. Security Classified General 
Correspondence, 1943-43 
Box 682; Folder 320.2 Africa, Case 584 to 649 
Box 1249; Folder 381 ETO, Case 108 to 111 
Entry 421 - Records of Operations Division, Top-Secret "American-British-Canadian" 
Correspondence Relating to the Organisational Planning and General Combat Operations 
During World War 11 and the Early Postwar Period 1940-1948 
ABC 381 Bolero (3-16-42) Sec. 1; Direction for formation of Commando Unit. 
Record Group 218 - Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Entry I- Central Decimal Files 1942-1945 
311 
Box 8; Folder 000.51; Subversive activity, Jedburghs. 
Box 150; Folder 323.361; Command for US-British operations. 
Box 151; Folder 323.361; Command for US-British operations. 
Box 152; Folder 323.361; Command for US-British operations. 
Box 281; Folder 370.03; Development of technique of the passage of underwater and 
beach obstacles. 
Box 284; Folder 370.23 (5-2-44); Coordination of resistance groups. 
Box 285; Folder 370.5 (2-2-43); Employment of FSSF. 
Box 369; Folder 385 (8-6-42); Agreements between OSS and SOE. 
Box 372; Folder 385; OSS. 
Box 373; Folder 385; OSS. 
Box 374; Folder 385; OSS. 
Box 375; Folder 385; OSS. 
Entry 2- Geographic Files 1942-1945 
Box 13; Folder 370.64; Guerrilla operations in the Balkans. 
Box 58; Folder 350.05; Dieppe Raid. 
Box 153; Folder 385; Special Operations from North Africa. 
Box 158; Folder 381 (7-15-42); Employment of FSSF. 
Record Group 226 - Records of the Office of Strategic Services 1940-1946 
Entry I- R+A Office of the Chief General Correspondence 
Box 13; Folder 10; OSS: Maritime Unit. 
Entry 92 - COI/OSS Central Files 
Box 111; Folder 49; Commando Training. 
Box 159; Folders 39-40; OSS: Maritime Units. 
Box 160; Folders 1-8; OSS: Maritime Units. 
Box 192; Folders 1-5; OSS: Ilistory Det. 101. 
Box 271; Folders 1-2; OSS: Maritime Unit. 
312 
Box 329; Folders 10-12; North Africa OG. 
Box 490; Folders 26-28; OSS: Maritime Unit in Asia. 
Box 491; Folder 3-7; OSS: Maritime Unit in Europe. 
Box 491; Folder 8; SAS Troops. 
Box 491; Folders 15-16; OSS: Maritime Unit in SEA. 
Box 495; Folders 10; OSS: Maritime Unit in Mediterranean. 
Box 534; Folder 8; OSS: Diving Unit. 
Box 546; Folders 9-11; OSS: Underwater Operations. 
Box 547; OSS: Underwater Operations. 
Entry 97 - Algiers Files 
Box 2; Folder 9; OG (Algiers). 
Box 40; Algiers. 
Box 41; Algiers. 
Entry 99 - OSS History Office 
Box 2; Folder 4; London Office Progress Reports. 
Box 16; French Resistance. 
Box 17; French Resistance. 
Box 28; 2677t' Regiment progress reports. 
Box 29; 2677th Regiment progress reports. 
Box 34; OGs on Vis. 
Box 35; OGs (Patch review 2). 
Box 36; OGs on Corsica. 
Box 42; Reports on value of partisan operations in Italy. 
Box 44; Folder 182; MEDTO Co. B. Spec. Recon Bn. Operational Reports 1944. 
Box 45; Folders 184-186; MEDTO Greece and Italy OGs. 
Box 46; OG in Italy. 
Box 54; OG in Balkans and METO MU. 
313 
Box 63; Reports on MU [3/4]. 
Box 64; Det 404. 
Box 65; Det 101. 
Box 66; Det 101. 
Box 67; Det 101. 
Box 74; OSS in CBI. 
Box 98; History of OG and MU. 
Box 118; NORSO. 
Entry 101 - Records of the Jedburgh Teams 
Boxes 1 and 2 
Entry 103 - Records of the Special Forces and Jedburgh Mission Reports 
Boxes 1-3 
Entry 108C - Washington Registry SlIntel Field Files 
Box 12; Folders 58-59; Operational Groups. 
Entry 133 - Washington Registry Office Chronological Files 
Box 16; Folders 12-13; MLJ (Washington). 
Entry 136- Washington and Field Station Files 
Box 19; Folders 197; MU (Bari). 
Box 140; Folders 1460-1467; OG (Washington). 
Box 141; Folder 1468-1469; OG (Washington). 
Entry 139 - Washington and Field Station Files, Honolulu 
Box 73; Folder 710; MU. 
Entry 143 - Field Station Files: Calcutta and Caserta 
Box 5; Folders 71-83; MU (Caserta). 
Box 6; Folders 81-101; MU (Caserta). 
314 
Box 7; Folders 102-113; MU (Caserta). 
Box 8; Folders 114-119; OG (Caserta). 
Box 9; Folders 120-126; OG (Caserta). 
Box 10; Folders 127-137; OG (Caserta). 
Box 11; Folders 138-148; OG (Caserta). 
Box 11; Folder 145; History of 2671 Sp. Rec. Bn.. 
Box 12; Folders 149-154; OG (Caserta). 
Box 13; Folder 154A; OG (Caserta). 
Box 14; Folders 155-157; OG (Caserta). 
Entry 144 - Field Station Files: Algiers, Austria, Bari, Belgium, Burma, Cairo and Calcutta 
Box 68; Folders 586-99A; OG (Bari). 
Box 70; Folders 631-641; OG (Burma). 
Box 70; Folder 630; MU (Burma). 
Box 70; Folders 642-646; MU (Cairo). 
Box 71; Folders 647-62; MU (Cairo). 
Box 72; Folders 663-78; MU (Cairo). 
Box 73; Folders 679-91; MU (Cairo). 
Box 74; Folders 691-710; MU (Cairo) 
Box 75; Folders 711-727; MU (Cairo). 
Box 76; Folders 728-743; MU (Cairo). 
Box 77; Folders 744-750; MU (Cairo). 
Entry 148 - Field Station Files, Chungking 
Box 12; Folders 231-234; Commando Op. 
Box 14; Folder 249; OSS: SACO Relationship. 
Box 82; Folder 1194; MU (London). 
Box 83; Folders 1199-1202; War Diary ETO MU. 
Box 83; Folders 1204-1212; OG (London). 
315 
Entry 154 - Field Station Files. ' Kunming 
Box 56; SO (Caserta). 
Box 162; Folders 2760-2774; OG (Kunming). 
Box 163; Folders 2775-2805; OG (Kunming). 
Box 164; Folders 2806-2825; OG (Kunming). 
Box 165; Folders 2826-2845; OG (Kunming). 
Box 166; Folders 2846-2855; OG (Kunming). 
Entry 161 - Schools and Training Branch Records 
Box 8; Folder 86; Det. 101 ATB. 
Entry 165A - Records of OSS Operations 
Box 5; Folder 9; Det. 101 Roster '44-'45. 
Entry 168 - Field Station Files: Cairo 
Box 6; Folders 105-113; OG (Kunming). 
Entry 190 - Field Station Files: History of OSS aid to French Resistance 
Box 75; Folder 54; MU. 
Box 740; Folders 1462-1463; Jedburgh History. 
Box 741; Folder 1469; Jedburgh Origin and Developments. 
Entry 194 - Washington and Field Station Files, Cairo 
Box 14; Folders 53-54; MU (Cairo). 
Box 19; Folder 71; OG (Caserta). 
Box 34; Folder 158; OG (Kunming). 
Entry 210 - Previously withdrawn documents 
Box 63; Folders 1521-1512; War Diary 2671/CO A. 
Box 72; Folder 2537; History, SOE Disagreement. 
316 
Record Group 319 - Records of the Army Staff 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Operations, Records Section 
Box 380; Decimal File, March 1950-1951,322 Ranger. 
Record Group 331 - Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters. World War 11 
Entry I- SHAEF Of ce of the Chief of Staff, Secretary, General Staff, Decimal Files 
Box 61; 70 Land and Sea Reconnaissance. 
Entry 2- SHAEF Off ice of the Chief of Staff, Secretary, General Staff, Geographical 
Correspondence File, 1943-45 
Box 110; French Resistance. 
Entry 12 - SHAEF General Staff, G-2, Operational Intelligence Sub-Division, Numeric-Subject 
File 
Box 12; German report on Dieppe Raid. 
Box 13, SHAEF Raids and Reconnaissance Committee. 
Box 14, SHAEF Raids and Reconnaissance Committee. 
Entry 23 - SHAEF Office of the Chief of Staff G-3, 
General Records 
Box 16; Dieppe Raid, 1942, Operation and Instructions. 
Box 17; Dieppe Raid, 1942, Operation and Instructions. 
Box 55, SHAEF Raids and Reconnaissance Committee. 
Entry 29A - SHAEF General Staff G-3, Operations "A " Section, Numeric File 
Box 120; 17225 Raids and Reconnaissance: Policy and Operations. 
Entry 30 - SHAEF General Staff G-3 "C" Section 
Decimal Files 
Box 128; 322-4 Liaison with Special Force IIQ. 
Box 129; 370-1 SAS Operations Reports. 
Box 130; SFHQ and resistance documents. 
Box 131; 370-30 Strategic Planning for Resistance and SAS Organisations. 
Box 132; 370-21 Assistance from Special Forces to Operation Eclipse. 
317 
Box 133; 370-30 Strategic Planning for Resistance and SAS Organisations. 
Box 134; OSS MU Operations. 
Box 135; Resistance and SAS Organisations. 
Box 136; EMFFI Reports. 
Box 137; 370.2-14 Reports on SAS Operations. 
Entry 30A - SHAEF G-3, Operations "C" Sub section 
Box 145; 17240/16 Special Report on Resistance Operations in Brittany. 
Box 146; SAS Operations. 
Entry 30C- SHAEF General Staff, G-3, Organisation and Equipment Section, Decimal Files 
Box 152; 091.411-1 SAS Activities. 
Entry 56 - SHAEF Special Staff' Adjutant General's Division, Executive Section, Decimal 
Files 1944 
Box 41; 322-1 1st Special Service Force. 
Box 60; 370-9 Reconnaissance Operations for Overlord. 
Box 81; 370.5-5 30 Assault Commando. 
Box 158; 1945: 322 SAARF. 
Entry 61 - SHAEF Special Staff, Engineer Division, Executive Of ce, Decimal File 
Box 2; 370-26 Policy on Control of Raids and RECCE. 
Entry 198 - HQ Twelfth Army Group, Special Staff, Adjutant General Section, Administrative 
Branch, Decimal Files 
Box 141; 322 Rangers. 
Entry 199 - HQ Twelfth Army Group, Special Staff, Adjutant General Section, Administrative 
Branch, TS Decimal Files 
Box 30; 322 First Special Service Force. 
Box 32; 322 Rangers. 
Box 94; 370.2 SAS. 
318 
Entry 262A - SHAEF Air Staff, SHAEF Deputy Chief of Staff (Air), Subject Files 
Box 28; SAS Jeep Squadron in France. 
Entry 268- SHAEF A-3, Air Plans Section, Numeric Files 
Box 70; SAS Operations in Support of Overlord. 
Box 93; Employment of SAS Troops. 
Record Group 338 - Records of U. S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organisations (World 
War II and Thereafter) 
Entry 745054 - Records of Sixth ArmyG-2 Section 
Boxes 1-27 
Entry 37042 - Unit Records, HQ Ist Special Service Force 
Boxes 455-464 
Record Group 407 - Records of the Adiutant General's Office, 1917- 
Entry 427 - WW[I Operations Reports 
Box 70; Asiatic Theatre, 92-TCC3-0.2 to 92-TF6-3.16 
Box 9575; 34th Infantry Division, 334-INF(168)-0.3 
Box 21066; Infantry INBN-1-0 
Box 21067; Infantry INBN-1-0.3 
Box 21068; Infantry INBN-1-0.7 
Box 21069; Infantry INBN-1-0.12 to INBN-1-1.14 
Box 21070; Infantry INBN-1-3.7 
Box 21071; Infantry INBN-1-3.9 to INBN-1-3.13 
Box 21072; Infantry INBN-2-0 to INBN-2-0.3 
Box 21073; Infantry INBN-2-0.3 to INBN-2PA-0.2 
Box 21074; Infantry INBN-3-0 to INBN-3-1.13 
Box 21075; Infantry INBN-4-0.1 to INBN-4-1.14 
Box 21076; Infantry INBN-5-0 to INBN-5-0.3 
319 
Box 21077; Infantry INBN-5-0.3 
Box 21078; Infantry INBN-5-0.3 to INBN-5-1.13 
Box 21079; Infantry INBN-6-0 to INBN-6-0.3 
Box 21080; Infantry INBN-6-0.4 to INBN-6-2.2 
Box 21081; Infantry INBN-6-3 to INBN-6-3.7 
Box 21082; Infantry INBN-6-3.9 to INBN-6-30.0 
Box 21321; Infantry, INRG-5307-1.13 to INRG-7892-1.14 
Box 23274; Special Service Force, SSFE-1-0 to SSFE-1-0.3 
Box 23275; Special Service Force, SSFE-1-0.3 
Box 23276; Special Service Force, SSFE-1-0.3 to SSFE-1-2.1 
Box 23277; Special Service Force, SSFE-1-2.1 
Box 23278; Special Service Force, SSFE-1-3.1 
Box 23279; Special Service Force, SSF&1-3.2 
Box 23280; Special Service Force, SSFE-1-3.2 
Box 23281; Special Service Force, SSFE-1-3.2 to SSFE-1 -3.17 
Box 24157; Pre-Invasion Planning, 525 to 535 
Box 24369; Pre-Invasion Planning, 596 to 615A 
Box 24385; Pre-Invasion Planning, 719 to 734 
Unpublished - Private correspondence, diaries, memoranda, etc, 
Imperial War Museum, London 
IWM 02/56/1 Papers of Lieutenant-Commander F. M. Bemcastle. 
IWM 03/24/1 Papers of O. A. Brown. 
IWM 97/7/1 Papers of Major-General T. B. L. Churchill. 
IWM 77/67/1 Papers of Captain N. Clogstoun-Willmott. 
IWM 03/54/1 Papers of Colonel N. A. C. Croft. 
IWM 05/20/1 Papers of J. R. Davies. 
IWM 03/53/1 Papers of F. Enright. 
IWM 04/29/8 Papers of Major-General Sir Colin Gubbins. 
320 
IWM 93/28/4 Papers of Major-General J. C. I laydon. 
IWM 88/48/1 Papers of Colonel T. B. Langton. 
IWM PP/MCR/C13 Reels 1-5 Papers of Major-General D. L. Lloyd-Owen. 
IWM 05/73/1 Papers of Colonel Sir Thomas Macpherson. 
IWM 78/43/1 Papers of Captain J. E. C. Nicholl. 
IWM 78/1/1 Papers of Captain F. R. J. Nicholls. 
IWM 90/25/1 Papers of Captain M. J. Pleydell. 
IWM 84/42/1 Papers of Major P. H. B. Pritchard. 
IWM 67/253/1 Papers of Captain G. W. Read. 
IWM 77/68/1 Papers of Commander J. S. Townson. 
IWM 76/143/1 Papers of Lieutenant S. Weatherall. 
IWM 99/19/1 Papers of Major B. H. Westcott. 
IWM 73/46/1 Papers of Major G. S. Young. 
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London 
KCLMA Allfrey Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Walter Allfrey (1895- 
1964). 
KCLMA Burton Papers of Captain John George Burton (1921-1978). 
KCLMA Cary-Elwes Papers of Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald Aloysius Joseph Cary-Elwes 
(1913-1994). 
KCLMA Davy Papers of Brigadier George Mark Oswald Davy (1898-1983). 
KCLMA Johnston D Papers of Major Duncan Johnston (1914-1945). 
KCLMA Laycock Papers of Major-General Sir Robert Edward Laycock (1907-1968). 
KCLMA McLeod Papers of General Sir Roderick William McLeod (1905.1980). 
KCLMA Mills-Roberts Papers of Brigadier Derek Mills Roberts (1908-1980), 
KCLMA Mockler-Ferryman Papers of Brigadier Eric Mockler-Ferryman (1896-1978). 
KCLMA Montanaro Papers of Brigadier Gerald Charles Stokes hlontanaro (1916-1979). 
KCLMA O'Regan Papers of Captain Patrick Valentine William Rowan O'Regan 
(1920-1961). 
KCLMA Purdon Papers of Major-General Conan William Brooke Purdon (b 1921). 
321 
KCLMA Riley Papers of Lieutenant-Commander Quintin Theodore Petroc 
Molesworth Riley (1905-1980). 
KCLMA Street Papers of Major-General Vivian Wakefield Street (1912-1970). 
Miscellaneous 
Campbell, John, The Green Box, (Privately held unpublished memoir) 
Published - Official documents 
Briscoe, Charles H., et al., All Roads Lead to Baghdad - Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq, 
(United States Army Special Operations Command History Office, 2006) 
Buckley, Christopher, Five Ventures: Iraq-Syria-Persia-Madagascar-Dodecanese, (HMSO: London, 
1977) 
Norway, The Commandos, Dieppe, (HMSO: London, 1977) 
Crowl, Philip A. and Love, Edmund G., Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, (Office of the Chief of 
Military History, Department of the Army: Washington D. C., 1955) 
Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 31-21: Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations, 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army: Washington, D. C., 1961) 
Dziuban, Colonel Stanley W., United States Army in World War II - Special Studies: Military Relations 
Between the United States and Canada 1939-1945, (Department of the Army: Washington 
D. C., 1959) 
Foot, M. R. D., SOE in France - An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in 
France, 1940-1944, (Her Majesty's Stationary Office: London, 1966) 
Harrison, Gordon A., Cross-Channel Attach (Office of the Chief of Military l listory, Department of the 
Army: Washington D. C., 1951) 
Hinsley, F. H., British Intelligence in the Second World War - Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 
Volume One, (Her Majesty's Stationary Office: London, 1979) 
British Intelligence in the Second World War - Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 
Volume Two, (Her Majesty's Stationary Office: London, 1981) 
His Majesty's Stationery Office, Destruction of an Army - The First Campaign in Libya: Sept. 1940 - 
Feb. 1941, (London, 1941) 
Historical Division, US War Department, Merrill's Marauders, (Centre of Military IListory, US Army: 
Washington, D. C., 1990) 
Small Unit Actions, (Centre of Military History, US Army: Washington, D. C., 1991) 
MacDonald, Charles B., The Siegfried Line Campaign, (Office of the Chief of Military I Eistory, 
Department of the Army: Washington D, C., 1963) 
Ministry of Information, Combined Operations, 1940-1942, (1 IMSO: London, 1943) 
322 
The Eighth Army September 1941 to January 1943, (l IMSO: London, 1944) 
Playfair, I. S. O., History of WWII - The Mediterranean & Middle East, Vol. I- The Early Successes 
Against Italy, (Her Majesty's Stationery Office: London, 1954) 
Playfair, I. S. O. and Molony, C. J. C., History of WW11- The Mediterranean & Middle East, Vol. IV - 
The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa, (fier Majesty's Stationery Office: London, 1966) 
Roosevelt, Kermit, War Report of the OSS, Volume I (Walker & Co.: New York, 1976) 
War Report of the OSS, Volume IT The Overseas Targets, (Walker & Co.: New York, 1976) 
United States Army, SH21-76: Ranger Handbook, (United States Army Infantry School: Fort Benning, 
Georgia, July 2006) 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-05, 
December 2003 
United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual - 1940 Edition, (United States Government Printing 
Office: Washington, 1940) 
Wynter, H. W., Special Forces in the Desert War 1940-1943, (Public Records Office: Kew, 2001) 
Published - Autobiographies and memoirs 
Alsop, Stewart, and Braden, Thomas, Sub Rosa - The OSS and American espionage, (Ilarcourt, Brace 
and World, Inc.: New York, 1964) 
Altieri, James, The Spearheaders, (Hobbs-Merrill Co.: New York, 1960) 
Bagnold, Ralph A., Sand, Wind and War: Memoirs of a Desert Explorer, (The University of Arizona 
Press, 1990) 
Bank, Aaron, From OSS to Green Berets - The Birth of Special Forces, (Presido Press, 1986) 
Beevor, J. G., SOE Recollections and Reflections, 1940-1945, (The Bodley I lead: London, 1981) 
Benyon-Tinker, W. E., Dust Upon the Sea, (I fodder and Stoughton: London, 1947) 
Brown, Arthur, The Jedburghs: A Short History, (Privately Printed) [Copy in IWM 03/24/1 j 
Bowen, John, Undercover in the Jungle, (William Kimber: London, 1978) 
Bradley, Omar N., A Soldier's Story, (I Ienry I Iolt and Co.: New York, 1951) 
Burhans, Robert D., The First Special Service Force: A War History of the North Americans, 1942-44, 
(Infantry Journal Press: Washington D. C., 1947) 
Calvert, Michael, Fighting Mad, (Airlife Publishing: Shrewsbury, 1996) 
Chapman, F. Spencer, The Jungle is Neutral, (Granada Publishing Ltd.: London, 1977) 
Clarke, Dudley, Seven Assignments, (Jonathan Cape: London. 1948) 
323 
Colby, William, Honourable Men: My Life in the CIA, (Ilutchinson: London, 1978) 
Cooper, Johnny, One of the Originals - The story of a founder member of the SAS, (Pan Books: London, 
1991) 
Corvo, Max, The OSS in Italy, 1942-1945, (Praeger: London, 1990) 
Courtney, G. B., SBS in World War Two: The Story of the Original Special Boat Section of the Army 
Commandos, (Robert Hale: London, 1983) 
Cowburn, Benjamin, No Cloak, No Dagger, (Jarrolds: London, 1960) 
Crichton-Stuart, Michael, G Patrol: The Story of the Guards Patrol of the Long Range Desert Group, 
(Tandem: London, 1958) 
Darby, William O. and Baumer, William H., Darby's Rangers, We Led the Fray, (Ballantinc Books: 
New York, 1980) 
Dodds-Parker, Douglas, Setting Europe Ablaze - Some Account of Ungentlemanly Warfare, 
(Springwood Books: Surrey, 1983) 
Dunning, James, The Fighting Forth - No. 4 Commando at War 1940-1945, (Sutton Publishing Ltd.: 
Gloucestershire, 2003) 
Durnford-Slater, John, Commando - Memoirs of a fighting Commando in World War Two, (Greenhill 
Books: London, 2002) 
Farran, Roy, Winged Dagger: Adventures on Special Service, (Cassell: London, 1998) 
Fergusson, Bernard, The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations, (Collins: London, 1961) 
Frost, John, A Drop Too Many, (Sphere Books Ltd.: London, 1980) 
Hackett, General Sir John, I Was a Stranger, (Chatto & Windus: London, 1977) 
Harrison, Derrick. I., These Men are Dangerous, (Blandford Press.: London, 1988) 
Hastings, Stephen, The Drums of Memory- An autobiography, (Leo Cooper: Yorkshire, 2001) 
Hills, R. J. T., Phantom Was There, (Edward Arnold and Co.: London, 1951) 
Hilsman, Roger, American Guerrilla - My War Behind Japanese Lines, (Potomac Books: Washington 
D. C., 2005) 
Hislop, John, Anything but a Soldier, (Michael Joseph: London, 1965) 
Hue, Andre and Southby-Tailyour, Ewen, The Next Moon - The remarkable true story of a British agent 
behind the lines in wartime France, (Penguin: London, 2004) 
Hunt, David, A Don at War, (Frank Cass: London, 1990) 
Krueger, Walter, From down under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth Army in World 1Var Il, (Zcnger 
Publishing Co.: Washington D. C., 1979) 
Lawrence, T. E., Seven Pillars of Wisdom, (Wordsworth Classics of World Literature: l1crtfordshire: 
1997) 
324 
Lodwick, John, The Filibusters: The Story of the Special Boat Service, (Methuen and Co. Ltd.: London, 
1947) 
Lord Lovat, March Past, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1979) 
Lindsay, Franklin, Beacons in the Night - with the OSS and Tito's partisans in wartime Yugoslavia, 
(Stanford University Press: 1993) 
Maclean, Fitzroy, Eastern Approaches, (Webb, Son and Co. Ltd.: London, 1949) 
Marks, Leo, Between Silk and Cyanide -A Codemaker's Story 1941-1945, (1 larper Collins: London, 
1999) 
Masters, John, The Road Past Mandalay, (Cassell & Co.: London, 2002) 
Mousalimas, Andrew S., Greek/American Operational Group Office of Strategic Services: Memoirs of 
World War II, (Preservation of American Hellenic History Network, 2004) available at 
http: //www. pahh. com/oss/ 
Neville, Ralph, Survey by Starlight: A True Story of Reconnaissance Work in the Mediterranean, 
(Hodder: London, 1949) 
Obolensky, Serge, One Man in his Time, (Hutchinson and Co. Ltd.: London, 1960) 
Ogburn, Charlton, The Marauders, (Harper and Brothers: New York, 1959) 
Owen, Ben, With Popski's Private Army, (Astrolabe Publishing: Wolverhampton, 1993) 
Owen, David Lloyd, The Desert My Dwelling Place, (Arms and Armour: London, 1986) 
Providence Their Guide - The Long Range Desert Group 1940-45, (Pen & Sword: 
Barnsley, 2003) 
Peers, William R. and Brelis, Dean, Behind the Burma Road, (Robert Ilale: London, 1964) 
Peniakoff, Vladimir, Popski's Private Army, (Cassell: London, 2003) 
Pleydell, Malcolm James, Born of the Desert: With the S. A. S. in North Africa, (Greenhill Books: 
London, 2001) 
Purdon, Corran, List the Bugle - Reminiscences of an Irish Soldier, (Greystone Books: Antrim, 
Northern Ireland, 1993) 
Reid, Francis, Resistance Fighter, (Brown, Watson Ltd.: London, 1957) (Published earlier by W&R 
Chambers Ltd. as I Was in Noah's Ark] 
Samain, Bryan, Commando Men: The Story of the Royal Marine Commando in World War Two, (Pen & 
Sword Military Classics: Barnsley, 2005) 
Shaw, W. B. Kennedy, Long Range Desert Group - The Story of its Rork in Libya, 1940-1943, (Collins: 
London, 1945) 
Slim, Field-Marshal Sir William, Defeat into Victory, (Cassell and Company Ltd.: London, 1956) 
Strong, Kenneth, Intelligence at the Top - The Recollections of an Intelligence Of cer, (Cassell: 
325 
London, 1968) 
Thompson, Robert, Make for the Hills, (Pen & Sword Books/Leo Cooper: London, 1989) 
Timpson, Alistair and Gibson-Watt, Andrew, In Rommel 's Backyard -A Memoir of the Long Range 
Desert Group, (Leo Cooper: Barnsley, 2000) 
Truscott, Lieutenant-General Lucian King, Jr., Command Missions: A Personal Story, (E. P. Dutton and 
Co., 1954) 
Twining, Merrill B., No Bended Knee - The Battle for Guadalcanal, (Ballantine Books: New York, 
1996) 
Wright, Bruce S., The Frogmen of Burma: The Story of the Sea Reconnaissance Unit, (William Kimber: 
London, 1970) 
Yunnie, Robert Park, Fighting with Popski's Private Army, (Greenhill Books: London, 2002) [Published 
in 1959 as Warriors on "eels] 
Secondary Material 
Books 
Adams, James, Secret Armies - The full story of SAS, Delta Force and Spetsnaz, (Hutchinson: London, 
1987) 
Adams, Thomas K, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare, (Frank Cass: London, 1998) 
Adleman, Robert H., and Walton, George, The Devil's Brigade, (Corgi Books: London 1968) 
Alexander, Joseph H., Storm Landings - Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific, (Naval 
Institute Press: Annapolis, Maryland, 1997) 
Ambrose, Stephen E., Pegasus Bridge - D-Day: The Daring British Airborne Raid, (Pocket Books: 
London, 2003) 
Appleyard, I. E., Geoffrey, Being the Story of 'Apple ' of the Commandos and Special Air Service 
Regiment, (Blandford Press, 1946) 
Arnold, R., The True Book about the Commandos, (Muller: London, 1954) 
Arquilla, John (ed. ), From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times, 
(University Press of America: Lanham, Maryland, 1996) 
Asher, Michael, Get Rommel - The Secret British Mission to Killlfitler's Greatest General, (Cassell: 
London, 2004) 
The Regiment - The Real Story of the SAS, (Penguin: London, 2007) 
Asprey, Robert B., War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, (William Morrow and Company. 
Inc.: New York, 1994) 
Barbey, Daniel E., MacArthur's Amphibious Navy - Seventh Amphibious Force Operations 1943-1945, 
(US Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, Maryland, 1969) 
326 
Barnett, Frank R., Tovar, Hugh B. and Shultz, Richard il. (eds. ) Special Operations in US Strategy, 
(National Defence University Press: Washington, 1984) 
Beaumont, Roger, Military Elites, (Robert Hale and Co.: London, 1974) 
Special Operations and Elite Units: A Research Guide, (Greenwood: Connecticut, 1988) 
Joint Military Operations -A Short History, (Greenwood: Connecticut, 1993) 
Beckett, Ian F. W., Modern Insurgencies and counter-Insurgencies - Guerrillas and their Opponents 
since 1750, (Routledge: London, 2001) 
Beevor, Antony, Crete - The Battle and the Resistance, (Penguin Books: London, I991) 
Bidwell, Shelford, The Chindit War - The Campaign in Burma 1944, (Book Club Associates: London, 
1979) 
Bidwell, Shelford & Graham, Dominick, Firepower- British Army Weapons and Theories of War 
1904-1945, (George Allen and Unwin: London, 1982) 
Bierman, John and Smith, Colin, Alamein - War Without Hate, (Penguin Books Ltd.: London, 2002) 
Bjorge, Gary J., Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations in Northern Burma in 1944, (Combat 
Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
1996) 
Black, Robert W., Rangers in Korea, (Ballantine Books: New York, 1989) 
Rangers in World War 11, (Ballantine Books: New York, 1992) 
Bond, Brian (ed. ), The First World War and British Military History, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1991) 
Bounds, Gary L., CSI Report No. 4 - Notes on Elite Units, (Combat Studies Institute U. S. Army 
Command and General Staff College: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1984) 
Bradford, Roy and Dillon, Martin, Rouge Warrior of the SAS - Lt-Col. 'Paddy' Blair Mayne, (John 
Murray: London, 1987) 
Breuer, William B., MacArthur's Undercover War - Spies, Saboteurs, Guerrillas, and Secret Missions, 
(John Wiley and Sons Ltd.: Chichester, 1995) 
Butler, Rupert, Hand of Steel: The Story of the Commandos, (Severn I louse Publishers Ltd.: London, 
1981) 
Campbell, John P., Dieppe Revisited -A Documentary Investigation, (Frank Cass: London, 1993) 
Carrell, Paul, The Foxes of the Desert, (Macdonald: London, 1960) 
Casey, William, The Secret War Against Hitler, (Simon and Schuster: London, 1990) 
Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War - Volume 1. " The Gathering Storm, (Cassell & Co. Ltd: 
London, 1948) 
The Second World War - Volume 11: Their Finest Hour, (Cassell & Co. Ltd: London, 1950) 
327 
The Second World War - Volume X. - The Grand Alliance, (Cassell & Co. Ltd: London, 1950) 
The Second World War - Volume IV: The Hinge of Fate, (Cassell & Co. Ltd: London, 1951) 
The Second World War - Volume V: Closing the Ring, (Cassell & Co. Ltd: London, 1952) 
Clancy, Tom, Stiner, Carl and Koltz, Tony, Shadow Warriors - Inside the Special Forces, (Sidgwick 
and Jackson: London, 2002) 
von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, (Wordsworth Classics of World Literature: llertfordshire, 1997) 
Clayton, Peter, Desert Explorer - Biography of Colonel P. A. Clayton, (Zerzura Press: Cornwall, 1998) 
Clifford, Alexander, Three against Rommel - The campaigns of Wavell, A uchinleck and A lexander, 
(George G. Harrap and Co. Ltd.: London, 1943) 
Clifford, Kenneth J., Amphibious Warfare development in Britain and America from 1920-1940 
(Edgewood: New York, 1983) 
Cocks, A. E., Churchill's secret army 1939-45, (Book Guild: Lewes, 1992) 
Cohen, Eliot A., Commandos and Politicians - Elite Units in Modern Democracies, I larvard Studies in 
International Affairs - Number 40, (Harvard University, 1978) 
Collins, John M., Special Operations Forces: An Assessment, Institute for Strategic Studies, (National 
Defence University Press: Washington D. C., 1994) 
Constable, Trevor James, Hidden Heroes - Historic Achievements of Men of Courage, (Arthur Darker 
Ltd.: London, 1971) 
Cook, Graeme, None but the Valiant, (Rupert Hart-Davis Ltd.: London, 1972) 
Commandos in Action, (Hart-Davis, MacGibbon: London, 1973) 
Small Boat Raiders, (Hart-Davis, MacGibbon: London, 1977) 
Cookridge, E. H., Inside SOE - The Story of Special Operations in Western Europe, 1940-45, (Arthur 
Barker Ltd.: London, 1966) 
Courtney, G. B, Silent Fleet - The History of 'Z' Special Operations, 1942-4S, (R. J. & S. P. Austin: 
McRae, 1993) 
Cowles, Virginia, The Phantom Major, (Armarda: London, 1989) 
Cruickshank, Charles, Deception in World War II, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1979) 
SOE in the Far East, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1983) 
Cunningham, Chet, The Frogmen of World War 1I -An Oral History of the US Nary's Underwater 
Demolition Teams, (Pocket Star Books: New York, 2005) 
Dear, Ian, Sabotage and Subversion: The SOE and OSS at War, (Cassell: London, 1996) 
Devins, Joseph H., Jr., The Vaagso Raid - The Commando Attack That Changed the Course of World 
War II, (Robert Hale: London, 1967) 
328 
Dugan, Sally, Commando: The Elite Fighting Forces of the Second World War, (Channel 4 Books: 
London, 2001) 
Dunstan, Simon, Commandos - Churchill's 'Hand of Steel', (Ian Allan: Surrey, 2003) 
Dwyer, John B., Seaborne Deception: The History of US Navy Beach Jumpers, (Praeger: London, 1992) 
Scouts and Raiders: The Navy's First Special Warfare Commandos, (Praeger, 1993) 
Eisenhower, John S. D., Allies: Pearl Harbor to D-Day, (Da Capo Press, 2000) 
Elliott-Bateman, Michael (ed. ) The Fourth Dimension of Warfare - Volume One: Intelligence, 
Subversion, Resistance, (Manchester University Press, 1970) 
Ellis, John, The World War II Databook - The Essential Facts and Figures for All the Combatants, 2°d 
Edition, (Aurum Press Ltd.: London, 2003) 
Erskine, David, The Scots Guards 1919-1955, (William Clowes and Sons, Ltd.: London, 1956) 
Fane, Francis Douglas and Moore, Don, The Naked Warriors, (Allan Wingate: London, 1957) 
Foley, Charles, Commando Extraordinary - Otto Skoraeny, (Cassell: London, 1987) 
Foot, M. R. D., Resistance -An Analysis"ofEuropean Resistance to Nazism 1940-1945, (Eyre Methuen: 
London, 1976) 
SOE: An outline history of the Special Operations Executive 1940-46, (BBC: London, 1984) 
Foot, Michael and Langley, J. M., MI 9- The British Secret Service that fostered Escape and Evasion: 
1939-1945 and its American Counterpart, (The Bodley Head Ltd.: London, 1979) 
Ford, Roger, Fire from the Forest - The SAS Brigade in France, 1944, (Cassell: London, 2003) 
Steel from the Sky - The Jedburgh Raiders, France 1944, (Cassell: London, 2004) 
Fowler, Will, The Commandos at Dieppe: Rehearsal forD-Day, (harper Collins: London, 2002) 
French, David, The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000, (Unwin lLyman: London, 1990) 
Fuller, J. F. C., Lectures on F. S. R. 111- (Operations between Mechanized Forces), (Sillon Pracd & Co. 
Ltd: London, 1932) 
Fullick, Roy, Shan Hackett - The pursuit of excellence, (Leo Cooper: Barnsley, 2003) 
Funk, Arthur Layton, Hidden Ally: The French Resistance, Special Operations, and the landings in 
Southern France, 1944, (Greenwood Press: London, 1992) 
Garrett, Richard, The Raiders: The World's Elite Strike Forces, (David and Charles: Devon, 1980) 
Gaujac, Paul, Special Forces in the Invasion of France, trans. Janice Lert, (I listorie & Collections: 
Paris, 1999) 
Geraghty, Tony, Who Dares Wins - The Story of the SAS 1950-1992, (Warner Books: London, 1993) 
Gilbert, Adrian, The Imperial War Museum book of the Desert War, (Sidgwick and Jackson: London, 
1992) 
329 
Gilmore, Allison B., You Can't Fight Tanks with Bayonets - Psychological Warfare against the 
Japanese Army in the Southwest Pacific, (University of Nebraska Press, 1998) 
Gordon, John W., The Other Desert War: British Special Forces in North Africa 1940-1943, 
(Greenwood Press: London, 1987) 
Gray, Colin S., Explorations in Strategy, (Greenwood: London, 1996) 
Modern Strategy, (Oxford University Press, 1999) 
Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, (Weidenfeld & Nicholson: London, 2005) 
Harris Smith, Richard, OSS - The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency, 
(University of California Press: London, 1972) 
Hastings, Max, Das Reich - Resistance and the march of the 2"d SS Panzer Division through France. 
June 1944, (Michael Joseph: London, 1981) 
Hawes, Stephen and White, Ralph (eds. ), Resistance in Europe 1939-1945, (Butler and Tanner Ltd.; 
London, 1975) 
Heaton, Colin D., German Anti-Partisan Warfare in Europe, (Schiffer Publishing Ltd.: Atglen, PA, 
2001) 
Heilbrunn, Otto, Partisan Warfare, (George Allen and Unwin: London, 1962) 
Warfare in the Enemy's Rear, (George Allen and Unwin: London, 1963) 
Heimark, Bruce H., The OSS Norwegian Special Operations Group in World War 11, (Praeger: London, 
1994) 
Hoe, Alan, David Stirling: The Authorised Biography of the Creator of the SAS, (Warner Books: 
London, 1992) 
Hoffman, Bruce, Commando Raids: 1946-1983, (RAND Corporation, 1985) 
Hoffman, Jon T., From Makin to Bougainville: Marine Raiders in the Pacific War, (Marine Corps 
Historical Centre: Washington, D. C., 1995) 
Hogan, David W. Jr., Raiders or Elite Infantry? The Changing Role of the US Army Rangers from 
Dieppe to Grenada, (Greenwood Press: London, 1992) 
US Army Special Operations in World War II, (Department of the Army, Centre for Military 
History: Washington D. C., 1992) 
Holland, Jeffrey, The Aegean Mission -Allied Operations in the Dodecanese, 1943, (Greenwood Press: 
Westport, Connecticut, 1988) 
Holt, Thaddeus, The Deceivers - Allied Military Deception in the Second World War, (Scribner: 
London, 2004) 
Hooton, E. R., Eagle in Flames - The Fall of the Luftwaffe, (Brockhampton Press: London, 1997) 
Bernd Horn, J. Taillon, Paul B., and Last, David, (eds. ) Force of Choke: Perspectives on Special 
Operations, (McGill-Queens University Press: Kingston, Ontario, 2004) 
330 
Homer, David, SAS: Phantoms of the jungle -A history of the Australian Special Air Service, (Allen 
and Unwin: London, 1989) 
House, Jonathan M., Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, (University Press of Kansas, 
2001) 
Howarth, Patrick (ed. ), Special Operations, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955) 
Undercover - The men and women of the SOE, (Phoenix Press: London, 2000) 
Hoyt, Edwin P., Airborne - The History ofAmerican Parachute Forces, (Stein and Day Publishers: 
New York, 1978) 
Ireland, Bernard, The War in the Mediterranean 1940- 1943, (Arms and Armour Press: London, 1993) 
Isely, Jeter, A. and Crowl, Philip A., The U. S Marines and Amphibious War- Its Theory and its 
Practice in the Pacific, (Princeton University Press, 1951) 
Jenner, Robin; List, David and Badrocke, Mike, The Long Range Desert Group 1940-1945, Osprey new 
vanguard series No. 32 (Osprey Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 1999) 
Jewell, Derek (ed. ) Alamein and the Desert War, (Sphere Books Ltd: London, 1967) 
Jones, R. V., Most Secret War -British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945, (1lodder and 
Stoughton: 
London, 1979) 
Jones, Tim, Postwar counterinsurgency and the SAS, 1945-1952 -A Special Type of Warfare, (Frank 
Cass: London, 2001) 
de Jong, Louis, The German Fifth Column in the Second World War, (Routledge and Kegan Paul: 
London, 1956) 
Keegan, John, The Second World War, (Hutchinson: London, 1989) 
Churchill, (Weidenfeld & Nicholson: London, 2002) 
Kelly, Saul, The Hunt for Zerzura - The Lost Oasis and the Desert 
War, (John Murray: London, 2002) 
Kemp, Anthony, The SAS at War - The Special Air Service Regiment, 1941-1945, (John Murray: 
London, 1991) 
Keyes, Elizabeth, Geoffrey Keyes V. C., (George Newnes Limited: London, 1956) 
Kiras, James D., Special Operations and Strategy - From World War 11 to the War on Terrorism, 
(Routledge: New York, 2006) 
Kolenda, Christopher (ed. ), Leadership: The Warrior's Art, (The Army War College Foundation Press: 
Carlisle, PA, 2001) 
Ladd, James, Assault from the Sea, 1939-45 - The Crat, the Landings, the Men, (David and Charles: 
Newton Abbot, 1976) 
Commandos and Rangers of World War 11, (MacDonald and Jane's: London, 1978) 
331 
SBS - The Invisible Raiders: The History of the Special Boat Squadron from World War Two to 
the Present, (Arms and Armour: London, 1983) 
By Land, By Sea - The Royal Marines 1919-1997An Authorised history, (I Iarper Collins, 
London, 1998) 
SAS Operations - More than Daring, (Robert Hale: London, 1999) 
Laffen, John, Raiders: Great exploits of the Second World War, (Sutton Publishing: Gloucestershire, 
1999) 
Lankford, Nelson Douglas (ed. ), OSS against the Reich - The World War 11 Diaries of Co lone! David 
K. E. Bruce, (Kent State University Press: Ohio, 1991) 
Landsborough, Gordon, Tobruk Commando - The Raid to Destroy Rommel's Base, (Greenhill Books: 
London, 1989) 
Lane, Ronald L., Rudder's Rangers (Ranger Associates: Manassas, Va., 1979) 
Langelaan, George, Knights of the Floating Silk, (Hutchinson, 1959) 
Larrabee, Eric, Commander in Chief- Franklin Delano Roosevelt, his Lieutenants, and their War, 
(Andre Deutsch: London, 1987) 
Lewes, John, Jock Lewes: Co-Founder of the SAS, (Leo Cooper: Barnsley, UK, 2000) 
Lewin, Ronald, The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps -A biography, (B. and Batsford Ltd.: London, 
1977) 
The Chief Field Marshal Lord Wavell, (Hutchinson: London, 1980) 
Lewis, Adrian R., Omaha Beach -A Flawed Victory, (University of North Carolina Press, 2001) 
Lewis, Jon E. (ed. ) The Mammoth Book of SAS and Special Forces - True Stories of the Fighting Elite 
Behind Enemy Lines, (Robinson: London, 2004) 
Lewis, S. J., Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12'n Army Group, August 1944, (Combat 
Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth: Kansas, 1991) 
Liddell Hart, B. H. The Future of Infantry, (Faber & Faber: London, 1933) 
(ed. ) The Rommel Papers, (Collins: London, 1953) 
Linderman, Gerald F., The World Within War - America's Combat Experience in World War 11, 
(Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997) 
Lucas, James, War in the Desert - The Eighth Army at El Alamein, (Arms and Armour Press: London, 
1982) 
Kommando: German Special Forces of World War Two, (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1985) 
Lucas Phillips, C. E., Cockleshell Heroes, (Pan Books: London, 1956) 
The Greatest Raid ofAll, (Pan Books: London, 2000) 
Mackenzie, William, The Secret History of S. O. E. - Special Operations Executive 1940-1945, (St. 
332 
Ermin's Press: London, 2002) 
Mackenzie, J. J. and Holden Reid, Brian (eds. ) The British Army and the Operational Level of War (Tri- 
Service Press: London, 1989) 
Macksey, Kenneth, The Partisans of Europe in World War II, (Hart-Davis, MacGibbon: London, 1975) 
Commando Strike: The Story of Amphibious Raiding in World War 11, (Leo Cooper: London, 
1985) 
Manchester, William, American Caesar -Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, (Dell Publishing Co.: New 
York, 1978) 
Marquis, Susan L., Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces, (Brookings 
Institution: Washington, 1997) 
Marrinan, Patrick, Colonel Paddy: The Man who Dared, (Pretoni Press: Belfast, 1983) 
Marshall, Bruce, The White Rabbit, (Cassell: London, 2000) 
Mattingly, Robert E., Herringbone Cloak- GI Dagger: Marines of the OSS, (USMC Command and 
Staff College, 1979) 
Maule, Henry, Out of the Sand - The epic story of General Leclerc and the 
Fighting Free French, 
(Odhams Book Ltd.: London, 1966) 
McConville, Michael, A Small War in the Balkans - British Military Involvement in Wartime 
Yugoslavia, 1941- 1945, (Macmillan: London, 1986) 
McDonald, Gabrielle, New Zealand's Secret Heroes - Don Stott and the `Z' Special Unit, (Reed Books: 
Auckland, 1991) 
McMichael, Major Scott R., A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry, Combat Studies Institute 
Research Survey No. 6, (US Army Command and General Staff College: Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, 1987) 
McMillan, Richard, Rendezvous with Rommel: The Story of Eighth Army, (Jarrold's: London, 1945) 
McRaven, William H., SPEC OPS - Case Studies in Special Operations 
Warfare: Theory and Practice, 
(Presido Press: Novato, 1995) 
Mead, Peter, Orde Wingate and the Historians, (Merlin Books: Devon, 1987) 
Melville, M. Leslie, The Story of the Lovat Scouts 1900-1980, (St Andrews Press: Edinburgh, 1981) 
Messenger, Charles, The Commandos 1940-46, (William Kimber: London, 1985) 
Messenger, Charles; Young, George and Rose, Stephen, The Middle East Commandos, (William 
Kimber: Northamptonshire, 1988) 
Meyers, Bruce F., Fortune Favors the Brave - The Story of First Force Recon, (Naval Institute Press: 
Annapolis, Maryland, 2000) 
Miksche, F. O., Secret Forces - The Technique of Underground Movements, 
(Faber and Faber: London, 
1950) 
333 
Millar, George, The Bruneval Raid - Stealing Hitler's Radar, (Cassell & Co.: London, 2002) 
Miller, Russell, The Commandos, (Timelife Book: Chicago, 1981) 
Millett, Allan R. and Murray, Williamson, (eds. ) Military Effectiveness - Volume III - The Second 
World War, (Allen and Unwin: London, 1988) 
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
Millett, Allan R. and Maslowski, Peter, For the Common Defence: A Military History of the United 
States ofAmerica, Revised and Expanded edition (Free Press: New York, 1994) 
Mockaitis, Thomas R., British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960, (Macmillan: London, 1990) 
Moore, Robin, Task Force Dagger - The Hunt for Bin Laden, (Macmillan: London, 2003) 
Moorehead, Alan, African Trilogy - The North African Campaign 1940-43, (Cassell: London, 1998) 
Morgan, Mike, Daggers Drawn: Second World War Heroes of the SAS and SBS, (Sutton Publishing: 
Gloucestershire, 2000) 
Sting of the Scorpion - The inside story of the Long Range Desert Group, (Sutton Publishing: 
Gloucestershire, 2003) 
Morris, Eric, Churchill's Private Armies - British Special Forces in Europe 1939-1942, (I Iutchinson: 
London, 1986) 
Guerrillas in Uniform - Churchill's Private Armies in the Middle East and the War against 
Japan 1940-1945, (Hutchinson: London, 1989) 
Mortimer, Gavin, Stirling's Men - The Inside History of SAS in World War II, (Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson: London, 2004) 
Nag], John A., Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam, (University of Chicago Press, 2005) 
Neillands, Robin, In the Combat Zone - Special Forces since 1945, (New York University Press, 1998) 
Newsinger, John, Dangerous Men: The SAS and Popular Culture, (Pluto Press: London, 1997) 
Nutting, David (ed. ), Attain by Surprise - The Story of 30 Assault Unit Royal Navy/Royal Marine 
Commando and of Intelligence by Capture, (David Colver: Chichester, 1997) 
Oakley, Derek, Behind Japanese Lines - The Untold Story of Royal Marine Detachment 385, (Royal 
Marines Historical Society: Portsmouth, 1996) 
O'Carroll, Brendan, Bearded Brigands - The diaries of Trooper Frank Joplin, (O'Brien Press: Dublin, 
2002) 
O'Dell, James Douglas, The Water is Never Cold: The Origins of the US Navy's Combat Demolition 
Units, UDTs, and SEALs, (Brassey's Inc.: Washington D. C., 2000) 
O'Neil, Richard, Suicide Squads, (Salamander/Lansdowne, 1981) 
Osanka, Franklin Mark (ed. ), Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 
1941-1961, (Free Press of Glencoe: New York, 1962) 
334 
O'Toole, G. J. A., Honorable Treachery: A History of US Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action 
From the American Revolution to the CIA, (Atlantic Monthly Press: New York, 1991) 
Paddock, Alfred H. Jr., USArrny Special Operations - Its Origins, Revised Edition (University Press of 
Kansas, 2002) 
Parker, John, SBS - The Inside Story of the Special Boat Service, (Headline: London, 1998) 
Commandos - The Inside Story of Britain's Most Elite Fighting Force, (headline: London, 
2000) 
The Paras - The Inside Story of Britain's Toughest Regiment, (Metro Publishing Ltd.: 
London, 
2002) 
Perrett, Bryan, Desert Warfare - From its Roman origins to the Gulf con, Jlict, (Patrick Stephens Ltd.: 
Northamptonshire, 1998) 
Perry, F. W., The Commonwealth Armies - Manpower and Organisation in two World Wars, 
(Manchester University Press, 1988) 
Pitt, Barrie, The Crucible of War: Western Desert 1941, (Jonathan Cape: London, 1980) 
The Crucible of War: Year ofAlamein 1942, (Jonathan Cape: London, 1982) 
Special Boat Squadron - The story of the SBS in the Mediterranean 
(Century Publishing: 
London, 1983) 
Porch, Douglas, Hitler's Mediterranean Gamble - The North African and the Mediterranean 
Campaigns in World War II, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 2004) 
Posen, Barry R., The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain. and Germany Between the World 
Wars, (Cornell University Press: London, 1984) 
Prefer, Nathan N., Vinegar Joe's War - Stilwell's Campaigns 
for Burma, (Presidio Press: Navato, CA. 
2000) 
Raugh, Harold E., Wavell in the Middle East 1939-1941: A Study in Generalship, (Brassey's: London, 
1993) 
Reynolds, David, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance -A Study in Competitive Co-operation, 
(Europa: London, 1981) 
Rich Relations: the American occupation of Britain, 1942-1945, (Harper Collins: London, 
1996) 
In Command ofHistory- Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War, (Penguin 
Books Ltd.: London, 2005) 
Reynolds, David, Kimball, Warren F. and Chubarian, A. O. (eds. ) Allies at war: the Soviet. American. 
and British experience, 1939-1945, (St. Martins: New York, 1994) 
Rhodes-James, Richard, Chindit, (John Murray: London, 1980) 
Robertson, Terence, Dieppe - The Shame and The Glory, (Pan 
Books: London, 1965) 
335 
Rogers, Anthony, Churchill's Folly - Leros and the Aegean - The Last Great British Defeat of World 
War Two, (Cassell: London, 2004) 
Rooney, David, Wingate and the Chindits - Redressing the Balance, (Arms and Armour: London, 1994) 
Royle, Trevor, Orde Wingate -Irregular Soldier, (Phoenix Giant: London, 1995) 
Saunders, Hilary St. George, The Green Beret - The story of the Commandos 1940-1945, (Michael 
Joseph Ltd.: London, 1949) 
Schrijvers, Peter, The Crash of Ruin - American Combat Soldiers in Europe during World War II, (New 
York University Press: 1998) 
Seymour, William, British Special Forces - The Story of Britain's Undercover Soldiers, (Pen & Sword 
Military Classics: Barnsley, 2006) 
Sheffield, G. D. (ed. ), Leadership and Command - The Anglo-American Military Experience Since 1861, 
(Brassey's: London, 1997) 
Sides, Hampton, Ghost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War I! 's Most Dramatic Mission, 
(Doubleday: New York, 2001) 
Springer, Joseph A., The Black Devil Brigade: An Oral History, (ibooks, inc.: New York, 2001) 
Stafford, David, British and European Resistance: 1940-1945 -A survey of the Special Operations 
Executive, with Documents, (University of Toronto Press, 1980) 
Camp X. - SOE and the American Connection, (Viking: London, 1988) 
Churchill and Secret Service, (Abacus: London, 2000) 
Roosevelt and Churchill - Men of Secrets, (Abacus: London, 1999) 
Secret Agent - The True Story of the Special Operations Executive, (BBC Worldwide Limited, 
London, 2000) 
Strawson, John, A History of the SAS Regiment, (Grafton Books: London, 1986) 
Stevens, Gordon, The Originals - The Secret History of the Birth of the SAS, in their own words, (l: bury 
Press: London, 2005) 
Sutherland, Jonathan, Elite Troops of WWII, (Airlife Publishing Ltd.: Shrewsbury, 2003) 
Swinson, Arthur, The Raiders: Desert Strike Force, Purnell's History of the Second World War - 
Campaign Book No. 2 (Macdonald: London, 1968) 
Terraine, John, The Right of the Line - The Royal AirForce in the European War 1939-1945, (1lodder 
and Stoughton: London, 1985) 
Thompson, Julian, Ready for Anything - The Parachute Regiment at War, 1940-1982, (Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson: London, 1989) 
The Imperial War Museum Book of War Behind Enemy Lines, (Sidgwick and Jackson: London, 
1998) 
The Royal Marines - From Sea Soldiers to a Special Force, (Pan Books: London, 2000) 
336 
The Imperial War Museum Book of the War in Burma, 1942-1945, (Sidgwick and Jackson: 
London, 2002) 
Thompson, Leroy, US Special Forces of World War Two, Uniforms Illustrated 1, (Arms and Armour 
Press: London, 1984) 
US Special Forces, 1941-1987, (Blandford Books: Poole, 1987) 
America's commandos: US Special Operations Forces of World War II and Korea, (Greenhill 
Books: London, 2001) 
Thorne, Christopher, Allies of a Kind - The United States, Britain and the war against Japan, 1941- 
1945, (Oxford University Press, 1978) 
Trenowden, Ian, Stealthily by Night - The COPPists: Clandestine beach reconnaissance and operations 
in World War II, (Crecy Books Ltd, 1995) 
Tuchman, Barbara, Sand Against the Wind: Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 
(Macmillan: London, 1971) 
Tulloch, D., Wingate in Peace and War, (Macdonald: London, 1972) 
Vandenbroucke, Lucien S., Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of US Foreign 
Policy, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1993) 
Vagts, Alfred, Landing Operations - Strategy, Psychology, Tactics, Politics, From Antiquity to 1945, 
(Military Service Publishing Company: Washington D. C., 1946) 
Vaughan-Thomas, Wynford, Anzio, (Longmans: London, 1961) 
Villa, Brian Loring, Unauthorised Action - Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid 1942, (Oxford 
University 
Press: Canada, 1989) 
Warner, Philip, The Special Boat Squadron, (Sphere Books: London, 1983) 
The Special Air Service, (Sphere Books: London, 1986) 
Auchinleck - The Lonely Soldier, (Cassell and Co.: London, 2001) 
Secret Forces of World War II, (Pen and Sword: Barnsley, 2004) 
Weale, Adrian, Secret Warfare - Special Operations Forces from the Great 
Game to the SAS, (i lodder 
and Stoughton: London, 1997) 
Weigley, Russell F., History of the United States Army, (B, T. Batsford Ltd,: London, 1967) 
The American Way of War: A History of United States Strategy and Policy, (Collier Macmillan 
Publishers: London, 1973) 
Weiss, Steve, Allies in Conflict - Anglo-American Strategic Negotiations, 1938-44, (Macmillan Press 
Ltd.: London, 1996) 
Whiting, Charles, The Battle ofHurtgen Forest (Pan Books: London, 2003) 
Whittaker, Len, Some Talk of Private Armies, (Albanium Publishing: I iertfordshire, 1984) 
337 
Windmill, Loma Almonds, Gentleman Jim - The Wartime Story of a founder of the SAS and Special 
Forces, (Constable & Robinson: London, 2001) 
Woollcombe, Robert, The Campaigns of Wavell 1939-1943, (Cassell: London, 1959) 
Young, Peter, Commando, (Pan/Ballantine Books: London, 1969) 
Yu, Maochun, OSS in China - Prelude to Cold War, (Yale University Press, 1996) 
Zedric, Lance Q., Silent Warriors of World War 11. " The Alamo Scouts Behind Japanese Lines, 
(Pathfinder Publishing: Ventura, California, 1995) 
Zedric, Lance Q. and Dilley, Michael F., Elite Warriors: 300 Years ofAmerica's Best Fighting Troops, 
(Pathfinder Publishing: Ventura, California, 1996) 
Articles 
Absalom, Roger, `Hiding History: The Allies, the Resistance and the Others in Occupied Italy 1943- 
1945', The Historical Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1, (March 1995) pp. 111-131 
Andrews, R. D. A., `Special Boat Section - Royal Marines', Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 39, No. 12, 
(December 1955) pp. 48-52 
Arnoldt, Robert P., `The Dieppe Raid: A Failure that Led to Success', Armour, Vol. XC No. 4, (July- 
August, 1981), pp. 12-19 
Asprey, Robert B, `Special Forces: Europe', Army, (January 1962), pp. 56-61 
Berens, Robert J., `First Encounters', Army, Vol. 42, No. 7 (July 1992), pp. 45-48 
Bidwell, Shelford, `Irregular Warfare: Partisans, Raiders and Guerrillas', Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institute for Defence Studies, Vol. 122, No. 3 (September 1977), pp. 80-81 
Brailey, Malcolm, `The Transformation of Special Operations Forces in Contemporary Conflict: 
Strategy, Missions, Organisation and Tactics', Land Warfare Studies Centre, Working Paper 
No. 127, (November 2005) 
Briscoe, Charles H., `Major Herbert R. Brucker SF Pioneer - Part III: SOE Training and "Team 
HERMIT" into France', Veritas -Journal ofArmy Special Operations History, Vol. 3, No. 1, 
(2007), pp. 72-85 
`Major Herbert R. Brucker SF Pioneer - Part IV: SO Team HERMIT in France, Veritas - 
Journal ofArmy Special Operations History, Vol. 3, No. 2, (2007), pp. 3-16 
Churchill, T. B., `The Value of Commandos', Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, (February 
1950), No. 577, Vol. XCL, pp. 85-90 
Clancy, James and Crossett, Chuck, `Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare', Parameters, 
(Summer 2007), pp. 88-100 
Colby, William E., 'OSS Operations in Norway: Skis and Daggers', Studies in Intelligence, Centre for 
the Study of Intelligence, Winter 1999-2000 
Dodson, Charles A., `Special Forces', Army, Vol. 11, No. 11 (June 1961) pp. 44-58 
338 
Drysdale, D. B., `Special Forces', Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 38, No. 6, (June 1954) pp. 49-53 
Ferris, John, `The Intelligence-Deception Complex - an Anatomy', Intelligence and National Security, 
Vol. 14, No. 4, (October 1989) 
Finlayson, Kenneth and Jones, Robert W. Jr., 'Rangers in World War II: Part II, Sicily and Italy', 
Veritas -Journal ofArmy Special Operations History, Vol. 3, No. 1,2007, pp. 49-58 
Fleming, Peter, `Unorthodox Warriors', Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. CIV, No. 
616, (November 1959), pp. 378-389 
Foot, Michael R. D., 'Was SOE Any Good? ', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 1, (January 
1981) pp. 167-181 
Freeman, Paul J., 'The Cinderella Front - Allied Special Air Operations in Yugoslavia during World 
War II', A research paper submitted to the Research Department Air Command and Staff 
College, (March 1997) 
Funk, Arthur L., `American Contacts With the Resistance in France, 1940-1943', Military Affairs, Vol. 
34, No. 1, (February 1970), pp. 15-21 
Gleason, Frank A., 'Unconventional Forces - The Commander's Untapped Resources', Military 
Review, Vol. XXXIX, No. 7 (October 1959), pp. 25-33 
Gole, Henry G., `Bring Back the LRRP', Military Review, Vol. LXI, No. 10, (October 1981), pp. 2-10 
Gooderson, Ian, `Shoestring Strategy: The British Campaign in the Aegean, 1943', The Journal of 
Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3, (September 2002), pp. 1-36 
Gray, Colin S.., `Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operations Succeed? ', 
Parameters, (Spring 1999), pp. 2-24 
Gubbins, Sir Colin, 'Resistance Movements in the War', Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 
(May 1948), Vol. XCIII, No. 570 pp. 210-223 
Hackett, J. W., `The Employment of Special Forces', Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 
(February 1952), No. 585, Vol. XCVII pp. 26-41 
Hampshire, A. Cecil, `The Exploits of Force Viper', The Royal United Service Institution Journal, 
(February 1968), pp. 41-50 
Hanrahan, G. Z., 'Guerrilla Warfare', Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 40 No. 3, (March 1956), pp. 26-31 
Henriksen, Rune, `Warriors in Combat - What Makes People Actively Fight in Combat? ', The 
Journal 
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, (April 2007), pp. 187-223 
Hogan, David W., Jr., 'MacArthur, Stilwell, and Special Operations in the War Against Japan', 
Parameters, (Spring 1995), pp. 104-15 
Horan, R. H. E., 'Combined Operations, 1939-45', Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 
(February 1953) 
Hughes-Hallett, Rear Admiral J., `The Mounting of Raids', Journal of the Royal United Service 
Institution, Vol. XCV, No. 580, (November 1950), pp. 580-588 
339 
'The Mounting of Raids', Military Review, Vol. XXXI No. 2, (May 1951), pp. SS-93 
Isenberg, David, `Special Forces: Shock Troops for the New Order', Middle East Report, No. 177, Arms 
Race or Arms Control in the Middle East? (July - August, 1992), pp. 24-27 
Karau, Mark, 'Twisting the Dragon's Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918', The Journal of 
Military History, No. 67, (April 2003) pp. 455-482 
Kehoe, Robert R., `1944: An Allied Team with the French Resistance - Jed Team Frederick', Studies in Intelligence, Centre for the Study of Intelligence, Winter 1998-1999 
King, Michael J., 'Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II', Leavenworth Papers, No. 
11, June 1985, (Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College: Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas) 
Kutger, Joseph P., 'Irregular Warfare in Transition', Military Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 3, (Autumn, 1960) 
pp. 113-123 
Laycock, R. E., 'Raids in the Late War and their lessons', Journal of the Royal United Service 
Institution, (November 1947), No. 568, Vol. XCII, pp. 528-540 
Maloney, Sean M., 'Who has seen the wind? - An Historical Overview of Canadian Special 
Operations', Canadian Military Journal, (Autumn 2004), pp-39-48 
Melillo, Michael R., 'Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities', 
Parameters, (Autumn 2006), pp. 22-35 
Mucci, Henry A., 'Rescue at Cabanatuan', Infantry Journal, Vol. 56, (April 1945), pp. IS-19 
Nickerson, H. Jr., 'Force Recon - by Land, Sea, and Air', Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 43, No. 2, 
(February 1959), pp. 44-48 
O'Dell, James Douglas, `Joint-Service Beach Obstacle Demolition in World War II', Engineer, (April- 
June 2005), pp. 36-40 
Sacquety, Troy J., 'Supplying the Resistance: OSS Logistics Support to Special Operations in Europe', 
Veritas - Journal ofArmy Special Operations History, Vol. 3, No. 1,2007, pp. 37-48 
'A Special Forces Model: OSS Detachment 101 in the Myitkyina Campaign - Part I', Veritas - 
Journal ofArmy Special Operations History, Vol. 4, No. 1,2008, pp-30-47 
'Wings Over Burma: Air Support in the Burma Campaign', Veritas - Journal ofArmy Special 
Operations History, Vol. 4, No. 2,2008, pp. 30-43 
Shaw Close, C. C., `An Early Attempt at Combined Operations', Journal of the Royal United Service 
Institution, Vol. XCIX, No. 594 (May 1954), pp. 267-270 
Shelton, George R., `The Alamo Scouts, ' Armor, Vol. 91, (September-October 1982), pp. 29-30 
Spearin, Christopher, `Special Operations Forces a Strategic Resource: Public and Private Divides', 
Parameters, Winter 2006-07, pp. 58-70 
Stiner, Carl W., 'US Special Operations Forces: A Strategic Perspective', Parameters, (Summer 1992), 
pp. 2-13 
Thomas, David, `The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-82', Journal of 
340 
Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, (October, 1983), pp. 689-717 
Tompkins, Peter, `The OSS and Italian Partisans in World War II - Intelligence and Operational 
Support for the Anti-Nazi Resistance', Studies in Intelligence, Centre for the Study of 
Intelligence, Spring 1998 Edition 
Twohig, Lieut. -Colonel, J. P. O'Brien, `Are Commandos Really Necessary? ', Army Quarterly, (October 
1948), Vol. LVII, No. 1, pp. 86-88 
Williams, Colonel R. C. Jr., `Amphibious Scouts and Raiders', Military Affairs, Vol. XIII, No. 3, (Fall 
1949) pp. 150-158 
Wyatt, Thomas C., `Butcher and Bolt - The case for Strategic Offensive and Reconnaissance Troops, 
trained to execute special missions', Army, Vol. 10, No. 10 (May 1960), pp. 37-45 
Unpublished theses 
Chae, Chelsea Y., `The Roles and Missions of Rangers in the Twenty-First Century', Thesis, Fort 
Leavenworth: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996 
Peaty, John Robert, `British Army Manpower Crisis 1944', PhD Thesis, King's College London, 2000 
Rhyne, Richard G., `Special Forces Command and Control in Afghanistan', Thesis, Fort Leavenworth: 
U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2004 
Stewart, Jeff R., `The Ranger Force at the Battle of Cistema', Thesis, Fort Leavenworth: U. S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2004 
Internet 
USSOCOM 2006 Posture Statement, http: //www. socom. mil/Does (Accessed June 2007) 
341 
